

951.042 G69c

Keep Your Card in This Pocket

Books will be loaned only on presentation of proper library cards.

Unless labeled otherwise, books may be retained for two weeks. Borrowers finding books marked, defaced or mutilated are expected to report same at library desk; otherwise the last borrower will be held responsible for all imperfections discovered.

The card holder is responsible for all books drawn on this card.

Penalty for over-due books 2c a day plus cost of notions.

Lost cards and change of residence must be reported promptly.



Public Library
Kansas City, Mo.

Keep Your Card in This Pocket



KANSAS CITY, MO. PUBLIC LIBRARY



CLIP
BANK
NOT

DATE DUE

48
MAILED EXT

64

JUL 10 '48 X 10 4

Jul 17 '48

NOV 11 '48

42

JAN 10 '50

AUG 1 '50

CHINA IN THE SUN



CHINA IN THE SUN

Randall Gould



Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1946

COPYRIGHT, 1946, BY RANDALL COLFEE
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES
AT
THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N. Y.
FIRST EDITION

TO DOROTHY
*as token payment on my great debt
to her heart and judgment*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THANKS ARE DUE the following authors, agents, and publishers for permission to reprint extracts from their work:

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—for excerpt from *Missions in Far Eastern Cultural Relations*, by Searle Bates, with special permission from Professor Bates; excerpt from *Life and Labour in Shanghai*, by Eleanor Hinder; and an excerpt from *America's Policy in the Far East*, by T. A. Bisson.

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.—for an excerpt from *Minor Heresies*, by John Espey, copyright, 1945, by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

The New York *Times*—for extracts from an article by Brooks Atkinson.

Nancy Parker, agent, for extract from an article by James Burke, from *Harper's Magazine*, December 1944.

FOREWORD

SOME YEARS AGO I urged Madame Sun Yat-sen to write a book. She said jokingly, "All right, someday, but when I do you must write its preface." Relief work for her people and many other tasks have occupied the intervening years, and so far the book has not materialized. But finally, long urgings by my chief Neil Starr took effect and behold, it was I who was at work on a book. From New York I sent a letter to Madame Sun in China, confessing. So, she replied, I had "succumbed"; and she added warningly, "Whatever you do, don't write like an Old China Hand, please!"

In the sense intended I have tried to obey orders. But there are Old China Hands and Old China Hands. Madame Sun with justice dislikes one sort—the outdated Treaty Porter, who may or may not have exploited the Chinese people but who certainly knew little about them, had little in common with them, and lived only to go "home" finally because he never felt in the least at home in China, no matter how many years he lived there. On the other hand Neil Starr, who has mostly lived in China's big cities but who has worked with and enjoyed all sorts of Chinese, sees the Old China Hand in another light which I can understand. That sort of Old China Hand I am willing in degree to represent, if it be understood that he liked the Chinese and meant them to profit by his presence as he in turn profited by the Chinese.

I am indebted to both Madame Sun and to Neil Starr for friendship, inspiration, and information. More could be said of my indebtedness to Neil with regard to this book along with a multitude of other matters, but it would be unjust to him if I created any

impression that he deserves too intimate a responsibility for the book. He got me started, a chore in itself, and he helped much without forcing his views upon me. He is not to be blamed for my ideas, any more than is Madame Sun or any of a great many others who have left their mark on my life.

R.G.

CONTENTS

1. <i>China Makes Sense</i>	I
2. <i>War-lordism Commits Suicide</i>	19
3. <i>Nationalist China</i>	39
4. <i>Kuomintang vs. Communism</i>	62
5. <i>"Pie in the Sky"</i>	85
6. <i>Soviet Russia: Friend or Foe?</i>	107
7. <i>Watch Japan!</i>	133
8. <i>Big Frog, Little Frogs</i>	156
9. <i>"Uncle Chump from Over the Hump"</i>	179
10. <i>The Chinese Military Potential</i>	209
11. <i>Industrialization and the Land</i>	227
12. <i>China's New Economic Policy</i>	254
13. <i>Have Christian Missions a China Future?</i>	281
14. <i>Deleted by Censor</i>	303
15. <i>"Is It True What They Say . . . ?"</i>	341
16. <i>China's Place in the World of Tomorrow</i>	369
<i>Index</i>	387

CHINA IN THE SUN

Most nations love the sun. Germany fought two disastrous wars for what she called her "place in the sun." Japan's Rising Sun covered all Asia briefly. Yet China for centuries sought the shade.

Today China finds herself in the sun. This is not because of her own effort or desire, but through an inexorable cycle of events. The light is bright and the heat intense. China may expand and flourish, she may wither; which?

I

CHINA MAKES SENSE

THIS IS A BOOK ABOUT CHINA. But it won't cash in on the outworn "mystery of China" theme. On the contrary, China is not mysterious and the Chinese aren't mysterious. Both make sense. In whatever I write here or elsewhere I shall try to keep that in mind, and I shall seek sensible solutions to all problems. Sooner or later the Chinese themselves will find such solutions. On certain points which involve the modern world, Westerners may be able to help them toward paths suited to their natural genius. There is no issue as to whether China should join that modern world—she is being dragged into life membership by forces none of us can dominate. But China has the right, in fact the obligation, to shape her modernism in accordance with Chinese characteristics and traditions. So we who are interested in and friendly toward China must combine our own Western modernism with the essential qualities of a Chinese frame of mind. This is a thing which I, personally, find congenial because when one understands the Chinese mind it is seen to be far from the "inscrutably oriental." Instead it is a mind just like anybody else's, in essence, but distinguished by sensitivity and realism.

What I have just said isn't designed to oversimplify a people as normal, and therefore complex, as the rest of us. After all, the human animal is regarded by scientists as one of nature's great compromises. That biological fact is good enough reason why the very human Chinese are bound to have their complications and their seeming mysteries. We like things to be a little mysterious, particularly when those things have the charm of remoteness, and sometimes we play games with ourselves by magnifying the remote and superficially

strange. Life is, in fact, full of mysteries which perplex many of us but about which we keep discovering solid facts. Consider (for instance) chlorophyll, electricity, why fish mate, white corpuscles, radio, and the girl next door. Every one of those is jam-pack full of mystery, yet certain explanatory facts can be turned up about them all. The Chinese are really very simple by comparison.

There is less excuse for ignorance about the Chinese than about almost any other people. They have an archeological story running back perhaps as much as five hundred thousand years. Chung-king, to the outer world relatively unknown until 1938, boasts a history of more than forty-two hundred years. China's written record extends to at least 1400 B.C. But a lot of what passes for Chinese history isn't very helpful to most of us. Owen Lattimore quotes an old missionary as remarking that it is "remote, monotonous, obscure, and—worst of all—there is too much of it." At any rate Chinese history teaches that the Chinese have been in circulation for a good while. It follows that the practices which enabled them to get along are based on common sense gained the hard way.

For more than two decades I have lived mostly among the Chinese. Through this contact and by natural inclination, I am somewhat Chinese in my attitude toward life. Americans and Chinese almost always borrow from one another, in fact, when they come in close contact. They share many basic characteristics and they have some similar thinking habits. But there are enough differences to provide spice and profit. In my own case I differ from many Chinese in being no gambler. The Chinese are widely known as gamblers, and for a long time that perplexed me, because it seemed contradictory to and at odds with their inborn caution. Then I noticed that in Shanghai it was the poorest people who went to the most desperate lengths to buy tickets in the monthly state lottery. I've heard it is that way in Mexico, in Spain, in every country where there are lotteries. So now I believe that China's gambling tradition is due to the tragic fact that millions of Chinese are poor, poor beyond Western understanding. Even a rich Chinese is likely to know poverty well. He may have been poor once himself, he knows how future disaster may make him poor, he is plagued by poor relatives, and he is surrounded by the great tragic sea of the poor Chinese masses. Their poverty, cheerfully accepted though it

usually is, must be regarded as a decisive conditioning factor in Chinese history.

If I were less a Chinese, this book might be another story of a newspaperman's personal adventure. But over the years I have tried to use good Chinese-style prudence, to avoid adventure. Most adventures bore me because they shouldn't have happened to a person employing reason. They reflect on the adventurer. In the old Peking days when Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews was making his Gobi Desert trips which discovered for us, among other things, that dinosaurs laid eggs, Roy experienced many adventures of the intellect—and that I commend. But when it came to the sort of external mishap which people usually mean when they use the word "adventure," Roy used to say that any such adventure made him ashamed. It betrayed some lack of foresight and preparation on his part. Before he ever started out he tried to think of every adverse possibility and to guard against it. As a result his exploration tours were handicapped by few adventures. That is the way all life ought to be conducted, according to the Chinese.

Pure survival has always been a big problem in China. So a Chinese, like Roy Andrews, tries to look ahead. He is frugal and cautious (except for the occasional gamble which might miraculously deliver him from all perplexities, for a little while); and when a Chinese dies it is as late as possible, and after a minimum of exciting personal history.

Mentally, as I have said, the Chinese has quite a tendency to be adventurous and to explore. He has in his time tested and tried quite a bit. Some of the consequences tended to reinforce his native caution!—gunpowder, for example, didn't work out too well, and sometimes I have my doubts about printing. So even in his gambling the Chinese keeps calm and uses his head. That's the only policy for survival in his big, crowded, undersupplied country (about the size of the United States, with 22 per cent of the population of the whole world).

Chinese are so modest and courteous as a rule that it is easy to oversimplify them if one has a little knowledge with which to crack through our silly legends and superstitions. That is why it is so easy to set up shop as an "expert" on China. I hate the "expert" label and try to avoid it. Few of us are experts even on the subject of

ourselves, much less the Chinese. But I and many others have found the Chinese easy and pleasant to live among by application of ordinary everyday rules requiring no expert knowledge—mostly just a realistic approach, good sense, courtesy, and the Golden Rule of treating others as we wish to be treated ourselves. You can talk straight out to a Chinese, and he will appreciate it if you do so in the right spirit. I hope I have mostly been true to that spirit in past association with the Chinese, and I shall try to be so in this book. The Chinese often ask advice, though like ourselves they don't always act on it. In any case their attitude doesn't mean we should tell them how to run their business. Yet it has always seemed reasonable and fair to support what seemed the right thing if evidence could be mustered to show its rightness. For example, back in the mid-twenties when the Kuomintang was to most foreigners in China (and many Chinese) a suspect radical group, I wrote rather strongly in my newspaper dispatches on behalf of the Kuomintang. This was because it seemed clear to me that the then one great political idea in the country was bound to prevail over the then popular "strong man" notion. Later at times the Kuomintang seemed to me to deviate from the main currents which were setting in China. I have never hesitated to speak plainly though moderately about that. Such things, put in a friendly way honestly and with candor, are accepted by the Chinese whether they fully agree or not. They have been at the business of living for a long time, and they have learned the value of friendly tolerance. It advances their own interest in the long run, as they fully realize.

Generalizations have to be laid down, but they tend to be tedious. Specific examples are easier to take. So before I get on to chapters which will consider certain questions, I would like to speak of a few common, often encountered misconceptions by Westerners in general and Americans in particular. God knows the Americans have less reason than anybody on earth to misunderstand the Chinese. The Americans and the Chinese, in their essentials, resemble each other more than either resembles anybody else. It is sidesplitting to hear some ignoramus presuming, for instance, that "the yellow races" are likely to band together against the whites. There are most tremendous and fundamental differences between the Chinese and the Japanese, though they have many casual habits in common—

they both use chopsticks, for instance, and they both write with a brush which the Japanese often uses to make Chinese characters pronounced in a Japanese way (the Japanese speech is long-winded and polysyllabic, while Chinese is pungent and monosyllabic). But I think that Y. C. James Yen, of the famous Chinese thousand-character mass-education movement, cut through to an illuminating truth when he pointed out at a public meeting in New York City that, after all, the Chinese were fighting by the side of the Americans against the Japanese, and the Americans and the Chinese were at war with Germany—whereas by a “yellow peril” thesis we should have had the Chinese and Japanese fighting against the Germans and Americans!

None of us found the World War II line-up a strange thing. We knew the facts pretty well, so there was obvious logic in mixed-color Allies against the mixed-color Axis. Now let us jump to an almost ridiculous extreme, the eating habits of what Bert Leston Taylor termed “the so-called human race.” Plenty of Americans who understand why Chinese fought Japanese deemed it inexplicable that neither people had seen the light of reason sufficiently to give up chopsticks for forks. As a matter of fact, even a peacetime Japanese diet is so drab and sparse that it might as well be shoveled down with the scant aid of a toothpick. But the Chinese normally put away quite a variety of food; they are keenly interested in the subject, and it isn’t at all frivolous to inquire whether their lengthy adherence to chopsticks shows a lack of sweet reason on their part.

A man from Mars, who no doubt would be considerably puzzled by a world war, which we understand readily, very likely would side with Chinese practice after testing fork against chopsticks. These handy little implements were employed and enjoyed at least as far back as the third century, probably earlier—the ancient record makers didn’t put down such minutiae. (The garrulousness of even a Winchell might be curbed if he had to carve his copy in stone.) Chopsticks are used by millions today for a single sound reason—that they fit their purpose. Chinese food is served in central bowls and reached for by all around the table; much of it is in small pieces. A bit of food firmly held between two chopsticks is much more secure than gingerly balanced on a fork. This is an important factor when the tidbit has to be carried some distance from bowl to

mouth of ultimate consumer, even though Chinese etiquette of eating is mostly a matter of do-what-you-please, with minor mishaps indulgently disregarded. And learning to use chopsticks is no such task as is generally imagined.

Recently a New York newspaper commented with indignation on the wrongheaded Chinese refusal to switch from their colorful ideographs to our own form of writing, if not to abandon their distressing language altogether—or at any rate to quit writing it in irrational manner from top to bottom of page. This is a big subject, but a few things may be said quickly on behalf of China's established ways. In the first place the Chinese have us considerably outweighed numerically. If you know the Chinese language you have access to more people than with any other language on earth. Granted that this language is to continue in use, and excluding the beauty and the indescribable pungency of the Chinese ideographs, there is still a major problem in Romanizing a tongue where for 49,400 ideographs (only about 2500 in daily use) there are but forty sounds, or about four hundred true syllables, all differing from, though sometimes similar to, English sounds, and with between four and nine "tones" (according to dialect) to be somehow indicated—usually by numbers—if China's own ideographs are abandoned. The Wade and other systems manage fairly well to give the auditory idea through our alphabet of a given character, but there is certain to be a considerable number of meanings for that sound. To puzzle out the sense of a single line of Chinese words expressed in our letters plus tonal numbers is enough to make anyone dizzy.

The sound "yi" can mean "one," "or," "nothing," or a total of fifty-five other things. Words and terms in which "yi" is found total about 11,000. At Shanghai in 1940, Volume I of a projected forty-volume Chinese dictionary was to be devoted exclusively to "yi," employing twenty-nine persons for a year. The whole job (undertaken by the great Commercial Press which was a special target for Japanese aerial bombing in both 1932 and 1937) was to require at least a decade and result in the biggest dictionary in history.

The question is bound to come up, "These sounds must be very hard to utter, why don't the Chinese change them if they are such a sensible people?" In the words of an acknowledged authority, W. B. Pettus of California College in China: "There are no inherently

difficult sounds in any language. Sounds really hard to pronounce would not survive." Which still doesn't too readily bridge the gap for us, of course.

Finally, as to writing, Chinese don't stick wholly to up-and-down writing of their ideographs; they also write from side to side, and when they do so they are about as likely to write from left to right as from right to left! But anyone who will learn the formalized stroke order of written Chinese will see that it is probably easiest and most logical to follow the old plan of starting the new ideograph just under the one already written.

When I first reached China in 1924 there were frequent civil wars. The American public thought it very comical that the Chinese soldier traveled with a paper umbrella and a teapot. The idea conveyed by visiting correspondents was that Gilbert and Sullivan might have written these campaigns, and that the troops' equipment indicated effeminacy. They should have looked further on this latter point, at least. The soldier's umbrella was his poor substitute for the pup tent of better-equipped armies. If he got wet he had neither change of clothes nor fire to dry him—lacks common to millions of civilian Chinese also. The teapot provided him with all that he drank, and provided it in a form safe to drink. Chinese water is almost invariably polluted in all save the most remote upland regions. The widespread use of human excrement for fertilizer is a particularly dangerous feature. When the Chinese soldier boils water in a teapot, often without any tea leaves, he is carrying out the most elemental but essential sanitary precaution at his disposal. That he knows nothing about germs has no bearing; he is following one of the many good practices of a race which has survived because it had sense and profited even by things it doesn't always understand.

The Chinese sailing junk is regarded by most Occidentals as a picturesque monstrosity, quaint to look at but clumsy, antiquated, and inefficient. As a matter of fact there are dozens of kinds of Chinese junks, each representing a time-tested compromise among the factors of weather to be met, materials available for construction, and work to be done. The ocean-going junk is especially a marvel. No one who has stood by a steamship rail in heavy weather and watched one of these craft serenely bobbing along in safety if

not comfort can forget that here we have a true product of age-old experience. Many have questioned this to their cost. Some years ago the writer-adventurer Richard Halliburton bought a junk at Hong Kong and spent a great deal of time and money on "improvements," despite protests by those who realized he was ruining its quality of seaworthiness. Finally he set out across the Pacific and was never heard from again.

"Face" is one of the things most generally misunderstood about the Chinese. It is true that they do many foolish and unnecessary things in connection with "face," but that does not mean that "face" itself is foolish and unnecessary, merely that in this as in some other matters the Chinese (being human) have at times gone off to extremes. "Face" actually means courtesy, tact, consideration for the feeling of others. You don't do rude, brusque things in China if you want to conform to the spirit of the land. You think of the other fellow's "face," as he does of yours. If you have a rebuke to administer, you talk to your servant or clerk privately, because if you gave him what-for in the presence of his colleagues he would "lose face." Many people go out to China expecting to have a terrific time in learning the cult of "face." But if they want to observe it they probably already know its essentials, because gentle conduct is about the same anywhere.

A great many customs peculiar to the country have grown up simply as response to China's special conditions. Under normal circumstances labor is plentiful and cheap (that happens not to be true today, in wartime), so people of means have many servants toward whom they tend to build up a relationship not very different from that between the better type of masters and slaves in our own pre-Civil War South. Pay levels are low. It is the custom for shops, especially the compradore stores which supply many household needs, to pay a commission to the cook or No. 1 boy. This is a known, accepted thing. Many newcomers from abroad find China residence full of trying, puzzling conflicts owing to their lack of understanding and experience, and usually entailing depletion of pocketbook as well as nervous system. But the longer they stay and the more they apply a rule of reason to everything about them, the more explicable life in China becomes.

If anything in the foregoing conveys that all is inevitable and cmi-

nently reasonable in China, I've done a poor job so far. The Chinese are neither sages nor angels. They have built up many a poor custom, wasteful and silly. That again is proof of their common humanity. But if we hew to the line of our thinking we can see that the bad customs have their logical explanation, even if this isn't always a really good excuse. One of the most elemental yet deadly faults of China is that of widespread nepotism. Let any man of outstanding ability, or luck, get into a good job with the power of giving other jobs in lower brackets, and he finds himself forced to provide employment for a horde of parasitic relatives as well as friends and the relatives of friends. I chose the word "employment" rather than "work" advisedly, for employment gained through pull is not likely to be productive of efficient results in China any more than elsewhere. That is why Chinese mills, Chinese steamship lines, Chinese cigarette factories, and many other forms of enterprise have so often failed (despite generally lower levels of pay and often longer hours of theoretical toil), in competition with foreign-directed concerns which could offset higher pay and shorter hours by the fact that they could employ people of ability and see that they really worked at the jobs they were paid to do. It is the Chinese themselves, often Chinese fiercely opposed to "foreign exploitation," who most decry their own nepotism.

But in China as elsewhere it is one thing to perceive an evil and another to bring about its cure. Unfortunately the roots of this particular evil lie deep-buried in the heart of China's great problem of overpopulation. Relativity rules in the matter of population as in all else. But it is commonly accepted as fact that the Chinese tend to press hard on the margin of subsistence, although there have been wide fluctuations in the population tolerance of the land at various periods. (Though 450,000,000 is the generally accepted present total, the last Ming census, in 1578, gave only 63,600,000; the first organized nose count by the Manchus, in 1741, showed the number as 143,412,000; despite war and natural disaster, many believe that the present population of all areas claimed by China may actually be in excess of a half billion.) World history shows that industrialization of any given country has hitherto led to sudden great increase in the number of people. Japan doubled her population within the seventy years starting in 1868 after Meiji had ushered in

a Nipponese version of "modern industry," while the industrial revolution in England doubled the population from 1801 to 1851. Thoughtful Chinese scientists believe that even with the help of modern scientific aids to food production, China should instead aim at reducing her numbers to within 300,000,000, to afford decent standards of living. Birth control was among a large number of advanced proposals endorsed by the Sixth Kuomintang Congress of 1945. Practice is another matter.

There is general agreement that China is a country of many mouths and limited opportunity, which has automatically reinforced old Confucian doctrines of mutual responsibility and a rigid family system. So it is up to the fortunate few to do everything possible for the many without opportunity, but with some claim of family connection—which may be extended out to include even the family connections of close friends and business associates. The result is that every new enterprise is filled, in something less than a twinkling, with a horde of eager relatives whose ability and inclination to do the work often leaves a great deal to be desired.

This make-work-for-others policy extends even into one's household-servant hierarchy, ruled in theory by the master but in fact by the No. 1 boy. It is a stale wheeze of the Treaty Ports that if a householder be so incautious as to invest in a few goldfish, behold, next morning a special goldfish coolie will have been hired to take on the care of the critters. No A. F. of L. craftsman in America is more scrupulous in keeping to his own particular job than are Chinese workers, whether in home or in factory. But the Chinese ability to adapt to changing circumstances may in time help cure the evils of both nepotism and specialized function, provided that greater opportunities can be made available and the national thinking shaped in genuinely social-minded directions.

Those who have worked close to the Chinese have found that their minds are much more open to suggestion than might be expected. That which often passes for mulish stubbornness, the product of peasant background in a land where eight out of every ten are cultivators of the soil, is often merely a proof of unintelligent presentation. The fact is that those harsh economic forces which compel the practice of nepotism, just mentioned, are also forever burnishing away at the wits of the Chinese people. There is plenty of conserva-

tism on the part of both the peasant in the country and his newly industrialized cousin in the city, but that means only that neither wants to be an easy mark for deceit or inexperienced enthusiasm. Win the confidence of such people, however, and they follow gladly in new ways.

During a trip into Kiangsi province in 1935, for example, I was surprised and impressed by the way the country folk were joining in various forms of co-operative movements. They had (in an area recently the scene of civil war) such a variety of enterprises as marketing, supply, educational and credit co-operatives, assisted by the government's own National Economic Council as a vital measure of rural rehabilitation. It was interesting to note that the Shanghai bankers were joining in the credit co-op movement, finding it profitable to themselves and to the countryside to undercut the native moneylenders with their usurious rates of interest (a minimum of 2 per cent a month, or 24 per cent yearly). The foregoing is cited only to show the mental background involved and to make clear what a logical thing it was for wartime to promote the well-known Industrial Co-operatives, or "Indusco"; though at present the factor of inflation, which through 1944 depreciated the national currency not less than 5 per cent a month and in 1945 moved much faster, upsets the mechanics of all co-operatives or other undertakings where money is involved.

It is significant that the mental flexibility of the Chinese people, so little realized by most who don't know them, has helped work out various ingenious new shifts. Of these the most sensational is the co-operative certificate plan of "model governor" Yen Hsi-shan in the Kuomintang-controlled area of Shansi province. This scheme involves compulsory delivery of all produce to a provincial Union Co-operative in return for certificate receipts, thus virtually substituting commodities for money and giving distribution according to labor, since the "value" of the delivered commodities is calculated in terms of the labor estimated to have gone into them. Free trade and individualistic merchandising enterprise have been abolished in this province where General Yen has, with the docile concurrence of his people, not merely set up practices parallel to Marx, but (as he modestly admits) improved on Marxism! Yet this is not Communist but Kuomintang territory, and Yen was in his heyday an

old-fashioned "war lord." When we see a great agrarian area going along with such a program because it has been put into effect by a trusted leader, and because it gives results which they approve, we had better go a little easy in generalizing on the allegedly hide-bound conservatism of the Chinese.

This brings me too close for comfort to the great subject of communism in China. I am going to sheer off, for no other reason than that it is entirely too big to tackle in a preliminary chapter devoted to sketching in background. It must finally be dealt with, at least briefly, as a historic phenomenon; its economic side of course has to be considered; and at present it has both political and military aspects. For the moment I will dodge it except to mention one somewhat ironical remark made to me at Hankow in the spring of 1927 by Michael Markovitch Borodin, then nearing his final days as Soviet high adviser to the National Government of China. Later I will tell more of this remarkable, ultimately disappointed man's theories of the Chinese. In response to some probably naïve query by myself as to whether the Chinese would ever accept communism, Borodin retorted with a deep, pitying scorn: "China already has communism, the communism of the family's one rice bowl!" The picture he brought before my eyes, of a group sitting about this central *fan tung* and each taking his portion, has never left my mind.

Later I shall speak, also, of another foreigner in China who thought deeply and had great influence from what might be termed an "enlightened capitalistic" point of view. Miss Eleanor M. Hinder, that fine Australian woman formerly chief of the Industrial and Social Division of the Shanghai Municipal Council, won't thank me for any such clumsy phrase; she shaped a unique and vital administrative social instrument in China's greatest industrial center, always having the welfare of the workers in her great heart, but she accepted the capitalistic scheme of things and achieved most of her many successes by persuasion exerted on the employers, mostly though not all Chinese. Her work illustrated again the open-mindedness of the Chinese to things which can be proved to be for their best interest. Miss Hinder, and for several years her factory inspector Rewi Alley, increased safety precautions in factories with almost no legal weapon at their command, by showing that these were vital to the employers' interest. She trained illiterate Chinese boiler

tenders. Critics said, "They cannot be taught," but Miss Hinder replied, "They tend boilers!" and her lecturers found that they *could* be taught, by visual methods employing lantern slides. Both adult and child workers in Shanghai's terrible native factories suffered from beriberi and other malnutrition diseases, so Miss Hinder tried out an experimental diet kitchen where the full nutritional value of rice and other foods was preserved; in the half year this kitchen operated, until it was finally shelled out of business in the 1937 Shanghai warfare, it demonstrated to Chinese factory owners that at actually lower cost it was providing food which carried its patrons through the hot season without the ailments besetting their fellows fed by standard means. Eating habits are especially hard to change, but this lesson, like others, sank in.

Upcountry there is a perfect thirst for knowledge. The work of "Jimmy" Yen, of the thousand-characters-in-96-hours movement, has recently come to the attention of many Americans, and there can be no doubt that through such means China should finally struggle free in large degree from the age-old shackles of a general illiteracy. But coupled with this is an extraordinary general willingness to make use of knowledge. New methods of crop cultivation, systems of irrigation, improved communications, better home handicraft, even birth control, are all subjects of great interest to the Chinese because they are no fools and they can readily apply all these things to their personal welfare.

It is true that obstacles have often been put in the way of progress. This was usually a fault in method of presentation. If the farmers are conscripted to work on roads, for example, they are likely to be annoyed about it, especially if the roads aren't of a sort suited to their own rude carts. It will take a while for them to see any point to highways for passage of motorcars they are too poor to own, though in time, as there are more busses which they can afford, the reason for such roads will become more apparent. As the roads serve them in marketing their produce and bringing home goods from outside, they will find still more point to the matter. Meanwhile it helps to try a little judicious education and refrain from attempting to conscript farmers during times when they must harvest their own crops. All work should be paid for. Both highways and river dikes are often built on a basis of paid famine relief work,

instead of mere charity, during times of local crisis. Such projects prevent disaster through poor communications or flood another year.

Of course there are inevitable handicaps in the way of traditional beliefs and superstitions. Much has been made of this in writing and thinking of the past. What I am trying to do is furnish a modern mental approach. To me the surprising thing is not that such an old, mostly agricultural country has its fair share of stubborn ancient ways and thinking, but that the obstacles aren't greater. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that failure to put across a new notion in China reflects more on the teacher than on those to be taught. So rich are the Chinese in essential common sense that they will not resist indefinitely if the merits of something new can be demonstrated. However, they do hang on hard until they get their demonstration—and for this they have sound reason. Many of their old ideas really are better than the new.

Up in the Peking of the middle 1920s, even the shiny new up-to-date Peking Union Medical College, Rockefeller-endowed, was respectful toward the doctors of the relatively drab old German hospital down in the Legation Quarter. It was recognized that the German doctors knew their stuff. But what surprised and interested me was to discover that those Germans, in turn, recognized a need to respect the lore of the native Chinese doctors. Much of Chinese practice seemed pretty fantastic, involving such quaint stunts as sticking needles into the patient in accordance with a mystic chart, or administering repulsive concoctions made out of reptiles, insects, or unexpected features of animal anatomy. But queer as these customs seemed, the pragmatic Germans had found that in certain instances (not all, by any means) the native witchcraft worked. Not only did it work but often it worked fast, and in a way quite beyond the skill of Western practice. So instead of dismissing the Chinese methods of treatment, and especially the Chinese pharmaceuticals, as so much unsanitary nonsense, these German doctors were trying hard to winnow the wheat from the chaff and to find out the secrets of the Chinese regarding such treatments as had merit. In this latter they were having great troubles because the native Chinese doctor was jealous of his knowledge and by no means disposed to spread it to the world. Remembering this, I was considerably entertained (in

a wry sort of way) to read a Chinese writer's recent rantings about how the West dismissed all Chinese medical knowledge as rubbish and refused to take advantage of its benefits. "Refused" my foot! The Chinese are, among other things, tenacious of what they have. Although I am familiar with United China Relief in the United States, I have never run into any sort of United America Relief in China.

So if the Chinese are not always bug-eyed over a chance to take aboard some choice new flowering of Western culture, they are again merely practicing their admirable practicality. They figure that maybe we are wrong. Wrong we have been at times, in some pretty big ways. The more they find out about us the more they are likely to realize that. It will be their task, and also a most fascinating job for their foreign friends, to weed out what we have good to offer them and to discard what is bad, just as I described the German doctors as seeking to discover what Chinese medicine might help a victim of tuberculosis and what would cause a bellyache patient to fall in fresh contortions.

It takes an old nation (as it takes an old person) to be truly naïve, in the best and most refreshing sense. The Chinese attitude toward our bright and shining toys of what we like to call our "civilization" is notable for a merry, twinkling shrewdness. They are happy to be amused, unready to take too seriously what may not deserve seriousness. This attitude runs through affairs both great and small. It can produce puzzling results. Chinese often seem superficially unpredictable in making business deals. They may smell around and haggle for days running into weeks and months, and finally drift off without ever giving a straightforward yes or no. On the other hand they may casually nod acquiescence as soon as they hear the proposition. In general they are likely to manifest great interest in anything novel, but that doesn't mean at all that they will finally accept it. When final decision is made, familiarity is likely to play a great part. The friend or relative, trusted, gets backing without a struggle, while the newcomer (however impressive his documentation) is likely to have quite a time establishing himself. Similarly the type of suggested enterprise usually has to be fitted into a known pattern of some sort, although there has been a rather ready acceptance of the notion that new things are desirable and should

be made in China if possible. China has long produced a much wider variety of articles than is generally realized, from electric light bulbs to steam engines.

The Western world has heard so much of the innate conservatism of the Chinese that these distinctions are likely to be overlooked. Of course we always come back to the points that age does make for innate conservatism in some ways, and that China is fundamentally a land of farmers who tend to be conservative. Nevertheless the Chinese are well-rounded human beings, as I have been trying to make clear. They have just as much right to enjoy the luxury of a few complications as anybody else. Their chief distinguishing mark in that respect is that they are finally always essentially reasonable. They make sense.

So in the following chapters we must be patient in dealing with some of the great problems which now perplex China, and which will affect all of us in some degree. We must forget the common concept of the enigmatic Chinese, full of guile and hiding all sorts of thoughts crafty or highly philosophical (according to the sentimentality with which we view him) behind his inscrutable face. If there is any composite Chinese he is a hearty, broad-faced, smiling individual, plain and good-natured, though keeping his wits well sharpened in order to make a living against tough competition. He knows little if anything about Confucius, although a good deal of the life pattern within which he lives has been powerfully shaped by the Confucian ethic. Neither is he steeped in any sort of religion, although in his practical way he may have absorbed the essence of quite a number of religions from Buddhism to Christianity, finally believing a little in all of them but not much in any of them. Essentially his thesis is a pragmatic "God helps him who helps himself," and any other belief is just a prudent hedging of bets. It is obvious to him that quite a variety of gods variously help or harass mankind, and he feels that it costs relatively little to pay tribute to as many as possible in one way or another. One of the few things no Chinese can understand is a narrow adherence to creed. Such intolerance is as odd to him as rigid adherence to one deity. This, in the midst of so much unknown, he feels to be imprudent.

With such mental background, can we be surprised that the Chinese admiration for (say) modern Western industrialism is

mixed with misgiving? After all, we should feel such misgiving ourselves if we looked at our own record of the relations of Man vs. Machine with fresh eyes. When the Tata interests of India investigated America's steel industry a few years ago, they decided to emulate our technological advances but by no means to duplicate our steel towns where lay such depressing contrast. So instead of patterning after us in both the efficiency of our factories and the degradation of our workers, they copied our factories but set up their own model town where the workers could enjoy advances in the art of living comparable to the technical improvements of the machines they served—this in India, a land generally of the most depressing poverty. The Tatas are Parsi, a group comparing with the most advanced Chinese businessmen and industrialists. It is true that before the Sino-Japanese conflict we had few evidences that China realized the need for conserving social values during the march toward industrialism. But today the need is recognized, and I look for important consequences, contrasting with the horrible, essentially wasteful Chinese factory conditions of prewar Shanghai, where private greed seemingly knew no limit. This is one of the things of which I intend to speak more at length.

What is true of the need for thinking ahead on China's industrial program is at least equally true with reference to the land. Eighty per cent of the population is agricultural. For a long while industrialization is unlikely to make outstanding change in this balance. In China's agrarian organization there were bad factors before the war, especially in South China, where two thirds of the peasants had to pay tribute to landlords. During the war there were interesting shifts in landlord-tenant relations in various parts of China, though it is a striking fact that even the most radical group by ordinary definition—the Chinese Communists—did not practice collectivism. Instead the Communists merely lowered but guaranteed rentals. How the essential Chinese spirit is shaping China's great agricultural problems is a fascinating study, too much for me to handle in detail, yet a necessary part of any discussion of the national situation.

There has been much misapprehension about the Chinese attitude toward the foreigner. Both parties are responsible for a lot of loose talk. It seems to me, as it seems to many Chinese, high time

that a calmer, more constructive spirit prevailed. The "unequal treaties" have been abolished, extraterritoriality and the former fixed 5 per cent tariff are things of the past, and if there is going to be any future "exploitation" it may well turn out to be exploitation of the unwary Westerner by the Chinese rather than vice versa. There is no reason why China should any longer feel sorry for herself as occupying a "semi-colonial status." But at the same time she may easily find herself so in fact though not in technical position if she fails to take advantage of opportunities now before her. At the moment there is reason for great hope concerning the Chinese attitude toward the foreigner and the present Chinese National Government's attitude toward its own responsibilities and privileges. Hope, of course, doesn't imply certainty.

One of the most important points about the China of the future is the question of China's relation to other countries—her place in the world. Perhaps no other nation on earth has a more complex set of potential relationships which are already in process of establishment. Consider such oddities as that China for years resisted Japan, yet carried on officially sanctioned trade with Japanese-occupied areas; that China's leading political party and government based their organization largely upon Soviet Russian models, but at times could hardly keep on speaking terms with Moscow; that China's whole record of relations with the West has shown alternations of attraction and repulsion, according to whether the Occident seemed to have more or less to offer conservative Cathay.

Many of China's seeming contradictions are due to an age-old habit of compromise. China has seldom had much, so it was necessary to make do with little. She has experienced many vicissitudes which have taught the need to give and take. Progress has mostly been evolutionary, often fitful with many reverses. It is necessary to look at history a little to realize how matters have progressed to their present phase. But this book will not deal with the Peking Man, or the many dynasties since; its historic section will be as brief and painless as possible.

2

WAR-LORDISM COMMITS SUICIDE

MOST PEOPLE think that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 arrived late. England's Magna Charta dates from 1215, the American Declaration of Independence boomed forth in 1776, the French Revolution started in 1789, Perry opened Japan to the modern world in 1852, and Japan's Restoration (which ushered in her rapid but ill-judged imitation of the West) occurred in 1868. From the standpoint of sheer expediency, therefore, the Chinese were slow starters. But there is another side to the matter. Judging from the viewpoint of inward preparedness, the Chinese Revolution came not too late, but too early. A real revolution stems from inner explosion, not outer decay. We should face the fact that China's revolution occurred before the country was mentally and spiritually ready for it. That fact gave rise to subsequent reaction, explaining a great deal not otherwise clear.

High indeed were the aspirations of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a handful of other revolutionary-minded men and women, in China and out. But they did not overthrow the Manchu Dynasty in a true sense. Instead there occurred the rot and collapse—quite largely from its own weight—of a decadent government structure which had been set up and maintained by aliens, not Chinese. The so-called Chinese Revolution was not, therefore, a true revolution but essentially a spontaneous disintegration. It reminds one of Holmes's "wonderful one-hoss shay," which rolled merrily on and on until finally it went to pieces all at once. There was nothing very wonderful about the Manchus except their gall, but the comparison serves.

What was lacking, if we stop to reflect and to penetrate past the

spectacle of a few fine daring people who sought change, was a mainspring of mass movement. This was not to be seen in China until that great surge from the south in 1926-27. Foreign sympathy and a few Chinese with advanced and in great degree foreign ideas were not enough. The Kuomintang of that period could not keep its grip on events. And so for years to come, war-lordism was to be the prevailing influence.

Dr. Sun was President less than two months, January 1 to February 23, 1912, and then he was replaced by Yuan Shih-kai, a general under the Manchus. So far was the medieval-minded Yuan (to borrow a phrase from the late Eugene Chen) from the ideal of a true president, that after withstanding a second effort at "revolution" in 1913 he tried to be emperor before his none too early death in 1916. It was a messy period. The externals of Western democratic institutions were perverted to serve the ends of scoundrels.

Again Dr. Sun became President in 1921-22, but still the mainspring of a nation-wide revolutionary feeling was not there. While Canton became a separatist center for all the advanced political and economic thought of the country, dry rot set in at the capital in Peking.

There, not far from a stately Temple of Confucius, sat a Parliament whose members reached the lowest depths of corruption and irresponsibility. When in the midst of inane debate feelings rose high, their weightiest arguments took the form of stone ink slabs which they flung childishly across the hall at one another. These monkeyshines were freely reported in Japan and no doubt did their part to establish in Nipponese minds a conviction of superiority. I have reason to recall this point because the antics took particularly violent form in late 1923, when I was in Tokyo recovering (like the rest of the town) from the great September earthquake. During this period I worked for an English-language newspaper owned by Japanese, and therefore intensely interested in affairs Chinese. In fact we bragged about our close coverage of Peking—mostly by rumor! We were considerably more sedate in dealing with governmental happenings in Tokyo, a city whose Diet was at least as ineffective and corrupt as that of Peking and which not only featured fights between members but the occasional dropping of live snakes by spectators in the balcony.

The President in 1923 was an antique gentleman by the name of Li Yuan-hung, who suddenly found himself expelled by the minions of another war lord, Tsao Kun. A great hubbub at once arose over the question of the presidential great seal, possession of which in those queer days was regarded as the next thing to being the President in person. Indeed, it had become the custom for the President to be an inanimate object wielded by some hidden hand behind the scenes, so there was point to regarding the seal as the really important member of the team!

Now when President Li hastily scrambled out of Peking, just after a press conference in which he had announced that he would "stay on to death," he divested himself of the seal. When he was caught and shaken upside down there was no seal to be found. A Mack Sennett comedy hunt at once began for members of Li's household entourage. Several were caught, with equally negative results.

Finally the favorite Li concubine was intercepted by night somewhere between Peking and the nearby port city of Tientsin. My Japanese translator, whose English often provided me with rib-tickling surprises, handed in the story with the triumphant conclusion—"so the concubine at 3:30 A.M. was delivered of the seal." If anybody needed medical attention I suspect it may have been Li.

After this, there was an "election" of a new President by the precious pack of rascals comprising the Parliament. They candidly made their votes available to the highest bidders. Day by day the press carried dispatches listing the bid and asking prices for votes as though these were stock quotations. Finally, to nobody's surprise, Tsao Kun was announced as the next duly elected President. In the same breath the newspapers totaled up the cost of this literally high honor, which was found to have come to 13,000,000 Chinese yuan, then about U.S. \$6,500,000.

No wonder I wrote in press dispatches home at that time:

Gilbert and Sullivan in their most gleeful moments never imagined anything half so funny as Peking's official "Follies of 1924." Here, in the one-time Khanbalyk of Kublai Khan, today reigns a Graustark Government whose pronunciamientos shake the earth within the city walls and fail to reach ten miles beyond them. Here resides a dignified diplomatic corps which would put up its shop shutters and suspend

business if cable connections with the home governments were broken. Circumstance and pomp there is in plenty within Peking's ancient stone barriers, but it is of a sort which makes men laugh and angels weep. . . .

After citing a dictionary definition of the Chinese Republic, I went on with the pitilessness of youth:

And yet the unofficial truth is that this former empire consists of broken-up provinces under military lords of varying strength, fighting like tomcats, controlled by nobody, harrying the poor and robbing the rich, with a futile and undemocratic so-called Government in Peking maintained by foreign Powers, which must have at least a nominal Government in order to proceed with the business of "shaking down China for what they can get." The Peking Government is, it is true, maintained by a strong military party, of which Wu Pei-fu is a leading light. But the militarists are boss, not the Government. In addition to these militarists, there are only the foreign Powers, which, as remarked, are not here for their health or for that of the aforementioned Peking Government.

Indeed, the position of the foreign Powers was such as to set them up as a sort of supergovernment. The most solid manifestation of this was the least conspicuous. They enforced upon China, by the dubious virtue of their claim for a guaranteed income on foreign loans, a maximum 5 per cent maritime customs duty. No imports paid more, whether these were something necessary to the Chinese people (such as imported rice—with a fifth of the world's population China produces only a tenth of the world's foodstuffs) or something of luxury category, such as champagne. The result was that in Peking we bought our American cigarettes at retail considerably cheaper than their price in the United States. Transportation across the Pacific didn't add enough to offset the exemption from U.S. internal revenue dues, the sole tax being the extraordinarily low Chinese tariff. Of course this situation helped make Peking the cheapest as well as most glamorous and romantic capital on earth. But it unquestionably contributed to war-lordism and disorder in China because no Government could eke out more than a starvation income from such a low tariff—and in the then primitive state of the country the maritime customs, even on a mere 5 per cent basis, was one of the main revenue producers.

Yet the question of customs, however apparent in our own daily

lives and however much a background factor in keeping China from developing a strong government, wasn't spectacular. Certain aspects of the Boxer Protocol were. This treaty had been imposed on the then Manchu Dynasty in 1901, following a world-publicized siege by the Boxers, with covert sympathy of the hard-bitten old Empress Dowager, of the Peking Legation Quarter the previous year. It contained not only punitive provisions (which by the mid-twenties were almost liquidated) but certain precautionary measures which deserve notice as indicative of the extraordinary aspects of the period. Although China was now in theory a republic, and the Manchus and the Boxers were both of the remote past, the Protocol still provided that the Chinese Government railway between Peking and Shanhaikwan and the Pei-ho (Pei River) from Tientsin to the sea must be kept open at all times for foreign navigation. It was also set down that telegraph communication between Peking and the outside world must not be interrupted. As enforcing agents, there were American, British, Japanese, and other Legation Guards, and troops stationed at points along the railway. General Joseph W. Stilwell served with the infantry at Tientsin in the late twenties after studying the Chinese language at Peking in an earlier phase.

Sometimes these inadequate yet outwardly impressive foreign armed precautions gave rise to incidents which in dramatic fashion high-lighted the fantasy of the whole period. The now forgotten "Taku incident" was sensational at the time. Taku is a sleepy fishing village near Tientsin at the mouth of the Pei River, where China formerly maintained forts. These were demolished as part of the Boxer settlement. In 1926 there was civil war arising from the presidency of Tsao Kun. Marshal Chang Tso-lin, of Mukden, Manchuria, sought to send troops down from the north by land and by sea aiming at Tientsin as gateway to the eternal prize, Peking. When war lord Chang's naval and land forces tried to reach Tientsin by the Pei, the general defending Tientsin naturally took steps to repulse them. These steps included the installation of artillery on the shore and mines in the river. Navigation in general was of course endangered, foreign shipping along with the rest, and in fact the port of Tientsin was temporarily almost closed. Because the out-of-date Boxer Protocol provided for free navigation to the sea, the foreign legations protested in that unified fashion which was often

highly effective but which greatly irritated the Chinese Waichiaopu (Foreign Office).

Then there came an exchange of shots between Chinese naval vessels of the one faction and Chinese shore batteries of the other. Foreign ships trying to enter or leave the mouth of the river were jeopardized. One Japanese vessel was actually struck by a shell. The shore-battery commander subsequently explained that this was accidental and due entirely to the fact that an "enemy" warship was trying to creep into the river close behind the Japanese commercial craft. Japan had been helped by Chang Tso-lin in the Russo-Japanese War (which found him a bandit but left him in the chips), and was strongly suspected at this stage of doing anything she could to advance the fortunes of the Manchuria war lord. Later, after he outgrew Japan's help and developed big ideas of his own, the Japanese were even more strongly suspected of engineering his death by ingenious methods. But for the moment he was their man, and anything they could do (without too conspicuously deviating from the then united foreign diplomatic front), they would do. Anyway, there were more incidents of comparable sort, and in Peking a clamor rose high: "The Boxer Protocol must be upheld!"

Foreign consuls at Tientsin entered protests against the river entry of Chinese naval vessels and troops. Louder and louder grew the cries of indignation in Peking. The American Government began to entertain strong doubts as to the advisability of going further in this particular embroilment, but the tradition of joint foreign action was still strong, just as China was still weak. So the legations unitedly joined in an ultimatum. Their embattled front was conspicuously minus the one embassy, that of the U.S.S.R., unclubby in all such matters and in any event debarred from participation because the Soviet Union had renounced all the "unequal treaties" with China in 1924. The ultimatum was dated March 16, 1926, and required that Chinese military officers remove mines and all obstructions as well as cease all acts that interfered with safe navigation of the Pei-ho.

It was anybody's guess what might have happened next—but with characteristic Chinese lack of finality, the civil war drifted off in another direction as result of a more or less casual decision by the attacking forces that they could do better elsewhere!

This incident is cited at length to illustrate how completely unreal were most foreign concepts at this period. Observe what had happened, so far as the Powers were concerned. There was a Chinese Government of sorts in Peking, duly recognized by themselves and presumably entitled to some measure of support. Yet not only did they keep a strangle hold on a most important source of China's governmental revenues, so that it was impossible for Chinese central leadership to build up a strong army, navy, or governmental structure, but in a period of civil war they actually took measures based on an old, mainly obsolete treaty provision, which worked out to the direct detriment of the Government at Peking—since it was the river defenses of this Government which were the target of the ultimatum.

War-lordism was drawing toward its close. And picturesque as it was, the period certainly was ripe for some sort of end. I have spoken of the disgraceful bought election of President Tsao Kun. His regime started on October 10, 1923, but was to last only one year, making this little luxury cost him and his backers an average of U.S. \$17,800 a day, including Sundays. The thing which caused him to go out was a growing discontent of Marshal Chang at Mukden. However much the sinner this worthy may himself have been in the earlier days when he was a common *hung-hutze* (red-beard), shooting at passers-by between the high stalks of Manchuria's *kao-liang*, he now with Nipponese-backed prosperity had become a proponent of good government and morality—for others, anyway. His own government left something to be desired, from the viewpoint of the poor peasants his minions oppressed and squeezed, and his morals were of a liberal old Chinese school. But he felt that Tsao, as titular head of the nation, should not make the nation a laughing-stock. To foreign journalistic visitors from Peking the old marshal muttered darkly of tales that Tsao's revels were not merely with concubines (respectable by the then Chinese standards) but with young boys. Presently he got his military machine under full head of steam and in the autumn of 1924 started for Peking.

Marshal Wu Pei-fu, the defender of Peking, was a gentleman and a scholar of classic traditions. Nevertheless he was a practical fighter too. He promptly assembled his cohorts, prominent among whom was the Methodist "Christian general," Feng Yu-hsiang.

They conferred. Then Feng led his men northward, while Wu proceeded by rail to Tientsin and on to where the Great Wall meets the sea at Shanhaikwan, the point mentioned in the Boxer Protocol and a historic ground for clash between Manchuria and North China. Chang had meanwhile been proceeding down the railway toward Shanhaikwan.

Both leaders showed a lofty disregard for the elemental principles of normal railroad operation. Converging on a single-track line, they stacked up a stupendous array of locomotives and cars of every description against the Shanhaikwan meeting point from both directions. Neither made the slightest provision for two-way shuttle service in order to bring up more troops and supplies. What went in stayed in. It was a magnificent mess. John Earle Baker, then American adviser on railways, later declared that with scientific operation the lines could have been kept open, all troops and supplies could have been moved to the expected battlefield, and normal traffic (not through traffic, of course) could have been maintained. But war lords scorned science, except as it produced new weapons and creature comforts. Running railways was no fit study for such he-men.

The great battle of Shanhaikwan finally proved a damp squib because a sudden, highly unexpected development intervened on the home front. Feng Yu-hsiang, last seen marching north and assiduously improving the roads as he went, had staged a *coup d'état*. He had quietly reversed his course and marched south again, over his improved roads. On a bright morning in late October the residents of Peking awoke to find Feng's troops patrolling the *hut'ungs* with fixed bayonets, all nine gates of the main Tartar City tightly locked shut, all telegraph and telephone lines to Tientsin and the outside world severed, but the situation well in hand—General Feng's hand.

We went out-of-doors, were herded back inside our own compound, ventured out again to be met with a gentler reception, and by noon the foreign correspondents gathered by ricksha for their usual press conference at the American Legation. To the minister we entered formal representation that with this wonderful story in hand, we were unable to transmit to home offices a single word about it. There was no telegraph line! I had had a taste of the same

exasperating experience only a year before, when I went through the Tokyo earthquake, but the others regarded this as a complete outrage, and they burned to do something. Finally the minister agreed that we were on a spot warranting extreme measures and a further dusting off of the hoary Boxer Protocol. Because telegraphic communication by land had been cut, we might for this occasion only communicate with the outside world by means of the Legation radio, which ordinarily was by treaty restricted to official business.

So we debated and sweated to concoct one brief fifty-word joint message, to be distributed in duplicate from Washington to each of our offices. It was no ball of fire, but it gave the essential facts. Later we discovered that the press of America, accustomed to judging the importance of foreign dispatches by their length, gave this message a single cursory glance and dropped it either into the wastebasket or onto page 36. For weeks we waited for mail and newspapers from home, expecting to find that our plight had been magnified into a second Boxer siege. But for once we were more excited than even our fondest relatives. No one at home paid the slightest attention; which, as matters turned out, was justified to the extent that nobody was killed, nobody was hurt, and within a matter of hours the city gates were open and the telegraph and telephone lines had been spliced.

This left Feng Yu-hsiang in military command of Peking, President Tsao Kun on the anxious seat, and Marshals Chang and Wu glaring at each other on either side of the Great Wall end at Shan-haikwan. From then on, matters moved fast.

Feng turned against his ex-chief, Wu. He set up a new Cabinet and offered a reward of 50,000 Chinese yuan (U.S. \$25,000) for Wu alive, or 25,000 yuan for him dead. Proclamations were posted denouncing Wu as the sole obstacle to peace and declaring his crimes were "great as heaven is high." At the same time Feng initially pretended to be all for President Tsao, giving him 5,000 yuan to cover immediate expenses of government. But old Tsao evidently knew the score, for he was quoted rather pathetically as declaring that though both Feng and Wu seemed greatly concerned to protect him, he would be satisfied to go unprotected if it would end all fighting. (Wu had meanwhile telegraphed Tsao in response to a wire sent him in the name of the government under Feng's orders,

telling him to take up a "bush league" post in Tibet; he expressed undying loyalty to Tsao but said that though he would in time obey the new orders, he insisted on first coming to Peking to receive them from Tsao personally.) Scant wonder that in the midst of this confusion, Tsao acquiesced gracefully when on November 1 he received a call from representatives of the new Cabinet, who said that they "approved of his desire to surrender the presidency." He was offered two alternatives—to go to the round tower in the Winter Palace grounds, or retire within the walls of a Peking residence completed by his immediate predecessor, ex-President Li Yuan-hung, just before Tsao chased him out the previous year! Five days later Tsao was a virtual prisoner hardly an ink-slab throw from the presidential palace on a tiny island in the center of the Nanho, or South Lake, of the Winter Palace grounds—the spot where the old Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi kept guarded until his death the young emperor Kaung Hsu, her nephew, following suppression of his attempted "hundred day" reforms in 1898. As Tsao wandered through the decaying courts of the small palace prison and watched the lotus-covered lake, he indeed had food for reflection, if we may grant that his slow mind was capable of such unwonted exercise.

Meanwhile, the Christian general was making himself the liveliest figure on the North China plain. Although Feng had left Peking for new headquarters at nearby Fengtai rail junction, by his instruction the Peking police on November 5 made a historic move. They ejected the youthful Manchu "boy emperor" Hsuan Tung from the pink-walled Forbidden City at the center of Peking. Here this lad had remained close-kept within the northern half of a fascinating, secret, but dismal miniature town-within-town. Establishment of the republic had been attended by an agreement through which this last Manchu sovereign had retained his nominal title, his Forbidden City residence, properties including priceless treasures, and a theoretical annuity supposed to be equivalent to a couple of million American dollars a year for the upkeep of himself and his horde of hangers-on, eunuchs and bowmen and other feudal retainers. Restoration was always a possibility, and things had now drifted to where any change might have gained followers.

Under duress of Feng's men, the Boy Emperor signed an order formally abdicating his title and making him plain Mr. Henry Pu

Yi. He surrendered all his extensive lands and other properties to the "Republic of China." Then he signed another paper, presented by one General Lu Chung-lin and imposed by the *de facto* military regime by that time existing under Feng Yu-hsiang, agreeing to accept an annuity of 500,000 yuan, with the understanding that he would spend 2,000,000 yuan in the establishment of factories to give employment to his retainers. Again, none of these financial provisions was ever lived up to by anybody concerned.

Having acquiesced docilely in all this, the now former Boy Emperor was permitted by the police to scamper off with his family. At first it was rumored that he had found refuge somewhere among his followers within the Imperial City, which immediately surrounds the Forbidden City and is itself within the mightier walls of the Tartar City. Then came a new sensation—Pu Yi and two concubines had sought and received shelter at the Japanese Legation! And there, safe in the heart of the foreign-guarded Legation Quarter, he remained for some weeks. Finally he slipped quietly down to further Japanese protection in Tientsin. For years he remained there, apparently happy in riding his bicycle around quiet, high-walled gardens, until finally he was called by other war lords, this time in Tokyo. This last summons was to proceed to Manchuria, land of his forefathers, and assume the hollow title of Emperor of Manchukuo in 1932—an unlucky thirteen years before Japan's downfall put him ignominiously under the guard of the onrushing Soviet forces.

Marshal Wu, long touted by foreign admirers as "the strong man of China," due to achieve national unification at last, had been caught in pincers back in that earlier crisis of 1924. Before him, on the other side of the Great Wall, was Chang Tso-lin; now behind him was his erstwhile subordinate General Feng. He evaded both at last, making off by sea southward to the Yangtze and eventually taking lodgment in Hankow till washed out again by the northward-flowing tide of a new and this time truer revolution. A melancholy yet distinguished figure, Wu finally found a scholar's retreat up the Yangtze Gorges in then-remote Szechuen province. During the early 1930s he passed his time with Chinese calligraphy and the composition of poetry, a considerably more dignified retirement than fell to the lot of most war lords. His *finale* was impressive and

regarded by all but the Japanese as highly creditable. During 1939, when the Japanese were trying to devise means of holding their occupied China territory by easy and profitable devices, they had Marshal Wu at Peiping and offered him the form of power over North China. Wu replied politely that he would be glad to become leader of North China providing every Japanese soldier would retire from Chinese soil. To this the Japanese could think up no easy retort. The aged marshal died soon after.

Meanwhile Chang, of Mukden, with a new sympathy for his erstwhile foe Wu, and with no love for "treacherous Feng," collaborated only briefly with the latter and then again pushed a campaign against Peking after having retreated to Manchuria in 1925. The Christian general fell back in good order. Within the city we danced snugly of an evening during the spring of 1926 at the Grand Hôtel de Pekin and at intervals ascended to the roof, from which we could watch machine guns flashing just beyond the southern wall and hear their distant rattle against the sound of orchestra music below. Red-haired Rayna Prohme, whom I had known in Chicago cub-reporter days, and later in San Francisco, had just arrived with her husband Bill. They were about to plunge into political events later immortalized by Vincent Sheean in his *Personal History*. Meanwhile she was wide-eyed at our fantastic scene and wrote a highly colored fragment for the *Christian Science Monitor* about this business of dancing while death struck in the chilly dark without.

War-lordism was drawing near its close, but few understood more than the depressing and non-constructive side of the picture—a common situation as regards China. Most observers still failed to realize that the structure of government has need for political validity. Outside show is not enough. So there were lugubrious sighs over the exit of Marshal Wu, who had been strong and a gentleman beside. Christian Feng, said the gossip of the Peking Club bar, was liked by nobody except missionaries, who ruefully realized that few of their converts ever achieved high places (a situation due to undergo great change, could they but have known!). The country folk liked Feng too, because only his troops, of all the Chinese armies, were restrained from plunder and general outrage. On the contrary they were often put to work on roads, dikes, and other constructive

undertakings; but who cared what the peasantry thought? As for Chang Tso-lin, who was still pushing Feng back until the latter for many weeks made a stubborn stand at Nankou Pass by the Great Wall northwest of Peking—well, the ex-bandit was surely no gentleman like Wu, he had the advantage or disadvantage of being no Christian like Feng, but he did seem to have the great point of being the “strong man” so long sought. Also, his son Chang Hsueh-liang spoke a little English and played tennis! The arrival of the Changs was received with general equanimity. Tuan Chi-jui consented to become Provisional Chief Executive. The Powers gingerly accorded him recognition *de facto* but not *de jure*, a nice distinction lengthily debated over Legation Quarter teacups; it meant that he existed, but not by law.

Feng, who had constructed elaborate lines of trenches improved by sharp stakes and electrified wire, was finally outflanked and driven up to Kalgan, where for some time he promoted the uplift in rigid Puritanical fashion, finally drifting off to Moscow. Thereafter he kept bobbing up here and there at various later stages, often the recipient of high but empty official honors. One of my last glimpses of him was at Chungking during the early 1940s. A big awkward figure in blue peasant's garb, he was taking his exercise by riding a bicycle around a deserted school exercise ground. I thought back to Pu Yi, driven by this same Feng to bicycle riding at Tientsin from the splendor of his Peking Forbidden City. But if there was any special moral to the matter it now escapes me.

In leisurely fashion the Chang family took over—a patronizing extension of the Manchurian domain. We were all very casual about it, as I remember. One day young Chang Hsueh-liang and his close American friend Jimmy Elder invited a party of us on a junket by train, over the Chinese-built Kalgan railway as far as the scene of Feng's Nankou stand. We had wonderful fun, my horse fell into a trench (luckily at a moment when I wasn't aboard), Marshal Chang dirtied his white uniform in trying to pull the horse out, and finally we feasted on watermelon as we rode home in Jimmy's compartment of the Chang private car. Life seemed neither very real nor very earnest.

From an eyewitness standpoint, the exasperating thing is how one

remembers the bizarre and trivial and forgets the ultimately consequential. But history should pay attention to that phenomenon. History would be different if people always knew what was important when it was happening. Merely to mention a few of the events of really solid consequence which went on about us during this decay-of-war-lordism epoch should bring out my point.

Consider how Sun Yat-sen briefly came among us, was largely ignored, and died. We had heard of his long up-and-down political record, but few thought much of him or his Kuomintang. His departure from Canton had followed a series of maneuvers between Yünnan-Kwangsi militarists, who had promoted his political interest for their own gain, and the Canton merchants who wanted to protect themselves against militaristic exactions. A clash occurred and property suffered. Dr. Sun went north, having known Tuan Chi-jui and thinking he might work out some sort of deal against Wu Pei-fu with Tuan and his war lord boss, Chang. He reached Peking in December 1924. All of us swarmed down to North Station and got jostled and bayonet-jabbed to see a quiet, serene, frail man gaze at us a moment from the car steps. When he descended into the crowd he was lost in every sense. Chang had attended to both Wu and Feng, while Tuan's only notable gesture of the period was to order the machine-gunning of several hundred students who had gathered around his yamen to protest against misgovernment (or, rather, no government in particular). Ill and with all the cards seemingly stacked against him, Dr. Sun died March 12, 1925. His body went to a temporary resting place in the Western Hills, his spirit carried on, but most of our northern know-it-alls dismissed his memory as that of a crackpot well out of the way before he made trouble. Could they but have known the trouble he was still to make!

On January 12, 1926, in magnificent state at the Chu Jen Tang of the Winter Palace South Lake, there was held the opening session of an international Commission on Extraterritoriality In China. This was to arrange for ending foreigners' trials in China by their own courts under their own laws. My program shows that after the address of welcome by the Chinese Minister of Justice there was a response by the Japanese commissioner, His Excellency Mr. Hioki, who evidently was deemed the outstanding man for this honor of all

the foreign dignitaries present. Ho, hum. What I mainly remember is that we correspondents were run off the main approach streets and had to ricksha along the side *hut'ungs* because the Chinese gendarmerie were displeased at our lack of formal attire, but Grover Clark, editor of the Peking *Leader*, was allowed to trundle directly to the main gate because he had had the forethought (conceit, we put it) to provide himself with a shiny top hat. Such memories are good enough for the event, since within a few weeks the commission suspended its sessions indefinitely because there were such signs of Chinese governmental breakdown as to render farcical—it was felt—any further discussion of the surrender of foreigners' extraterritorial privilege, whether gradually or otherwise. (Extraterritoriality, enjoyed prior to the first World War by nineteen countries, was not given up by the last major Powers—Great Britain and the United States—until treaties ending this status were ratified May 20, 1943.)

In March of 1926 high adviser Borodin quietly arrived in Peking from Canton. He was tired, out of sorts, and ready to go back to Moscow. Kuomintang squabbles at Canton had followed the death a year previously of Sun Yat-sen in the North, and finally Chiang Kai-shek had struck hard at the Chinese Communists. Handsome black-whiskered Soviet ambassador Lev Mihailovich Karakhan gave Borodin shelter and encouragement—Karakhan himself was eventually to meet death at the hands of his own government for being a "counterrevolutionist." Within the spacious grounds of the formerly Czarist Legation, later the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., I met and talked with Borodin. The incident will be dealt with later; for the moment the only point is that no other correspondent met Borodin on that visit save the veteran German, Captain Erich von Salzmänn—a man who had come to China with the Boxer relief force and stayed on, a newspaperman with the hard realism of a soldier. Unlike most of the other newsmen, Von Salzmänn didn't fear that his social prestige might suffer if he stepped foot into the Embassy of the Reds. What he wanted was to know what went on, and he realized that to cover China news without thought of Russia was insane. That thought holds good to our present day. Anyway, Borodin came to Peking, hesitated, and turned back to the job he had started in Canton in September of 1923. Few of us thought

much of it, many knew nothing of it—but two months later, in June, the Northern Punitive Expedition started from Canton. We were to hear a great deal of that.

Finally, an incident of mid-April 1926. Correspondents in Peking were startled by a sudden summons to the Belgian Legation. We were ushered into the presence of the minister, a pleasant little man who sat in the midst of family portraits and other keepsakes symbolizing his usual tranquil, easy existence. Something had hit the minister stunningly, and he sat crushed, hardly able to speak. The Chinese Foreign Office had just notified him that it was terminating China's treaty with Belgium. This pact would end in October (meaning, among other things, an end to extraterritorial privilege for Belgians), and another must be negotiated in its place. What it meant, as we gradually realized, was not that Belgium was suddenly being treated as an enemy, but that Belgium—a small state without means of comeback—was chosen as target in starting off a new policy by which China would unilaterally abrogate any treaty to force a new agreement satisfactory from the viewpoints of equality and reciprocity.

Here was a technique which, give us credit, we realized had teeth in it, providing the Chinese possessed the nerve to carry through. Of course the startling angle was that Chinese diplomats representing such a precarious governmental structure should have the nerve even to attempt such a thing. To friends of China this was heartening; to others, or to the unthinking, it was outrageous. Certainly it showed a trend. China had failed to get what she had expected from pledges at the Washington Conference in 1921, especially with regard to putting her own laws into force against foreigners (Heaven knows they weren't especially effective against Chinese either, at this period) or tariff autonomy. The extraterritorial problem was to drag on for many years. The tariff question was handled first piecemeal and then finally by as drastic an action on the part of a new National Government as the tattered Peking regime had employed against Belgium in 1926. That is, on February 1, 1929, tariff autonomy became a fact through China's own act and without Treaty Power agreement, and the Chinese began to collect rates ranging from 7½ to 27½ per cent instead of a flat 5.

If the foregoing has seemed to be tangled, confused, and going

nowhere in particular, it mirrors its times. Just as the Manchu Dynasty collapsed through its own decay, so the war lords killed themselves. They never stood a chance against the force of a really strong national idea, and they lasted just as long as it took this idea to grow into strength. Of course the idea had been in existence for many years, clear back to the time of the 1911-12 revolution and before, though at that period it was weakened by many conflicts of theory. Abortive as the "hundred days" reform of 1898 had been, that brief imperial gesture gave ground for hope that the Manchus still held some answer. Lieutenant General Homer Lea, who worked in America to bring changes in China, was initially part of a Po Wong Wui, or Protect Emperor Society, devoted to freeing the author of the 1898 reforms from his aunt the Empress Dowager, and it was only later that he decided that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had the right notion in wanting something wholly new. Canton's famous San Ho Wui, or Triad Society, was devoted to the idea of "Destroy the Manchus, restore the Ming," the Ming being an earlier Chinese Dynasty. Dr. Sun's own ideas underwent a considerable metamorphosis during his lifetime. From the day of his death in Peking a new period began including all sorts of fresh interpretations of his ideas, coupled with an elevation of his personal status to that of a sort of saint.

Watching these developments from the picturesque but precarious vantage point of North China, I felt that the real vitality of the country's thinking and planning centered on the city from which Dr. Sun had come—Canton. There lay the one political force, as opposed to the "strong man" idea to which the North still clung despite repeated disappointments. For a political force to crystallize there is need for a political party, which in this case obviously was the Kuomintang. The "strong man" idea had been proved to boil down to war-lordism, and that had utterly discredited itself.

In my next chapter I must go over some of this same ground in order to stress aspects of Nationalist China. It is a temptation to say that this differed from the era of war-lordism as day differs from night. Such easy breakdown of Chinese affairs is much encouraged by the general public, which wants to be spared headaches. But my own feeling is that oversimplification of China actually produces the headache in the long run, because in an effort at making the picture

easy to see, it falsifies that picture, producing contradictions which require more and more elucidation. A true Chinese picture isn't all white and black; it is full of various tones of gray. So in this initial picture problem of ours, let's face it: war-lordism was not all bad, nationalism was not and is not all good. Each partook of the other in some degree, each had some typically Chinese aspects. But as to what predominated, there could be no doubt. At best the war lords had the good points of so many benevolent-bandit Robin Hoods; at their norm or their worst, they were bad. On balance they were bad for China because they were selfish and planless except for their own ends. What happened otherwise was mostly accidental, or merely tolerated. There was no true political plan, no program for the people.

Such political thinking as was anywhere in progress had to be either in opposition to war-lordism, or indulged by some war-lord patron. The Kuomintang experienced both at one time and another. Dr. Sun and his friends seem never to have worked out in their own minds which course was best, and their opportunism proved relatively ineffective during Sun's lifetime; war-lordism finally had to be fought directly and hard with its own weapons before it betrayed its weakness and fell. The fact that the war lords were so blindly planless at any rate allowed reform and revolution to grow in the open. Thus the Kuomintang was never crushed in South China, though it had many vicissitudes. Individuals with vision were able to experiment in ways later to bear considerable fruit. An example is the case of Jimmy Yen and his mass-education movement. Had war-lordism been really smart and villainous, it would have pounced on anything of that sort like a hawk, for no feudal baron could stand to gain by having his serfs receive education. But Yen, who had first developed his notions while working with Chinese labor battalions in France during the first World War, was able to become quite busy by 1923. He got a real start in mid-1924 when a woman associate went to Nanking and talked 10,000 Chinese dollars out of Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, leading figure in a Central China war-lord coalition of the time. From Yen's thousand-character adult-literacy movement grew unprecedented advance for at least a few of the common folk of China—better understanding of public health, co-operative credit and marketing and other eco-

conomic enterprise, improved agriculture, and finally democratic government. All these things, and particularly the last, were full of dynamite for the war lords, and yet (perhaps because at heart they were more decent than we gave them credit for being) they not only permitted but in degree fostered such work.

There are still war lords, and they still have their mixture of bad and good. I have already mentioned and later shall speak further of Shansi's "model governor," General Yen Hsi-shan, one of the old-timers, who seems to me to meet the specifications of an authentic war lord, yet who has wisely kept to his own home grounds and who has shown tremendous capacity for new ideas. Today he rules his roost within the conservative Kuomintang, yet he has put into practice an economic system much more radical than anything practiced by the Chinese Communists. He points with pride to the fact that, within its present setting, his system works. Before we write war-lordism off as a total loss, remember that there were and still are war lords like Yen Hsi-shan—able to change with the times.

But more typical of the period under scrutiny is Shantung's fabulous General Chang Tsung-chang. This oaf, six and a half feet tall, with physical strength to match (the same couldn't be said of his intellect), started adult life as a wharf coolie among the Russians at Vladivostok. Ever after he had a liking for Russians, especially of the toothsome feminine variety. When by his power and unscrupulousness he rose to become war lord of Shantung province, an important part of his very impressive armament consisted of an armored railway train manned by the toughest White Russian veterans he could find. And he was an expert on things tough. Rivals died suddenly, through methods direct or indirect. Concerning his intimate life, which was far from private, John Gunther reports that though Chang never knew how many concubines he had (or how much money, or how many soldiers), he had concubines of twenty-six different nationalities, each with her own washbowl marked with the flag of her nation.

My one meeting with this particular Chang was in Peking, while I was in an official yamen one morning waiting for audience with Marshal Chang Tso-lin. A hulking form entered, the name "Chang Tsung-chang" was murmured, and I noticed my companion, Grover Clark, turning first pale and then a light green. That morn-

ing, Grover had excoriated Chang Tsung-chang in his Peking *Leader*—it had quite a missionary following—as a decadent menace to the morals and general welfare of China. We were duly introduced to the Shantung gangster. Grover was obviously waiting for Chang to pull a pistol out of each hip pocket and shoot him dead. But Chang only nodded mildly and murmured a few uncouth Shantung-dialect words. I then recalled that I had heard he didn't speak or read English—and the *Leader* was an English-language paper, luckily for editor Clark.

Looking Chang up and down, I saw only a coolie-garbed Chinese hobbledohoy far from the Hollywood-type handsome ruffian I had expected. Mud was on his shoes and a vacant look on his broad coarse face. He seemed in that moment to have the general force, the intelligence, and the sex appeal of a cigar-store Indian. In more ways than one he might well have been compared with the dinosaur; a stupid, brutal giant, he ruled in his own brief epoch but lacked the brains to survive either as an individual or a type. In 1933 he was killed on a station platform at Tsinan. I am happy to say that this sanitary act was contributed by the relative of a newspaperman Chang had executed.

3

NATIONALIST CHINA

"THE KUOMINTANG," said Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in a 1945 speech, "is the historical party of national revolution; it overthrew the Manchu Dynasty; it destroyed Yuan Shih-kai, who would be emperor; it utterly defeated the militarists that succeeded Yuan Shih-kai; it brought about national unification; it achieved the removal of the unequal treaties; and it led the country into the eight-year-old struggle against Japan. It is we who are the party of liberation and progress."

Obvious elements of truth lie in the foregoing. At the same time, if you have read my opinion of revolution in China it should be apparent that I have some mental withholdings as to the amount of over-all revolutionary credit the Kuomintang can justly claim. The time for embarking on political analysis is not yet; for the moment, I wish simply to indicate again what has already been suggested, that the Kuomintang beyond question provided that solid political idea against which war-lordism finally broke itself.

There has been a tendency to regard successive periods of Japanese aggression as major turning points of recent Chinese history—the Manchuria invasion of 1931, or the Lukouchiao clash of 1937, or Pearl Harbor. But all these things diminish in historic importance when compared with the tremendous change wrought in China by the substitution of a political idea for war-lordism. This substitution was dramatic, drastic, and much more clear-cut than most events in China. As already stated, there were elements of political and other advance during the war-lord era, and certainly there have been hang-overs of war-lordism in Nationalist China. But beyond debate

a great transition occurred because of the revolutionary period of 1925-27, the first period present-day China had known which I regard as really revolutionary.

We may have more revolution ahead. The Kuomintang may be among the casualties. But for the moment let's consider the past.

Kuomintang beginnings date back, as the Generalissimo indicates, to the time the Manchus fell or were pushed. The group from which the Kuomintang developed followed Dr. Sun's original Hsin Chung Hui (Regenerate China Society), formed in 1892. The next was known as the T'ung Meng Hui, or Brotherhood Society, with Sun Yat-sen as its head. It was organized in Tokyo during August of 1905, and took the leading role in occasional outbreaks against the Dynasty in the following two years and in 1910. On October 10, 1911, rebels captured the viceroy's yamen at Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the Yangtze, and the T'ung Meng Hui snowballed this last affray into revolutionary proportion.

Elements in the 1911 upheaval were by no means exclusively political, or within China. A major factor was the newly renovated army of the Manchus themselves; overseas Chinese contributed heavily in money and even in personnel, some being smuggled to China so that they could bore from within as part of the army; the student class was strong, as it always is during times of ferment in China. Many of these students had absorbed something of modern ideas from American and other mission schools within China. A good many had received further education abroad, in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan—this last country being often a refuge and gathering spot for Chinese intent on disturbing the *status quo* in their own country. Progress of such a sort was a thing the Japanese were always happy to assist.

As a matter of specific date, the Kuomintang was not formed till August of 1912. At that time the T'ung Meng Hui—rather shaken up by its very successes—was reorganized and joined with four other groups to form a nationalist-democratic federation opposed to President Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan's dictatorial displacement of Dr. Sun was already keenly regretted.

Read the historians if you want details of the skulduggeries of this period. Yuan maneuvered himself into a permanent presidency, ordered an end to the "seditious" Kuomintang, indefinitely sus-

pended Parliament in 1914, hand-picked his own constitutional rules, put a lid on the press, and set a Gestapo after the liberals, furbished up Confucian authoritarianism, and restored an old imperial practice of worship by the head of the state (formerly, of course, the Emperor) at the Peking Altar of Heaven. This was a logical build-up to making Yuan himself an emperor, but his intended ascent to the Dragon Throne (thrice requested by his Council of State) was checked by another wave of revolution which swept up from the South in late 1915. Yuan backed down by confessing that he had misread the nation's desire. On June 6, 1916, he died before fully untangling the latest aspects of the general snarl he had created.

There followed more conflict, more effort to squelch war-lordism, more futile effort at parliamentary constitutionalism—to put it baldly, more gang rule. There is no point in confusing the reader with the names of passing puppets, but many have heard of the Anfu Club, which became the ascendant faction of the period. We may remember the Anfuites as China's Tammany Hall lacking the element of benevolence. Anfu control, running till 1920, was featured by semisecret loans from Japan, particularly the notorious Nishihara Loans—loans by which Japan sought to keep the Chinese leaders of the period under her thumb, and by which the leaders sought only their own enrichment. Nobody today can state even the precise amount of the Nishihara Loans, but they haunted many later years of China.

Japan, rather than any internal Chinese political force, was decidedly the dominant influence during all this phase. For when the scoundrel Anfu clique was finally chased out of Peking in 1920, Japanese-fostered Marshal Chang Tso-lin of Mukden was a leading influence in the purge. Japan had put Chang in, though he didn't thank Japan for it, and she was finally to put him not merely out of politics, but out of the world. Few things happened in those days which were not in some way dictated or at least influenced by the Japanese.

But down in South China the Kuomintang still stirred. True, it was without power, but it retained life. First there had been an effort in 1917 to keep Parliament going in the great mid-China port of Shanghai. Next came retreat down to Canton. And this is where

things begin to be interesting to those who have curiosity as to how political-economic notions pass from the intellectual and abstract into the real and dynamic.

For years the Kuomintang had been a secret underground party. Its very name was not consistently the same. In 1914 it changed from the familiar version meaning "Nationalist Party" to Kemin-tang, or Revolutionary Party; there was an oath of personal allegiance to Dr. Sun, its *Tsungli* or president, and an obvious realization that more revolution was somehow in order.

Most important, yet now seldom remembered, events occurred at Shanghai beginning in December of 1922. Dr. Sun met for extensive conversations with Adolf A. Joffe, Soviet Far East representative. The following month, in January 1923, the two issued a joint statement which said in part:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order or even the soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

This statement can be taken as the basis on which Dr. Sun's collaboration with the Soviet Union began. It is a pity that it is not better known. Many who distrust Moscow are likely, of course, to insist that the adroit Joffe merely sold gullible Dr. Sun a bill of goods. Yet in the rather close scrutiny which I was to keep over Soviet activities in China for some years to follow, I felt that Mr. Joffe expressed a common-sense view which was shared by his superiors in charge of Moscow policy. I was to discuss China intimately on several occasions with Borodin, who implemented Soviet cooperation in China. He not only dealt with China's problems in the spirit of this declaration, but he made this attitude seem sincere, reasonable, and realistic. To most Americans, and especially to most Britons, Borodin was a mysterious fiend never seen and certainly never interviewed by respectable people. Thus it was easy for them

to set up straw dummies by attributing idiotic, extreme programs to Borodin, and then demonstrate their own acumen by dramatically proving how silly such programs were. But what Dr. Sun and Mr. Joffe said was moderate and an attitude on which the conservatives could have found common ground, had they taken the trouble to listen. A little more common ground on the part of all those interested in China of the period might have meant a great deal less trouble finally.

Borodin's arrival in China occurred twenty months after the Sun-Joffe talks, in September 1924. With him were other Russian experts, notably the young military genius Marshal Vassily K. Bluecher, who became known to the Chinese and foreigners as "Galen." Years later Galen was to be head of Soviet Russia's Far East armies until he, like Karakhan and Karakhan's successor, suffered that quiet removal from the scene which Moscow has administered to so many of her leaders, including several from the Far East.

With the arrival of the Russians at Canton things began to happen.

Under Borodin's advice there was a Kuomintang party reorganization and an expansion which was to give solid structure on which to build a set of new party principles. With the Russian Bolsheviks as model, members of the old group were registered again. Some refused to go along or were not found acceptable. An important detail was admission of members of the new Chinese Communist party to membership—as individuals—in the Kuomintang. This was the first historic get-together of Chinese liberals and Marxists. It is significant that from such coalition came first solid success. Even today, after successive chapters of fissure and reunion and fissure again, the Kuomintang holds to Russian-originated ideas of organization and discipline. It is still a relatively small, highly organized group with the characteristics of exclusiveness and ego. This is not written in any spirit of criticism but merely as representing the fact.

A strong political party was set up, which led to a party trusteeship when control of government was finally won. That in turn was supposed to lead to constitutional democracy, but such a stage has been repeatedly postponed.

Although we are running ahead of the story, it seems helpful to do so as a means of underscoring the meaning of those first beginnings of true Chinese political thought with a punch.

It was intended that there should be a reversal of the situation of the immediate past, when a secret organization was subordinate to Dr. Sun. This time power was to pyramid up from a broad base of party members in local groupings, rising to organs of the sub-districts, districts, and provinces to a central annual National Congress, handling policy, and a Central Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee to supervise and direct party affairs between congresses. Dr. Sun was granted life presidency of the party. But instead of its leader, the party was to have primary power.

Speaking at Chungking in 1944, Dr. Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen, was to point out that since 1924 the Kuomintang had been in theory organized on a basis of democratic centralization stemming from the new party constitution of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang. He declared that if there had been strict observance of the principle of democracy during the past twenty years, the democratic spirit of the Kuomintang "would today shine brilliantly"—but "unfortunately, we have not strictly observed this principle," and as a result the Kuomintang organization moved on the contrary from top to bottom. Central Party Headquarters appointed the members of committees of provincial and municipal party headquarters. The result was that "the organization of the Kuomintang has thus become a governmental or even bureaucratic organization contrary to the spirit of democracy."

In 1924 the Kuomintang was fresh and new and hopeful. By 1944 it was old, hardened in one-party control over a government long recognized by the world, and for nearly eight years head of a nation in armed resistance to Japan. Events had blocked many intended developments. This had in turn caused the leadership to solidify and a feeling to develop that change was dangerous. And in 1944 the party still numbered less than one per cent of China's population. None of this could be foreseen in 1924.

Even then it was not all clear sailing. The presence of the Chinese Communists was resented by a considerable section of their fellow members of the Kuomintang. But much was to be done, and the first thing was the holding of the 1924 Congress, designed to be fol-

lowed by others each year. Because the congresses after 1924 were held at longer intervals than had been planned (the second in 1926, the third in 1929), almost from the outset there was a tendency for the Central Executive Committee to assume increased power. While trends set thus in the field of practical politics, Dr. Sun in the last few months of his life enunciated certain principles destined to have lasting though not always decisive influence.

These included his series of lectures at Canton which gave the foundation for the famous San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People. Couple this with his subsequent "Will" and the "General Principles of Reconstruction" which were drafted and proposed by Dr. Sun with acceptance as a manifesto by the first Kuomintang Congress, and there is a group of ideas accepted in basic aspect by virtually all political groups within China today. We may add as a specifically economic program Dr. Sun's book, *The International Development of China*, the backbone of the National Government's new economic program announced in late 1944. Of special yet seldom realized significance is the fact that the Chinese Communists, however much at odds with the Kuomintang, still uphold the San Min Chu I, a Lincolnian concept which thus has become the heritage of the whole Chinese people irrespective of political grouping. It is hard to select what deserves elucidation in trying to deal with so much in small compass, but a few words on the Three Principles seem called for.

A handy way to remember the general idea is to recall the phrase "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Dr. Sun's actual headings were nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood, respectively called Min-Tsu, Min-Chuan, and Min-sheng. These principles had been initially discussed in the three volumes of his 1918 Plans for National Reconstruction, psychological, material, and social, which in 1922 were in process of fresh exposition at greater length. But when in June of that year the local Canton military bigwig Chen Chiung-ming turned his guns on Sun's headquarters—things were seldom dull in Canton!—the firing destroyed a tremendous accumulation of notes and reference material. The 1924 party reorganization led to a need for Kuomintang propaganda, and Dr. Sun proceeded to deliver weekly lectures on his Three People's Principles at National Kwangtung University,

Canton. The plan was for eighteen lectures, but the last two were postponed because of Dr. Sun's northern trip on which he died.

Critics have had a field day with these extemporaneous lectures. It has been claimed, variously, that they exhibit great profundity of thought and that they embody successive contradictions which betray an undisciplined and vacillating mind. I am no student and shall not expertize on the subject, but certainly Dr. Sun manifested social conscience and a great deal of understanding of his people. He changed certain aspects of his thinking from time to time, but this came from fresh information and new ideas which his intellectual honesty forced him to accept. It was necessary in his day to do a great deal of trail blazing. Both China and the world have experienced a great deal (whether it can be called progress in all respects or not) in the years since his death; much data has accumulated which was not then available to him.

In his first lecture, for example, Dr. Sun said that one of the greatest dangers to China was the rapid increase in the population of other countries. He believed China's population had remained stationary for the past two centuries, while during the past hundred years the United States had shown an increase of 1,000 per cent, Britain and Japan 300 per cent, Russia 400 per cent, and Germany 250 per cent, so he thought there was danger that China might be "swallowed up"—an inversion of the Yellow Peril idea which many Westerners will find quaint. Dr. Sun himself might have revised this notion in progressing from consideration of Nationalism to People's Livelihood. But China was in such a poor international position that it was natural for him to lay stress on strong national unity, which he contrasted with China's former main point, cultural unity. This latter might indeed be a valuable national heritage, but it was clearly inadequate to cope with the guns and economic power being built up by other countries. He compared China with a rope of sand. In her relations with other Powers he called her a "hypocolony," something below the status of real colony. The three great national problems he saw as pressure of foreign population increases, and foreign domination, political and economic.

Democracy was seen by this time in a different light from that in which Dr. Sun had viewed it in 1911. He felt that immediate full democracy could not be conferred upon China, and although "the

foundation of the government must be built upon the rights of the people," it was necessary that "the administration of government must be entrusted to experts." Controlling this authoritarian power at the top must be such safeguards as election and recall of policy-determining officers, together with the initiative and referendum. Under such controls China should have a governmental system on the basis of a five-power constitution providing for legislation, execution, judgment, examination, and censorship. The first three powers were common to foreign countries, Dr. Sun said, but the last two "come from old China," a characteristic effort to blend what was deemed best from the Occident and Cathay.

It was in his People's Livelihood section that Dr. Sun established himself as clearly a social evolutionary rather than a proponent of Marx's materialistic concept, including class war, or social revolution. One of the oddest features of this part of the lectures was Dr. Sun's citation of the previously obscure works of a New York dentist, Dr. Maurice William. After long study of Marxism, Dr. William had privately printed a book opposing the class war and Marx's emphasis on production, finding on the contrary that distribution and the democratically based interests of the consumer were the things to be stressed and that the materialistic conception of history is wrong, whereas the social problem rather than material forces determines historic courses. There has been learned argument as to whether a chance-met copy of Dr. William's *Social Interpretation of History* drastically altered the Sun Yat-sen thinking and program. As to the latter, it is impossible to ignore the Joffe-Sun declaration which proves that as early as January 1923 Dr. Sun recognized the inapplicability of orthodox Marxian technique to China, as did the Russians. Thus from one point of view he found merely a confirmation of program in the William book. But students see a change in Dr. Sun's thinking after the period within which he read the William volume in mid-1924, a period when his series of Canton lectures was interrupted and after which he said that "we have not championed socialism but the *Ming-sheng* [livelihood] principle." Perhaps it is fair to say that on a realistic basis Dr. Sun and Joffe saw that Marx wouldn't work in China, and that later Dr. Sun was convinced by Dr. William that Marx wouldn't work anywhere! It is an interesting sidelight that the Kuomintang has

honored Dr. William with life membership and the Chinese Government has bestowed upon him, along with Pearl Buck, the Order of Jade, White Cravat with Red and Blue Borders. This not unnaturally causes the slightly informed to presume that he must be some rather special sort of an Old China Hand minus the usual dank odor of imperialism. Dr. William himself frankly makes no pretense of ever having stepped foot in China, but he is equally frank in feeling that he knows most of the China answers.

Dr. Sun advocated an equalization of land ownership by appropriation of value added to the land through social development, a line of thought reminiscent of Henry George and single tax. Vinacke's conclusion, which appears sound, is that the evidence seems to justify classing Dr. Sun "as a radical bourgeois social reformer rather than a Communist." At the same time Dr. Sun endorsed collaboration with Communists. This attitude, which to many seems contradictory, has haunted and perplexed Kuomintang thought and act through the years up to the present.

Something has already been suggested of the intended structure of the new government. It would take almost endless and excessively tedious explanation to tell what was finally built up, and such information is available elsewhere. The essential point is that Dr. Sun started this government off as a strictly Kuomintang affair, though at a time when the Chinese Communists were members of the Kuomintang; it has been kept one-party by a procedure so far inclining to greater exclusivity rather than less. The period of political tutelage, which followed conclusion of the essential first military stage, has not yet given way to the scheduled and long-promised handing over of full power to the people.

Possibly disproportionate space has been given to some of these earlier developments and documents, yet here is a case where it is well to have firmly in mind certain basic essentials. With the death of Dr. Sun in March of 1925, any of his possible shortcomings, intellectual or political, were buried with him. Overnight he became the top-flight revolutionary hero. At the same time his philosophy became steam in the boiler of Kuomintang revolutionary fervor. Each Monday morning, at memorial services in all party offices, government organs, and military posts, there are ceremonials which include three bows before the national and party colors and Dr.

Sun's portrait, and a reading of Dr. Sun's will. This latter bids the comrades follow his Plans for National Reconstruction, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, Three People's Principles, and the manifesto of the first Congress. The portrait-bowing is to me unfortunately reminiscent of Japanese religious ceremony involving the picture of the Emperor. However, trust the Chinese not to take even this too seriously.

When the Kuomintang completed its reorganization in January of 1924 it was stated that the Communists were being allowed to enter the party as individuals "in order to bolster the strength of revolutionary elements in the country." To this sentiment Li Tachao of the Communists made response that: "In joining the Kuomintang, Communists of the Third International are to obey Kuomintang principles, adhere to Kuomintang discipline, and participate in the national revolution. They have not the slightest intention of turning the Kuomintang into a Communist party. Those Communists who join the Kuomintang do so as individuals and not on a party basis."

This indicates the general basis of coalition. I shall deal here as briefly as possible with the Kuomintang-Communist situation, since that is to be the subject of a special chapter bringing the problem into focus in terms of the present and future. It still remains an open question as to whether there is foundation for solid, permanent collaboration as between the Kuomintang and the Communists. We have seen them joining to meet the revolutionary necessities of 1925 and immediately thereafter. They were to split as soon as the outer pressure relaxed, in 1927. They were to fight each other through intermittent civil wars until a new national crisis brought them together again a decade later, this time the menace of Japan being the unifying factor. And again they were to split, early in 1941, even before Anglo-American entry into the war with Japan gave Chinese a feeling of assurance that their whole country would ultimately be regained for them and meanwhile they might wrangle over internal affairs.

If I were dealing primarily with the historic record, this is where I would really get down to work. This is the point where, against the Russian advisers' inclination, the newly reorganized Kuomintang started its famous and successful Northern Punitive Expedi-

tion on July 9, 1926. Borodin was anxious and reluctant; he realized how little had been done in stabilizing the base of popular welfare in Kwangtung, and he was a man of too solid conscience lightly to leave his first task half done. But the military leaders of the Kuomintang were thirsty for action. A spark had been dropped as far back as 1925 by the "May 30 incident" at Shanghai, when during the course of a student-worker demonstration resulting from trouble with Japanese mill owners, International Settlement police under command of a Briton fired upon the crowd. Trouble spread in all directions, there were fresh outbreaks, and at Canton the British figured in another shooting, the "Shakee Road massacre" of June 23, 1925, which in turn led to an anti-British boycott particularly directed at Hong Kong and lasting fifteen months. These things, coupled with a *coup* by Chiang Kai-shek in early 1926 against leftist Chinese elements at Canton, combined to push the Russian advisers into agreement that energies should be channeled in a northern drive. They therefore set up a propaganda machine which sprayed a fiery political path northward for the troops.

China had never seen such a campaign—a drive where the masses really got the idea of overthrowing war-lordism and achieving a democratic goal. All the Soviet propaganda technique was employed. There were posters with pictures and simple direct messages. Students went ahead and delivered impassioned talks. The armies were welcomed, something new in China, where I had seen even Christian Feng's well-behaved troops, on retreat in the north, greeted by shutters slammed over shop fronts as the vanguard arrived.

Hankow was taken from Wu Pei-fu in September, following an inland campaign. Next came a turn down the Yangtze River, Hankow being a little less than five hundred miles west of Shanghai and the sea. British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were taken over, and finally permanently repossessed by China after London had consented to negotiate with the *de facto* Nationalist authority promptly set up in Hankow with Trinidad-born Eugene Chen as its Foreign Minister.

Home policies of the leading foreign governments, particularly the British, were by this time considerably more generous than the personal attitudes of most foreign residents in China, to whom the

onrushing Nationalist dragon was beginning to take on the aspects of a juggernaut. When in November the Government removed from Canton to "Wuhan," the tri-city grouping of Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang five hundred miles up the Yangtze, its leftist elements were vigorously in the ascendant. Labor was encouraged, and it frequently worked to anticipate or secure gains for the Nationalist armies. In Hankow there was such a seizure by workers of the British Concession. Foreign Minister Eugene Chen persuaded the British to negotiate direct, and this resulted in formal retrocession to the Chinese of this concession through the Chen-O'Malley Agreement. The British Concession at nearby Kiukiang went likewise. Treaty Port foreigners were further angered and alarmed.

Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek, who had been out in charge of army operations, arrived at Nanchang and tried to regain political prestige without success. It was the "Nanking Affair" of March 24, 1927, which finally helped establish him, although for a time it seemed due to have a precisely opposite effect, and was believed by many to have been plotted to that end. Elements of Nationalist soldiery entering Nanking went on the loose, terrorizing foreign residents and causing British and American gunboats in the Yangtze to fire on the city in order to cover evacuation.

Foreign indignation mounted everywhere. Missionaries and business folk were pulled out of the interior, and within a short time the arrival of foreign defense groups in North China had brought the total such armed personnel to over twelve thousand. In Peking, to manifest any trust in the Chinese was regarded as equivalent to treason. Dr. J. Leighton Stuart and I both found that out—I because of writings tending to pooh-pooh foreign official hysteria, and Dr. Stuart because he mildly declined to order his Yenching University faculty to proceed inside the Peking city walls and under the protection of the American Legation. Dr. Stuart's Chinese students and staff were loyal, a wall was erected around the university property, and all hands prepared to repel boarders of whatever race. It seemed to me, though to few others, natural that Dr. Stuart felt more secure at Yenching than among the jittery gentlemen and ladies of the Legation Quarter.

At this juncture the Diplomatic Body betrayed its attack of nerves by consenting to an unprecedented act on the part of Mar-

shal Chang Tso-lin. He was permitted to invade the hallowed Quarter with armed troops, which on the morning of April 6 staged a sudden raid on the western end of the extensive Soviet Embassy grounds where there were living quarters. Needless to say, the unco-operative Ambassador Karakhan was not in on the deal; in fact, he happened to be temporarily absent from the city at the time. But he had an intelligent chargé on the job, one Spilvanek. Nothing could be done to prevent the ransacking of many buildings, the capture of nearly twoscore Chinese leftist refugees who were promptly garroted, and the removal of piles of documents and other trophies, including Soviet flags, from a club maintained by the Embassy personnel. But when Chang proceeded to publish what were represented as facsimiles of captured Russian documents, said to show how Moscow was in full control of Chinese internal affairs, Spilvanek quietly exposed them as forgeries of the crudest sort, concocted by White Russians in Chang's entourage and employing the old Russian alphabet instead of the simplified style invariably used by the Soviet regime. This of course failed to impress the foreign public at large, already superheated and made more excited than ever by press reports of the Arcos raid in London. Russia and the powers of evil generally were deemed virtually on top of the whole world.

It was a touch-and-go time for the Nationalist cause. Chiang Kai-shek, long restive over the presence of Russian advisers and Chinese Communists within the Kuomintang governing group, seized opportunity. He went to Shanghai, promised a prompt satisfactory settlement of the Nanking Affair together with restoration of orderly conditions everywhere, and joined hands with the Chinese bankers and merchants. Every conservative force, foreign or Chinese, saw salvation in this newest "strong man" and flocked to back him. During April, Chiang set up at Nanking a new government directly competitive with that at Wuhan but supported (as Wuhan was not) by two powerful pillars—the foreign diplomats and the Chinese fat-cats of Shanghai. There could be but one outcome, although for a good many weeks the issue hung undecided.

During these days of negotiation and string pulling, Chiang was forging bonds in many directions. A significant move, with far-

reaching results, was his renewal and strengthening of old ties with the Shanghai gangsters. The Green and Red groups (Ch'ing Pang and Hung Men) have histories of two to three hundred years. They are by no means to be dismissed as mere hooligan racketeers, however much some of their originally patriotic practices have deteriorated in modern times and under big-city conditions. Chinese sometimes fear them, but their names also command respect.

Both organizations came into being during the reign of the Manchu emperor Kang Hsi, toward the latter part of the seventeenth century. The Ch'ing society was established by a Buddhist monk, with official cognizance, to rid the Grand Canal and other waterways (then main communications arteries within China) of pirates. Its members also dredged channels and built new ships. As reward for their work they were allowed to extend throughout the country. They have been criticized for services to the Manchus, but defenders say that they helped the people rather than the reigning house and that their final objective was to arouse nation-wide consciousness of the need to restore a purely Chinese rule. The Hung group originated in the famous Shao Lin Monastery in Fukien, renowned for instruction in Chinese boxing. Its monks helped Emperor Kang Hsi's campaigns against Tibet and neighboring states, then refused official place and retired to their temple, which the treacherous emperor jealously put to the torch. Five of the monks escaped and organized resistance against the Manchus within an oath of brotherhood. Thus the Ch'ing and the Hung grew to be the chief of many secret Chinese societies, independent but not competitive or antagonistic, united for generations toward the expulsion of the Manchu invaders and restoration of the native Ming Dynasty. The Hung functioned as a brotherhood in which all had equal status, while the Ch'ing was ranked in twenty-four divisions roughly bearing a master-disciple or father-son relationship.

With the overthrow of Manchu rule one of the main purposes of such secret societies passed. Yet they were firmly fastened in Chinese life. In Szechuen province alone the total number of adherents to all secret societies was estimated in 1940 at seven million, while it was believed that the aggregate membership in country places was forty million, including both men and women. Where the societies

had roots in agrarian life they sometimes performed constructive work, particularly in fighting against banditry and preserving peace and good order.

In turbulent Shanghai these had degenerated by Western standards. Their membership included bankers and philanthropists, but they also included opium dealers and pickpockets. Among the profitable enterprises of the gangster elements were numbered kidnapping, narcotic traffic, prostitution, gambling, newspaper operation, blackmail, and sale of compulsory "protection." Even so, one can err by oversimplification. In at least some Chinese eyes the secret groups still had prestige and did good. They reached into high and often official circles, notably in the French Concession. Benevolence was sometimes attributed to them, as in giving educational and other opportunities to poor boys. It was not always the case that advancement through the gangs was universally condemned. Later, in 1934, the National Government was to start a "six-year plan of opium suppression" and incorporate the secret-society narcotics chieftains as its key men.

During the days of organization of the National Government there was an alignment of the old and reactionary secret groups against the new rising and radical Chinese labor movement. Chinese industrialists had grown worried, and they saw in the gangs a weapon both convenient and logical. In old-time agrarian China the secret societies had fought banditry in the name of peace and order. Now their decadent Shanghai branches found it a respectable big-city equivalent to join hands with Chiang Kai-shek when in the spring of 1927 it suddenly developed that six hundred thousand workers had seized the Chinese areas of Shanghai in advance of the arrival of Chiang's three thousand troops. The result was two days of bloodshed, starting April 12, in which it is estimated that five thousand workers died. The Shanghai garrison commander executed about three hundred Communists.

Gradually order returned and foreign alarm subsided—but among the dead was the Chinese labor movement. It passed with its leaders. This fact was one of the determining points in causing Chinese Communists to abandon the city workers—tactics called suicidal by Trotsky—and to center on the peasants. It was Trotsky's view that conservative farmers never can be a base for advanced

social-economic action and that if the industrial workers were not utilized there could be no Communism.

Today this forecast seems to have been borne out by events, in that true communism has not materialized in China. The evolutionary and non-collectivist policies of the so-called Chinese Communists have, however, been considerably more satisfactory in the eyes of many.

With Chiang and the conservatives setting up shop at Nanking, the position of the leftist government at Wuhan became steadily more precarious and at the same time more confused. What was called the "Left Kuomintang" finally divided from the Communists on July 15 and insisted that Borodin and the other Russians must go home. So the Russians started off across-country and a dismal downriver trek began, with leader after leader in the Wuhan faction joining Nanking. Conspicuous among the few holdouts were Foreign Minister Chen and Madame Sun Yat-sen, the latter a gentle soul but capable of plain speech when aroused against anything which seemed to her a betrayal of her husband's principles. They proceeded first to Shanghai and then to Moscow, refusing to participate in what they regarded as counterrevolution.

As to the Communists, they set up a soviet form of government which grew to cover several Central China provinces and had its capital at Juikin, southern Kiangsi. They had their own army, their own mint and currency, and they sought support of the peasantry by a program of wresting land from the landlords, many of whom were executed, and giving it to the tillers of the soil. Collectivism even then was not attempted; it was merely a process of exchanging old owners for new, and landlordism might well have come back in time if the process had been left to work itself out.

But Nanking had no idea of permitting the peaceful development of a Red separate state within China. The first fighting started in July of 1927, and it was to continue in various stages until after the "Sian Affair" around Christmas 1936, which resulted in fresh coalition of Kuomintang-Communist forces to meet Japanese aggression.

Most of 1927 was occupied in shaking down the new Government at Nanking. In late summer Chiang Kai-shek retired from the political arena. He was back in a few months, and by the end of

the year he had allied himself with Feng Yu-hsiang of the Northwest and Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi. Only Chang Tso-lin remained to be overthrown. So in early 1928 there began a fresh move, against Peking. Japan for the last time intervened on behalf of Chang, sending infantry south to the Shantung railway junction at Tsinan in April while five thousand troops, rushed from the homeland, occupied the 280 miles of Tsingtao-Tsinan railway. Chang was able to withdraw, at a cost paid in full by the Japanese and the occupying southern Nationalists who clashed during the period of May 3-10. It is estimated that over a hundred Japanese were killed during intermittent fighting while Tsinan was cut off. The toll of Chinese lives probably reached seven thousand.

Then the Nationalists pressed on northward. Chang ordered his armies back to Manchuria. On June 4 he himself was re-entering his home capital of Mukden by train when an explosion occurred precisely as his private car was under an overpass carrying the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway line. Chang suffered injuries from which he soon died. Though findings of an investigating committee were suppressed, none doubted that his Japanese ex-friends were responsible.

Peking was occupied, and the new Nanking regime hospitably attempted to lure the Diplomatic Body out of its snug Quarter. But Nanking was a decayed old town without comforts or adequate housing; even the Chinese Government people spent as much time among the Shanghai fleshpots as possible. Peking was renamed Peiping, pronounced "Bay-ping" and meaning "Northern Peace" instead of the former "Northern Capital," to emphasize governmental desertion of the northern city. It was a slow and difficult task to lure the foreign diplomats down to damp Nanking. Years afterward, when war had driven the national capital upcountry to even less appetizing Chungking, it was noticeable that while everyone wanted to get back to Nanking for reasons of "face," there was a growing conviction that the eventual capital would again be romantic, luxurious, dry, and generally salubrious Peking.

Now, aside from the anti-Communist "punitive campaigns," most of the new Government's problems seemed either solved or on their way to solution. Tariff autonomy was put into effect July 25, 1928, with resultant heavy revenues. A sumptuous million-dollar

mausoleum was constructed on the slope of Purple Mountain, outside Nanking, and to this the body of Sun Yat-sen was removed from Peiping's Western Hills and interred amidst elaborate ceremonies lasting a week. Madame Sun was persuaded to return and take part in this tribute to her late husband, but if Nanking hoped that this meant any change in her aloof attitude it was in for disappointment.

After almost two years of voluntary exile, which among other things had entailed a breaking of family ties—for her sister Meiling had meanwhile married Chiang Kai-shek, to say nothing of another sister's previous union to H. H. Kung and her brother T. V. Soong's active participation in the Nanking Government—Madame Sun prefaced her return by a statement on May 6 reading in part:

I am proceeding to China for the purpose of attending the removal of the remains of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the Purple Mountain where he desired to be buried. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I have to state that I emphatically adhere to my declaration made at Hankow on July 14, 1927, in which I announced my withdrawal from active participation in the work of the Kuomintang, on account of counterrevolutionary policy and activities of the Central Executive Committee. . . .

It must therefore be abundantly clear that my attendance at the burial will not mean and is not to be interpreted as in any sense implying a modification or reversal of my decision to abstain from any direct or indirect work of the Kuomintang so long as its leadership is opposed to the fundamental policies of Dr. Sun; namely, the policy of effective anti-imperialism, the policies of co-operation with Soviet Russia and the Workers and Peasants policy. When these policies were the moving forces of the revolution we made rapid progress toward the realization of the policies of the party. Now that the three policies have been discarded, our party has again become the tool of militarists and counter-revolution. . . .

Although she had been elected to the Central Executive Committee at what in a 1930 article I termed "the hand-picked congress of last spring," Madame Sun resolutely restricted her activities to participation in the funeral services. She saw the casket deposited in its million-dollar resting place and then retired to Dr. Sun's old

home in the Rue Molière, Shanghai. Thereafter, while a disappointed Russia held aloof and the Chinese Communists first maintained themselves against repeated attacks and finally removed in their historic 1500-mile "long march" to new territory, she kept silent—except for occasional expressions largely suppressed in the local Chinese press but disturbing to the consciences of high National Government officials who heard her reminders and were troubled.

Progress unquestionably was being made, however. Even liberal observers who initially shared Madame Sun's disillusion began to feel that if the new machine worked, there must be something to it. New financial blood pumped through its veins and arteries. The Government expanded rapidly in many fields. Internationally its pressure for revised treaty relations brought results, including retrocession from the British of Weihaiwei, also the Chinkiang and Amoy concessions, and from the Belgians their concession at Tientsin. Brashly, Nanking announced an end to extraterritoriality effective January 1, 1930—but this was later postponed till January 1, 1932. And again this was forgotten in the excitement of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, which began on September 1, 1931, and which came about primarily because the late war lord Chang's son Chang Hsueh-liang had thrown in his lot wholeheartedly with Chinese Nationalism. Symptoms of a rising democratic power in Japan also motivated the Japanese war lords.

China's history here merges significantly with great events all over the world. Out of the failure of the League of Nations to check Japan in Manchuria came Italy's Ethiopia adventure, the war in Spain, the rise of Hitler, and finally the monumental fact of World War II. We now see these things as linked closer together. In 1931 some saw portents of things to come when Secretary Stimson's effort on behalf of China failed; but the general blindness of the time still amazes one.

Early in 1932 the Japanese engaged in six weeks of fighting with General Tsai Ting-kai's Nineteenth Route Army around Shanghai. The American newspaper with which I was connected, the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, had consistently attacked Japan's program of aggression. When we now saw Japan using the supposedly neutral International Settlement as a base of hostilities

against the Chinese, our paper came out with a front-page editorial acidly demanding: "To Those Who Have Abused a Trust—Get Out!" Some annoyance on the part of the Japanese was to be expected. But what really shocked me was to be treated as a moral leper by virtually every section of the foreign community up to and including our American consular people. The feeling seemed to be that the *Post* had broken a united foreign front which Americans, Britons, and others maintained in common with Japan against the Chinese. I am happy to report that by the time the second Shanghai War began on August 13, 1937, the *Post's* consistent attitude of opposition to Japanese outrage was shared by our fellow Americans and others of the foreign population.

The events of 1931-32 might easily have brought about open war between Japan and China. Japan then afforded ample provocation, and accentuated it by her successive seizures of Jehol province and other northern areas, her interference with Chinese customs and other administrations of North China, her setting up of a so-called "autonomous" (really puppet) regime in North China, her scandalous narcotics trade designed to drug the Chinese, and similar acts. Student pressure became strong upon Nanking for a war of resistance. To this was joined agitation by rising political minorities. But the Chinese Government held off. It was not yet prepared. Its army was weak, with most of its energies going into campaigns against the Communists; its navy was almost non-existent; its air force was being built up and American-trained but still amounted to little.

Then came the "Sian Affair" which started with efforts by Generalissimo Chiang to spur Chang Hsueh-liang and others into active combat with the Communists but resulted (after a kidnaping of Chiang and subsequent negotiations) in the knitting of a United Front of Kuomintang and Communists for resistance to Japan. Undeclared war started with a Sino-Japanese clash on the night of July 7, 1937, near Lukouchiao, an old marble bridge near Peiping mentioned in Marco Polo's Travels. This spread rapidly to Shanghai the following month. Chinese forces resisted around Shanghai with unexpected strength, holding out until just after Armistice Day, November 11, before an outflanking operation thrust them back. This brought a tremendous wave of patriotic feeling, unusual in China.

Even the relatively quick loss of Nanking around Christmastime did not dampen it, although many shrewd observers have felt that Japan's one chance to have gained some sort of peace was while the Chinese high command was in confusion just after the Nanking debacle. That chance was lost, and the weeks of murder, loot, and general outrage in which the Japanese troops indulged at Nanking were undoubtedly a powerful factor in stiffening Chinese resistance.

During 1938 the capital resided briefly at Hankow, or technically at Wuchang, across the river, till this mid-Yangtze point fell October 25. Then came another retreat, this time through the Yangtze Gorges to remote Chungking in Szechuen. There the capital was to remain seated through seven wartime years involving a multitude of basic changes. Take for example the one tremendous fact that probably fifty million Chinese emigrated back out of the war zones! A whole new, though limited and struggling, industry was set up in Free China. The United Front split, with active Government-Communist fighting in 1941 and at intervals thereafter. Chungking at last diverted to a blockade of Red areas a sizable proportion of its best troops (the number has been estimated at half a million, though official admissions range from 150,000 to 300,000). Yet the war against Japan went on, despite internal troubles, despite Japan's erection of a puppet state centering on Nanking and headed by a former high official of the Chinese Government, and despite the fact that finally Free China itself was blockaded. And so effectual was this blockade as to halt influx of virtually all consumer goods save commodities smuggled in from Occupied China—a situation which, coupled with troubles over effective controls, developed a terrific mounting spiral of inflation with widespread consequences. These changed direction but did not end with peace.

Even in war there was progress. Extraterritoriality had finally come to its end through treaties with the United States and Great Britain, signed January 11, 1943. A new economic policy including encouragement of foreign and of private Chinese enterprise was evolved, based on ideas originally enunciated by Sun Yat-sen for the international development of China. Within the frame of this policy emerged a decision, welcomed abroad and by private individuals in China, against large-scale government monopolies. Those who in Nationalism's expansive days of the early 1930s had feared that

they could discern evolution pointing toward Fascist-type monopolies and controls felt relief.

Problems pressed in as the war drew to a close and at last peace returned. But for every problem, solutions were offered both by Chinese and by friends of China. In subsequent chapters an effort will be made to state some of these problems in the light of what has just been said and with certain additional evidence on specific points.

4

KUOMINTANG VS. COMMUNISM

THIS IS the hottest nettle in China. Those who touch it (and who can miss it?) usually jump around in a state of painful irritation forever after. Yet there is no reason why it can't be firmly grasped and disposed of by anyone not afraid of it but ready to stand firmly near the center of the road or, like Mr. Roosevelt, a little to the left. That phrase "a little to the left" does not mean favoritism to the Communists. It is designed to imply a liberal attitude which, if the facts warrant it, could equally mean loyalty to the Kuomintang as China's historic party of revolution.

From the outset of any consideration the Kuomintang must command sympathy from an impartial investigator. It has been the historic party of revolution, so described by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In one guise or another a party of Sun Yat-sen has been at work throughout China's modern life. Since 1927 it has been really on the spot because it has had responsibility direct and exclusive. This exclusiveness has become one of the great points of complaint against the Nationalist party, both from outside and lately from some of its own leading membership. Chinese bankers and businessmen not of the party are among the critics. But whether wisely or not, the Kuomintang has carried the chief burden of government. From the middle of 1937 this entailed leadership of resistance to aggression by a strong neighbor.

Such a load was bound to show up the weak spots. Anything short of flat failure, under almost intolerable strain, must be regarded as a kind of success. I believe it is fair to say that the Kuomintang has been a success in essence, despite cries of dictator-

ship and many other epithets. During the war there was a reactionary trend, and slowness to move with the times. Peace caught the Kuomintang with its politics down. That was unlucky for all concerned, but the fault did not lie all in one quarter.

The record of achievement by the Kuomintang is its best argument. Chapter 3 gave something of the story of that record, although there was an intentional telescoping of the war years because so many aspects of wartime development will give subject matter for chapters to follow. It is not, in any event, my purpose to embark on argument through which the good and the bad points of Kuomintang and Kungchantang (as the Communists are called in Chinese) are spread out and compared. Other books do that job better. My purpose is to contribute what I can to an analytical record of fact leading rather toward possible solutions than to more argument, of which there has been enough and to spare.

Many of the ordinarily accepted facts concerning both Kuomintang and Communists are wrong. First, the Kuomintang has not been as exclusive a "country club" as one might think. It got its first really successful start as a dynamic political force at a time when Communists were admitted to membership. Again, it was able to rally a united nation for war against Japan through a second union with the Communists. Still again, there is the question of whether the Communists really deserve and live up to their name (provocative to most Americans and to many Chinese up to the Generalissimo). At any rate the Communists themselves hang on firmly to their name and resist all persuasion that it is at least presently inaccurate. Finally, the Communists are not China's only minority party, although mainly because they have guns, which in the Far East have long substituted for votes, they are the leaders of the opposition. But there are other minority groups which might be more in opposition if they dared. Some will be listed and their attitudes briefly described.

Any analysis of this subject should take into consideration the extremely primitive condition of China as a whole. It is superficially easy to compare the China of the present day with the United States of the present day; but what we should do is rather to compare twentieth-century China with eighteenth-century America. There are things in China which aren't even as modern as that, which go

back to feudal Europe and beyond. Therefore, if we are going to talk of the present phase of the Kuomintang and the Communists, let us not glibly suggest that there is a comparison to the United States Government and to Mr. Dewey as loser of a presidential election. If the Communists built up their own army, their own currency, a variety of regional governments, the comparison is not to be made to an imaginary Mr. Dewey suddenly bereft of his sense of law and order and rushing out to California to organize separatism with an army of rebellion. It is necessary rather to make comparison, inaccurate in detail, with our own early colonial days, when after a revolutionary period there were many armies scattered about. The governing forces were primarily autonomous then too, and only loosely in allegiance, while each of the new states had its own money, with wide fluctuations in value.

We forget how George Washington had to persuade and negotiate among these groupings to start a true United States. In his time any such concentration of authority as we now have in Washington, D.C., would have been incredible and strongly resisted. Some wish to resist today! We forget that the states' rights issue is still far from dead, and that our states continue to insist on certain fairly basic laws, each separate and in accordance with the social attitude of the locality. We forget what generations it took to achieve a unified currency which still had not come at a time within the recollection of many of us. Rather particularly I would like to remind those who urge force against Chinese sectionalism to remember our own Civil War. China has had an overflowing plenty of conflicts painful and costly to a country ill able to afford either disunity or destruction.

Thus runs the general record of Nationalism, which is largely though not exclusively a record of the Kuomintang. What are some of the bases of possible communism in China, and particularly the bases of the Chinese Communist party? In the last chapter I quoted the Sun-Joffe declaration of 1923. Here were two leading figures, one at the head of Chinese Nationalism and the other representing the Soviet Union, in agreement that "the communistic order or even the soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the suc-

cessful establishment of either communism or sovietism." A good deal of Kuomintang structure was patterned after the Soviet governmental system. But that may be disregarded so long as it concerns only the machinery of government and its apparently inevitable universal red tape, rather than the basic constitutional foundation. On this latter essential point the Chinese have not moved anything like as rapidly as was then expected. But at any rate the Kuomintang has not laid itself open to charges that it was aping Russia in vital respects.

Three years after the Sun-Joffe declaration in Shanghai, I met and had long conversation at Peking with Borodin, the Soviet high adviser to the Nationalist Government at Canton. On March 12, 1926, I wrote a United Press dispatch on my talk with this man, "half mythical to most foreigners resident in the Far East," whom I had found in the flesh a most substantial person—"a large quiet man whose white Russian blouse and drooping mustache somehow assist materially in conveying an impression of force, poise, earnestness." He spoke excellent English, deliberately, and gave the impression of being "the scientific Communist of reality, not the fire-eating Communist of political cartoons."

In an interview which he approved before publication, Borodin spoke of having proceeded to Canton two and a half years previously at the invitation of his friend, the late Dr. Sun.

"Friends who know Canton ask me what I am doing there," Borodin remarked with a smile. "It seems to them I am at a job for a Churchill, not a Communist. I did not go to Canton with the intention of staying, and my continued presence there has been rather a result of a series of episodes than any deliberate intent on my part. But I feel well justified in staying for the sake of the future.

"In Canton may lie the future of all China. Certainly Canton is a great experiment. It is in a most elemental stage now. There is really nothing sensational about Canton, despite misrepresentation to the contrary. Canton is not communistic; there is a hard struggle for political, economic, and social progress, such as other countries have already gone through a hundred years ago. I feel it is a struggle worth while, with possibilities in store. So I stay and do what I can to help."

Borodin complained that the things then being attempted in Canton would in Europe and America be considered rather backward, old, forgotten; yet for China they were deemed communistic.

"Take the political side," said he—and remember, he spoke then of a Kuomintang-Communist coalition government under the name of the Kuomintang. "Where else in the world today could one have a political program consisting only of the two words 'good government'? And yet this is the principal clause in 'Red' Canton's program today.

"The one thing which the Kuomintang is endeavoring to bring to the territory under its control is simply—good government. Security; safety for life and property; the assurance that when one wakes up in the morning his life and property will be safe. That is all."

At that period Canton and Kwangtung province were harried by bandits, corrupt officials, and dishonest politicians. On the economic side they were torn asunder by the conflicting forces of a medieval provincialism—each family and town endeavoring to provide for its own wants—and the modern idea of free interchange of goods. The Kuomintang was trying to pilot the people within its sphere out of the past and into the present. Today great strides have been made, yet Borodin spoke only two decades ago.

Stressing that the Nationalists were "endeavoring to bring about peace and normal living for the people," Borodin said that "in this, too, China has been many years behind the rest of the world, and it must make up for lost time, even though this may be branded communism."

It is puzzling in retrospect to make out why Canton was felt to be so Red. Part of the trouble was the great Hong Kong strike, Canton-instigated and still going on. British business in particular had reason to react to hurt by a cry of "communism!" Then there was the unquestionable fact that the Chinese Communists were a part of the Kuomintang organization, and that the Kuomintang had Moscow advisers headed by Borodin. Dr. Sun himself was no saint, in foreign eyes at least. Many people went in for snap judgment based on prejudice and hearsay. This sort of judgment is so easy and natural in time of stress that it would be a great wonder if we were free from it in our present crisis.

But to hark back momentarily to that long-forgotten but intensely

significant Borodin interview, it may be mentioned that much of our talk dealt with the then machinery of the National Government. Borodin said that formerly there had been a district magistrate over each Kwangtung district and that in effect he purchased his post—he had to raise its price in the form of a set annual tax on the people, and anything over that was his personal “squeeze” by an old bad system never changed from imperial days. The National Government was trying to remedy this by putting four other men into the district government, striving to pick honest and representative persons, with the whole success of the plan hinging on their honesty and ability.

“Everything is appointive,” I wrote in summary, “from the members of the Nationalist Government down, unlike the late Dr. Sun’s idea of a system of functional representation. That may come later, in the view of Borodin. The one attempt at election was unsuccessful. Now everything traces back to the Kuomintang—national, district, and municipal governments all find their sources there.”

Borodin said that so crying was the need for development in the province of Kwangtung itself that there was no chance of any unprovoked effort at expansion in the near future. Just before he left, Canton newspapers had been forbidden to print even suggestions of a northern military expedition. This is significant as showing Borodin’s personally conservative slant. Actually the Northern Expedition was to get under way that very summer, as we have seen, and from it sprang the National Government of today. “Provocation” was amply afforded by the decadence and abuses of war-lordism all over China.

“As we go on,” Borodin said in conclusion after discussing Kwangtung road building, harbor work, and similar efforts on a pathetically limited scale, “it is assumable that the province of Kwangsi may join us, perhaps followed by Yünnan and others. The present army of one hundred thousand should soon be two or three hundred thousand, with a corresponding increase in strength otherwise. I see no reason why Canton’s work should not spread over all China in time, though it must be emphasized that Canton is attending to consolidation at home first and foremost.

“I make no effort to judge concerning the animosities displayed toward our work in Canton. From what I have said you can judge

how much basis there is for the wild talk concerning the essentially simple procedure there."

So much for Communist Borodin and those early beginnings of Chinese Nationalism. Borodin was not under orders of Soviet Ambassador Karakhan, he told me, but I was convinced along with all others that there was close understanding and collaboration between them even though Borodin was technically "on loan" to the Kuomintang. Russia still was not pouring in supplies, as was to happen years later when China resisted Japanese aggression. Probably some money was available—certainly funds as well as technical help were forthcoming when the Northern Expedition was started and, under Soviet direction, Chinese artists and writers devised their extraordinarily successful propaganda posters and other devices which fired the enthusiasm of the peasantry and smoothed the way for the advancing southern forces as already mentioned. Up in Peking I felt far from the forces developing to the southward. I cultivated Karakhan and his staff in so far as this could be done by an American correspondent, bound to be somewhat suspect in view of the general hostility of the Anglo-American Peking community toward both the Russians and the Chinese Kuomintang. What I was told by the Russians added up. They were calm, scientific, objective, and in the line of the Sun-Joffe declaration and the Borodin interview. Not all in the Embassy were themselves Communists either by party membership or personal conviction, incidentally. My best friend of the lot turned out to be an "intellectual anarchist," and we entertained ourselves by discussions proving conclusively—the proof still seems to me beyond flaw—that the Americans and Britons resident in Peking were themselves practitioners of intellectual anarchy, though the notion would have filled their conservative breasts with horror. They enjoyed extraterritoriality, which meant that they could not be subjected to trial in Chinese courts or under Chinese law; and since there was no court, either British or American, and no foreign police force aside from a handful of Legation Quarter police mostly for traffic duty, we who dwelt here and there among the delightful network of Peking's narrow lanes were in effect anarchists! How intellectual we were about it was, of course, a matter of question which my Soviet Embassy friend politely refrained from raising.

Now let's skip over to the period of Wuhan rule, when southern

forces had swept up to the Yangtze behind Soviet-assisted propaganda, and the Chinese leftists were riding high in the newly established capital. During the spring of 1927 I went down to Shanghai from Peking, observed the wonders of the battleship-crowded Whangpoo River and the foreign boundary guards moved well out (with exception of the Americans) into Chinese territory, and went upriver by Japanese ship to Hankow. We traveled only by day, since Chinese troops along the bank fired at anything that moved by night. As it was, a few bullets zinged past but didn't hit anything in particular. On the next voyage the British ship on which I returned downriver was less lucky, and three Chinese passengers were wounded.

My outstanding memory of the up voyage was not of danger but of discomfort. The trip stretched out to a week during which I had to use the same face towel; our coffee seemed to be made from the same grounds day after day, and we reached Hankow just as it became indistinguishable from other heated but unflavored water. Rayna Prohme and Milly Mitchell were down at the wharf in Borodin's private motorcar which, it developed, had been left behind in Wu Pei-fu's hasty exodus. We all rolled off triumphantly to quarters in the Missions Building, of all places—a place which I dare say never saw such jolly times as we were provided by Rayna and Milly with kind assistance of a large appreciative group of male visitors currently including Vincent Sheean, Earl Browder, Tom Mann, Jacques Doriot, and other delegates to the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference then in progress.

By day we interviewed government leaders or inspected propaganda factories or dropped in at the offices of the daily *People's Tribune*. Rayna had worked with Eugene Chen to start this Nationalist organ in her and Bill's home in Peking, later moving it down to Hankow. By night we gathered in Rayna's apartment to listen to classical records on her phonograph or join with an ex-I.W.W. (whom I had seen sentenced to prison by Judge Landis in Chicago years before) in singing "There'll Be Pie in the Sky When You Die!" It was more like an excited lot of college freshmen than a real revolution complete with blood. The story of red-haired Rayna was not typical, yet it was illuminating. When I first knew her in America she had been the young wife of Samson Raphaelson, whose

Jazz Singer was the first successful talkie, with Al Jolson. I read its script at Hankow in a copy sent Rayna by Raph. They had separated some years earlier, and she first went to China as a student of comparative religions. Returning to America, she went out again with her second husband, Bill Prohme, a liberal character though formerly a Hearst editorial writer. Bill had a t.b. relapse in Peking while working on the *Leader* and his temporary incapacitation caused her to look for a job. Chen needed an American to join with him in starting a Canton-backed daily. Thus, contrary to the impression of Sheean and many others, she was utterly without revolutionary background but keenly enthusiastic over China's Nationalist cause—as were we all. There was then no question of party. Everybody in the news-gathering group supported the Kuomintang. But there was a strong tendency to be interested in its Communist wing, because that was providing the steam as compared with the more cautious conservatives.

"The workers and the peasants should be armed!" was a remark frequently heard. That was one of many debated points. Trotskyite critics later were to declare that Borodin's refusal to endorse such a policy, which was strongly opposed by the old-line Kuomintang members, was responsible for the eventual unseating of his Chinese supporters and himself, the Chinese Communist split away from the Kuomintang, and the Communists' subsequent long years in the wilderness. But Borodin, with whom I frequently talked, was cautious; he was forever resisting efforts to put him into executive authority. "This is a Chinese revolutionary movement, and Chinese should run it," he repeatedly told me, and he sought union within the party and its leadership. So in Canton he had tried to delay military operations until there could be extension and solidification of sound governmental practice, another manifestation of this same canny attitude.

It was curious to find this supposedly radical Russian actually holding back his impulsive Chinese colleagues. Eugene Chen loved to exercise his excellent Oxford English in tirades against the "medieval mentalities" of reactionary comrades from whom he was separated even by the barrier of language—he spoke no Chinese. Most appealing of all those in Hankow was Madame Sun, beautiful and shy, yet driven by tremendous inner fires. Everyone who knew her

loved and deeply respected her. Rayna was particularly close to this remarkable person, who for her part was indulgently sympathetic toward the fiery young American enthusiast. Neither was a Communist, but both were interested in changing old Chinese social, economic, and political structures for the benefit of the suffering masses whose plight all about us in those war days pressed on us painfully. One of my last chats with Rayna, on a spring day when, to snatch a few moments apart, we had found a secluded bench by the river front, centered about the lack both of us felt in mental preparation for true understanding of the tremendous things happening about us.

"You know," Rayna remarked, "I have never even read any Marx. Yet these American fellow countrymen of mine here in Hankow, missionaries and business people who walk around me on the sidewalk as though I were a leper, think I am a trained revolutionary with a bomb in each pocket! Anyway, I am going to learn—I am going to study Marx and all the others, as soon as I can."

Time was pressing harder than we knew. That summer Rayna was to slip downriver with Madame Sun, pause briefly in Shanghai, where we talked by phone as I passed through on my way to Manila, then go to Moscow, where, within a short time, she died suddenly of a rare and extraordinary ailment. Bill, her husband who had served the Nationalist cause in Shanghai, was in Manila with me at the time of her death (his mail watched by five different espionage organizations, we learned). Contrary to what some have thought, he and Rayna were very dependent on each other. Anna Louise Strong cabled me to break the news to Bill. It was a terrible task. Waiting only to receive her last letters, he went to Moscow to get Rayna's ashes. After wandering almost the rest of the way round the world and again ill with tuberculosis, he killed himself in Honolulu on the anniversary of Rayna's death. By that time we were all deeply depressed over the apparent failure of the Chinese revolution, a point of view Sheean well expressed in his autobiographical *Personal History*. The book made Rayna known to many thousands, though it deeply annoyed Bill, who loved Rayna so much that he utterly failed in efforts to write of her himself. Before he died he carefully destroyed all his papers bearing on Rayna, which the book publishers' representatives considered a grievous personal loss.

But in Hankow that spring it was still not certain that the revolution was running aground. However, we had intimations. One was the failure of controls, through which the government sought to ameliorate disturbed economic conditions. A fiat paper currency had been issued in a country used to metal or notes backed by metal, so the banks promptly closed; when I called on the American manager, A. D. Calhoun, of the National City Bank, I had to go in the back door. If one entered a shop it was to find only bare shelves, because the shopkeepers had learned that refusal to accept the Kuomintang paper money often led to beheading or shooting of the merchant out by his own front door. But even the barest shop had goods put away under the counter, and the way to lure those goods forth was to slap down silver Chinese or Mexican dollars or Shanghai banknotes! It was a liberal education, which I find still useful.

Too soon, I had to leave Hankow, only imperfectly realizing that its exciting part in current politics was almost played. On July 14, 1927, the *People's Tribune* issued its closing edition. The first issue had been just in time to "splash" the Shanghai disorders of May 30, 1926. This final number boldly played up a statement by Madame Sun, suppressed in other papers, which began:

We have reached a point where definition is necessary and where some members of the party executive are so defining the principles and policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen that they seem to me to do violence to Dr. Sun's ideals and ideas. Feeling thus, I must dissociate myself from active participation in carrying out the new policies of the party.

In the last analysis, all revolutions must be social revolutions, based upon fundamental changes in society; otherwise it is not a revolution, but merely a change of government.

Madame Sun then pointed out that her late husband's third vital principle, that of the Livelihood of the People, was at stake in the existing crisis. It was emphasized that Dr. Sun had felt this principle to be basic in the revolution. (Today this thought is still to the fore in Madame Sun's thinking, although the necessity for a united front against Japan forbade her departure from the National Government ranks while the war continued.) Her statement went on:

In this principle we find his analysis of social values and the place of the laboring and peasant classes defined. These classes become the

basis of our strength in our struggle to overthrow imperialism, cancel the unequal treaties that enslave us, and effectively unify the country. These are the new pillars for the building up of a free China. Without their support the Kuomintang, as a revolutionary party, becomes weak and chaotic and illogical in its social platform; without their support, political issues are vague. If we adopt any policy that weakens these supports, we shake the very foundations of our party, betray the masses, and are falsely loyal to our leader. . . . We must not betray the people. We have built up in them a great hope. They have placed in us a great faith. . . .

Dr. Sun was poor. Not until he was fifteen years old did he have shoes for his feet, and he lived in a hilly region where it is not easy to be a barefoot boy. His family, until he and his brother were grown, lived almost from hand to mouth in a hut. As a child he ate the cheapest food—not rice, for rice was too dear. His main nourishment was sweet potatoes.

Many times Dr. Sun told me that it was in those early days as a poor son of a peasant family that he became a revolutionary. He was determined that the lot of the Chinese peasant should not continue to be so wretched, that little boys in China should have shoes to wear and rice to eat. For this ideal he gave forty years of his life.

Yet today the lot of the Chinese peasant is even more wretched than in those days when Dr. Sun was driven by his great sense of human wrongs into a life of revolution. And today men who profess to follow his banner talk of classes and think in terms of a "revolution" that would virtually disregard the sufferings of those millions. . . .

With those words Madame Sun left Hankow and China. She spoke for the leftists in general. Nanking made no reply. It was busy building a governmental structure that would work in its way, though that way wasn't what Madame Sun, or Eugene Chen, or the Chinese Communists, or Borodin and Galen, could go along with. The structure was based on bankers and industrialists, not workers and peasants. It would use anything that served its pragmatic purpose—Madame Sun was presently to be elected to the Central Executive Committee, for example, during her absence from the country and despite her bitterly expressed oppositionism. The body of Dr. Sun was to be brought to Nanking by men whom his widow regarded as falsely cloaking themselves in his mantle. After she had participated in the reinterment, she retired to Dr.

Sun's green-shuttered house in the Shanghai French Concession and refused to participate in Nanking's administration despite repeated efforts to win her over. Once a government official called and in exasperation told her: "If you were anyone but Madame Sun, we would cut your head off." Whereupon she smiled cheerily at her sullen visitor and retorted: "If you were the revolutionists you pretend to be, you'd cut it off anyway!"

Meanwhile the Kuomintang as a whole had been left with this dilemma: That Chiang Kai-shek's arrangements at Shanghai, which set up a new government at Nanking, were in essence not a party accomplishment but a *coup* by a military chief with the acquiescence or, in the case of the French, the active co-operation of certain foreign Powers, big bankers, industrialists, and landlords. It was for the party to choose whether to go along or not. Many went instantly, without question—they had had quite enough of revolution as tinged by communism. Others, such as Madame Sun's favorite brother Finance Minister T. V. Soong, went slower and more reluctantly. They felt that as between Nanking and communism there was only one choice. And things seemed to have come to that.

The National Government, as in token of accomplishment the new grouping at Nanking chose to be called instead of the former "Nationalist," was keenly aware of a need to placate the foreign Powers. It believed that China's recovery of political, territorial, and economic sovereignty could now be achieved by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means, though it jealously held to the term "revolution" and began to call the Communists (by this time in armed opposition from their Central China base) "counter-revolutionary." It felt that the way to build a strong China was not by inflaming the country further but by calming it down.

There could be honest difference of opinion in all this. If the more idealistic felt that reaction had emerged, and that the lot of the poor peasantry could never be improved through such tactics, there were on the other hand plenty of conservative realists, as they saw themselves, who knew that even the battle against war-lordism was not yet won and who felt that progress of the country as a whole dictated the new line. They pointed out that Dr. Sun had opposed the doctrine of class war. They felt that trust of such countries as

America and Britain must be enlisted and their positive support gained. If that meant separation from the Chinese Communists, so much the better; if it meant war with the Communists, those latter must be crushed.

The job of crushing the Communists proved harder than expected. Going into areas where they knew that the peasantry had suffered terrible oppression from their landlords, the Reds had taken drastic steps to win support of the masses whose problems they already knew. As secretary of the Kuomintang Peasants' Committee in 1926 Mao Tse-tung had gathered land statistics for areas within twenty-one provinces. These showed that poor peasants, aggregating 65 per cent of the rural population, at that time owned only 10 to 15 per cent of the cultivatable land, while 10 per cent of the rural population, comprising resident and absentee landlords together with officials, rich peasants, and moneylenders, owned about 70 per cent, while a remaining approximately 15 per cent was held by the "middle peasantry." This situation was rapidly leading to rural bankruptcy, since it was accompanied by nothing to help the people.

Among desperate folk, desperate measures win popularity. The Communists in Kiangsi province rested their future on support of the poor peasants. They didn't hesitate to use drastic means to satisfy the people's demand for an agrarian New Deal. If the means were violent, so were the times in general. Nanking's armies drove against the new regime based on Juikin, and this fought back with support of a peasantry which now found itself owner of the land. Old title deeds had been burned, landlords had been driven out or killed.

This was not communism in any textbook sense. There had been no collectivization, to say nothing of any tie with the industrial proletariat of the cities. All that had been done was to turn over the land to new owners and to introduce local democratic organs of self-government. With it had been widespread terror and bloodshed, often accompanied by cruel banditry on the part of rural gangsters of no political creed who took advantage of Communist ideology to besiege and murder the rich for their own selfish gain. But on balance, the peasants found gains and hope in the Communists. Caught in a vicious feudal strangle hold, they were at last

catching their economic breath, and if the process meant physical death for their oppressors—so much the better! The government's task of fighting Communists backed by the local population thus resembled Japan's task, from 1937, in fighting a united China.

Meanwhile the Kuomintang had scarcely completed its overthrow of northern war-lordism when there was Japan's Manchuria adventure of 1931 to cope with. Clearly Nanking was in no position to wage war on two fronts. So it hopefully put Japan's aggression up to the League of Nations and continued to go after the Communists. Gradually the new Government was building something which approximated a modern military machine. This was not risked in an armed opposition to the much stronger Japanese, who in 1933 pressed down from newly created "Manchukuo" to invade North China and set up a puppet autonomous regime there under Yin Ju-keng. It was significant that in their gesture the Japanese made a covert bid for Nanking friendship by naming Yin's wretched structure the "East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." They claimed to be, like Nanking, "restoring order and fighting the Reds." But though Nanking was fighting Communists, it was well able to distinguish the true nature of what Japan had set up in the North, and the fake of their collaborative pretexts. At the same time it was highly paradoxical that Nanking fought fellow Chinese in Kiangsi while refraining from forceful resistance against the Japanese and their puppets. This was an opportunistic policy necessary in Nanking's view, but productive of much bitterness, and of claims that Chiang never would oppose Japan; that he was so rabidly anti-Communist as to have been taken in by Nipponese anti-Communist propaganda.

Amidst this general confusion another separatist regime suddenly rose in 1934 at the sleepy tea port of Foochow, south of Shanghai. Heading it was General Tsai Ting-kai, who had fought the Japanese at Shanghai in 1932, and with him as Foreign Minister was Eugene Chen from Hankow. Tentative overtures were made for a joining of hands with the Communists inland. But Tsai, Chen, and Co. lacked two things—really positive political-economic convictions (except a feeling that Nanking wasn't the heart's desire) and the support of the people. They let their underlings start collection of oppressive new taxes in Foochow, and what Fukien province as

a whole heard of them it didn't like. I visited Foochow and saw this, though finding Chen persuasive as always. Wanting help from the Communists if help could be had, they still shrunk fastidiously from political unity with the Communists. Suddenly from Nanking modern American bombing planes swooped down on Tsai's forces—and the rebellion was at an end.

Chen slipped off to France, then back to seclusion in Kowloon, to be captured by the Japanese there with the fall of Hong Kong. He was taken to Shanghai, resisted efforts to force him into collaboration with the enemy, and died in 1944 loyal to those whom he had earlier opposed—not reconciled to them wholly, but glad that they were fighting Japan. Tsai was in hospital when war broke out in 1937, but as soon as possible he offered himself to the United Front national cause. This was typical of how politics became a dead issue when finally the country pulled itself together to resist Japan.

Before this time the gradually tightening ring of Nanking forces had squeezed the Communists out of Kiangsi and off on their historic "long march" to the Northwest. In December of 1936 they occupied Yen-an, northern Shensi, making it their capital, which it remained through the war. No such 1500-mile removal could have been possible without the collaboration of the people among whom they passed. So this adventure underscored the fact that they had solidified their hold upon the peasant masses. But at the same time Nanking had been seeking to unify the country under itself by other means and with much greater resources. It was also stalling off Japan by various purchases of time at the expense of sovereignty, for example the Tangku Truce and the much-criticized Ho-Umetsu Agreement. This latter, completed by General Ho Ying-chin, was felt to have signed away much of North China. For many a later year it was to plague General Ho through his War Ministership when the very fact that he finally led resistance to Japan seemed to his friends sufficient defense against assertions that he was personally pro-Japanese. But name calling and other forms of insult are a good old habit not unique to China, though raised to the status of high art there.

(If a Chinese steps up to his enemy and inquires in a most casual manner whether it will rain tomorrow, he has uttered a fighting word. Why? From a Chinese point of view, it's simple, and it's art.

For the turtle is considered the only animal which can foretell the weather; therefore to imply that a person can foretell the weather is correspondingly to imply that he is a turtle, grown from a turtle's egg. And an erroneous but firmly held Chinese belief is that turtles have abnormal sex habits, which make it no compliment to be called a turtle's egg. The foregoing is an example of the more complex, old-fashioned, and relatively polite ways of applying epithets in China. One of the Communists' contributions to contemporary Chinese life is to follow the Russian, or American, plan of calling names with a brutal directness. In 1945 Communist headquarters in Generalissimo Chiang's own capital of Chungking called Chiang a dictator, a despot, and a lunatic.)

The Kuomintang was employing brains and scientific skill in attacking a variety of problems in those mid-1930 days. Whether Nanking was politically reactionary or no, the fact was obvious that everywhere new roads were built, for example; this was one of the reasons the Communists were compelled to move, for over such roads the modernized personal troops of Chiang Kai-shek thrust in to the attack with weapons heavier than anything the Reds could muster. Such roads were often built with unwilling conscript labor, but they *were* built, and in time these much-needed communications arteries paid off for the country as a whole by facilitating processes of order, suppressing banditry, and moving essential supplies. Similarly waterways were improved, flood control and irrigation works were started, and there were advances in such fields as the co-operative movement and rural hygiene, together with such educational experiments as Jimmy Yen's thousand-character movement.

Industry grew at Shanghai and elsewhere. It was a whirling, semichaotic period in which many things were debatable but one thing seemed clear—China was in certain limited respects making solid progress toward modernity.

The limitations were self-apparent. Rule was by one party. At times it developed tendencies of somewhat fascist character. This was evidenced not merely by restriction of individual expression, the press, and popular assemblage, but by economic moves disturbing to Chinese private business and foreign enterprise alike. Examples included the monopolization of the tea and wood-oil trades and by the establishment of an official Shanghai fish market aided by

gangster tactics against private competitors. These things were regarded as significant of a trend which was to receive a setback first by the start of full-dress war with Japan within a few months, and finally late in 1944 by the announcement of a liberalized new economic policy which will be dealt with at length in Chapter 12.

Putting the matter bluntly, about the early part of 1937 foreign observers, especially among the Shanghai business community, found their initial enthusiasm for the "safe and sane" Kuomintang regime beginning to cool because it was feared that the Government was "getting too big for its breeches." An additional cause for worry was that despite Japan's acquisition of Manchuria and control of most of North China, the Chinese were trading quite freely with the Japanese again. Despite the fact that war with Japan broke out halfway through the year, 1937 registered a record high for both imports and exports; and the over-all official totals for 1938 show that Japan had then ousted both America and Great Britain for leadership in each category.

Figures for 1938 show the Japanese holding top trade position with an export-import total (expressed in Chinese national currency, or "CN") of CN \$326,000,000, up CN \$91,000,000; the United States second with CN \$328,000,000, down CN \$182,000,000; Germany third—the German trade rise had also been significant and alarming—with CN \$169,000,000, down CN \$50,000,000; and Britain fourth with CN \$127,000,000, down CN \$65,000,000. Japan held 23.49 per cent of China's imports and 15.26 per cent of her exports as compared with 16.93 and 11.37 per cent, respectively, for America.

The Kuomintang had the internal political situation thoroughly in hand, for there was no effective rival in sight. Certainly the Communists did not so classify, nor, as will be made clear, did any other minority. Only the Communists, by virtue of having an army, were in the picture at all. They did not make a bid for foreign recognition or national leadership, then or later. Evidence of that fact came to light when I visited formerly "Red" Kiangsi province in early 1935, shortly after the Communists had been driven out. I was startled to find, both by the evidence given me and by the measures being taken by the National Government to win adherence of the people, that whatever might be the ultimate aspirations of the Communists,

what they had practiced in Kiangsi certainly was not orthodox communism.

There had been violence, but it was hard to tell how much traced back to the forcible wresting of land from the landlords, how much was pure banditry sometimes given the Communist label, and how much was part of the great civil war which had raged for years. Not all destruction had stemmed from the Communists. The people said that some burning and other wreckage was due to the former "White" soldiery. Generalissimo Chiang's troops, then in occupation, appeared to be efficient and well disciplined. The Reds had operated a nation within a nation, complete with hammer-and-sickle-stamped coinage, a postal system, an army, new laws on labor and marriage and many other vital subjects—almost everything but landlords, who had been killed or chased out, and land title deeds, which had been burned and the land divided for ownership by those who tilled it.

What Nanking now sought to provide was a "model province," restoring that which had been destroyed in as great a degree as possible (including replacement of the old title deeds) and additionally providing a great deal that was new. I saw the beginning of "welfare centers" designed to take in a wide variety of educational, health, economic, and social functions. The New Life Movement, which struck me as rather prissy and blue-nosed in some of its aspects, was certainly giving the people new standards of personal cleanliness and self-respect. Mass education went hand in hand with rural co-operatives designed to assist in purchase and marketing and to break the grip of the rural usurers. Now part of this was to help a population which had undergone much suffering; but part of it, too, was to compete with certain reforms through which the Reds appeared to have gained their mass support. Full evidence to judge the Reds was lacking, but for the National Government this represented advance. It seemed too bad that some fundamental solution of the land problem was not being attempted by Nanking. But otherwise it was a case of competition being the "life of trade." Whatever the Reds had done, the Kuomintang was trying to improve on it. Who could quarrel with that?

The unexpected, melodramatic "Sian Affair" at the end of 1936 laid a way for renewed coalition between Kuomintang and Com-

munists. Already on August 31, 1935, the then Chinese Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party had issued a "Declaration on Unity" pointing out the rising menace of Japan and putting forward a ten-point proposed national program. This included: Resistance to Japanese invasion and the recovery of lost territories; assistance to the famine-stricken and undertaking of extensive river conservancy; tax reductions and financial reorganization; improved living conditions of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, teachers, etc.; "exercise of democratic rights and liberation of all political prisoners," and other changes. With characteristic communistic lack of tact this manifesto went out of its way to indulge in name calling of men who might have been open to persuasion but hardly prepared to yield to such verbal bludgeoning. Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei (then high in the National Government), Chang Hsueh-liang, "and other traitors" were termed "a handful of corrupt elements who have 'human faces but beastly hearts'!"

It is typical of the surprises likely to overtake observers of the China scene that at Sian on December 12, 1936, a short year and a half later, Generalissimo Chiang was taken prisoner by a subordinate who had been linked with him in the foregoing (Chang Hsueh-liang, formerly of Mukden), held for thirteen days during which the "Young Marshal" from Manchuria worked to persuade his chief that the Communists were right, and finally allowed to return freely to Nanking. There, convinced of Communist sincerity at last, the Generalissimo set in train events which led to a new United Front and to war with Japan in mid-1937.

Few nations have on record any incident as bizarre. Yet things worked out finally in an essentially sensible fashion, as was agreed by everyone concerned—in itself a truly Chinese occurrence, and one which lends hope to hearts sometimes grown faint by long waiting through any given muddled situation in China.

From the purely political point of view, the great consequence of Chiang's kidnaping was both to promote and to disclose unity. In the first category came the reachievement of a Kuomintang-Communist entente. In the second was the fact that word of Chiang's jeopardy brought assurances of allegiance and solidarity from all directions, including such provinces as Shansi, Shantung,

Hopei, and Kwangtung. Support for Chiang even came from the Chinese "puppets" of Japan's Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

Thus by early 1937 Chiang knew that the country was with him. Other minority groups less outlawed than the Communists had been pressing for war with Japan. Nanking knew that its preparations were not yet complete, but it was plain that the moment of full collaboration for the purpose of war with Japan had come.

Naturally not everything happening behind the political scenes could as yet be candidly revealed, lest Japan strike the sooner. But in September of 1937, after the war was in full swing, declarations on successive days by the Communists (September 22) and Generalissimo Chiang (September 23) gave notice to all that Chinese unity had been restored for the sake of resistance to Japan. These statements also revealed the terms of Kuomintang-Communist entente. We now reach a point where events—notably pressure on the Government for resistance to Japan—enlarge China's political problem to take in minorities other than the Communists and lead us to consider this whole issue in larger terms than Kuomintang vs. Communists. But it is worth while to note the conditions of this get-together of the two armed groups.

The Communists in their declaration stated that they had, "on the basis of peace and national unity and joint resistance against foreign aggression, reached an understanding with the Kuomintang" toward "concerted effort for overcoming the national emergency." The Communist Central Executive Committee proposed general objectives for "the common struggle of the entire people," including first the swift launching of a national revolutionary campaign to recover lost territories and restore the integrity of territorial sovereign rights; next, to "enforce democracy based on the people's rights and convoke the National People's Congress in order to enact the Constitution and decide upon the plans of national salvation"; and finally to "improve the well-being and enrich the livelihood of the Chinese people by relieving famines and other calamities, stabilizing the people's livelihood, consolidating national defense and economy, removing the sufferings of the people and bettering their living conditions."

In order to deprive Japan of any pretext that her campaign was to free China from communistic menaces, the Communists then

declared that "the San Min Chu I [Three Principles of the People] enunciated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen is the paramount need of China today. This party is ready to strive for its enforcement."

Further, "this party abandons its policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang of China by force and the movement of sovietization and discontinues its policy of forcible confiscation of land from landlords."

The party announced abolition of the Chinese Soviet Government "and will enforce democracy based on the people's rights in order to unify the national political machinery." Finally:

"This Party abolishes the Red Army, reorganizes it into the National Revolutionary Army, places it under the direct control of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government, and awaits orders for mobilization to share the responsibility of resisting foreign invasion at the front." This last led to a government-controlled Eighth Route Army and later the New Fourth Army which, in an early 1941 squabble, was attacked and partially disarmed by Kuomintang-controlled forces, in what proved the start of a fresh Kuomintang-Communist division. The break was as complete as that of 1927, but it involved a blockade of the Communist northwest areas by Chungking and was never without dangerous potentialities of renewed civil war.

On the following day (September 23, 1937) Generalissimo Chiang made his statement which was a comment on the Communist utterance. With tactful understatement such as the Reds seldom emulate, Chiang said that "during the past ten years not all of our countrymen have had a sincere and unwavering faith in the Three Principles of the People, nor have they fully realized the magnitude of the crisis confronting our country." However, "those who have in the past doubted the Three Principles have now realized the paramount importance of our national interests, and have buried their differences for the sake of internal unity."

The Generalissimo then paid tribute to the Communist manifesto as "an outstanding instance of the triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration." Its decisions represented, he felt, "essential conditions for mobilizing our national strength in order that we may meet the menace from without and guarantee our own national existence," and he added that "the Chinese Communist

party, by surrendering its prejudices, has clearly recognized the vital importance of our national independence and welfare. I sincerely hope that all members of the Communist party will faithfully and unitedly put into practice the various decisions reached. . . ."

This love feast was joined by all groups and individuals. Already, as has been indicated, the Communists had ceased to be the only outstanding minority group; indeed, many months before the war with Japan began there had been bold heckling of the Kuomintang regime by such organizations as the National Salvationists. Nanking's imprisonment of certain leading objectors created around these a halo of martyrdom in no wise relished by a government which still attempted to call itself "revolutionary." The beginning of united resistance immediately resolved all these problems and soothed the irritated skin of the body politic. When within a few months once more dissatisfactions began to mount, it was no longer the Communists alone against the Kuomintang. The issue became that of One-Party Rule vs. The Rest. And of this "rest," by the time of restored peace the Communists were but one section. None of the dissenters had ballots. The Reds stood out because they had bullets.

5

"PIE IN THE SKY"

AT HANKOW in the brave days of 1927 a familiar hymn tune with new words often rang out of an evening from Rayna Prohme's apartment in the Missions Building. The words were cynical: "Work and pray, live on hay, there'll be pie in the sky when you die." Originally this song came from the American "wobblies," the Industrial Workers of the World, an extremist labor union impatient with methods of slow reform. In Hankow many of the foreign correspondents thought the song appropriate as satire on the slow-evolution ideas of the Kuomintang's conservative faction.

As the years passed, I often thought afterward of this song. It rather patly expressed the whole idea of the unexpectedly protracted Period of Tutelage in China. Dr. Sun had laid down a three-step program of national development, starting with a period of military unification, continuing with a period during which the Kuomintang was to instruct the country toward eventual political maturity, and finally reaching a stage of constitutional rule. Thus the goal of constitutionalism was always concrete, yet as emergency followed emergency that goal kept vanishing into the future. One-party rule by the Kuomintang remained as present a reality in China as one-party rule by the Bolsheviks in Russia, or by the Nazis in Germany, or by the Fascists in Italy; and in the minds of the democratically disposed it began to be clouded with opprobrium.

The National Government was not initially slow in proceeding with fulfillment of Dr. Sun's program. It adopted a Provisional Constitution as early as 1931. That, with certain changes, remained the basis for governmental administration through years to come.

But in late 1932 and under prodding by Dr. Sun's son Sun Fo, the Central Executive Committee concluded to prepare for establishment of a permanent constitution. A National Congress was to be convoked in 1935 to adopt a constitution. But before the time arrived it was announced that there would be a postponement, first of many which were to occur in that connection. Meanwhile, however, the Legislative Yuan went to work early in 1933. After more than three years of toil entailing seven revisions, the draft of this document was made public May 5, 1936.

It was announced that the constitution-approving People's Congress would meet in November 1937. But hostilities with Japan began in midsummer of that year, at a time when about half of the nearly seventeen hundred delegates had been chosen. The session was indefinitely postponed. By vote of the Central Executive Committee, Generalissimo Chiang was given powers as commander in chief "to unify the command of all party, political, and military matters and shoulder the responsibility of bringing about a successful conclusion of both military resistance and economic reconstruction." It was further remarked that "the whole nation has now rallied under his command," a point having reference not only to the Communists but to other groups about to be mentioned. As to constitutionalism, that seemed for the time being to have become a thoroughly dead duck. Fighting the foe naturally came first. However, a 1943 statement of the Central Executive Committee promised that constitutional government would be achieved a year after termination of the war. This seemed the final word until Generalissimo Chiang's sensational New Year message to the people of China on January 1, 1945, in which he altered this position and promised constitutional government before the end of the war. Yet soon the opposition was alleging Kuomintang hand-picking of delegates and the Communists were calling for a complete boycott of the National Assembly.

Had constitutionalism remained the sole issue, it is doubtful whether any conspicuous opposition other than the Communists would have emerged. But with the beginning of the period of active Japanese aggression in the early autumn of 1931, many Chinese felt that the issue of passivity or resistance was the great one. After all, if Japan were finally to gobble the whole of China, it wouldn't

matter much whether Chinese democracy flourished or not during the period of the last bite or two. In fact, a state of emergency usually tightens the grip of some single party. The disadvantage of the Kuomintang was that although in power, it was not yet in position to give satisfaction to the hotheads by putting up a fight. The inadequacies of China's armies, and indeed of her whole national structure, were quite apparent to National Government leaders but they hesitated to explain too frankly. I recall that Nathaniel Peffer after a visit to China wrote candid advice, in a magazine article, that China should avoid conflict with Japan until such time as she had gained greater strength—for which friendly tip he drew fiery denunciations from many Chinese quarters.

North China in particular, which first felt the far from benevolent Japanese touch, became disheartened with Chiang, the National Government, and the Kuomintang. I found myself defending Nanking. Correspondents of the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, including missionaries in the interior, had written us that the National Government was making quiet preparations at various points. Camouflaged fortifications were being built at railway junctions, munitions and foodstuffs were being stored at a variety of strategic places; these things indicated resistance to come. But we could not reveal such tidings in our newspaper, nor could the Government explain what was projected to the students and others, burning Chiang in effigy at Peiping. Cries of "Traitor!" began to be directed at the Generalissimo from many quarters.

Among the leading groups which became vocal was the All-China Federation of National Salvation Unions. Meeting at Sian, it adopted a manifesto on May 31, 1936, which summed up the desire of many Chinese patriots for resistance to Japan based on internal unity. The manifesto began with the following paragraph:

Since "September 18th" [1931—the date was well known to all by now] China has experienced four years and eight months of suffering. During this period Japanese imperialism has on the one hand blinded the powers of Europe and America with the smoke screen of the establishment of a military base for an attack upon the Soviet Union. [Actually Japan hadn't said such a thing, but her border clashes with the Russians, and her loud generalized attacks on communism in general, were no doubt designed to give such impression to victims of

wishful thinking.] On the other hand it has lured our authorities into the trap of "joint suppression of communism," at the same time that it seizes from us a territory of 1,680,000 square kilometers, covering six provinces, enslaving sixty million of our people, and killing more than 300,000.

The manifesto went on in this vein at length. The National Salvationists had repeatedly advocated, it declared, that all military units of the country should put an end to civil war and instead of killing their own countrymen and wasting the national strength, "take prompt action to unite to fight the enemy." It was further advocated that the whole nation should mobilize, that economic relations with Japan should be broken off, that smuggling (Japanese-fostered extensively in North China at this time) should be "fundamentally suppressed" and that China should carry on a "war of resistance." Such talk appealed to the country, smarting as it was under a sense of deepening humiliation and wrong. At the same time National Government armies supposed to be carrying on unending "punitive campaigns" against the Chinese Communists were beginning to feel that it was indeed wasteful to be battling their fellow Chinese while taking no apparent measures to cope with the "island monkeys" who were overflowing and polluting their land.

That was the background of the Sian Affair already briefly described. Fighting on the part of forces under such former Manchuria leaders as the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang and his subordinate, General Yang Hu-chen, had diminished. Royal Leonard, American pilot to the Young Marshal, says that the Generalissimo had gone to Sian for consultation and that there Marshal Chang told Chiang not only that captured Communists were proving pretty decent people, but also that his Manchurian troops were so enraged against the Japanese that they were seriously considering union with the Communists in order to fight Japan. Bear in mind that Marshal Chang and his men were from an occupied land, out of which they had retired unresistingly before the Japanese in compliance with orders from Nanking, and that they had now had ample time to see that the League was not going to recover their "lost territories" for them. This Sian incident, it will be recalled, finally culminated in a forced detention of the Generalissimo in order that he might be made to listen to arguments he at first resisted. According to Leon-

ard, the windup of the affair should be viewed in the light of a re-kidnaping of the Generalissimo for deliverance by the Young Marshal against the will of the latter's subordinates. Chiang and his ex-captor flew back to Nanking, where Chiang Kai-shek conspicuously demonstrated for the first, but not the last, time that he was more flexible in his mental processes than most of those about him. His attitude had basically altered. He had become convinced that China should and could be united to fight Japan.

Unluckily, the Young Marshal now lost his personal liberty in the course of winning his argument. W. H. Donald, a remarkable Australian ex-newspaperman who had earlier broken Marshal Chang of his use of narcotics and who was present at the main events both in Sian and Nanking, later told me that it was the blunt candor of Chang which "dished" him. At a general conference in Nanking after Chang and Chiang had flown there, Chang said in effect that he was loyal to the Generalissimo and trusted him but could find no trust in his heart for others of the Nanking chiefs. After that, the best that could be done for Chang even by the Generalissimo was to have him exiled to an honorable imprisonment in remote Kweichow. His support was inadequate to make him the rallying point for any new group.

The Young Marshal was not the only Japanese hater who was to suffer imprisonment. There was the matter of the "Seven Gentlemen," members of the National Salvationists already mentioned, whose abuse of Nanking became so terrific in late 1936 that they were jailed till after the start of hostilities. This affair kicked up a terrific storm in the Chinese newspapers. Demonstrations against both Japan and the Chinese Government began to develop all over the country, especially among the students, who, among other things, stopped trains and insisted on free passage to the capital so that they could air their demands for national resistance. Madame Sun Yat-sen was a prominent supporter of the National Salvationists.

Other political groups had sprung up at various times around various objectives, although during the period preceding the United Front they were in a state of considerable repression. As far back as 1923 the Young China Party (Kuo-chia-chu-yi-pai) was organized in Paris on a program of intensive nationalism, radical social legislation, and a democratic form of government. It preferred to be

known by its French name, *Républicain Nationaliste Parti de la Jeune Chine*. Desiring unification of Chinese affairs and putting state welfare above any political parties, this group was opposed both to capitalism and communism; control should be exercised over predominant capitalists and big landowners, it felt, and there should be state control over huge industrial enterprises, adoption of labor insurance, restriction of inheritance, and other social-economic changes coupled with a protectionist policy so far as other nations were concerned. Some compared it with the Italian Fascists. This, the Young China leaders vehemently declared, was wrong, since the Fascists practiced aggression abroad and despotism at home, to both of which the Chinese group was opposed. This illustrates somewhat the risk of misunderstanding Chinese efforts toward thinking for themselves, and should put us on guard in the matter of too readily accepting familiar labels which in China may have special, localized application.

Nothing could illustrate this better than the case of the party known in English as the National Socialist Party, headed by Carsun Chang, a liberal professor of political science and philosophy. Not only has this party no resemblance whatever to the German Nazi group of the same name, but as James Shen has written—Hitler is a dictator, Carsun Chang is a dictator-hater! The Chinese name of this party is *Kuo-chia-sui-hui-tang*, which literally means the “State-Social-party.” Though it was organized in Peiping after Japan had invaded Manchuria, Carsun Chang’s thinking traced back to early association with scholars and reformers of the days of China’s first efforts toward the republic form in 1912–14. His desire is to head an “intellectual elite.”

Nationalism is advocated by this party on a basis of Dr. Sun’s teachings. The party program says:

We believe that nationalistic sentiments are stronger than class sentiments. . . . When the Japanese oppression has reached an unbearable degree, even capitalists and workers, two antagonistic classes of society, are forced to unite in a common effort to resist the enemy. . . . The U.S.S.R. . . . owes her success not so much to the spread of the class struggle throughout the world as to the nationalistic character of her socialist reconstruction.

Socialism is also advocated, but the institution of private property is recognized with economic enterprises subject to government planning—an attitude again based on Dr. Sun's teachings, and strikingly in the line of the 1944 "new economic policy" of the National Government. The National Socialists also advocate a "reformed form of democratic government," and their program would preclude the possibility of any political party's entrenching itself in the seat of power, an attitude strikingly pertinent to the general subject of one-party rule which by the mid-1940s had become a crucial issue in Free China.

In the spring of 1938 Carsun Chang on behalf of the National Socialists and Tso Shun-sheng on behalf of the Chinese Youth Party addressed letters to Generalissimo Chiang, expressing their groups' recognition of the war emergency and declaring themselves in wholehearted support of the National Government under Chiang's leadership. There was gracious response from the Generalissimo, accepting the principle of co-operation on a basis of Dr. Sun's principles. These and other minorities had already been granted places on the National Defense Advisory Council, subordinate to the Supreme National Defense Council which had been created in succession to the former Central Political Council (link between Kuomintang and National Government) shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. They were now given representation on the People's Political Council, which was gradually to emerge, in default of an arrival of constitutionalism, as the greatest wartime forum for public criticism. The Communists have been among those represented on the P.P.C., and even in the midst of the Kuomintang-Communist dissensions of early 1945 they were included in a general increase of membership, being given eight seats in place of the four previously held though not always occupied.

Other political groups also existed. One of the most important though least known was the "Third party," regarded by some as adhering closely to original revolutionary Kuomintang principles and known by various other names, including Farmer-Labor party. It split off, like the Communists, at the time of the Kuomintang swing toward the right in 1927. Again, there were adherents to a Social Democratic party. Two groups devoted to agrarian improvement on

a model less strenuous than that of the Communists were the Rural Reconstructionists, including such men as the mass educator "Jimmy" Yen and devoted to economic-educational reconstruction of the villages, and the Vocational Educational Group, comprising persons interested in the Kiangsu province vocational schools.

It has never up to the present been easy in China to draw firm distinction between political party and clique. The distinguishing characteristic, presumably, is possession by a party of a program and a membership. But in periods when the parties were kept under tight restrictions it was obviously impossible to claim many adherents. In 1940 James Shen wrote that leaders of the Young China party claimed (and many outsiders believed) that in Szechuen province, seat of the wartime capital, its following was greater than that of the Kuomintang. Even the Kuomintang has never had large membership; John Gunther's efforts to check up during his China visit of 1938 indicated that it then had perhaps one hundred thousand members, of whom some twenty thousand were the active cadre. The confusing thing is that many Chinese support or work for the Kuomintang who are not party members, while many within the Kuomintang tend to follow individual leaders of cliques or parties more or less apart from the Kuomintang.

Thus there is within the Kuomintang the "C. C. Clique" under two prominent conservative Kuomintang officials, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu. Gunther has called the C. C. P'ai "China's Tammany Hall," and it not only has been featured by much administration of party patronage, promotion of "Thought Control" efforts both within China and among Chinese students overseas, and opposition to the Communists, but it is said to maintain a secret police of its own—though none of China's several secret police groups is as powerful as Tai Li's machine operating under direction of the Military Affairs Commission. General Tai Li headed the terrorist Blue Shirts, which in theory didn't exist, but which used very material bullets at times for the eradication of "dangerous Reds." Nanking constantly insisted to the Shanghai newspapers that there was no such thing as a Blue Shirt. Certainly there was some gang group, close under Generalissimo Chiang, which was implacable in pursuing all his political foes, therefore a political weapon which no conscientious writer can ignore in striving to trace at least some of

the threads of these tumultuous times. But Tai Li is not a man to ask about or try to see. Boo!

More peaceful were such organizations as the Political Science Group (Cheng Hsueh Hsi) organized by Western-educated Chinese who desired to modernize the economic-political structure but which (as do the Communists still) favored decentralization as against the idea of a strongly centralized structure. Able General Chang Chun, governor of Szechuen, is a leading member. This group controlled provincial economic policies and was at odds with the centralized financial system of the National Government as administered for more than a decade by Dr. H. H. Kung. Further, Maxwell Stewart classifies Dr. Kung as head of a "Business-Banking Group, which, before the war, was moderately progressive in outlook." The loss of the wealthy ports, where industry centered, brought landlords and merchants of the interior into a stronger relative position. Again, no one can ignore the military "Whampoa Group," officers educated as Whampoa cadets in Kwangtung, with General Ho Ying-chin as a leading figure.

The foregoing may only confuse the reader to some degree, yet it is impossible to avoid this risk in driving home the grave error in the common assumption of a China with just two great factions, the Kuomintang and the Communists. Some of the other groups had paper programs at least equal to those of the Communists in social-economic experimentiveness. But for the most part they did little or nothing to implement those programs, or at any rate they were peaceful about it. On a trip into the Red areas in 1944, Harrison Forman found within Kuomintang territory the active administration of a program considerably more radical than any economic idea actually being put into effect by the blockaded Chinese Communists—Shansi province's "improvement on Marx," as Governor Yen Hsi-shan modestly called it. This scheme caused all produce to be turned in to a provincial Union Co-operative which issued "co-operative certificates" in payment, the value of commodities being judged in accordance with the labor required to produce them. Free trade and individualistic merchandising enterprise were "out." It was Mr. Forman's judgment that here, within Kuomintang China, was something with a greater resemblance to actual communism than anything practiced by those who called themselves Commu-

nists. If this confuses, again regard it as part of a process of opening your mind to the fallacy of trusting too much in labels!

The pistol-packing Communists at all stages stood out from the rest because they were armed, militant, and had physical control of large areas of China containing millions of Chinese. Estimates of their strength have varied widely, and the strength itself has varied at different periods. Guenther Stein wrote in early 1945 that the Communist-initiated "New Democracy" included a population of 90,000,000 as compared with 120,000,000 under Kuomintang rule, and more than 200,000,000 under Japanese-controlled puppet governments in Nanking, Peiping, and Manchuria. Figures in Chungking set the Communist strength at far less, but naturally the National Government is reluctant to go officially on record about areas under control of a group technically subordinate to itself; Floyd Taylor, in 1943-44 an American journalistic adviser to the Ministry of Information provided by the State Department, wrote early in 1945 that it seemed probable that the central government controlled at least four times as many inhabitants as the Communists. One of the arguments between Government and Communists is that in 1937 the Government recognized only 45,000 Communist troops although about 80,000 men had participated in the Long March, and Communist policy has been to multiply constantly the number of both regular soldiers and peasant guerrillas—a policy attacked by the Government as designed to build up Communist strength, but defended by the Communists as essential to mass prosecution of a people's war against Japan. Chungking's Chinese News Service in 1945 estimated Communist forces at 400,000. *Time* magazine said the Communists in mid-1945, just before Japan gave up, claimed to command 470,000 regular troops and over 2,000,000 guerrillas. As to Communist party membership, Stein in 1945 estimated it at 1,200,000 at the end of 1944—perhaps not far from that of the Kuomintang, on a basis of Sun Fo's statement that the latter numbers less than 1 per cent of China's whole population.

Any way you work out your personal conclusions on all this, there is no questioning the point that the Communists have a strength unique among the Chinese minority political groups, which must be regarded as competitive with that of the central regime and which must by some means be assimilated within the national structure if

any true unity is to be achieved. Both Kuomintang and Communists realize this. Most of the quarreling which has seemed to be centered among both Chinese and foreigners around this problem is actually around the problem of ways and means of achieving a jointly desired end. That is a thing about which outsiders may have sympathies and desires but about which they have no moral right to take action beyond a certain easily defined point.

As to the other minorities, whatever their beliefs or even their practices, these were tolerated by the Kuomintang so long as they did not become obstreperous. However, as in the case of the National Salvationists in 1936-37, individual group members found themselves subject to quick arrest and sometimes lengthy imprisonment without trial if they overstepped certain lines laid down by the ruling party.

Throughout the Japanese war, in spite of general impressions to the contrary, the Kuomintang and the Communists were in most respects considerably closer than in the period before the 1936 Sian Affair. The frame of the United Front was never wholly shattered. Communist offices were maintained in Chungking, together with a heavily censored Communist newspaper. There was at least the semblance of Communist representation in the People's Political Council and at such meetings as the San Francisco Conference on International Organization in the spring of 1945. At this latter, several other minority groups, including the National Socialists, were represented. The Kuomintang had become clearly sensitive over accusations that it wanted to fasten its one-party rule on the country permanently. In September of 1945 Generalissimo Chiang promised equal legal status for all parties, though declaring that private armies would not be tolerated.

As background for such sensitivity there had been a general pooling of party considerations for the national interest at the beginning of the war with Japan. In other words, the very fact that everybody had voluntarily given up party program and aspiration for the sake of China's defense put upon the ruling Kuomintang a clear obligation not to take advantage of such a situation for its selfish interest. Of this obligation, conscientious elements in the Kuomintang were keenly aware. Like any other organization, the Kuomintang had its small-minded members anxious for their own advantage, but it is

safe to say that the dominant factors were honest in wishing to give a true National Government through the nation's crisis.

The Communist attitude has already been described. At a plenary session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in February of 1937 the Communist proposals had been discussed and a resolution was passed saying that reconciliation with the Reds could be effected under four conditions, including abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the united command, dissolution of the "so-called 'Chinese Soviet Republic' and similar organizations," cessation of Communist propaganda together with acceptance of the Three Principles of the People, and stoppage of class struggle. These conditions were accepted, and the reconciliation formed the basis for the war effort which developed within a few months, this being due to the fact that only the Kuomintang and the Communists had command of any considerable armed forces. Such other armies as existed were relics of war-lordism not connected with any political idea but personal retainers of some such "strong men" as the Kwangsi generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who joined in the United Front with complete readiness when it was an issue of resisting Japan.

There was no question of armed clashes as between any Chinese groups during the opening phase of Sino-Japanese hostilities. Most of us presumed that the United Front collaboration would evolve progressively along democratic lines, strengthening China's national resistance as it tightened the bonds of Chinese union.

By the fall of 1938 the constructive trend was reversed. Reactionary Kuomintang elements were alarmed by the growing demand for more democratic government. The student movement, which had played an important part in forcing the Kuomintang to abandon its prewar policy, grew rapidly. First sign of reaction came in May 1938, when all non-Kuomintang youth organizations were destroyed by the simple expedient of compelling them to register with the Government and then refusing registration to those considered undesirable. Executive power began to be used to suspend newspapers, dissolve popular organizations, and prohibit public meetings. During the winter of 1938-39, political prisoners began once more to fill the jails and concentration camps. By spring of 1939 relations between the Kuomintang and Communist-led armies were strained

to the breaking point. "For Chinese liberals," commented *Amerasia* magazine, "it was no longer a question of taking advantage of anti-Japanese unity to introduce democratic reforms, but of halting the trend toward renewed civil war, capitulation to the Japanese, and national extinction."

It must be a matter for speculation as to how events would have worked out if the Communists, like the other minorities, had lacked an army. My own guess is that Communist party history would have been like that of the National Socialists and the other unarmed minorities. In other words the party status might have been fairly described by that mouthful, "innocuous desuetude." Quite likely it would have joined, on March 25, 1941, with the National Socialists, the Young China Party, the Third Party, the Rural Reconstructionists, and the Vocational Education Group in establishment of the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties, which later, as the Chinese Democratic League, was to represent the outstanding minority groups with the exception of the Communists. The divergencies in immediate program among the minorities and even as between them and the Kuomintang do not turn out to be great, upon close examination. While the Communists have always adhered to an ideal of eventual Marxism, they decidedly have not as yet closely approached much of what is usually deemed essentially Marxist. In fact the program announced on establishment of the Democratic Federation embodied the one central point on which the minorities found greater and greater agreement as time went by—and that was a general, increasingly vehement objection to the Kuomintang's "There'll be pie in the sky by and by" attitude.

After setting up as a first point their patriotic determination to carry out resistance to the end, with recovery of all lost territory and full re-establishment of integrity and sovereignty together with opposition to all compromise, the united minorities went on to declare that their new group should work "to embody the democratic spirit in political institutions, putting an end to one-party control over the state. . . ." Later:

To give effect to the abolition of one-party rule mentioned in Point 2, the following reforms should be made: (a) the Government's prestige and influence should not be used to promote the power of any one party in schools and cultural institutions; (b) official personnel

should be selected on the basis of the "best and ablest" as advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and the use of national political power for purposes of party recruiting should be prohibited; (c) the practice of paying party expenses out of national and local government revenues should be abolished; and (d) the "New District System," whereby members of district advisory councils and the headmen of villages are selected by examination rather than election, should be altered.

There were other strong points such as a demand for protection of legitimate expressions of public opinion (free speech and press), enforcement of government by law, and so on, all of them embodying implicit criticism of the way things were going under Kuomintang one-party rule. But the Federation lacked both votes and guns; and without either, it was impotent. Its only weapon lay in the new People's Political Council whose two hundred members, none elected by popular vote, had only advisory powers, yet did increasingly serve in a role somewhat resembling that of the olden imperial censors. By providing a forum where dictatorial officials could be raked over hot coals, it furnished one form of deterrent to abuses bound to spring up in the wake of protracted one-partyism whether in China or America. In olden days fifty-six imperial censors reported to the throne from all parts of the country on subjects connected with the welfare of the people and the conduct of government. They were known as *erh mu kuan* or "eyes-and-ears officials." The People's Political Council gathered in the nation's capital, where through an extra organ—the tongue—it let the National Government know something of what the people thought.

Just what happened to break afresh the Kuomintang-Communist entente is one of those problems which can be debated without end. It will be noticed by the statement of the Democratic Federation in 1941 that political grievances of the minority groups against the Kuomintang's ruling methods had accumulated during the war years. On the part of the National Government there was dissatisfaction almost from the outset with the independent attitude of the Communists. Such dissatisfaction centered on the Communists, not because they were Reds (unless independence may be taken as inherent in the Red attitude), but because they exercised local governing functions, which they were reluctant to let the Kuomintang take over, and because their troops were not much given to obeying

the orders of Kuomintang commanders. A series of articles which I wrote in early 1941 after my third visit to Chungking noted the rising storm and said that there had been an earlier passing crisis at the time of my last previous trip in March 1940. In fact I forecast recurring crises of varying intensity, in trying to analyze the then position which had just drifted into a stage of armed clash. This was to lead to blockade and virtual stalemate in Kuomintang-Communist relations for years to come, although the exact magnitude of the trouble was not then apparent; it could have developed from that point either for the better or the worse.

After checking up on the situation in early 1941, using a documentary record of telegrams and first-hand testimony of leaders on both sides, including Generalissimo Chiang for the Government and General Chou En-lai of the Communist Central Committee, I concluded that the fundamental facts of their views did not seem to me very far apart. I wrote:

There is divergence of opinion, certainly. The Communists have done much with little. This has been made possible by their great success in gaining popular support within their areas. One rightist in the Kuomintang suggested that their support came from shooting people, but this extreme view is not held generally. On the other hand the Communists have not gained their following by being ultra-"Red." Their program has been one mostly of fundamental effort at agrarian reforms. Often their gains have merely resulted from doing what the Kuomintang promised without performance.

Dealing with the just-developed military crisis between these two Chinese political parties with armies, I remarked that it might in a way be compared to that as between the former war lords with armies. It recurs constantly. One Kuomintang member privately declared that it would always recur while the Communists had their own army; a Communist might have said the same thing of the Kuomintang, which is the one legal party under the National Government, although the Communists are tolerated as due for some more solid status later.

What we later called the Chinese Government forces were then rather generally regarded as Kuomintang troops, as opposed to the Communist troops. By the 1937 United Front agreement the two had been supposed to merge, but there was a feeling on the part of

not only the Communists but other minorities that the Kuomintang had continued to use at least certain of the Government forces for party purposes. Quite clearly the Communist troops had remained essentially "Red" in sympathy. But the thing cut both ways. Recognition of this problem may be seen in a part of the Democratic Federation program of this same year which insisted that "the Army belongs to the nation, and military men must owe loyalty to the nation alone. [We] oppose all party organizations in the Army, and . . . use of the Army as a weapon in party strife." It is not possible to say whether the Federation was sniping at the Kuomintang or the Communists. Either or both might well have been targets.

I continued in my 1941 report:

The latest crisis had to do with a government order for the Communist army, or armies (the New Fourth and the Eighth Route) to move. There was a time limit, and there was indication that expiry of the time would find the Reds immovable and obdurate. Yet things finally smoothed out, and the Communists began to go north of the Yangtze as instructed. That is the nut-meat, and it perfectly illustrates how such crises rise. Latest word indicates that this one developed to an exceptionally decisive stage. Later came a virtual liquidation of the New Fourth on disciplinary grounds, but this seems not to have involved the Eighth Route.

Actually there was to be open fighting and the death of a great many people, including troops on both sides and opposing guerrilla fighters. Generalissimo Chiang made a report before the People's Political Council on March 6, 1941 (my report had been in January), in which he emphasized that "there is now but one party exercising administrative power," meaning the Kuomintang. He defended the Government's patience in tolerating insubordination of the Communist troops, called for a complete change in the attitude and actions of the Communist party, and without going into detail as to what the Government's punitive actions had been, said that they were required by the situation. The Communists at the same time accused General Ho Ying-chin, chief of staff, of actively organizing intrigue as "head of the pro-Japanese clique"; part of this intrigue, it was declared, consisted in outrageous attacks against the Communist armies which sought only to combat the Japanese effectively. In

southern Anhwei "some six thousand troops and non-soldiers of the New Fourth Army who were on their way to withdrawal in compliance with the government order had been slaughtered," and so on, the whole constituting "the most shameless deeds ever recorded in the history of the war of resistance."

There is no point to enlarging beyond this general indication of the major rift which for years after was to cause hot argument inside China and without, and which beyond question was to cripple China's resistance to Japan all the way to the end. Unquestionably there were the makings of a Grade A civil war in this situation. Both parties felt great sense of wrong. The Kuomintang took the stand that no armed minority should be permitted to defy the Government—a position logically leading to the query, "Well, what are you going to do about it?" Many Kuomintang members and sympathizers angrily replied, "Fight!" The Communists said that the Kuomintang would rather further its selfish political ends than resist the Japanese, implying that such had been the attitude of many in the minority group since years before 1937 and that no change of heart had occurred since that year.

Credit must be accorded Generalissimo Chiang in a multitude of instances where he took decisive stands for national unity. Although he had fought the Communists for years, it was he who had established the United Front finally. The military clashes culminating in early 1941 might undoubtedly have proceeded to full-dress civil war at that point had he not kept his head. Before the Tenth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in November 1942, the Generalissimo still stood for a policy of relative toleration. He put forward a program whereby the Communists would be treated on the same plane as others if they would from then on comply with certain requirements which seemed externally reasonable, yet proved out of line with realities as they had by that time developed. A major demand was that the Communists should have no army of their own. Yet from the Communist point of view there was no guarantee that a laying down of arms would be accompanied by anything but their own immediate repression and slaughter—many of the Kuomintang had been outspoken in declaring what they would do to the Communists if given opportunity. I myself had been told by leading government officials that death was too

good for the leading Communists. There was no secret as to the bitterness of feeling, and the Communists had no taste for surrender or suicide.

One of several decisive gestures was made by Generalissimo Chiang in September 1943. Again I was in Free China, this time to start a Chungking edition of our Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury* whose home plant was held by the Japanese. I was shocked at the violence of expression on the part of some of the leading government people who seemed completely to have lost sight of the existence of a state of war with Japan. Their attitude was—"Oh, America and Britain are in now, they'll win for us sooner or later." With regard to internal problems they felt that nothing mattered so much as to attack and completely subdue the Chinese Communists "before Russia can help them."

A historic declaration was made by Generalissimo Chiang in mid-September 1943. Calmly addressing the Eleventh Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, he laid down the principle that "first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means." That was the crux of a logical, moderate statement which splashed cold water into the faces of the hotheads and brought his party promptly to heel in acceptance of further efforts at political settlement in place of the major clash of arms for which the stage had been set both by the generally prevailing sentiment in high circles and the strategic position of large forces of government troops blockading the Communist territories. The Central Executive Committee on the very next day adopted a resolution based on the Generalissimo's views and summing up in the words, "Me too!"

Concerning the Generalissimo, the Communists have apparently never quite made up their minds. At one period they speak well of him, at another they declare him tyrant and traitor. At the time of the declaration just mentioned, I asked a Communist representative in Chungking whether he thought that the Generalissimo had changed fundamentally from the days when he conducted armed warfare against the Reds. After pondering, the Communist replied: "I believe that *in his heart* he still has a subjective desire to use force." This academic yet precise phraseology caused me inner

amusement which I didn't show; it was characteristic of people who learn their English from books rather than speech, and the Yenan crowd is studious. I thought I got the idea that though Chiang endorsed political means now as a measure of strategy, if he ever got a chance after Japan was licked to strike freely at the Communists again they had better watch out!

That is too tough a view, in my opinion. The Generalissimo has mellowed with the years, although he still has plenty of spice for special occasions and certainly he doesn't love the Communists. My personal impression, gained through repeated meetings though I lay no claim to personal friendship, is that he isn't dictatorially inclined, either for himself personally or for the Kuomintang. I believe that if he promises pie by and by he doesn't mean that one will have to wait to get it in heaven. He has been sincere in his pledges. And whatever one may say as to his heart, certainly the Generalissimo's brain is that of a political realist. He knows, what the American public only imperfectly realizes, that the Kuomintang is up against a large minority sentiment—not just the Communists, though they had guns and a large population apparently in substantial accord with them and satisfied with what they call a guidance-toward-rule rather than rule itself. But there are also many others who can't be numbered on party rosters, yet who constitute impressive oppositionist public opinion.

Nothing could better illustrate the Generalissimo's capacity to be flexible at the right time, however inflexible he may be as a rule, than his "Victory and Democracy" message of January 1, 1945. In good Chinese fashion the Generalissimo confessed errors, promising a reorganization of existing armed forces and a building up of new ones, and going on to say that "in the matter of wartime administration we have not grown tall." He noted a recent "awakening among the people" and with regard to political matters now deemed it expedient to provide for constitutionalism before the end of the war instead of after, as expected. The Three People's Principles had sunk so deeply into the hearts of the people, the Generalissimo explained, that "I do not feel that it is necessary to wait until the end of the war to call a People's Congress." As to the background of this: "It is one of our greatest regrets that we have not been able to adopt a Constitution and introduce a constitutional government.

I feel that a revolutionist should lay emphasis on work and not on talk. Therefore I usually do not vainly talk much about democracy. But I have not for one single day forgotten the need of the realization of constitutional democracy. . . ."

Again, in a speech March 1, 1945, at the opening meeting of the Preparatory Commission for Inauguration of Constitutional Government in Chungking, the Generalissimo announced that a National Assembly or People's Congress would be convened on November 12 to adopt a permanent constitution and inaugurate a constitutional government. At the same time he recalled his earlier "long-held conviction that the solution of the Communist question must be through political means" and reviewed the history of long efforts to come to terms with the Communists. He said:

It has been our unvarying experience that no sooner is a demand met than fresh ones are raised. The latest demand of the Communists is that the Government should forthwith liquidate the Kuomintang rule and surrender all power to a coalition of various parties. The position of the Government is that it is ready to admit other parties, including the Communists as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the Government without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National Assembly. We have even offered to include the Communists and other parties in an organ to be established along the line of what is known abroad as a "war cabinet." To go beyond this and yield to the Communist demand would not only place the Government in open contravention of the political program of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but also create insurmountable practical difficulties for the country.

But the minorities, for whom the Communists now regarded themselves as spokesman, decidedly wished some form of immediate political participation involving real power. The Democratic League foresaw in the constitutional meeting "only another Kuomintang Congress." The Communists complained bitterly that Chiang misrepresented their views and sought to delude them by dangling empty honors before their noses. They had not sought to oust him as supreme commander nor had they expected the Kuomintang to accept less than a majority position in the Government, but they did want a coalition including participation not only by the Communists but by other minority groups. In a New York speech on one Chung-

king proposal to put the Chinese Communist armies under an American officer, the American Communist leader Earl Browder (of 1927 Hankow days) said that this would undoubtedly have attracted Yen-an in an earlier phase—but not after the incident of Washington's recall of General Stilwell by request of Chungking! Actually, the role of American officers in China was always strictly advisory, and there could have been no exercise of more than moral authority to protect Communist or any other Chinese placed under an American.

As the war drew toward its close it was apparent that the Communists were becoming more and more difficult to deal with, for they felt fresh strength and knew that they had a good gamble for cashing in on Japanese defeat. Their guerrillas occupied areas which Kuomintang forces had evacuated under Nipponese pressure, all the way down the China coast from Shantung to Shanghai and beyond, though at many points their occupation was patchy and sometimes disputed by both the Kuomintang and the Japanese. In starving, misery-ridden Shanghai a strange struggle began as America's air forces blasted the cities of Japan. Communists, renewing their old ties with what remained of industrial labor, were pitted against Kuomintang henchmen attached to such men as General Tai Li and Tu Yueh-sen, while the Japanese blindly stabbed out against both. This preliminary skirmish in the dark seemed a possible prelude to greater economic-political battle which might extend out from China's greatest city to envelop the whole country.

With Japan's capitulation, the United States acted in this as in other instances to support the hand of the National Government. At the end of August 1945, just after Soviet Russia had herself strengthened that Government by a new and far-reaching treaty, American air forces and air-borne troops of Generalissimo Chiang landed in the Shanghai area in accordance with previous arrangements made with the Japanese commander. Any Communist *coup* in Shanghai had once more been offset. The situation roughly compared with what Chiang did at Shanghai in the spring of 1927, but this time he achieved his end with American help, and bloodlessly. There could be no question of the political control of Shanghai, but that was still no guarantee that Communist prestige might not carry weight in other ways.

The fact still remained that while areas which had been under the Kuomintang were suffering severely from the effects of economic blockade and inflation, Communist-ruled territories had experienced relative prosperity and improved standards of life for the people. The Communists stood out against giving up such territories to "Kuomintang misrule." Though the National Government everywhere was helped by U.S. forces as well as by the Japanese to frustrate Communist expansion efforts resulting from the Japanese surrender, and though this in turn made civil war less probable unless the Government chose to force the issue contrary to the stand repeatedly stated by Generalissimo Chiang, still there would for a long time remain great questions of power and livelihood.

The international situation at any rate seemed such as to give China a free hand for attacking her inner problems. America certainly had no aggressive designs, Britain's efforts were to hold to what she had, Japan was at least temporarily down and out, and Soviet Russia had clearly declared at least a truce to further wrangling through the new Sino-Russian treaty of friendship. The question was, how durable would such a truce prove in future? Some answer may be found through examination of the past. Fundamentally the answer must be, with regard to Chinese and Russian affairs, as to all other international arrangements: "So long as it suits both parties." At any rate it was a hopeful sign that both China and Russia seemed well satisfied with this setup as a beginning to their postwar world. The major disquieting factor remained an apparent inability to substitute, in China, orderly democratic processes for medieval force in settling political economic issues.

6

SOVIET RUSSIA: FRIEND OR FOE?

SOVIET RUSSIA IS TODAY, from a Chinese point of view, less a country than a challenge.

Not all Chinese even of the best-informed types realized this while the war was on. Japan then represented the great and immediate problem. But a great many Chinese were aware that over the edge of their sometimes nebulously defined territories stretched the longest land boundary on earth—with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side.

Already, in the case of Outer Mongolia, this had led to anomaly in China's political structure. Many Chinese showed their human side by occasional vague lamentations over the Outer Mongolia question. It was characteristic of China's shrewd, realistic Generalissimo that days before the Japanese war's end he proposed to other high-ranking Chinese officials that China fully recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and allow Tibet a high degree of autonomy. With Japan then virtually defeated, he was thinking ahead, and it had become clear to him that Chinese relations with the Soviet Union were henceforth of the greatest importance.

Probably the Generalissimo was already evaluating the problem of whether China could become united within and firm against the outside world where firmness was in order, or remain a mere so-called republic which in essence might be only a geographic fragment of the whole country. This latter China would be comparable to the hemmed-in Free China of the Japanese war period. Its borders would contain not one but several sore spots like Outer Mongolia, recognizing the empty form of a Chinese suzerainty but

actually autonomous areas in which Soviet influence would be the vital factor. They would be in close treaty relationship with Russia, and good prospects for eventual membership in the Soviet Union.

At this juncture the Generalissimo swallowed an old antipathy to Moscow and sent T. V. Soong and Wang Shih-chieh there to sign a treaty—the momentous document of August 14, 1945, pledging Sino-Soviet friendship and alliance. This pact was the first such document to be concluded following the San Francisco formation of an International Organization of United Nations, which it mentioned specifically as a guiding principle.

It represented a desire on the part of both countries to enjoy future security. Neither came out a complete winner; there was give-and-take on both sides, to the end that past wranglings should be ended and future co-operation be built on a basis better than that of former engagements, some of which are worth glancing over after a brief analysis of this newest treaty. What Russia wanted was a solid feeling that there need be no more immediate trouble with China, and in seeking this she once more renounced the principle of territorial gain. Her attitude endorsed a view I have long held that a friendly and well-intentioned China could deal firmly yet peacefully with the U.S.S.R. On the other hand I think that China's concessions showed realization that if the Chinese were grasping, unsure, or ignorantly bombastic they might expect drastic steps to their disadvantage, sooner or later, by Russia. Both parties recognized China's need for finding her own way, and Russia surprised a great many by failing to take any open position in favor of the Chinese Communists, while in fact greatly strengthening the position and prestige of the Kuomintang-controlled National Government and again promising not to interfere in China's internal domestic affairs. This does not, in my opinion, mean that Russia would be incapable of exerting considerable pressure on the Chinese Government in the interest of peace with the Communists and a unified China under a government including elements more congenial to Moscow than any but the most liberal leaders of the Kuomintang; but in case of any such fundamental decision as was represented in the 1945 Treaty, Russia under Stalin once more showed herself nationalistic and thinking first of herself rather than of world communism as envisaged by the late Third International.

The treaty first dealt with the problem of finishing off Japan, and next with keeping Japan finished off. In case of more trouble with Japan, the two Powers would stand together in active military operations, which is an entirely different position from that taken in an earlier non-aggression treaty of 1937, even though this was followed by some Soviet military help to China. Then came pledges of friendly postwar co-operation, including mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Here we had an echo of the first Sino-Soviet treaty back in 1924, which similarly pledged a hands-off attitude in internal affairs but which later led to a great deal of recrimination on both sides. Events no doubt have taught their usual lesson learned the hard way. There was likewise a promise of mutual postwar economic assistance. Coupled with the foregoing points were separate agreements of much interest and similar historic roots.

With regard to the formerly jointly owned and operated Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, the old basis first set up in 1924 was in effect renewed on a thirty-year program of joint ownership and operation of an expanded network taking in not only the old C.E.R. but also Japan's South Manchuria line stretching south to Dairen and Port Arthur. All this is to revert to full possession of China, without cost, at the end of the thirty years. A master stroke of psychology conferred on this railway the name of "Chinese Changchun Railway," a combination most soothing to Chinese susceptibilities. One important reason was in its revival of the name "Changchun," which had been abolished by Japan in creating the Manchukuo capital "Hsinking" at the juncture of the C.E.R. and the S.M.R. As to the cities at the base of this line, Port Arthur was to be a joint Sino-Russian naval base while Dairen, the former Russian "Dalney," was made a free port open to the shipping and trade of all countries but with Chinese administration and certain special Soviet property rights. Thus Russia gained her coveted ice-free port and railway access to it by China's own free agreement. Soon China was complaining that the Russians were trying to run the whole show—but that is what always seems to occur, and it signifies only a move to set up a good bargaining position.

There were further provisions by which Russia strengthened the position of the Chinese National Government through pledges of

moral support and military equipment, and through recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and Sinkiang. From this latter rich territory Russia had withdrawn, months before, but cynics had expected a Soviet return at some convenient pretext. Outer Mongolia, by another document, was guaranteed a plebiscite, with Chinese assurance of independence if that seemed the desire of her people. In late October 1945 the result of a vote was announced with 97.8 per cent of the Mongols voting to be independent of China.

Thus Russia and China both went further than had been generally expected, and their attitude was established on a closer basis than ever before. Nevertheless it is no more than realistic to acknowledge the fact that treaties are things of paper. Past history has shown how subject all agreements are to the wear and tear of developing facts. Russian technique in particular has developed a long way. It is going to be up to China to keep to her advantageous position through continued good faith and—most important—a growing strength and unity. Otherwise Russia would continue to avoid any sort of flatly menacing stand, yet she would proceed with the breaking off and drawing to herself of various areas along the pattern already set in the case of Outer Mongolia. Manchuria is not forever guaranteed against such a process. Neither is Sinkiang, or Inner as well as Outer Mongolia. The precarious situation of Korea within such an expanding Soviet sphere is obvious. And no one would be able to do anything but splutter. China had enough of splutter from the late League of Nations, which finally committed hara-kiri by Nipponese invitation in 1931.

When the Soviet Union was young, in 1919 and 1920, China was already an object of her keen interest. By a Declaration of Renunciation in 1919 the new rulers of Russia gave up various rights, including those to payments under the Russian Boxer Indemnity. This was during what I have called China's Period of War-lordism. Though Moscow exhibited a generally friendly attitude, seeking to establish diplomatic relations with China, and authorizing control by Chinese of all Russian rights and interests in China, the Chinese pseudo-Government of the period took an extremely literal and one-sided view of the Soviet renunciation and showed no desire to make

concessions herself—an attitude which Soviet officials occasionally intimate, with slight bitterness, has all too frequently characterized Chinese diplomacy through many phases.

Although negotiations by L. M. Karakhan with the Chinese Government in the North got nowhere, it has already been noted that Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Russia's Mr. Joffe were able to agree amicably at Shanghai on certain basic principles in early 1923. Dr. C. T. Wang went to Japan that autumn ostensibly to inquire into the killing of Chinese, mistaken for Koreans on mischief bent, at the time of the September earthquake; rumors were that the real reason behind the trip was an effort to reach an understanding with Japan on Russian matters, but if so, nothing came of it. Japan, negotiating with Mr. Joffe in Tokyo, drove him back to Moscow in disgust after the irresponsible but officially inspired Tokyo newspapers had published childish gossip having to do with his family affairs both domestic and official. Meanwhile in November a dispute embarrassing to the Chinese side arose when the heads of eight principal Chinese educational institutions wrote to Mr. Karakhan about the renounced indemnity, which they suspected the Chinese Government meant to grab for payment of diplomatic and consular officials abroad. Mr. Karakhan granted the educators' request that this money be used, like the remitted American indemnity, for educational purposes. He also took this chance to point out that at the time Russia's indemnity was renounced by the 1919 Declaration, the Chinese Government not only ignored this note but continued to participate in military intervention against the U.S.S.R.

Gradually it began to sink into the mentality of what Eugene Chen called "the Peking Mandarinate" that perhaps Dr. Sun's attitude of friendship toward Russia had its strategic points and its realistic aspect. For months the Karakhan mission in Peking had been treated as a lot of moral lepers. When I arrived there in May of 1924 a preliminary agreement had already been signed on March 14, yet still the foreign correspondents feared to contaminate their clothes by making news calls on the Soviet group. The one quiet exception was Ray G. Marshall, an old friend and my one-time city editor on the Minneapolis *Journal*. Before long, at his request I was to take over his Peking United Press post. Ray was a grass-roots

Minnesotan who had no fear of being harmed by Soviet soft soap and no anxiety about his social standing in the Legation Quarter. So in the course of routine operations he made me acquainted with Karakhan & Co., the start of a beautiful friendship of considerable news value, although it promptly made me more than a little suspect at the American and British legations.

At any rate I already had an inside track as a sort of "old Bolshevik" when Mr. Karakhan suddenly, on May 31, signed with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, then Chinese Foreign Minister, a treaty of mutual Sino-Soviet recognition. This re-established normal diplomatic relations, it handed over the luxurious old Czarist Legation to Soviet occupation at cost of excruciating anguish to the neighbors, and it embodied various declarations referring to such matters as the renunciation of extraterritoriality for Russians in China and to joint operation of the strategic T-shaped Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria. This line, later to be taken over by "Manchukuo," connected the Trans-Siberian Railway from Moscow with the eastward extension to Vladivostok as it ran across the top of North Manchuria. It also stretched southward to join Japan's South Manchuria Railway at Changchun, a sleepy town which, renovated later as "Hsinking," was to become capital of Japan's post-1931 North Manchuria puppet state.

Mr. Karakhan promptly became the first Soviet official representative in China's capital. With characteristic acumen, Moscow didn't content herself with creating him a minister like all the other diplomats, but instead elevated him to the rank of ambassador extraordinary and envoy plenipotentiary. This grandness fairly stunned the Legation Quarter, which found itself involved in a distressing dilemma very much to Moscow's taste. Up to then it had been the habit of the Diplomatic Corps to function as a clubby little closed corporation. Whenever the Chinese showed signs of action, or inaction, regarded as detrimental to foreign interests in China, it was the habit of the Corps to hold a meeting, agree on policy, and send to the Waichiaopu (Chinese Foreign Office) a joint note signed by all the ministers and representing in effect a foreign united-front ultimatum. Under such bludgeoning the Waichiaopu invariably reacted humbly and apologetically.

Now not only was distrusted Red Russia in possession at last of

diplomatic representation in Peking. In joining the Diplomatic Body, Mr. Karakhan came as no meek newcomer sitting quietly in a back pew, but as the only ambassador in the lot! Ordinarily the *doyen*, or dean of the Corps, was the senior minister in it; but an ambassador, however new, outranked a minister, however aged in the Quarter. So it looked as though Ambassador Karakhan was due not only to join the foreign diplomats' tea party but to do the pouring.

This grave emergency caused as much perturbation as another Boxer Uprising. Hasty visits were exchanged in all directions except the Soviet Embassy, to which went only a polite Waichiaopu representative and the amused Messrs. Marshall and Gould—who were served cake off a czarist gold plate by the no less amused Mr. Karakhan. Finally the labor of the diplomatic mountain brought forth this mouse: For all formal official purposes, Mr. Karakhan was indeed dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and he would so function on such weighty occasions as, say, the paying of congratulatory calls at the Waichiaopu on the anniversary of the birth of the Republic of China. But for clubby meetings of the ministers alone—hatching up something to which the suave, black-whiskered Mr. Karakhan was to be kept as much a stranger as anyone else, if not more so—the *doyen* would, as hitherto, be the senior minister. This seemed a workable solution, but it left the ministers considerably shaken, as though they had seen a ghost, with a hammer and sickle on his nightgown, peering into the window. Indeed, they had.

Although the Chinese were happy to use the new Soviet ambassador as an instrument, on occasion, for prying apart the previously united foreign diplomatic front, there was little trust on the part of the Chinese Foreign Office toward the new Embassy. In the first place, the Waichiaopu had behind it only the feeblest of successive governmental regimes, moving nearer to disintegration with each titular head. And in the second place, the northern Chinese knew that Moscow was playing ball with that dangerous radical crackpot of the South, Sun Yat-sen, high enemy of their war-lord-bossed selves. It had sent Soviet advisers who were strengthening the Canton regime. Even in Peking there were sympathizers with Canton, and actual Canton agents including foreigners. Rayna Prohme, who was starting Eugene Chen's Nationalist daily newspaper in her

American-protected Peking home, was a U.S. citizen actually in Canton employ. Another was Rayna's and my friend Milly Bennett Mitchell from San Francisco, who presently arrived to co-operate with Rayna in running Far T. Sung's Chung Mei (Sino-American) News Agency. When Canton's Northern Expedition started with great success, alarm in Peking mounted. The rebels were coming. Everybody was likely to be killed in his bed!

Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who hadn't troubled to buy himself a presidential election but who achieved dubious *de facto* foreign recognition as "provisional chief executive," went out and Mukden war lord Chang Tso-lin arrived to relieve the foreign diplomats with assurance that at last here was their long-awaited "strong man." But Chang, for years maintained in power by the Japanese in Manchuria, was automatically a hater of things Soviet. So in the spring of 1927 Ambassador Karakhan decided to return to Moscow for a stay of indefinite duration.

Marshal Chang now availed himself of the new plan of ministerial meetings without participation of the Soviet Embassy. He caused the British, American, and other foreign ministers to hold a secret huddle at which the unprecedented action already mentioned earlier in this book was authorized—a raid by Chang's armed troops upon the Soviet Embassy, even though this was within a Legation Quarter where armed Chinese had never been permitted since the Boxer trouble. Typical of the semihysterical spirit prevailing at the time was the fact that only the night before I had quarreled with an American Legation high official, Ferdinand L. Mayer, over an unprecedented occurrence—his refusal to perform his clear duty to help two American citizens who had been detained at their hotel by Chinese police. While this is a little off the line of main narrative it is worth mentioning because it so perfectly epitomized the extraordinary state of mind prevailing in the Legation Quarter just then. However, as the American Legation was mostly aping the British and had scant courage of any convictions of its own, it was more jittery than the average.

The Americans were Milly Mitchell and a Shanghai visiting newspaper friend of hers, Wilbur Burton. Rayna had already removed to Hankow with the *People's Tribune*. Operation of the Chung Mei agency was becoming more and more difficult because

of interference by Chang Tso-lin's police with the agency's Chinese personnel. Far T. Sung had taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy, a rather usual recourse, as we have seen in the case of the Boy Emperor and the Japanese. Wilbur was returning to Shanghai, and Milly decided to throw in her hand and go south too. News of her impending departure of course reached Chang's alert Gestapo, which by tapping her telephone knew that she had accommodat-ingly promised to carry some Chinese letters by hand to the Cantonese. Therefore on Monday, April 4, 1927, the day before they were to leave, Milly and Wilbur were arrested by the Chinese police but merely irresolutely detained in their quarters at the Du Nord Hotel.

They immediately phoned me, and I went over. As both were Americans, I was incredulous when they told me they had already appealed for help to the American Legation and had been told that nothing would be done for them. Under extraterritorial procedure, it was the duty of our Legation to move at once to take over such prisoners from the Chinese, who might then prefer charges to be heard before an American court under American law. Ordinarily our officials were more than zealous in safeguarding extraterritorial privilege in all its aspects. I jumped into my ricksha again and sped off to the Legation Quarter for an interview with "Freddy" Mayer, who was counsellor of legation and next in authority to Minister John Van Antwerp MacMurray.

To my great surprise, the ordinarily cordial Mayer was in a state of excitement which rapidly verged toward hostility when I implied that there was shortcoming in the Legation's attitude. Milly was an agent of Canton, and she had also been seen visiting the Soviet Embassy. Wilbur was apparently deemed in the same category; such people were 'a disgrace to their country, and anything that happened to them was too good for them, he declared.

One confusing aspect of our meeting was that Mayer had already summoned me to the Legation on another matter, although his phone call had missed me while I was at the Du Nord. He said that Hallett Abend, then on the news desk of the Peking *Leader*, had told him of a United Press dispatch I had issued as part of our service to the local press that afternoon. It had been sent from Washington, and it flatly stated that the policy of the American

Government would not include any participation in a joint ultimatum against the Chinese. For the historic record I quote:

WASHINGTON, April 4.—The United States Government today sent instructions to American Minister J. V. A. MacMurray at Peking regarding joint American, British, and Japanese demands which are to be conveyed to the Nationalist authorities. It is understood here that the instructions permit Mr. MacMurray to join in joint demands for indemnity in connection with the Nanking and other recent outrages. The instructions are likewise understood to provide for a request for guarantee from the Nationalists in connection with future protection of lives and property of foreigners in China. The instructions do not authorize the United States minister to participate in any form of joint ultimatum, it is declared.

It was evidently the last sentence which had stirred up Mayer and, I presumed, his chief, MacMurray. The American Legation was then at every point playing along with the British, in my view and that of others. If America were to break a "united front" of hard-boiled dealings with Chinese Nationalism, it entailed great loss of face for those in charge of administering U.S. policy in China. Naturally they wanted time to argue with Washington; and certainly they didn't want the Chinese tipped off that Washington was (if pushed to the issue) no more in accord with the views of the Peking ministers than was the Soviet Embassy! Without outlining this candidly, of course, Mayer demanded that I withdraw the dispatch.

It so happened that in an earlier phase of inexperience, soon after I had taken over from Marshall, I had been subjected to a similar request from the Legation. The previous year there had been excitement over a matter I have already mentioned, the efforts of one Chinese faction to fortify and defend the mouth of the river leading to Tientsin against entry by Chang Tso-lin's forces. This was a technical violation of the antiquated Boxer Protocol, but Washington conveyed through United Press an intimation that the American Government was reluctant to act in the matter and that its influence was being exerted with the other Powers to forestall an ultimatum. In order to build up my relations with my own officials on the scene, I notified them of receipt of this dispatch, but on their urgent representations that "something must be wrong" I then

withheld it from publication—and for my pains received as severe a reprimand as U.P.'s kindly president, Karl A. Bickel, could bring himself to administer. Mr. Bickel conveyed that Washington was boss in American diplomacy and that it was not up to me to take orders from the hired help in the outlying districts—that United Press, as a world-wide disseminator of news, was frequently employed by our Government as an unofficial, unpaid, but convenient means of letting the public abroad know precisely what American policy was in a given crisis.

With this background in mind, I now respectfully advised Mr. Mayer that once bitten, twice shy; I hadn't come over to promise suppression of any incoming dispatches, but I was deeply concerned both as a friend and as an American citizen over the Legation's remissness in performing its duty under extraterritoriality.

Very huffy over my unexpected stubbornness in the matter of the Washington dispatch, Mayer gave short shrift to my efforts to read him a lesson on his duties toward Milly and Wilbur. We parted bad friends.

In a state of considerable thoughtfulness (and of course with no idea that the Messrs. Mayer and MacMurray actually were excited over something much bigger—their participation in the secret authorization of Marshal Chang's raid next day on the Soviet Embassy), I went off and filed a long dispatch to America. Then I returned to dine with the culprits. Within an hour I found myself likewise held by the Chinese and facing interrogation by two American Legation inquisitors, who had just arrived and who seemed very chummy with Chang's police.

This completed my surprise. But later I discovered that Milly's boss, Mr. Sung, had phoned from his Legation Quarter hide-out during my absence and had implored Milly to do away with Canton-bound letters from him in her possession. She assured him that this had been done already. Chang's police listened in on this talk and jumped to the erroneous conclusion that I had taken the letters away. Actually Milly had burned the papers and then flushed the ashes down the toilet. This hadn't been revealed to me, and I was much bewildered at being regarded as a party to some kind of crime. Finally I won freedom by loudly announcing that whatever I was thought to have in my possession, I didn't have it, and that to pre-

vent further nonsense and harassment I would gladly renounce whatever personal privileges I might hold, submitting freely to search of my person and home so that there would be no further suspicion.

My vehemence got me off without any further trouble. But Milly was taken to another room, stripped, and searched by a Chinese policewoman with such thoroughness that it provided her with a subsequent Rabelaisian anecdote of great effectiveness. Wilbur was also gone over, but less thoroughly for a variety of reasons.

Next morning I returned to the American Legation, heartened by congratulatory messages from my home office which had found our clients appreciative of a "scoop" concerning two well-known American newsmen. This time I saw some technical subordinates of the Legation, who assured me I was wasting my time. So I trundled out the front gate just at a moment when from a news point of view I was assuredly *not* wasting my time—for the Chang raid on the Soviet Embassy was in full swing. Chinese soldiers with rifles crowded Legation Street, and at intervals they dragged out of the Soviet gate (and to his doom, as was soon proved) a yelling Chinese refugee. Mr. Sung, most fortunately for himself, happened to be enjoying a walk in the sun outside the Embassy at the time the raid started. This walk proved even more beneficial to his health than he had anticipated, and he lived to become consul general to Batavia under the subsequent National Government. Nineteen others were speedily throttled by Chang's garroters.

Perhaps the foregoing will help give some of the melodramatic atmosphere of those days unique in Chinese or any other history. Even to associate with either a "Sun Yat-sen rebel" or a Soviet Russian was to make oneself suspect in Peking, as I have tried to convey. In addition to sending news of what was happening to Milly and Wilbur, and of the Soviet Embassy raid, I had meanwhile aggravated my own offenses. When the Legation continued to do nothing in aid of the two Americans, I telegraphed to Tientsin for an American lawyer. The arrival of a very acute specimen, the late R. T. Evans, almost caused the Legation personnel to start jumping out of windows. Evans fired fierce and sarcastic inquiries as to whether they had taken it on themselves to abolish extraterritorial rights of American citizens. Suddenly realizing their vulnerability

in Washington, they insisted that it was all a big mistake, that their sole purpose was to give the Chinese time to provide evidence on which Milly and Wilbur could be given fair trial (and then hung, was the presumption)! Simultaneously they instructed the Tientsin American Consulate to issue a warrant for the arrest of the pair—a thing which the consul, knowing his business, promptly refused to do without submission of evidence. Finally a Saturday deadline was set. When finally that afternoon a U. S. Marine guard went to the Du Nord because the Chinese still had failed to provide any evidence whatever, lo, the Chinese police had fled—and Milly and Wilbur were escorted at last into the Legation Quarter, from which they proceeded to Tientsin and Shanghai.

Meanwhile on Saturday morning I had turned up at the Legation to attend Mr. Mayer's daily press conference. There I was presented by the Marine orderly at the chancery building with a curt note from Mr. Mayer. It begged "leave to request you please to discontinue your attendance" at the press conference. The Marine had been told to inform me that Mr. Mayer would not see me. So I promptly gained audience with the minister and to my stunned surprise was told by Mr. MacMurray that he entirely supported Mr. Mayer. Attendance at the press conference, they both felt, was a privilege to be granted to the correspondents or withdrawn at the pleasure of the official in charge. No, there was no professional charge against me, Mr. MacMurray made clear. It was simply that Mr. Mayer had grown cool toward me.

I blurted out: "Why, from my point of view I could have a fist fight with Freddy in the side yard and then attend his press conference as United Press correspondent." Mr. MacMurray saw no merit to any such point of view. His former friendship, too, seemed to have cooled. To cut a long yarn short, the matter was promptly carried by cable to the attention of Karl Bickel (the Legation was much surprised that I dared let him know of my disgrace), and he ordered Miles W. ("Peg") Vaughn, chief Far East manager, to come over from Tokyo and investigate.

Peg talked with all parties concerned and found that Mayer's most crushing point seemed to be that I went to the Soviet Embassy in search of news. "What else would a good newspaperman do?" demanded Peg, himself a grass-roots boy from Kansas; and he

cabled his findings to Mr. Bickel. The latter then went to Washington for a discussion with then State Secretary Kellogg, who had himself been doing a bit of investigation by cable with the assistance of Assistant Secretary Olds. The upshot was that Mr. Kellogg instructed the Legation to re-admit me to the press conference, on condition that I was not to ask for an apology!—an instruction which the Legation finally carried out with the greatest reluctance. As a measure of face saving, announcements were sent to all the correspondents, including myself, saying that hereafter *all* American correspondents would be admitted to the conferences but none of other nationality—quite a blow to Reuter, which was at that time assiduous in sending out news according to official specifications whether British or American.

Shortly afterward I was transferred to Manila. At my first press conference there aboard Admiral Mark L. Bristol's flagship, the admiral (who had heard of the scrimmage and had no love for his opposite numbers of the Legation set) announced with poker face that Mr. Gould would entertain the gathering by an account of how he got into trouble with the American minister at Peking! Needless to say, I was too flustered to oblige. When I next attended a Peking conference several years later, things had returned to the old informal system, with Reuter and everyone else welcome—and a new official in charge.

As I glance back now on those days, it is almost impossible to believe the antipathy with which the average Treaty Port Briton or American regarded Nationalist Chinese and Soviet Russians alike. It was a sort of inverted case of the devil hating holy water. About the same time that I visited Hankow in the spring of 1927, a trip there was made by an intelligent and liberal pro-Chinese Reuter representative from Peking, H. J. Timperley. "Timp" interviewed Borodin and was thereafter regarded with an entertaining mixture of suspicion and wonder by his fellow Britons; suspicion as to his political soundness, wonder that he would venture to trust his life in the lair of the viper! Nowadays there has been a tendency on the part of the orthodox Kuomintang to look similarly on foreign journalists who visited the territory of the Chinese Communists.

Vincent Sheean later wrote scorchingly of the essentially unrealistic way in which the average Briton or American regarded the

China of that time. In Peking he found virtually his only civilized companionship at the Soviet Embassy. Few aside from the shunned Reds seemed aware of what was happening in China, or cared the proverbial two pins. Talk elsewhere in the foreign community was almost exclusively of dinners and tea parties. Anyone who regarded the Chinese as human beings and other than docile servants ("good" Chinese) or Russia-inflamed maniacs ("bad" Nationalist Chinese) was not merely queer, but a downright menace to the snug welfare of his fellow foreigners. I well remember with what outrage Lewis Gannett viewed the Peking scene when he passed through on a journalistic jaunt. He clashed horns over an issue of press freedom which arose with an American Legation official later to become one of my own chief bothers in the events just described, and was delighted when he heard in New York that I had found trouble in the same quarter—the official was "an ass," he wrote, and "no decent man could have avoided a run-in with him." It is pleasant to report that of late years our Government has showed greater selectivity in choosing its diplomatic personnel for China.

Soviet relations with China during that stormy 1927 period drifted steadily downhill. With establishment of Generalissimo Chiang's Nanking regime, and overthrow of the Hankow group with attendant exile of the Chinese Communists and a scampering home of the Soviet advisers, Russian influence and prestige in China reached a new low. Finally a diplomatic break between the new National Government and the U.S.S.R. came in December of 1927, ostensibly as a result of Communist riots in Canton. Yet although Soviet diplomatic and trade representatives in Central and South China were expelled, Soviet consular officials continued to function in North China, even though that had been the scene of the initial instances of friction. Similarly, Chinese consular officials remained in Soviet Russia. This set a pattern for crabwise official progressions as between Moscow and Nanking, the reasons lying in motives of conflicting expediency and suspicion on both sides. There is reason to expect more of this between Russia and China in future.

The next important step in Sino-Russian relations, and one which was to create perplexities, was what was popularly though inaccurately termed "Russia's sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway." Actually that which Russia sold was not the railway, jointly Sino-Rus-

sian owned and operated, but her share of rights in the railway. This was a thing she had a perfect right to do, but it by no means resulted in full legal disposition of that important North Manchuria line. To all intents and purposes it disposed of the railway for the time being, however, because by that time Japan had seized the whole of Manchuria from Chinese hands and the Russians were merely shrugging their shoulders with a brief expressive "*Nichevo* [Well, it can't be helped, forget it]." They had had enough troubles already, not merely with the Japanese but previously with their Chinese partners.

Article VI of the May 31, 1924, agreement had stated that China and Russia "mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories, the existence and/or activities of any organization or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Government of either Contracting Party." Both subsequently complained of violations by the other, and both probably were right. In 1929 the Chinese staged a raid on the Soviet Consulate at Harbin, professing that they had gained evidence of Third International machinations with aid of the railway and consulate. (Compare this with Chang Tso-lin's 1927 Soviet Embassy raid at Peking.) On July 11, 1929, the Chinese dismissed the Soviet general manager and assistant manager of the C.E.R. and took charge of the entire line as an "emergency measure." Russia came back with a prompt stern 72-hour ultimatum, at the same time concentrating large military forces at the border. The Chinese, jolted, tried to beg a mixed commission of inquiry, but Moscow was smarting from many a slap by that time and forced settlement on her own terms to re-establish joint control of the railway.

One Russian grievance about which nothing much could be done was the fact that many of the supposedly Red Russians employed on the line were what was known as "radishes," meaning that they were "Red outside but White inside." Both the Chinese and Japanese were forever using White Russians (some of whom took Soviet citizenship as camouflage) as spies and *agents provocateurs*. Because of the many points of difference which had grown up between the Russians and Chinese in their C.E.R. partnership, it was planned to hold a conference for general settlement; but to the Chinese, it seemed that the Russians were willing only to consider recognition of the established position. The conference broke up in 1931 when Japan invaded

Manchuria and the Chinese withdrew from the whole area covered by the Chinese Eastern Railway. This occurred at a time when Russia was feeling far from disposed to stand up for Chinese interests in addition to her own. In other words the Russians were by now considerably "fed up" with everything Chinese. Borodin, home in Moscow and lucky to have found safe harbor in editorship of an English-language official newspaper, can hardly have advocated any further early participation in the affairs of China. Russia was concerned over her own relations with Japan as result of the Manchuria occupation. She was also convinced that the Chinese then at the helm of their nation's affairs were undependable and evasive. Likewise she was inclined to feel that the Chinese Eastern Railway—formerly of strategic importance through its T-shape straddling over North Manchuria—would be more of a liability to the Soviet Union than an asset if Japan were to be left free by China and the League to exercise a free hand both in South and North Manchuria.

Russian realism dictated a cutting of losses. Thus it began to be rumored early in 1933 that the U.S.S.R. was willing to sell out to Japan. The Chinese Foreign Office issued a statement May 9, declaring that (despite the clear fact of Japan's Manchuria occupation) the only parties concerned in the C.E.R. were China and Russia. This was a proposition true in law but fantastically at odds with then existing conditions in the area where the railway was located. Four days later came a lengthy protest from Nanking to Moscow. The latter manifested no interest whatever. Negotiations with Tokyo quietly proceeded. Japan came to the conclusion that she should work through her new puppet Manchuria state of "Manchukuo." On March 11, 1935, a transfer agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the "state of Manchukuo" was initialed at Tokyo (appropriately, considering Japan's auspices), and there was final signature March 23.

China protested to Moscow March 11, declaring that "the Chinese government, which is joint owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway, regards the transaction as illegal and without binding force, and as such the sale cannot affect Chinese rights and interests in whatever manner." Five days later an identical memorandum was sent to the American, British, Japanese, French, Italian, Portu-

guese, Belgian, and Netherlands governments. "Manchukuo" was not considered, since China had no relations with this shadow state. China received some sympathy but nothing more tangible. The Chinese argument was confused—it was perfectly true that Chinese rights and interests could not be transferred by Russia, but there was no effort to do so, the pact yielding only "all the rights of the Government of the U.S.S.R." Russia wanted no more of single-handed attempts to maintain sole administration of a railway in virtually enemy territory from which her other partner had fled. Under the circumstances, many felt that she could not be blamed for liquidating what had become a bad and troublesome investment, even though Manchukuo was not much of a credit risk as regarded unpaid balances. The sales price was 140,000,000 yen (nominally U.S. \$70,000,000), to be handed over by installments, which never were completed, according to Moscow.

The C.E.R. was renamed the North Manchuria Railway. Busy bees that they are, the Japanese lost no time in bringing the Chinese Eastern's broad gauge down to the standard gauge of the South Manchuria line with which it connected at Hsinking, shoddy new capital of Manchukuo. Tens of thousands of coolies were put to work preparing to move one rail a few inches nearer to the other, throughout the ramifications of the C.E.R. At an appointed time the whole railway was narrowed to standard gauge within a half hour. There was no interruption to traffic. Trains thenceforth could roll from Dairen in South Manchuria to Harbin, at the North Manchuria trans-Siberian junction, without check; a great convenience to Japan then, and destined to be a greater one to her conquerors from 1945 onward.

Nanking screamed as though Russia had committed an act of vile treachery. During the period after Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria, formal diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.S.R. had been quietly resumed in December of 1932, with Dmetri V. Bogomolov proceeding to China as the second Soviet ambassador in succession to Karakhan. But this didn't help matters in the question of the C.E.R., while Chinese susceptibilities were soon to be further outraged by a protocol between the U.S.S.R. and an outlying section of China calling itself the "Mongolian People's

Republic." This was signed on March 12, 1936, at Ulan Bator (Urga).

A pact of mutual assistance, the treaty was clearly enough aimed at Japan, and evidently it was regarded by the Mongols as affording a safeguard which China could not give. What outraged the susceptibilities of Nanking, of course, wasn't the fact that Russia would if necessary help to repel Japan from Outer Mongolia—a thing which in itself should have been welcome—but that Russia had signed with Outer Mongolia as though the latter were an independent nation instead of part of China. There was a series of indignant Chinese notes and bland Russian replies, after which the problem dropped out of sight until Chiang accepted the Russian view in 1945. But in essence it represents the most important event of this chapter, because it set a pattern which may in future develop to unpredictable proportions if China is not able to set her house in order.

Bear in mind that although Outer Mongolia had developed what was called a People's Republic, as remote consequence of the global earthquake of World War I, China maintained suzerainty. By international law this meant that she kept a theoretical paramount control. Russia in no way refused to recognize this suzerainty by China over Outer Mongolia and in fact explicitly paid deference to it on paper. But suzerainty in the Far East had become a pretty nebulous affair. China was also suzerain over Manchuria, which fell into Japan's grip. She was suzerain over Tibet, which was remote and ruled by a lama hierarchy. She was suzerain over Tannu Tuva, or the Tuvinian People's Republic, a little-known statelet almost completely surrounded by mountains on the northwest Mongolia rim and with practicable outlets into nowhere but the protective Soviet Union. Such things have been better known to Soviet and Chinese officialdom than to most of the rest of us. In their hearts the Chinese realized that Russia had dealt with the Outer Mongolia problem on a basis of the cold facts and in a way which upon the whole was favorable to China because it strengthened the shield against Japan, which had already penetrated Inner Mongolia and assumed ascendancy over the new puppet state of Meng Chiang, or the "Federal Autonomous Government of Mongolia."

Subsequent Russian withdrawal from Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) seemed to give concrete evidence that the Soviet was sincere in renouncing imperialism.

Without further laboring a point which must be treated at various later phases in this discussion, because it may become the crux of a whole new Far East setup unless China is able to grow into her Anglo-American-conferred status among a Big Four, I will press on to Russia's much argued non-aggression treaties. Such pacts have long been favored by Soviet statesmen, but, for reasons never clear to me, China and Japan alike were for years reluctant to join in agreements for peace. It was easy to understand Nipponese skepticism, but in view of Tokyo's traditional readiness to promise one thing and then do another at her own convenience, I couldn't see why the early efforts by Joffe and subsequent endeavors by his successors were fruitless over a long period. Probably it went back to Japanese craftiness; the notion of a non-aggression pact was deemed too good to be true, there must be some unique form of Soviet bug under the chip. But China's attitude was completely inexplicable to me. Probably the best explanation is that the new Nanking regime outsmarted itself in this as in several other particulars.

T. F. Tsiang, an able negotiator who was laboring in Moscow during the period just before the "Sian Affair" of 1936, once told me something of his experiences. While I don't know under what instructions he was working, I suspect that Nanking had him on a tight rein. The Soviet was particularly anxious for some sort of new treaty not merely of neutrality but of help to either party in case of attack. At that phase Russia had real reason for anxiety about Japan. The Japanese had been involved in several border clashes with Russian troops. At Nomonhan they had lost a battle which taught them Russian toughness, a lesson they might well have passed on to their Axis allies. Moscow could not know how well the Japanese had learned by their Nomonhan losses to respect Soviet arms. Tokyo was still refusing to sign a mutual non-aggression treaty. So naturally Russia wanted Chinese support on the assumption that the U.S.S.R. might be the next major target of Nipponese aggression.

But with word of the "Sian Affair" and the impending formation of a United Front for Chinese resistance to Japan, the attitude of Moscow's shrewd diplomats changed instantly. Pressure for a

treaty with China dropped off to nothing. The Russians had perceived that a China once more knit together, and with strife between Kuomintang and Communists brought at least to truce, must become Japan's first foe. Japan couldn't afford to let China develop greater strength. Instead of Russia needing China, it had suddenly turned to a case of China needing Russia.

Sino-Japanese fighting began that summer. The fray spread to Shanghai on August 13, 1937. At Nanking—one hour distant from Shanghai by commercial plane—a Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed on August 21. Writing later in *Current History* magazine, I said that "it was universally recognized as embodying a belated scramble by Nanking to get Russia at least morally on her side."

Yet a glance showed that the treaty in its technical aspects meant little. Its initial article recorded that the two Powers "solemnly reaffirm that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and that they renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with each other, and in pursuance of this pledge they undertake to refrain from any aggression against each other individually or jointly with one or more other Powers." Then it was declared:

In the event that either of the High Contracting Parties should be subjected to aggression on the part of one or more third Powers, the other High Contracting Party obligates itself not to render assistance of any kind, either directly or indirectly, to such third Power or Powers at any time during the entire conflict and also to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the party subjected to aggression.

This mild statement appeared at a time China was swapping blows with a Power which the world press had fancied Russia to be virtually at war with less than a month previously! One can easily see how unlikely it was that Russia, still furiously annoyed with Japan's Siberia border attacks, would give any help to Japan whether Russia had signed the China treaty or not.

However, this provision was later to become a cause for Chinese grievance against the U.S.S.R. when Moscow and Tokyo finally

joined belatedly in a neutrality treaty for which Russia had angled so many years. This was signed in Moscow on Easter Sunday, April 13, 1941, during a visit by that "English country gentleman painted yellow," Yosuke Matsuoka. Each state pledged to respect the territorial integrity of the other and to hold its territories inviolable—a promise explicitly stated to cover Japan-protected Manchukuo and Russian-protected Outer Mongolia. It was also stated that "should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict."

China felt that she had cause for annoyance about this, but Russia was again bland; the treaty had nothing to do with China, Moscow explained, but merely with relations as between Japan and the U.S.S.R. It was at last to be denounced by Moscow on April 5, 1945, with a statement to Japanese ambassador Sato that since the signing of the treaty "the situation has radically changed. Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., and Japan—Germany's ally—helped the latter in her war against the U.S.S.R. In addition, Japan is fighting against the United States of America and Great Britain, which are the Allies of the Soviet Union. In such a situation the pact of neutrality between Japan and the U.S.S.R. has lost its meaning, and the continuance of this pact has become impossible." Soviet Russia declared war on Japan four months later, on August 9. Japan quit cold on August 13.

It may well have been exasperating for the Chinese to reflect how, even in 1937, Russia failed or refused to take notice of Japan's aggression in China which within a matter of weeks was to sweep over the very building in which the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed at Nanking. In my contemporary comment I wrote acidly that the Sino-Russian document was "about as much use to frantic and war-torn China as an extra tail to a cat." But I also noted that Russia probably had told the Chinese, in effect: "We have been saying for a long, long time that we want a treaty of mutual non-aggression. Well, if you want something from us, sign that treaty just as we have been asking; it will get you nowhere at the moment, but you won't ever get anywhere until you do it." And without a doubt China was glad to be able to proclaim something, no matter how

superficial, that indicated a prospect of help from somebody. Already it was apparent that neither Russia, nor America, nor Britain, nor the League, nor anybody else was prepared to take up arms beside China for China's defense. But the "outside barbarians," as Chinese of an earlier day used to call the foreigner and as exasperated present-day Chinese must sometimes think of him, had airplanes, guns, and money more freely available. Soviet Russia, it was soon to develop, even had skilled Russian pilots whose training she was willing to advance by letting them go out to China and fight Japan in Russian-built fighter and bomber planes, without declaration of war and under the Chinese flag.

Meanwhile, however, the Sino-Russian treaty, innocuous as it was, stirred up some excitement. In Berlin the Japanese-German Association issued a hysterical declaration that "China has thrown herself into bolshevist arms." German political circles were alleged to feel that this confirmed their long-held opinion that the Kuomintang had been under Soviet influence for a long time—a view completely contrary to fact, of course. Germany had a group of military advisers helping Nanking, and they were not withdrawn till after bitter Tokyo protests. Foreign observers on the China scene were generally agreed that China was scrambling after Russia but had missed the boat. "A year ago," I wrote, "Moscow would gladly have signed a Sino-Russian treaty with teeth in it—and if such a treaty had been signed, and promptly published for the whole world to read, Japan might never have dared to risk a joint Sino-Russian stroke against her activities either on the Siberian border or in North China, to say nothing of such a center as Shanghai."

But the Russian view was that China had obdurately persisted in forcing Russia to pay the full costs of her insurance against war with Japan. These costs included the maintenance of a huge military establishment in the Far East and the achievement of a most difficult and hazardous diplomatic balance—while China held to her own policy independently and opportunistically. Since each maintained its independent risk, by China's choice, the Russians felt that there was no reason why they should now rush in and help pay off China's losses.

It was Soviet policy to help keep China in the business of resistance. So Russian munitions began to flow into China, and Chinese

stamina was stiffened by the arrival at Hankow in 1938 of Soviet aviators riding in their own planes. This aided China, but it was a pretty handy educational service for Russia too. Moscow discovered, for example, that a certain type of fast monoplane pursuit ship could go like the dickens in a straight line but that it took several miles to turn, therefore the more maneuverable predecessors of Japan's Zero could turn inside them and shoot them up. So shorter-turning Russian fighters were substituted. China like Spain was a testing laboratory for battles to come elsewhere. Some of us were certain that one day Russia would be fighting Japan beneath her own red flag—and for keeps. What we couldn't anticipate was the brevity of the battle!

As between Japan and Russia the issues were always clear. Tokyo hated and feared communism, fighting it as an ideology at home and military force abroad. Her continental aspirations were candid. There was never any doubt that she would drive at least to Lake Baikal if ever she deemed the opportunity ripe. On occasion Russia withdrew, as in North Manchuria; but when she stood firm, as at Nomonhan, it was with a fierceness which struck chill into Nipponese hearts and lasted to the day of 1945 surrender to Allies joined by Russia less than a week before. Japan's status as a menace to Soviet security left no doubt as to what Moscow's inner intent must be when, on her own side, circumstances had developed opportunity for the kill.

But there never was such clarity as between China and Russia. From the days of 1927, when Sun Yat-sen's policy of collaboration was overthrown by the rightist Kuomintang, relations have varied mostly between poor and fair. Seldom have they been really good. Today, more than ever before, many thinking Chinese realize that perhaps China's No. 1 problem of the future is whether her mighty neighbor is to develop into friend or foe, wholly irrespective of existing treaties of mutual non-aggression or of friendship and alliance. Russia also signed with Germany and Japan, it is recalled.

Despite the ideological tie between Yen'an and Moscow the Chinese Communists were never supplied in any wartime phase with munitions or anything else by the Russians, nor did the latter maintain representation in the Communist capital. Visitors to Yen'an found no sign of the Moscow controls so often rumored. But

the Kuomintang recognized dangerous potentialities. It was in an effort to remedy this that Dr. T. V. Soong, who had been made president of the Executive Yuan May 30, visited Stalin at Moscow in July of 1945, signing the friendship-alliance pact during a second visit a month later. But clearly a real solution of the nebulous problem with Russia waited solution of China's own concrete inner contradictions. Maybe China can wobble along without too much harm from constant internal bickering and intermittent minor armed civil warfare, but she cannot risk a full-dress rebellion.

Can Russia be expected to maintain a hands-off attitude in case of major civil war? Few believe it. An appeal by the Chinese Communists would be answered if it suited the Soviet book. Affairs in China are at a point where Moscow must be at least as interested as America or Britain in the forms of eventual settlement. In another Chinese civil war there could be no neutrals. Even to keep hands off would be to aid the orthodox Kuomintang (which Moscow cannot but regard as reactionary) against the liberal-Communist minority.

It is unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would go so far as to help openly toward overthrow of the National Government. What could happen, in all probability, would be separatism; a new Chinese state split off in the Northwest, having treaty relations with Moscow comparable to those between the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia. China's National Government would regard this as enmity on Moscow's part and there would be plenty of world opinion on her side, but it is likely that Russia could stage-manage things with sufficient skill to avoid any possibility of Sino-Russian war. Yet any such turn of events would be the start of a chain of buffer states probably including the whole of a great debatable territory—Inner as well as Outer Mongolia, northwest China, Manchuria, quite likely the newly freed Korea. What could China or any of the rest of us do about it? Russia's hand would be seen, and still all this would be part of a great procedure of self-determination in which no geographically remote nation would dare interfere.

To my way of thinking there is no reason to assume that what I have just outlined will happen—providing China unifies herself and presents no menace to Soviet security. I may seem to presume too much in the way of Soviet good faith, but to me it is merely

good sense, in which I do not think Moscow deficient. Russia would get along best, in the long run, with a strong liberal China. But if Moscow feels that China cannot or will not set her house in order, and that the whole Far East is likely to be disturbed in consequence, she is bound to intervene and set up a belt of quarantine territory.

7

WATCH JAPAN!

STUDY JUDO and you study Japan's national policies. The art of jujitsu, as it is better known abroad, consists in conquering one's opponent by employment of his own strength against him. It represents one of Japan's few original contributions to the world. Let us be dispassionate about the matter, recognize that we have here a permanent problem, and keep our eyes open. Watchful intelligence can cope with it. After all, it was Japanese realization of certain basic inferiorities which caused war-lord leaders of a nation never above third class, but hailed by all of us as first, to turn toward quickness and trickery as fundamental weapons. Realization of this should reassure us, help us see why the Japanese gangsters became what they are, and assist in shaping something better for the Japanese people.

If this sounds condescending, I apologize to the reader and to the Japanese. I have no "master race" theories. While I concede few moral qualities in Japanese leadership or ethics, I believe Japan's national perversions are due to understandable causes which are not inherent in the Japanese people and can be corrected. Our own past complacencies and condescensions are responsible for much of the mess we have been in. We owe it to even a conquered Japan to watch her for a long time to come—but also to try to understand her, for both her and our own best interests. China, as Japan's closest neighbor, has particular obligation and necessity in this respect.

We encouraged Japan's jujitsu policies by our own stupidities. Time after time we blundered into traps of our own making, be-

cause we persisted in sentimentalizing and otherwise misrepresenting a shrewd, hard-boiled, hard-working island people who need to be dealt with courteously but firmly. That is how they deal with others. They need the same treatment for their own good, ours, and China's.

It was quite a while before any of us realized that finally it was China, as Japan's nearest neighbor, which must pay the major share of any bill Dai Nippon felt called on to present to the outside world. We should have been warned by the notorious Twenty-one Demands against China in 1915, if by nothing earlier or later. Those demands were in characteristic Nipponese style pressed secretly upon a weak Chinese Government at a period of world war when China's friends had their backs turned. They summed up to a comprehensive grab for permanent control over China. An American newspaperman, Frederick Moore of the Associated Press, revealed the demands in a scoop at first discredited by his home office and eventually to cost him his job. The power of publicity then killed most though not all of the demands.

And there were plenty of other signs before and after the Twenty-one Demands. Japan's wars against Russia and China were significant of the inner itches of the ruling cliques and of the Japanese capacity for explosive action. Her dissatisfactions over the outcome of an imperialistic urge patterned, she felt, after the best models abroad were roots of that frustration which for generations after the Meiji Restoration was to be her evil attendant spirit. Indeed, in all her imperialistic moves Japan was an excellent imitator never quite rewarded with what she felt to be her due. I speak, of course, of those in charge of Japanese national destinies. It is my contention that little of the sort holds true of Japan's population as a whole—a fact of almost no importance throughout Japan's national life up to the moment of surrender, but one which may be all-important henceforth.

From the beginning of my first-hand contact with Japan I was impressed by an anomaly existing between the mysterious "they" at the top of Japan's state structure—the directive brain—and the people of the country who made up the bone and flesh and blood and muscle. In saying this I seek to state fact, not to put forward apology. I repeat that Japan requires watching, but it is my hope

and belief that the people of Japan may themselves, when freed from mental shackles imposed by the most rigid and calculated mis-education in the world, first assist and then take over the work of watching those elements that have recently led them to ruin. It is clearly not profitable for the Japanese to be ruined by a handful of lunatics. That is assuredly what has been happening. That the head lunatics imposed a considerable degree of insanity upon virtually the whole nation does not mean that things have to be that way forever. They weren't that way in the fairly recent past.

Within my own Far Eastern experience span I have been able to see repression and maleducation warp the minds of the Japanese people. They have gone through successive waves of advance and retreat—indeed, we all have, but the Japanese were singularly unlucky in having at the top a vicious power clique intent on selfish ends destructive of the true national interest. Through the influence of these top people the Japanese were forced against nature. It was the power clique who encouraged the theory of a perpetually low Japanese living standard in order to build up national wealth not shared by the people. It was they who taught the Japanese to love death rather than constructive life, to seek as an ultimate objective the fiction of enshrinement as a god on the Kudan Hill war sanctuary. Such ideals for the nation must be regarded as a form of national sickness through thought-bacteria carefully sown by men who hypocritically professed to serve Emperor and country yet in truth served only their own lust for wealth and world power.

When I arrived in Japan May 19, 1923, it was after three years of "melting-pot" contacts in Hawaii. Already the peoples of the Far East had ceased to be especially enigmatic to me, though I felt that I still had much to learn. That feeling has not passed. In Hawaii one could see young Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos growing up to be American citizens. There were occasional exceptions, but the vast majority felt our free air welcome in their nostrils. In the parks one could see children of various colors playing together with identical play reactions, and in downtown stores and offices one could see the points in common of the different races far outweighing vestigial differences due to old customs and the tongues of remote homelands. I knew that there wasn't as yet much democracy anywhere in the Far East, but the races of Hawaii were democratic.

Many years later in New York City, after Pearl Harbor, I was to hear a young American of Japanese ancestry say, "Fascism isn't carried in the chromosomes." That was his defense against a charge which appearances of the moment automatically laid against anyone Japanese in origin. I agree with him, and I can't believe that there is in the chromosomes of any of the Far East peoples, whom I know pretty well by now, a really vicious inborn inclination. What there may be, and what can be almost as dangerous if not watched, is a tendency to accept authority and not to rebel against it when it is wrong. Japanese look to authority not as master but as head of a national family. Nothing could be more dangerous when it goes wrong.

Japan in those earlier days was having her "golden age for the foreigner," as Glenn Shaw of the U. S. Navy's Japanese-language schools once put it to me. We Americans in Japan had a wonderful time. Everywhere we went we met with kindly hospitality. We soon learned to speak a certain amount of the native language, including a few phrases of formalized courtesy which smoothed our way. We found that the Japanese bow has its social function and need not mean subservience. We were objects of eager curiosity but never of unkindness. Those of us who worked with or for Japanese received special consideration, which was also the case when we traveled on holiday or for business.

It was not hard in those days to get from Japanese some pretty straight answers to straight questions. Being curious themselves, the Japanese could sympathize with curiosity on the part of others. After a short period with the American-owned *Japan Advertiser* I became news editor of the Japanese-owned *Japan Times*, where my Nipponese associates took genuine pleasure in educating me. They had to be treated with tact, it is true, especially during my first days when S. Sheba, the publisher who had lived for years in Hawaii, cautiously warned me not to neglect the universal "san" after every name. Not only was our gentle old editorial writer and chief translator "Takahashi-san," never a mere familiar "Takahashi," but the office boy was a "boi-san"; and when office girls were hired, they became "onna-boi-san," or literally "Mr. Girl-Boy." Some of it was pretty funny, but all of it was solid stuff for dealing with a people used to doing things thus and so, and happy when their ways were

accepted by the newcomer. Since I accepted and didn't try to improve on things Japanese, the Japanese were at once more than ready to accept me and teach me whatever they could. Lafcadio Hearn's books taught me, too. He was a mystic and a sentimentalist, but the Japanese share those qualities.

In our office talks even the topic of the Emperor, today so much overdiscussed and misunderstood in America, came up. Certainly the Emperor's name was not bandied about. He was not subject to careless talk overheard by others. But I found no disposition on the part of my realistic associates to pull away from the issue. They let me know that the then Emperor, father of the present incumbent, was victim of a brain affliction, and told me several ludicrous tales based on that fact. They knew the old myths of divine origin of the Emperor, and the Empire, and they had their tongues in their cheeks about the whole business. They knew the Emperor was human. But he headed their Empire-family. There was nothing insincere about their devotion to their country, and I would have judged even then that when they were in the Army (as most had to be, at one time or another, because of the conscription law) they would have owed complete devotion to the high command. Most Japanese disliked their army service, like most people in most countries, but for the time they were in the Army it had to be admitted that the uniform and their samurai-descended officers did something overwhelming to them. As civilians, however, they were a pretty independent, critical, rational lot.

Of course this was before the chief period of mass miseducation in Japan. There is no question whatever that great changes took place in Japanese thinking as result of the complete embargo on uncolored news, and other facts, which closed down over the country from the time of the Manchuria invasion of 1931. The mischief had always been going on to some extent. Japan has never had an uncontaminated press, or what we would call an uncolored educational system, or full freedom of speech and assemblage. But in the early 1920s, certainly, the individual Japanese was a far freer being than most Americans dreamed. The same quality which lately has made them die fanatically was perhaps then in evidence to give them a peculiar kind of rugged individualism. They could speak out without regard for personal consequences so long as they could deem it a

healthy part of their national life rather than verging on treason. And that was true of Japan then, just as we regard it as true in America at all times. Remember that even we recognize some need for suppressing liberties in a period of national emergency; Japan, with the aid both of an extremist national psychology and of certain individual fanatics in high places, merely went the whole hog.

As far along as 1932 I was stopped on a main street of Tokyo by an English-speaking Japanese whom I didn't know, but later identified as a proprietor of a curio shop.

"What do you think of our actions in China?" he demanded with no regard whatever for possible lurking spies, of which there were many then and more later.

I cautiously replied that I myself lived in China, and I didn't think much of Japan's actions there.

"You are right—we are being crazy!" he shouted vigorously and went on to denounce Japanese militarism at great length. Nothing happened to him at the time. But it wasn't long, I suspect, before he landed in prison. Thousands of Japanese went to prison in the early 1930s, and those who did not die there finally won release only through action of General MacArthur in the fall of 1945. But they were only a fraction of those whose courage would have been up to prison if they had known the facts of their national courses. The trouble was that the Japanese themselves couldn't "watch Japan"; paradoxically, though they comprise one of the most literate nations in the world, this fact only made them victims of one of the greatest, most skillfully handled, most carefully calculated mass deceptions in history—a deception having to do primarily with Japanese policy in China, but branching out to include Japan's position in the world as a whole, and the attitude of the individual Japanese toward those in control of his revered nation-family.

Perhaps the clue to many of the contradictions in Japanese national life lies in what the late Hugh Byas called the most important political fact about the country—that it never finished its revolution which began in 1868. That revolution destroyed feudalism but failed to set up a strong substitute. There is some parallelism to the case of China, it is clear. But in Japan there was more concentration of power than in sprawling China, where within modern times

no true dictatorship has been possible because a dictator must build up or grasp already established power. Compact, energetic, growing Japan had the power but not a strong civilized government to wield it. So power has been tossed back and forth within a small group—"they," as it is often vaguely called—consisting of the Throne and those about it, the militarists (Army and Navy, often themselves in conflict), the big business families or *Zaibatsu*, and the generally corrupt politicians. All within this group have desire to get power from the others but not to let it get outside the group. This has resulted in a system of balances in which each gets occasional advantages, but none gets permanent supremacy.

To my mind the worst factor in the whole uneasy setup has been that constitutional provision, coming out of German origins and wholly counter to our ideas, which gave the armed services direct access to the Throne and could by their recalcitrance destroy the Cabinet. Any time that the services refused to allow a given general or admiral to serve as War or Navy Minister, respectively, they could block the formation of a Cabinet under any Prime Minister; or they could cause the War or Navy Minister to resign and thus make the whole Government resign. It has been an ultimate yet always available weapon, the best of the lot of tricks known to Japan's ruling groups. Through this constitutional provision more than any other single factor, Japan was brought to stage after stage of militaristic aggression culminating finally in the recent great war. To fail to require its elimination now that the power lies in our hands would lose the essence of our victory and lay up new trouble for the people of Japan and ourselves alike.

A great many Americans felt horror and disillusionment about the people of Japan when war finally burst upon our heads under peculiarly enraging circumstances. Those most disillusioned included some who had most reason to know the facts. Fred Moore of the Twenty-one Demands scoop lost his job over it but, ironically, was then hired by the Japanese Government. He certainly knows many things about Japan, yet is endorsed in the State Department and elsewhere as a patriotic American citizen who sincerely felt that he was serving his country by remaining an adviser to Japanese diplomacy up to the moment that Pearl Harbor automatically severed his connection. I lunched with Moore in Washington the week before

Pearl Harbor, and he was convinced that even Japan's military realized the necessity for retreat. War, he and I both felt, would spell ultimate ruin for Japan.

The day after Pearl Harbor I returned to Washington, happened to think of Moore, phoned him, and we lunched together again. He was shattered by what had happened. Both of us felt like utter fools. Yet later reflection convinced me that we were both right in our conclusions as to the ultimate results; we had been wrong, like many others, in our failure to size up the limitations of the Japanese military mind. We had not fully realized the fissure between the ordinary Japanese whom we knew and the mad clique at the top over whom they had no control by constitutional or other provision, and whom by tradition they must docilely follow once the die was cast. We knew then that the Japanese would join loyally in the group action which their leaders had decided on—there was no hope on that point—they were victims of one of their finer qualities here distorted to a base purpose spelling tragedy for us all. But we also knew that there would be heavy hearts among the Japanese people, who had no such superman complex as Germany's wild men were able to ferment in their own homeland. Japanese would give their lives for the Empire, but it would be in a morbid state of mind, fatalistically ready to give their all, aiding them perhaps when on the offensive but handicapping them when odds turned even or against them. Suicide, whether direct or indirect, is a poor weapon.

My experiences in the 1923 earthquake were sufficient proof of Nipponese capacity to "take it." From the moment of the first shock just before noon of September 1 there was no panic and little sign of fear. I had been editing copy at my desk. Suddenly I found my typewriter tipped over, myself crouched in the middle of the floor, ceiling plaster falling in great hunks, and our flimsy Western-style building pounding up and down like a ship on a reef. I had been told not to make an exhibition of myself by panic during Japan's frequent *jishin*, but when I observed that my Japanese colleagues were gone I realized that this was something special. So I staggered into the front room. Filing cabinets blocked the outer exit. Remembering that in such cases it is considered wise to get under a desk for protection, I stooped and looked around—to find that every desk already had a Japanese under it. Meanwhile the shocks went on. So

I deliberately selected a desk under which a pretty little "*onna-boi-san*" was crouched, and joined her. I still remember how in that moment the sound of giggles from all over the room rose through the noise of devastation!

A few minutes later the shaking subsided and we straggled out into the street. After taking stock of the collapsed buildings near by, some of us went inside to look over our own precariously leaning property. There we were caught by a second quake. I got as far as the front door but paused, looking at my fellow workers in the street, because a brisk hail of tiles was coming down off the eaves. Those roof tiles can lay one out neatly. I concluded I'd wait for the storm to abate. But the crowd in the street thought I was unable to realize my danger (actually a doorway is a good place to stand in a quake). Finally one of the printers dashed over to me, took me by the hand, and drew me out. Of course I went then, not because I thought it was a good idea but because the workman had risked himself for me.

For three days and two nights I had no sleep, as we experienced five hundred shakes in the first three days and it was dangerous to go indoors. I was young, greatly stirred, and curious as a cat. The shocks continued, fires spread over most of Tokyo, but I was personally lucky. My courageous "*cook-san*," who knew nothing of her husband's whereabouts, worked with me that night to remove my household effects to a nearby place secure from fire. Later, when the flames had barely spared my Japanese house, we moved the property back, and this same cook stood off an armed gang of robbers during my absence. I saw tens of thousands of poor people on the move during those nights and days. Many had lost everything but what they could carry. They had watched loved ones perish. But I witnessed not one tear from any Japanese—the only weeping I can recall, certainly justified enough in all conscience, was by a European man whose wife burned to death before his eyes after their home had fallen on her without bringing merciful extinction. Henry W. Kinney, who lost all he owned, said philosophically, "Thank God it's gone, now I can start piling up again!"

Only one unpleasant phase of Japanese character came to light during that period filled with manifestations of kindness toward myself, whether by strangers who gave me hot tea as I walked past,

or soldiers guarding the streets by night. (I was still to find out what awful transformation uniforms could work on Japanese who were not on home soil.) Members of the Young Men's Associations ran wild, apparently under instruction, against any believed to be "Koreans." It was rumored that these oppressed people were at last seizing their opportunity to retaliate for Japan's occupation of their country. Wells, on which everyone was dependent because the quake had broken water mains, were being poisoned—so it was said, with never the slightest proof. So throughout the Tokyo-Yokohama quake area there was a sudden slaughter of "Koreans." But those killed included Chinese and even Japanese who looked a little odd or who spoke with an accent. Actually all these people have difficulty in telling one another apart if put to a test, and the ancient blood mixtures explain why. At any rate it was a terrible event completely without justification save in the minds of apprehensive leaders, who betrayed a bad national conscience about Korea. I recall that the late Roderick O. Matheson of the *Chicago Tribune*, passing on foot through Yokohama on his way to file news reports out of Kobe because our own communications were all destroyed, lay down in the dark to sleep. On awakening in the morning he discovered that the man next to him had no head! Rod didn't linger to ascertain whether it was an authentic Korean or not.

The Japanese Navy was likewise mentally unbalanced, sign this time not so much of bad conscience as of judging others by itself. American warships rushing in to give aid were warned off. They went right through to Yokohama and other ports anyway. Indications were that Japanese officers—not the public—believed this moment of Japan's sorrow would be seized as opportunity for foreign occupation of the country. Clearly, with comparable opportunity the other way round, that is what they would have done. At Kobe an American officer friend of mine in command of a U.S. destroyer found himself unable to send out radio messages because of persistent jamming by a Japanese destroyer which finally even followed him out to sea. The Yankee ship stopped at dusk, got up steam without betraying its purpose, suddenly raced away under full throttle and escaped. Only then could it send out messages asking help for the very Japanese who suspected nefarious designs.

But all of this came out later and gradually. For those of us

actually in Japan there was only a gentle consideration such as I have seen nowhere else in time of disaster save in China, from the Chinese.

When it became possible to go indoors again, on Tuesday following the Saturday of the first big shock, our *Japan Times* printers picked up some large hand-set type from the floor and we began to issue single-sheet "Earthquake Extras"—the only English-language news in town, as the *Japan Advertiser* had burned. It was like a picnic. We printed on a job press which, as we had no electric power yet, was turned by a rope tied to its flywheel. Next an ingenious Japanese fitted a big wooden handle to the flywheel. And when finally someone devised a sewing-machinelike treadle, three laughing men crowded around to "step on it" in all senses of the phrase, so that Togo Sheba—Hawaii-born son of our publisher and self-appointed circulation manager *pro tem*—easily ran off several hundred copies daily for free distribution at the Imperial Hotel and similar gathering places of Americans and other readers of English. The *Japan Advertiser* had irked us for months by claiming the biggest English-language circulation in the Far East. So at the bottom of our Earthquake Extras we ran a line reading: "Smallest Net Paid Circulation on Earth." As we made no charge, the claim couldn't be refuted—but a sobersides missionary remonstrated with me for joking in time of trouble. Later I was made to realize that my youthful zest in catastrophe was not shared by certain Japanese neighbors, who sent a delegation to cook-san in courteous protest against my playing of the *chikonki* (a portable phonograph) at a time when so many *kami*, or ghosts, were newly floating around. I felt ashamed at my lack of sensibility and stopped the music for a time.

No one could go through that period of grave fortitude and immediate reconstruction without gaining a deep and lasting impression about Japanese as a whole. In years to come, over in China, I was to feel cold fury over Japanese aggressions and cruelties; yet at the same time, when I then visited Japan I found that such policies were unknown to the people at home. To them, in fact, the China adventure was presented most convincingly as a reluctantly undertaken measure of Nipponese defense. Japan's role was portrayed by the crafty chauvinistic big newspapers of Tokyo and Osaka (willing

instruments of the ruling hierarchy's imperialism) as that of savior of the war-lord-oppressed people of China, who welcomed the Japanese troops with shouts and banners and were given Morinaga caramels as reward. One could look at photos—which in China I saw being carefully staged—of the caramel distribution! Nothing, of course, was revealed to the Japanese people as to the conquest of war-lordism by the Kuomintang, which actually was a reason why Japan's military struck, lest a modernized China grow too strong. In Japan's papers there was only some occasional slander of the Kuomintang as an alleged instrument of Soviet Russia, controlled (so it was declared) by an unscrupulous super war lord named Chiang Kai-shek.

Japan's numerous equivalents of Dr. Goebbels cooked up a special propaganda dish for the Japanese people which had little, or only accidental, resemblance to their propaganda for the public abroad. They did do a skilled, particularized job in distorting the China picture for the understanding of the Japanese people, of course. Certain arguments for expansion of Japan which were purveyed to the world public were seldom if ever put forth at home. For instance, I doubt whether Japan's problem of overpopulation was much talked about on the home front; to have done so might have raised doubts as to the desirability for increasing it at a runaway rate, when the peasantry were heavily debt-burdened and city workers lacked employment.

During a visit to Japan from China, around 1926, I blundered into argument with a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs while waiting for a talk with the liberal Baron Kijuro Shidehara, his chief. What excuse, I demanded, did the Japanese Government have for failing to embark on active propaganda to limit the size of Japanese families? Didn't the course of things point inevitably to a Nipponese territorial grab for expansion in Manchuria?

No indeed, replied the Vice-Minister. Japan would in her own special way find means to accommodate her excess population. Birth control definitely would not become a state policy. But, he added conciliatingly, birth-control apparatus was freely sold in Japan even though the Government would not urge its use. (It is true that contraceptive devices were available, particularly at the famous "Sex Stores" in Kobe, a seaport with its eye on tourist trade. One of those

stores sold a catalog for ten sen, much in demand. Among other things it stated that use of its curious wares would "make the whole thing a real pleasure.")

But, I persisted, just *what* did the Japanese Government purpose to do with all these extra people? Was there any excuse for them unless we presumed eventual aggression against somebody else's property, since Japan's property was limited? Was there a plan for war?

This flustered the Vice-Minister and brought our discussion to a quick close, but not without one significant admission on his part.

"We can manufacture everything but man power," he remarked. Since Japan was then suffering from an oversupply of man power I could see no outlets or reasons save emigration and war, respectively. Both were tried. Both failed.

Japanese have been called the "most northerly of the tropical peoples." Their homes and daily life are such that each cold season seems to catch them by complete surprise, and even a plentiful supply of hot baths leaves them still reluctant to live in cold places. Japanese attempts at northern colonization have always proved fiascoes. Toward the southern tropical islands, such as the mandate group and Mindanao in the Philippines, they turned more readily. But it is exaggeration to suggest that they can't all of them live in their homeland if necessary. And it will be largely necessary since the end of the war. Standards of Japanese living can't be high, but that is one of the inevitable consequences of being led into a war where one is thoroughly licked; probably it is one of the inevitable consequences of war, for everybody, net.

During my first years in China, dating from 1924, I went over to Japan often and felt at home, though Washington's passage of an exclusion law at the very beginning of that period had made Americans considerably less popular in Japan. The Japanese resented being barred on race lines. I didn't blame them then, nor do I blame them today. It has always seemed most peculiar that our country, generally so opposed to everything Hitler stands for, should so often lay itself open to the charge of race prejudice. Our Negro problems are little understood abroad. Virtually everywhere, instances of Negro-white clashes in America are employed as anti-American propaganda to prove our inborn hypocrisy. Our own

sometimes boisterous complacency when abroad prepares the ground for such resentful digs. The strongest piece of propaganda Japan was able to use against us in occupied Far East areas after Pearl Harbor was furnished by our forcible removal of American citizens of Japanese ancestry (together with Japanese) from the Pacific coast. Even if we had been in the Far East to argue, we couldn't have denied that we acted on race lines against our own citizens among whom there had not been, and to this day never has been, any proved instance of either espionage or sabotage—while we let Germans and Italians throughout the country proceed calmly about their business, which often included more than met the eye. We can't be too surprised if some of the Far East peoples wondered whether, as Japan insisted, fascist elements had got control in America and were attacking the whole Orient without justification save greed!

All this runs ahead of my story. The point I am making is that just as I developed a good deal of Chinese viewpoint through years of residence in China, in that earlier phase I had absorbed some little Japanese viewpoint. To such extent as possible I've tried to keep it, because it is always useful to try to see things as the other fellow does even when study only proves how wrong the other fellow is. There were always matters of Japanese national policy I couldn't stomach, but these very points were often called to my notice by critical Japanese.

The Baroness Shizue Ishimoto, a sensitive lady of high position, worked for birth control among Japan's industrial slaves and went to prison for her convictions. At her home between Tokyo and Yokohama the police watched under orders but took no repressive steps because they admired and respected her. Laughingly she told me how she was finally freed. Her son was about to be presented to the Emperor at the New Year season, and he said that his mother must be removed from jail to see that he was fittingly attired! So, no doubt with relief, the authorities let her go. Her rank probably did not later save her from return to her cell when the "national crisis" grew acute—and I can testify that she was not merely intelligent but stanch. To talk with her was a joy because she spoke the common language of civilized people everywhere. It was characteristic that she recognized in Madame Sun Yat-sen, whom she had never met,

a woman of her own type, and once she gave me an autographed copy of her life story, in English, for me to take to Madame Sun. They both hoped to meet on the relatively neutral ground of Hong Kong during the tumultuous period of the late 1930s, but it was never arranged because the tolerance of the Japanese police toward Baroness Ishimoto had its limits—one of them concerning her personal whereabouts. She might receive guests ("Everyone who comes here is put down in the police record!" she assured me amusedly, watching for reaction), but she could not travel at that time. The trap was closing on the Japanese people for years before they were flung into conflict against the Allies.

What I say here must necessarily be limited, rather haphazard, and without intent to give any detailed history. But my personal contacts during the years were shaped by history, whether I was in Japan or China. While returning to China from my first trip home in ten years, I heard with intense dismay of the Manchuria aggression of 1931. That summer had seen apparent evidence of hope for greater voice of the Japanese people in Japan's internal affairs. Having signed the London Naval Treaty of 1930, the Hamaguchi Cabinet endeavored to reduce the Japanese Army by four divisions. Alarmed, the Army finally won a compromise by which the necessary money was made available for "improved equipment and mechanization." Then came another jolt for the armed services in the form of a Diet election in which, for virtually the first time, the people expressed themselves forcefully on the side of democratic reform. Quietly the Army laid its plans to regain the reins. With the flimsiest of manufactured pretenses it launched attack in Manchuria on September 18. A Japanese "punitive expedition" quickly flooded the whole of a territory in which Japan's foothold had formerly rested only on railway-lease rights.

Wilfrid Fleisher, backed by a quarter-century of experience in Japan, believes that Japanese fascism dates back to the invasion of Manchuria, also that this rise of the military took Japan entirely by surprise. This strikes me as a well-supported statement. The country as a whole was not watching those at the top—and what was worse, Japan's constitutional position left no effective recourse in any case. It seems to me that with such a constitutional setup the rise of Japanese fascism might easily have been earlier, faster, and worse in first

stages though not finally. But there was always division among the top people, conflict and doubt and hesitancy beyond real need. Only when one specific section of the ruling caste, the military, finally realized its strength did the inevitable come into its full evil blossom.

Arriving in Shanghai just after the Manchuria invasion, I concurred wholly in certain sweeping conclusions already reached by those in charge of the newspaper for which I was to work and for which in newly emigree and original "home" form I still work.

Cornelius Vander Starr, owner of the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, in the early 1920s went out to China from California via Japan and made a fortune by his genius for guessing right, quick—and being willing to back his judgment adventurously. He is primarily an insurance man but has a speculative gift in many directions, including the world of ideas. His intellectual side is often treated by business associates with tolerant condescension. Then in some sudden emergency they discover that he has been squirreling up a hoard of facts which suddenly take form as the right answer to a crucial problem. That, coupled with a talent for precise English, makes him a remarkable "editor's editor," however little he may be qualified for or inclined to the daily humdrum of newspaper life.

About Japan's drive into Manchuria, Neil Starr didn't have to think twice. He had himself lived in Japan, knew and liked the Japanese, but could instantly detect when they were headed the wrong way. Manchuria represented something tremendously, historically wrong; he recognized it from the moment of impact and told his then editor Theodore Olin Thackrey in effect: "Up to now I've never tried to lay down specific policy for the *Post*, but on this Manchuria thing—I must. We are against it!"

Ted was completely of this view. Arriving a few days later to write the paper's editorials, I too saw the matter in that light. We were all to find that the Anglo-American public as a whole had as yet come to no such conclusion. It was a terrible shock to me, just after I arrived back in Shanghai, to meet the late Willis Abbot, and find that Japan had thoroughly taken him into camp. A world-famed leader of pacifist thought, Mr. Abbot had visited first Japan and then Manchuria. He came away convinced that Japan was the one great pacifying force of the Far East, and that Chinese misgovernment in Manchuria had demanded that Japan finally reluctantly

take over, at whatever cost to her sensitive spirit. I never knew a good man in a falser position. We parted with minds at opposite poles.

In a later chapter on the press I will go deeper into the troubles which developed in quarters closer home and more bothersome to us. For the moment I may merely note that foreign Shanghai, and the Treaty Ports of China generally, divided on the Manchuria issue. A few months later, in early 1932, a sharper test came with the outbreak of six weeks' hostilities between the Japanese "defense forces" at Shanghai and Tsai Ting-kai's troops guarding the Shanghai-Nanking railway during political discussions in the capital. The violence of the times inspired a corresponding violence in our editorial denunciations of the Japanese. To our dismay a sizable portion of the foreign community, primarily Britons but including many Americans, accepted Japan's thesis that she was single-handedly supporting the general foreign interest. Typical of this attitude was the fact that the predominately British Shanghai Club, boasting the longest bar in the world, excluded Chinese but accepted Japanese as fellow foreigners.

With the passage of months we found plenty to criticize. Although the Shanghai war was called off, Japan moved from Manchuria into Jehol, toward Hopei province in which Peiping was located. I flew up to Peiping at the outset of the Jehol campaign, loaned to United Press and the *New York Times* jointly and expecting to stay not less than three months; but I was back at the *Post* in Shanghai just two weeks later, after the Japanese had knifed through not only the token Chinese resistance but even the thin line of embattled foreign correspondents, who in bewilderment found themselves far in the Japanese rear while they were still looking for the vanguard! In this campaign and subsequent moves Japan's military men employed corruption as a primary weapon. They had no trouble in buying up Chinese officials in Jehol and speedily developed the idea that this was a process which could be followed indefinitely for the conquest of China.

In our paper we dealt with Japan and her policies realistically and without pulling punches. No other Shanghai newspaper hit the Japanese so hard. But we never hit below the belt. Neil, Ted, and I were in perfect agreement as to tactics. If we felt the Japanese were

wrong we threw the dictionary at them. But if they were right about anything we gave them due credit. When we blundered, as sometimes happened, we made the matter good. We tried to keep their good qualities in mind, even when those qualities were least in evidence. We were fair, and the Japanese themselves admitted it. It was my idea to maintain personal contact with the Japanese diplomats, consular people, and (so far as possible) military, to see them as long as they would see me. Events proved that even when their Chinese puppets were bombing our building, assassinating our personnel, and threatening the lives of Neil Starr and myself—this was after Ted Thackrey had returned to America, in 1935—certain key Japanese were still not merely willing but anxious to keep touch with us, and at times helpful in ameliorating our troubles. Opposition to their policies was at last growing in other quarters. They knew they would at any rate get a fair deal from the *Post*, though at times our notion of even justice must have made them grind their teeth.

Thus I was allowed to interview Japan's "Lawrence," Major General Kenji Doihara. The incident is worth mention because he was regarded as the Nipponese master spy and supreme political fixer abroad. It must have been around 1935, when Doihara had just forced the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Hopei province together with the dissolution of the Peiping branch of the National Military Council and Kuomintang offices in Chahar and Hopei. This in turn brought about Doihara's unification of North China's five provinces of Chahar, Hopei, Suiyuan, Shansi, and Shantung, in the puppet "autonomous" grouping under Yin Ju-keng. Doihara quietly arrived in Shanghai and with the aid of a Japanese friend in the Nippon Dempo news agency I interviewed and photographed him.

Sitting quietly in the foreign-style parlor of one of the down-at-heel Japanese hotels north of Siccawei Creek, Doihara in his baggy civilian clothes looked drab and far from Machiavellian. His face seemed stolid, crafty perhaps, but far from the suave intelligence I was accustomed to find among Japan's top-flight diplomats. What he said was as uninspiring as his appearance—the usual stupid nothings regarding Japan's benevolent feeling toward China, and her total absence of desire for anything but peace, order, and trade. I

went away feeling that much of the famed Doihara strategy must reside in his capacity for throwing people off their guard by looking the opposite of a movie hero or villain. After all, Doihara was a traveling salesman for Japanese imperialism. If his appearance was shabby-commercial, so were the goods he was peddling.

Certainly nothing could have been shabbier than the tactics unfolded by Japan from this point on. Not merely opium but morphine and heroin were pushed by Japan's agents (mostly rogue Koreans, with some Chinese) on the people of North China both to make money and to drug the people into more docile acceptance of a slave status. Tientsin became particularly a center. Later I was to see and photograph retail narcotics shops openly operating at Nanking itself. During this period of gradual tightening of the Nipponese grasp on North China—a time of some hesitancy in Tokyo, and of furious secret talks in high Japanese places—a great many moves were tried experimentally and opportunistically. One important Japanese action was the virtual destruction of the Chinese customs structure in North China. Under Japanese guns, shiploads of goods were landed along the coast and imported without payment of duty. Later the "autonomous" North China regime set up its own tariff. Trains proceeding southward from Tientsin carried smuggling gangs of various nationalities—Japanese, Korean, and Chinese—who impudently carried commodities down to the Shanghai markets and beat up any who dared try to stop them. Such Chinese custom officers as persisted in efforts to function were disarmed by the Japanese and had to stand by, impotent.

Without effort to trace events in detail it should be mentioned that during this period Tokyo made a strong effort to win Nanking over—largely through their mutual antipathy to communism, but also by the argument, later to be much heard everywhere in the East, that they were in harmony on a policy of Asia for the Asiatics. During a period of Shanghai residence, years before, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had received General Jinzaburo Mazaki and discussed with him various idealistic Greater Asia theories. (His liberal son, in consular service, aided me in Shanghai before Pearl Harbor and others in Manila after.) This very old chicken came home to roost when on March 6, 1935, a statement was issued by Mamoru Shigemitsu, then Foreign Vice-Minister—a man whom I knew well and regarded as

highly intelligent—implying that Nanking and Tokyo found themselves in accord on economic co-operation and other matters and referring to “rapprochement” as “result of the mutual discovery that there is perfect concurrence between the Greater Asia doctrine of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the oriental doctrine of the Japanese people.”

Had the Chinese Government swallowed this, accompanied as it was by all manner of diplomatic gestures such as Japan’s elevation of her China Legation to the status of Embassy in May—had Nanking taken the bait as expected, history would have turned out vastly different. It is a fact that Nanking did not instantly reject the Japanese thesis, and during August, China’s ambassador Chiang Tso-pin offered Chinese co-operation to Foreign Minister Koki Hirota providing Japan would treat China as an independent state and desist from moves, as in Manchuria and North China, endangering her territorial entity. But Hirota’s response, though smooth as butter, embodied three principles later summed up by Professor Hsu Shu-hsi of Peiping as meaning “that China shall recognize the *fait accompli* in Manchuria, Jehol, Hopei, and Chahar, forsake the world, and make common cause with Japan against Soviet Russia. That was obviously more than any government could accept”—though Nanking still refrained from denying concurrence.

Month by month, problems multiplied in both countries. Japan was soon rocked by her “February Mutiny” led by young army officers early in 1936 under the guise of loyalty to the Emperor and elimination of politicians and evil capitalists exploiting Manchuria as “a hunting ground for their own profit.” But the Emperor called for them to give up. Their failure to comply promptly—or later to commit hara-kiri—caused many to be shot. In China, meanwhile, there was a series of incidents of violence against individual Japanese. The Chinese Communists’ entry into Shansi province in the spring of 1936 caused Mr. Hirota to view with alarm. He wanted Nanking to come out for his Three Principles and accept Nipponese aid in chastising Reds wherever found; “it is our intention,” he told the Diet May 6, “to urge the Chinese Government to make up their mind.” Several thousand more Japanese troops went into North China during that month, perhaps as a means of expediting Chinese mental processes.

With the appointment of Shigeru Kawagoe as Japanese ambassador to China, things began to move in a direction precisely the opposite of Tokyo's desires. Kawagoe had been Tientsin consul general, had negotiated with Japan's North China puppets, and his elevation caused the powerful General Li Tsung-jen of Kwangsi province to come out with a ringing declaration to the effect that China should unite, quit dilly-dallying, and tackle the problem of Japanese aggression head on. Similar harsh words came from the Kuomintang Executive Committee at Canton, following which the Kwangtung (Canton) and Kwangsi troops were called "anti-Japanese national salvation forces" and Nanking was threatened by attack from the south unless a policy of forceful resistance to Japan were proclaimed. Though this move by the Liang Kwang ("Two Kwangs") proved abortive and disappeared that summer after quiet explanation by Chiang Kai-shek that it was premature, it was symptomatic of the growing tensions throughout the country.

Significantly Chiang spoke at a Central Executive Committee session in July, answering a Kwangsi proposal for instant military action against Japan. After enunciating principles of national sovereignty and promising to sign nothing in violation of territorial rights, he concluded that ". . . in the event that all political and diplomatic means are exhausted and the violation is still not repelled, it will mean that the fundamental existence of our nation and our race is threatened, it will mean that it is impossible for us to endure any longer. When that time comes, we shall not hesitate to make sacrifices."

Japan failed to heed. During the autumn the Japanese ambassador and China's Foreign Minister Chang Chun negotiated fruitlessly. Yet on both sides sentiment was moving toward employment of force, save that on the Japanese side there was no belief that Chiang had anything more than a bluff at his disposal. Interviewed September 28, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita said: "Opinion is steadily gaining ground among the Japanese public and among the Japanese in China that any further negotiations with China are useless." But no Japanese looked for other than the token resistance and quick sell-outs which had featured China's record up to then. It was completely impossible to convince any Japanese that Chinese nationalism represented something new in China—to them, it was

merely old war-lordism in a new dress; their propagandists constantly said so, and in time, even Japanese who knew China well and should have realized the facts were hypnotized into believing their own lies.

What some high Japanese knew, beyond question, was that China was growing stronger and that the results of the Sian kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek at the end of 1936 meant unprecedented union. What they refused to face was that this union was more than a means of blackjacking Japan into paying a higher price than heretofore. The Chinese war lords had gotten together, that was all. Wedges must once more be driven between them, "silver bullets" must speed from Japan's purse toward China. It was a little puzzling that no Chinese seemed this time to be selling out yet, but patience; patience always won against even the patient Chinese, in the long run.

(A former Japanese minister, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, was an unusually slow-spoken man. Sometimes he would take two or three minutes to complete a sentence broken by long reflective pauses. It delighted him and his friends to tell how he had worn down Dr. C. T. Wang and other Chinese negotiators through this great deliberation. It always delighted the Japanese to feel that in some particular they were beating the Chinese, their historic mentors, at some Chinese game. But in this as in much else the Japanese were too easily made happy—sometimes they counted the game won when actually it was not won until the Chinese calmly picked up the pieces.)

In this recital I have dwelt long on seeming trivialities. Now I shall skip lightly over earth-shaking events and long years. The fact is that from Sian onward, Japan's goose was cooked, if she had but known it. Not merely was she about to face solid Chinese resistance, refusing to break under Japan's most shattering blows, but she was to amass growing ill will of the whole civilized world. Still pushing blindly on, she was to make war finally with America and Britain. The pattern is clear, consistent, from the moment of Japanese explosion in Manchuria on September 18, 1931. As we look back now we can see a logic of events only occasionally evident as we then looked forward, because it was and is an insane sort of logic leading only toward disaster.

The trouble was that to the devious judo tactics of Japan's ruling group none of us then had effective answer. The people of Japan and the people and governments of China, America, Britain, and Russia had great stakes in preserving a peace in which all might have found solid prosperity. Our failure brought great tragedy. Let no one tell you it was unavoidable, that Japan and her people were pushed by her economics. Military gangsters did the job. This at least gives hope for a future in which such savages can hold no more power.

8

BIG FROG, LITTLE FROGS

CHINA SHOULD, could, and probably will become the Big Frog of the Far East puddle. It is quite a puddle. While beating Japan, our battle craft cruised over a territory thrice the size of North America. That is merely the watery front yard of an Asiatic mainland that China clearly was made to dominate. The question—and it's not one that I or anyone else can answer finally as yet—is whether under the peace China is going to grow fairly suddenly to true Big Frog status, surrounded by an interesting collection of Little Frogs, or alternatively find herself just one of the miscellaneous mob.

Many Chinese and particularly many vociferous, well-meaning friends of China would have us think that the thing is either accomplished or bound to happen automatically. But other more realistic Chinese realize the wholesomeness of fact facing. Dr. C. L. Hsia, New York director of the Chinese News Service of the Information Ministry, wrote in a letter to the American edition, Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, of November 3, 1944:

You may be interested to know the sober reaction of an average thoughtful Chinese on the subject of China's being one of the Big Four. The truth is that this is not China's asking, and as time goes on it has become abundantly clear that it is part of the United States Government's policy to make China a fourth member of the World Council.

A great number of Chinese don't really care whether the world takes this seriously, because we are practical enough to realize it is a compliment paid to China because of her heroic stand against the Japanese and because of the tremendous sacrifices made by the Chinese people as a result of that stand. And we are not going to bank on that. We

know that whether China can really play an effective role in the events hereafter will depend largely on what progress China can make in the years immediately after the war. In other words, whether China will really be one of the Big Four or Big Five is a matter for future events to decide.

The question of American and other foreign policy in this connection is something I prefer to take up more in detail in another place, though passing heed may here be paid to Dr. Hsia's additional good point that Chinese representation at wartime council tables, "inadequate as it may be, does give the rest of the world—peoples in Africa and Asia, and even in Latin America—a sense that this is not a concert of Anglo-American-Soviet powers or a rule of the white man. This has a great psychological advantage in the present world situation which, as it is, is already giving critics cause for suspicion and distrust as to the victors' intentions." All this is pertinent to the Big Frog-Little Frog questions.

Wartime China was much whittled down as compared with its former vast areas. But at the Cairo Conference on December 1, 1943, a pungent declaration was made by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang. Mr. Stalin was not present because not as yet a party to war with Japan, though he later concurred. This statement said it was the Allied purpose "that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." It was also stated that Japan will be expelled from "all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed"—though no mention was made of the ultimate fate of these mostly colonial areas, except for Korea. Of course Korea was once under Chinese suzerainty, but regardless of this fact it was declared that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." Philippines freedom was already pledged by the United States, so there was no need to bring that up. But the presumption was that colonies once held by Britain, the Netherlands, and even France would once more go back to the possessive Power; while Hong Kong was tacitly left under British title when China negotiated the recent abolition of British extraterritoriality.

Here we have the making of extensive readjustments, and some important problems in which China is likely to occupy a central place if she has later gained for herself the Big Frog status to which both geography and history entitle her. It may be well, however, to consider initially the relatively small proportions to which war and other factors had whittled Free China as of early 1945.

It is not necessary to take into consideration certain anciently claimed areas of the former Chinese Empire, though the Chinese sometimes turn out to have long memories in such matters. Suzerainty has been exercised by China at one time or another over Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Tannu Tuva, and the Liuchiu, or Ryukyu Islands. During the period of the Manchus this suzerainty over Korea was recognized by England, but Generalissimo Chiang's participation in the Cairo declaration effectively ended any possible Chinese claims in that direction. Korea will be free and independent—though it is salutary to bear in mind that freedom and independence, like all other things, are relative. Despite China's old-time sovereignty claim over the Liuchius, Perry signed a treaty with the "Kingdom of Lew Chew" and there is a case for independence—or internationalization, which Perry advocated.

Manchuria fell into Japan's lap in 1931. With the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo under a Manchu emperor from Peking's Forbidden City with title derived from China's last dynasty, this situation seemed pretty well wrapped up from the Tokyo point of view. Diplomatic recognitions of the Hsinking regime were slow in coming, however—only the Axis countries and such small fry as San Salvador would play ball. Uncle Sam in particular held out rigidly against any form of recognition. Even more to the point, Manchuria was an issue on which it developed that China would never compromise. In fact, the United Front of 1937 developed primarily out of homesickness of Chang Hsueh-liang and his men for the lost northeastern provinces of Heilung-kiang, Kirin, and Liaoning. Cairo pledged the return of Manchuria to China, which meant the end of Nippon-created Manchukuo. Nothing was said about Russian-dominated Outer Mongolia, from which China later was to release the last of her faint grips, nor was there any talk of machinery to guarantee that a Manchuria freed from Japanese influence would not set up something comparable to the Mongolian People's Repub-

lic. As in the case of the Mongol structure, Chinese suzerainty could be cheerfully acknowledged by everyone concerned, including Russia. Thus the Cairo agreement would be implemented to such an extent that America and Britain would be irresolute in attempting to shape Manchurian destinies by their own armed force.

Nothing was said at Cairo, either, about Inner Mongolia, then become, like Manchukuo, a Japanese puppet state. Prince Teh jumped to strings pulled by Japan's Kwangtung army in Manchuria and went through the motions of running a United Autonomous Government of Mongolia, or Meng Chiang. Chinese who heavily colonized Mongolia want rule by China. But there are also the Mongols who conceivably might incline toward the Mongolian People's Republic. That problem may turn out great or little, like many another problem in this connection, according to the Chinese Government's capacity for tact, firmness, and fairness. Its importance may be judged by the fact that at one point, along the Suiyuan railway, Meng Chiang swept within thirty miles of clearly Chinese Peiping.

Next were the parts of China directly occupied by Japan, containing about half of China's population. Throughout this book, and particularly in parts having to do with military matters, I am reluctant to quote "statistics," which seldom are better than estimates and usually estimates inspired by somebody with an ax to grind. All through the Far East there is a special tendency for figures to lie and liars to figure. However, Guenther Stein, who is a man in search of truth, estimates "more than 200,000,000" inhabitants in Occupied China as of early 1945. Once Japan had pushed the Chinese Government out of Nanking at the end of 1937, and particularly after she had pushed it out of Wuhan in 1938, she began to sniff about for the structure of a shadow state. She wanted to carve out of China a counterfeit China, complete in every external detail but Nipponese at its core. To do this she needed some sharp instrument. It had been a matter of the most complete surprise when Japan's leaders found that Nationalism had so conquered the heart of Chinese people and leaders alike. For once, silver bullets made no conquests. Chinese industrialists had failed to "co-operate," the politicians had withdrawn, the generals had fought. To the Japanese this was a shocking situation.

Then Wang Ching-wei went over. In Chinese eyes that was even more shocking. Though an old revolutionist, Wang's fluctuations between left and right had given warning of his inner gnawings and instabilities. He was Canton-born and Japan-educated and became a close intimate of Sun Yat-sen. Wang's rebel zeal found insufficient outlet through writing and political organization, so in 1910 he tried his hand at a Russian-style bomb effort. This was directed against the Manchu Dynasty in the person of the Prince Regent, father of the feeble youth later to be expelled by Christian General Feng from the Forbidden City and at last to be installed (in probably next to the last important event of his life) as Emperor of Manchukuo. Wang blew up a bridge but not the Regent. Softhearted for once, the Empress Dowager spared his life and put the handsome youth into a prison from which he was freed by events of the following year. Wang rejoined Sun, was a right-hand man for years, wrote Sun's famed last will, still read at party memorial meetings, and expected after the death of his chief to step into the master's shoes. This was blocked time after time. Frustration set in, with consequences calling for a psychoanalyst.

His swings between left and right were amusing even to himself. In 1938 he told me of the long record of his governmental "ins" and "outs," ranging through high place at Wuhan as a leftist pro-Communist in 1927 to equally elevated subsequent position in an anti-Communist role at Nanking, and almost pathetically he remarked, "I seem always to get on the wrong side. When I urge that the Communists be in the Kuomintang, as at Wuhan, they are expelled. Later when I decide that the Communists are bad for us, they join in a United Front." But that was nothing to the way Wrong Horse Wang blundered with regard to the Japanese.

First intimation of his final dangerous shift came with his secret departure by airplane from Chungking just before Christmas of 1938. He paused at Kunming, talked vaguely of peace with Japan, then flew to French Indo-China. Illness was given as his excuse, and the Generalissimo so far fell in with this that as a face-saving device, Chiang wired Wang to return to his duties with the National Government as soon as he had recovered. But in Hong Kong I met Wang's secretary, T'ang Leang-li, Java-born and hiding beneath surface cordiality a fierce hatred of the whites who in America had

once treated him as an inferior. A single incident—exclusion from a West Coast restaurant, as I recall—permanently soured T'ang; but at this time he was still apparently friendly toward myself, and over an ice-cream soda we had discussion as mild as our drink. He made clear that there was a chance of some sort of deal “in the interest of peace for China” between Wang and the Japanese, and was frank in saying that he would personally stick by Wang loyally whatever the decision. I didn't then suspect that T'ang would later put me, along with Neil Starr, on a small, select list of persons who never would be missed by him or his fellow thugs of Puppet China.

Not to protract this part of the analysis unduly, it may be said that Wang went to Shanghai and after long negotiation with the Japanese he accepted presidency of a fake “National Government” which Japan set up under heavy guard in the former capital of Nanking. It was really marvelous how far the Japanese went in for window dressing. They established an “Orthodox Kuomintang” on the model of the real party and insisted that it alone was heir to the ideals of Sun Yat-sen—who, it was pointed out, hadn't been above going to Japan and dealing with the Japanese on occasion, and whose former No. 1 boy Wang (they didn't put it so crudely) was now in charge at Nanking. They started counterfeit editions of former Shanghai newspapers which had removed first to Wuhan and later to Chungking, and especially delighted in manipulating names of the papers which had been most against them. Even our own English-language Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury* was taken over by the Japanese in Shanghai! Confucius, too, served Japan's purposes. A “back to Confucius” movement was started to teach the Chinese the virtue of obedience to one's superiors.

But Japan never showed full trust in Wang, any more than in an earlier and still autonomous North China regime centering on Peiping. In signing a pact with him, instead of making the document simple and likely to impress the Chinese people of occupied areas with Japanese sincerity, Tokyo insisted (against the sounder judgment of a few) on making it devious and legalistic. The North was nominally brought under Wang but not actually so. Its own puppets and the Japanese Army kept control.

It was clear that Japan was still master and intended to remain so. The narcotics racket flourished. China's peasants were so squeezed

by Japanese-run monopolies that they quit growing foodstuffs for market and fell back on subsistence crops. Merciless punishments were constantly inflicted on the helpless countryside by the Japanese Army in retaliation for sporadic guerrilla forays. No one took seriously such puppet silliness as the Japan-Nanking "Treaty of Alliance" of October 30, 1943. Wang Ching-wei was so obviously fettered that no men of consequence joined him, and by the time of his death in the autumn of 1944 there was not even much hatred still evident. The second pseudo-President Chen Kung-po was far from satisfactory in Japanese eyes as Wang's successor. In Chungking, at the time of his appointment, I was told he had left there only because of disappointment at failure to be given high place, a situation which marked him both as politically inept and not in his heart attracted toward the Japanese. Who among all the Chinese ever was attracted toward Japanese domination, it may be asked? My own answer is that not one Chinese, anywhere at any time, honestly and normally was so attracted. The case of Wang Ching-wei was merely that of a frustrated near genius whose morbid jealousies drove him into fatal error. He had no fun out of it. Nor, we may be sure, had Wang Keh-min of North China or any other of the sorry crew of men who purchased notoriety and a shadow of power at a price of the eternal contempt of their fellow country folk.

With the peace, the Chinese Government regained Japanese-occupied China proper, with which may be included the island of Formosa with its 94 per cent Chinese population, and the Pescadores, mentioned in the Cairo agreement. There remains one other problem—the territory of the Chinese Communists, including perhaps ninety million people, declared by neutral observers to manifest no great objection and perhaps even to be pleased over certain improvements in their lot. These resulted on the one hand from the self-styled Communists' decision to let Marxism wait for the end of the war, or maybe even a century or two later, and on the other from these same Communists' detailed and devoted attention to local problems. They did only what the Kuomintang itself had promised but failed to do, probably because the Communists concentrated on local things while the Kuomintang felt weight of responsibility for both national and international problems. The Communists worked from a mass base, the Kuomintang ruled from

the top. Stein believes that 93 per cent of the Communist party members joined since 1937.

For a long time the question is likely to persist as to how completely and permanently the Kuomintang-Communist differences can ever be patched up. So far the Chinese Communists have never asked diplomatic recognition from anyone, even Moscow, neither have they shown more than superficial signs of separatism. Quick developments of that sort might come now, after the end of war with Japan. Moreover, if the Chinese do not themselves contrive to assimilate one another into a workable unified political pattern, Soviet Russia, despite treaty engagements, might take a hand at least to the extent that she has already taken a hand in affairs of Outer Mongolia. That is not at all certain. She withdrew completely and without any sort of pressure from rich Sinkiang, her "gateway to Asia," later solidifying the status by treaty. This is a thing we should remember before jumping to hasty conviction of evil Soviet intent. But Russia is run by some hard-boiled men with cold skill in doing what they deem necessary for Soviet security. So Communist China as endorser of a Chinese Big Frog of the Far East is not yet a certainty.

Turning to the East's colonial areas, China's status as a semi-colony of the West has changed, for keeps, but recollection of it will be reflected in China's feelings toward her struggling neighbors.

We have been taught to think of the Chinese as a people with their backs to the sea, interested primarily in their own affairs and self-centered to the point of calling their country the center of everything (*Chung-kuo*). Yet in fact millions of Chinese live abroad today, and the influence of China is diffused throughout the world.

It is true that almost all of the emigration has been from one small locality in South China, and large areas of China know little about places outside. But during our own China-clipper-ship days, men of the New England coast voyaged round the world while others inland in Maine and Vermont lived their whole lives through without traveling more than ten miles from their home farms.

All sorts of Far East interdependencies with China have already grown up; Chinese workers are the backbone of all the great southern colonial areas where cheap plantation labor has been necessary. Chinese small-shop merchants monopolize their fields in many coun-

tries. At the same time China has been all too dependent upon such lands as French Indo-China and even remote Burma for necessities, including rice.

Americans feel a special interest in the Philippines. Chinese penetration has been great. President Sergio Osmena is part-Chinese. Trading Chinese have journeyed southeastward to Manila and other ports for over seven hundred years. Though the number of settlers has varied widely because of anti-Chinese purges, Chinese now constitute the largest alien group in the archipelago, with a 1939 census rating of 117,487 Chinese in a total population of just over sixteen million. Within two decades the number of Chinese in the Philippines nearly tripled. Everywhere they go, the Chinese are readily assimilated into the general population, to which they always contribute welcome elements of industry, frugality, humor, and integrity. Women of every nationality find the Chinese men good husbands, and the Filipina's view is practically demonstrated by the fact that about one million Filipinos are now part-Chinese. The export-brand Chinese puts his best foot forward. A national tendency toward sharp dealing at home instantly shifts to a standard of rigid honesty abroad. This quick establishment of and adherence to high standards is characteristic of the Chinese in every field of overseas life. In Manila, American women regarded the Chinese baby-amah as the aristocrat of her class, and these Chinese servants so regarded themselves. Yet in Shanghai and other China ports it was difficult to find any such type of Chinese baby-amah, and most mothers used to try to hire Japanese—while in Japan, Chinese again were regarded as superlative in many fields from tailors to bank clerks.

This background of Chinese in the Philippines, coupled with geographic propinquity, foretells increasing closeness between China and the Philippines. Each has recently achieved new stature of political independence. Both, in different ways, typify an emergence of Far Eastern peoples from colonial status. If Philippines independence entails eventually the cutting of old commercial ties with the United States there will be an inevitable tendency for China and the Philippines to turn more to each other. China certainly cannot as yet provide any considerable market for expensive sugar or other high-priced Philippines products as did America, but she does offer a tremendous mass market for low-grade tropical prod-

ucts. Moreover, there will be many common political and military problems. It would be rash to conjecture too far ahead in time of profound world readjustments, but anyone can readily see that both China and the Philippines stand in a position of potential Far East leadership and interdependence. The United States at the same time is in a position of unique friendly interest toward both China and the Philippines. No other country offers a greater non-imperialistic and democratic example, coupled with material help toward postwar reconstruction.

Toward the still-colonial lands of the Far East China looks with a friendly eye, and Chinese leaders clearly mean to speak freely about their wartime colony-holding allies. It is apparent that China may assume considerable moral leadership. China verged on trouble with Britain over the Japanese surrender of control over Britain's crown colony of Hong Kong, though she cautiously pulled clear again. Obviously Britain won't keep Hong Kong without recurrent trouble. Chinese expect their own Government at some opportune time to take firm steps toward recovery of this rocky isle and the British-held China mainland territories adjacent. The British contend that they accepted something the Chinese didn't want and transformed their place of virtual exile into a paradise; but the Chinese quietly say, "What could you have done at Hong Kong without us?" During the war, Chinese preferred not to quarrel with Britain over such an issue, which they feared might also worry America and disrupt the Allied front generally. But even before peace there was tentative effort at recovery, and more must be heard of it before long, if for no other reason than that many Chinese feel their position of moral leadership throughout the Far East cannot prosper unless she asserts herself vigorously for the recovery—by one means or another—of Hong Kong. No threat of force is contemplated. Rather the strategy will be initial political pressure when the time becomes opportune, followed if necessary by recovery of the leased mainland territories and an eventual period of trade starvation directed at whatever former Chinese soil Britain still holds. Boycott of Hong Kong was punishingly effective two decades back; it is felt that less rigorous and more competitive measures would work in future. A compromise might work, as with Russia over "Port Dairen" in Manchuria.

Meanwhile the efforts of India nationalists to pull Chinese delegations into common cause with them against Britain, in recent international conferences such as that at Bretton Woods, have been unsuccessful. Such a situation may not indefinitely continue. Up to now China has had her own firm reasons for keeping as close friendship as possible with both Britain and the United States. She could see no profit to herself, and a possibility of great loss, by quarreling with the Big Two while there was a world war on. Therefore her delegations operated under wraps, instructed to confine themselves to China's urgent and immediate issues.

A sign of the future was seen, however, at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks meetings in Washington when China requested that the principle of racial equality be formally included in the charter of emerging world organization. This initial effort failed. The very fact was bound to increase a latent "Asia for the Asiatics" sentiment, first stirred up, with marked unsucccess, by the Japanese, yet bound to glow into flame increasingly as time goes on. This "Asia for the Asiatics" matter is not a subject for debate. By this I don't mean that we can ignore it, but on the contrary that it is too solid a future factor for anybody to deny. In the line-up which is likely to develop, China is as certain to seek leadership of her fellow Asiatics (not necessarily in any spirit of hostility toward friendly Westerners) as is Australia—which opposed China's race equality proposal at Dumbarton Oaks—to be lined up in opposition. Where the rest of us stand is something to ponder seriously. Western pigheadedness can fan the flame.

Continuing our survey of the Far East, and assuming that the Indians just mentioned are bound to create more trouble rather than less for Britain in the future, there is Burma, lying between India and China. Just as Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek manifested interest in Indian problems a few years ago by personal visit to the Indian leaders, followed by a pro-India overture by Chiang to Churchill, so visits of Burmese to China have been encouraged. When I was at Chungking during early 1940 a large delegation of Burma journalists was receiving lavish hospitality. The rest of us rode shank's mare over Chungking's rocky streets, but the Chinese Government made motorcars and several hundred gallons of precious gasoline-plus-alcohol available for the Burmese,

who were everywhere greeted by big banners proclaiming China's happiness over their presence. Many competent witnesses, however, feel that exploitation of the Burmese by Chinese merchants has left a heritage of strong anti-Chinese feeling in Burma.

The Japanese, too, courted Burma as well as Thailand before the war. All this was pretty heady liquor for a small area which had long sought full independence from the British Empire. Finally detached from British India, Burma was made a crown colony with its own constitution as of April 1, 1937—a status which the Burmese still found far from the heart's desire, and in which the Chinese and Japanese both extended hands of sympathy.

Japan overran Burma, the farthest point reached in her war drive after Pearl Harbor. Jack Belden and others have made it blood-curdlingly clear that whereas, in the Philippines, America's independence pledge drew almost all native action to our side, in resentful Burma not only the British but also our American forces and civilians of whatever nationality suffered heavily from the malice of native guerrilla-bandits, or dacoits.

Many feel that if Nipponese strength had not been wasted in vain effort to reach Australia, India might easily have fallen into their hands after Burma. But while the Japanese named Subhas Chandra Bose as head of a "provisional government" of India and rallied some Indian armed forces as spearhead of a movement to "deliver India from Britain," they never quite progressed to achievement. It was a tempting chance missed; India's richest industrial areas lay closest to the high point of the Japanese military tide, and unquestionably a considerable section of the Indian population was open to conviction that Japan would bring deliverance from British bondage. Some sections were openly hostile to the white man, who stood in their eyes for alien rule. Millions would have been passive, no help to Britain and no hindrance to Japan. It was significant that Bose's death, reported after Japan's surrender, was mourned by many Indian nationalists. If the Japanese had actually arrived, there would have been some speedy revision of bitter Indian thinking about the actually halfway and hesitant oppressions of British rule, for Japan's overseas administrators are not hesitant. Such Indians as Gandhi would never have been known round the world, or to more than a very few for a very brief space, under the Japanese.

Japan's militance failed, but a peaceful sympathetic China may in time exert far deeper influence.

Considerable effort was made by the Japanese in Burma to proceed along the lines of their prewar friendly propaganda, at least in so far as political relationships were concerned. They set up Dr. Ba Maw as puppet premier on August 1, 1942, and on August 1, 1943, they granted a form of independence to Burma just as in the Philippines. In both territories, however, their army's cruelties more than offset any semblance of Japanese civilian decency. Added to this was the usual Nipponese blindness regarding economic matters. Every territory ever occupied by Japan, at least during World War II, has been promptly squeezed of its material riches, and the welfare of the people has generally gone downhill at a rapid clip. Manchuria, earlier, was exception—too good to be permanently true. Nevertheless it cannot be ignored that Japan did grant a pseudo-independence to Burma, accompanied by a "withdrawal of the Japanese military administration" and followed by a Burmese "declaration of war" against Britain and the United States. In time to come it is logical to presume that many a Burmese will remember these external forms more vividly than some of Japan's brutal administrative realities. We cannot count on a lasting antipathy to the Japanese anywhere that they have been with the possible exception of the Philippines. That was the sole colonial Far East territory where independence was already pledged when Japan went in—and a territory where atrocities never to be forgotten were perpetrated against the native people during Japan's death throes in the area.

Britain's colonial arm also stretches over Malaya. Here are the Straits Settlements, including Singapore, also British North Borneo, the Nicobar Islands, the four Federated Malay States of the Malay Peninsula, the Unfederated Malay States, and the islands of Brunei and Sarawak. This treasure store of rubber, tin, and other natural wealth has in the past been of immeasurable value to Britain. Before the war, three fifths of the rubber used by the United States came from Malaya (though synthetics and new sources had much altered that picture by the time the war was over); three fifths of America's prewar tin was shipped from there. Japan consolidated the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States into a single ad-

ministrative section. Britain's postwar program included only a return to a *status quo* featured in the past by enthusiastic exploitation of Malaya's rich resources but little concern for native political, economic, or educational improvements. Over two million Chinese residents, comprising 40 per cent of the population and about equaling the natives in number, may in time play an influential part in unrest. Though the Japanese have earned hate, the white has lost prestige, and no one should count too certainly on the future docility of any of the Far East peoples.

Close-linked with Malaya by geographic ties and a common empire concept are the twenty thousand jewel-islands of the Netherlands East Indies, stretching over a distance greater than that from New York to Los Angeles and having a Chinese population of over 1,200,000. The "spice" islands of Java, Sumatra, the Celebes, the Moluccas, and their satellites in prewar days furnished 90 per cent of America's supply of pepper and 86 per cent of that of the world as a whole; 91 per cent of the world's cinchona bark, 72 per cent of the kapok, 37 per cent of the rubber, 27 per cent of the coconut, 33 per cent of the hard cordage fiber, 24 per cent of the palm-oil products, 19 per cent of the tea—all this together with raw materials of strategic value deeply appreciated by the Japanese, such as oil, tin, and iron ore. A parting of Japan from such a store has meant sorrow indeed for Tokyo. In turn it may cause considerable thought on the part of native populations increasingly disinclined toward any sort of alien exploitation. China's example may mean much to them. So far Chinese and native peoples have been fellow serfs toiling for strangers. Change is overdue. Revolt, perhaps set off by the retiring Japanese, flared at the very moment of Dutch return.

France, too, must be remembered in a unique role. This is as the colonial power holding Indo-China, her richest colony anywhere and centuries back a part of the Chinese Empire, in tenuous grip through a period when Japan spared no other Western colony holder within her sphere of Asiatic "co-prosperity." French misfortunes at home actually furthered her Far East interest for a time. Under Vice Admiral Jean Decoux, the governor general, French officialdom on the Indo-China scene played a complicated and daring series of moves. Decoux had replaced General Georges Catroux in mid-1940 after Vichy yielded to German demands. These were

made because Catroux had urged resistance to Japan's projected stationing of troops in northern Indo-China. Catroux later said Washington rejected his plea for planes with a statement that it "could not enter into conflict with Japan." Decoux in turn was pressed by the Japanese in September. He for a time had hoped that Vichy, the United States, or both would give aid; but American policy was restrained because of Vichy's world position, and Vichy as German puppet would not oppose Germany's Axis ally, Japan. So Decoux gave in, repeatedly, with resultant loss of French territory to Thailand after border warfare and Japanese mediation in the spring of 1941. Finally a Franco-Japanese protocol for Nipponese "defense co-operation" was signed in July 1941. This legalized Japan's exploitations but still left the French in seeming charge of their colony. The lowest point of Decoux's tactics was just after Pearl Harbor, when he called without success on peoples of the French Pacific islands, with bases vital to the Allied position in the Pacific, to revolt against their Free French authorities.

But by mid-1943 Decoux began to use the rallying Allied strength as a lever of independence against the Japanese. After the liberation of his homeland, on September 26, 1944, he declared that Indo-China owed allegiance to "eternal France," with a further bombastic statement that "Peace will find the mother country stronger than ever, and Indo-China linked with France's destiny more closely than before."

However that might be, Decoux was arrested by the Japanese on March 10, 1945, and his regime was abolished on the ground that French officials had collaborated secretly with U.S. air forces in the Philippines, China, and India, as well as with enemy submarines, and that French officials "were known to have strongly advocated immediate launching of an armed attack on Japan." It was Japan's final preparation for a loss of Indo-China which her leaders must already have been able to recognize as inevitable. At the same time Japan declared the independence of Annam, the Indo-China province nearest the Philippines—one more last gesture. Hardly had the war ended before Generalissimo Chiang made a statement encouraging independence for French Indo-China. There is tinder ready to burn the French despite their generous protestations toward this area.

Thailand with its two million Chinese is a special case. The former Siam or "Muang-Thai," in southeastern Asia and partly bounded by both Indo-China and Burma, entered the Pacific war period as an independent limited monarchy bound to Japan by ties giving her a suspiciously semi-colonial status. On December 21, 1941, the bonds already created by airlines, commercial treaty, and other involvements were strengthened by a Thai-Japanese ten-year Treaty of Alliance. This in turn put Thailand into the war against both the United States and Great Britain through a declaration issued on January 25, 1942. Thailand's military strength was negligible, but her rich supplies of minerals included coal, tin, iron, manganese, tungsten, quicksilver, and antimony, while if Japan had even been able to summon the necessary shipping, which became an increasingly grave problem for her, she might have made great use of Thailand's rice, para-rubber, cotton, tobacco, pepper, coconuts, and extensive forest wealth. China's Government has lately made a gesture toward fellow Asiatics of Thailand.

Looking back over what has been sketched here, it is obvious that the end of the recent war inaugurated a tremendous though perhaps partly submerged Far East struggle. China's position is one mostly of moral encouragement, at least at the outset, for China will have first a great struggle to set her own political house in order, followed next by vast problems of restoring or building new administrative and economic machinery. But there are obvious dynamics in the fact of large overseas Chinese populations in virtually all these territories.

With regard to Western colonies in the Eastern world, the London *Economist* summed things up with perhaps admirable candor in its issue of September 16, 1944. The *Economist* said: "For Britain, and in similar measure for France and Holland, the Far East is a necessity of greatness and wealth." Japan's concept of a co-prosperity sphere was termed a mere inconvenience to the United States, but "to Britain, to the Netherlands, and to France it was a death sentence passed on their fundamental way of life." Clearly, in the mind of this authoritative journal, Japan's temporary occupation of Far East property previously held by European powers must be regarded as a mere historic detail and in no way a fundamental turning point.

Others were less complacent. In March of 1945 the French Colonial Minister announced that after the war French Indo-China was to become the first dominion in a new French Union, or commonwealth of nations. Although foreign policy would be controlled from France, there would be local autonomy. M. André Giacobbi, the Minister, invitingly explained that "Indo-China will enjoy within this union its own liberty."

That, of course, was the bait Britain had been holding before India, with a few takers. London was uneasily eying Burma and weighing how a postwar status of "self-government within the British Empire" might compare with Japan's previous grant, however diluted by subsequent disillusion, of alleged full independence. The Dutch were at least equally anxious over their East Indies—hopeful that extermination by the Japanese of whole populations of certain islands, together with Japanese mass tortures, famines, slavery, and mass deportation of more than a million natives, would make a return of decent and honest officials welcome, whatever the hue of their faces. Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook, acting governor general of the Indies, said in a London speech that young Dutch administrators who had suffered severely during the Nazi occupation of Holland, "who know oppression and understand the necessity of a joint defense of liberty," were men who could deal on an equal footing with native people, whatever their color or race. The Dutch quite obviously aren't pulling out of their spice islands, but hope on the contrary to capitalize on Japanese past misrule to make renewal of their own better though alien administration a welcome postwar fact there. Queen Wilhelmina on December 7, 1942, declared for a postwar Netherlands Commonwealth in which the East Indies would enjoy considerable political and presumably economic advance. The first reaction of Indónesia was not appreciation, but rebellion.

In approaching a summary of China's prospects in the postwar period, let us go back to her smallest area and lowest point in modern history. The time may be set at November and December 1944. Japan's inland armies had just finished connecting a vital interior communication link between South and Central China through a cleanup of hitherto uncaptured portions of the Canton-Hankow railway. They had knocked out important advanced

American air bases, including Hengyang, Lingling, and finally Kweilin. Highways lay open to Kunming, China end of America's "Burma Road of the Air" from India, and to the wartime capital at Chungking. Quiet preparations for another evacuation began—but Chungking was the capital of a China at war, and no one was clear just where to go next. Tibet?

Generalissimo Chiang and Major General A. C. Wedemeyer, his new American chief of staff, rushed Chinese troops by air from the National Government's area of blockade against the Communists and from Burma. Perhaps this turned the tide and caused the Japanese to leave Kweichow province. There was no great battle. Many believe that the issue turned not on the Sino-American defense preparations, but on Japan's own policy toward China's Kuomintang-vs.-Communists situation. On one point Tokyo never had shown evidence of fundamental change. That was in her fear of anything labeled Communist and even remotely connected with Moscow. Thus some surmised that at this point, and perhaps earlier, Japan held her hand because, though she liked Chungking little, she liked Yenan less.

Free China had been whittled down enough, the Red-fearing enemy may have felt. Unless Japan could deliver a blow knocking out all Chinese resistance everywhere and of whatever sort, she conceivably preferred to see that the National Government continue rather than to drive it into the desert and let Red China rise suddenly in prestige as sole director of Chinese resistance. It is a historic irony that the next major help to National Government prestige was to come through treaty engagement by Soviet Russia.

The National Government's first postwar problem was to assimilate the whole of China proper. At the same time China took over territories not recently under her control but assigned to her by decisions of the Cairo Conference. Manchuria has been judged likely to be a chief testing ground. A united China could consolidate Manchuria once more within herself, quietly and permanently, in accordance not only with the Cairo decisions but subsequent Russian treaty. But if China's National Government tries to cope with problems of world peace while split by civil dissensions, none too friendly toward Moscow, and in conflict with a Northwest China regime at least ideologically in accord with Moscow, it is logical to

expect development of Soviet-fostered buffer states everywhere along the vast Sino-Russian border line. An outright Russian grab not only is forbidden by treaty—a none too firm fence—but would be deemed crude and unnecessary. Stalin spoke plainly to Churchill in the summer of 1944, however, when he made it clear that the U.S.S.R. would not tolerate a neighboring government unfriendly to her. His words then applied to Europe, but they have obvious Far Eastern application despite anything signed.

What would America and Britain be doing under such circumstances? My own answer is, "Nothing effective." Of the two Powers, America would be the more anxious to do something, but high ideals butter no parsnips. America's policy is to strengthen China, while Britain must consider solid though not necessarily decisive factors against this. With peace and Europe's Far East colonies regained, the position of America is bound to diverge from that of the colonial Powers. It is less a matter of moral attitude than economic luck.

An Attlee, no less than a Churchill, found himself bound to sustain the economic life of home islands which cannot be self-sufficient. Britain has to import food and raw materials, at the same time exporting capital and finished goods. Such natural necessities lead logically to that famed declaration of Churchill's that "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." True, there was subsequent paradox. It was the British Empire that liquidated Churchill. But within a few days Laborite Foreign Secretary Bevin was "taking steps to receive the surrender of the Japanese forces in Hong Kong," granting possible difficulties but "sure that in agreement with our Chinese and American allies our territory will be returned to us." After some demur the Chinese accepted this view, at least *pro tem*. That any formerly British Far East area could be lost seemed as fantastic to Bevin as to Churchill.

America, on the other hand, has food and raw materials. She can meet free competition in world markets. Her great natural need is to increase the purchasing power of backward territories rather than to exploit them. Thus there is something selfish to supplement kind hearts and compassion for colonial peoples, when we Americans deem Kipling's concept of the "white man's burden"

hypocritical. America just doesn't need colonies, which is at least one sound reason for not wanting them. It wasn't American altruism, but American labor and sugar interests, which finally put across Philippine independence. The altruism was there, though. It plays its part in forbidding us to endorse anything which tends to keep China in a colonial status. But supplementing altruism is a shrewd perception that it is better for us to have an independent China, growing bigger and with spending money in its pocket.

There have been many curious Anglo-Chinese incidents worth pondering, though little has been said of them. There was the question of Chinese aid for British defenders at the time Hong Kong was under siege—aid proffered by Chungking, but not accepted. Possibly the Chinese were mostly bluffing. Few foreign observers felt that anything effective for relief of Hong Kong could have been done by Chinese forces available. But certainly Britain seemed to prefer to lose Hong Kong in her own way, and later she was to reject any form of Chinese help in the way Hong Kong was regained. The case of Burma was even more conspicuous than Hong Kong. When Burma was in process of occupation by Japan, Generalissimo Chiang offered Chinese troops, and there was open rejection. One can choose between theories. Some whispered that this was because the Chinese expected to arrive unarmed and to receive arms from the British, which meant that they might possibly scamper home again with them. Others felt it was because Britain feared that she might finally lose Burma to China rather than to Japan. American-trained Chinese forces sent down by air to India proved among the stanchest fighters for the recovery of Burma. But the Burmese have a strong urge toward independence of everyone, not excluding the Chinese. Significantly, China's Generalissimo has expressed hope that the political status of Burma will be raised.

Japan will of course in no immediate future present a challenge to postwar China. She is up against a grim fate decreed at Cairo. It has been summed up by Wilfrid Fleisher as amounting to a change from her wartime empire of 3,000,000 square miles, populated by 500,000,000 people, to one reduced to 148,000 square miles of her own homeland inhabited (prewar) by 73,000,000 people. She has lost Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, and the Mandate Islands, among other areas. The great hunks of her territories China has received

in themselves go far toward setting China up as a Big Frog. At any rate Japan is effectively whittled down.

Proceeding southward clockwise around China, we find in the Philippines the only Far East territory additional to China which can count with confidence on immediate postwar status as a free and independent country. (Cairo pledged Korean independence "in due course.") There has been talk of "serving the Filipinos' best interests" by offering American statehood to the Philippines, or otherwise dodging Philippine independence, but that is all bosh. The United States is committed, and so feel most leading Filipinos. The latter felt they could not recede from their demands for independence; the United States could not possibly forfeit her position of Far East moral ascendancy by so much as suggesting anything but a fulfillment of Philippine political independence, though there was good ground for special economic arrangements perhaps going far to meet the necessities.

Thailand was treated by Washington, unlike London, as an enemy-occupied territory, and that had also to be our attitude toward French Indo-China as matters recently worked out. In retaking Indo-China, France promised political advance; similarly the Dutch in regaining their East Indies did so with promises of political improvements—there was no promise of full independence in either case, any more than from Britain to Burma and India. As to Thailand, Secretary Hull in 1943 said that "the efforts of the Government of the United States are and should be limited to assisting the Thai people to restore a native regime capable of discharging its responsibilities and free from foreign control. The final choice of the leaders of such a government is a matter for the Thai people alone to decide." This policy came to logical culmination when on August 19, 1945, Secretary Hull's successor, James F. Byrnes, pointed out that the United States had always felt that the Thai declaration of war had been forced by the Japanese, and declared that with victory over Japan the United States again recognized Thailand as a "free, sovereign, and independent country." Mr. Byrnes added that the Thai underground had been prepared to start open war against Japan but had done so when the British and American governments asked deferment of such action "for operational reasons." Three days previously the Regent had issued a

declaration in the name of the King declaring the war declaration null and void and contrary to the will of the people, likewise announcing determination to restore friendly relations with the United States and to repeal laws prejudicial to American interests. One of Generalissimo Chiang's first speeches after peace urged that Thailand "be allowed to resume her independence." A refreshing first step was sensible resumption of the name "Siam."

Let us try to sum up a situation full of ferment and complexities. China now has a chance for, but no guaranteed certainty of, early fulfillment of her ultimate destiny as the great Far East leader. Whether such achievement be early or late depends primarily on her capacity for internal harmony. Many feel that harmony can now come only through substitution of a coalition National Government for one-party Kuomintang rule administered by touchy bureaucrats too long in office. If her minority groups remain outside the pale, and dissatisfied, it will promote submerged dissatisfaction, probably give rise to fresh civil war and separatism, and cause Soviet Russia to proceed—shrewdly, carefully, without provoking anyone to war—to the fostering of Soviet-sympathetic buffer states. These would include a Communist regime, Outer Mongolia already apart, probably Inner Mongolia, at least the northern part of Manchuria and perhaps the whole of that area, and (if it can be managed by what Owen Lattimore terms Russia's competitive power of attraction) Korea.

Conventional Anglo-American notions about evils and inefficiencies in Soviet Russia should not blind us to the fact that, from the viewpoint of many Far East peoples, the Soviet Union is quite a success—military, economic, political. Everything is comparative. Compared with what many Far East areas have had, the Russians have achieved a pretty attractive setup.

Of course if China disintegrates, and Soviet Russia fosters buffer states, that leaves most other parts of the Far East on their own. Japan will take anything that the victors allow, and those victors may develop some vexatious conflicts of opinion. The Philippines will be free, perhaps shivering in the cold of an economically bleak new independence. Down around the colonial chain, European "owners" have resumed their newly regained territories. Each such master is self-conscious, anxious to "win friends and influence peo-

ple," but by that very fact the more determined that if anyone else thinks he's boss around here, let him start something! Uncle Sam, I suspect, may increasingly feel a little ashamed about much of the outcome, and America may be swept by another tidal wave of isolationism reminiscent of the end of World War I, despite our new need for trade and friendship abroad.

But if China can hold herself together, create harmony in her own organism—then her possibilities are almost unlimited. She should grow amazingly in much less time than even the most optimistic Chinese have expected. America will send capital and machinery to China, as in lesser degree to the Philippines. Britain, though smitten with certain doubts, will compete actively in this beneficent work. Without outwardly stirring dissension among the Far East colonies, China will be a revolutionary force inspiring toward self-determination if only by her own example. She will recover Hong Kong. To her role of Big Frog the rest of the Far East will speedily take roles of friendly and admiring Little Frogs. And every ear around the world will be stretched to discover whether Mother Big Frog's bedtime story is going to be a faintly remembered tale formerly heard from other lips, about "co-prosperity," "Anglo-American power politics," and "Asia for Asiatics." It could happen.

9

"UNCLE CHUMP FROM OVER THE HUMP"

FROM THE AUTUMN OF 1931 onward through many years, the American people experienced an almost morbid rush of sentimentality over China's plight. This feeling was sincere, based on brutal realities of Japanese aggression, but productive of little good. Indeed it caused some harm. Frustration, which set in with Japan's Manchuria adventure and the failures of both Secretary Stimson and the League, grew to an acute stage with the outbreak of widespread though undeclared war in North and Central China during the summer of 1937.

In retrospect, it is even more astonishing today than it was at the time that neither the United States nor Great Britain declared war on Japan in 1937. I do not refer to the summer's China hostilities but to the time of the attacks by Japanese aircraft on foreign warships in the lower Yangtze when Nanking was being evacuated in December. Most of the attacks were on December 12. On December 14 President Roosevelt gave stern instructions to tell the Japanese ambassador that "the President is deeply shocked and concerned over the news of the indiscriminate bombing of American and other non-Chinese vessels on the Yangtze River and that he requests the Emperor be so advised." On the same day a stiff note of protest recited that the vessels had been on the Yangtze "by uncontested and incontestable right," they were flying the American flag, engaged in legitimate appropriate business, and at the moment "conveying American official and private personnel away from points where danger developed." The Japanese had similar trouble on their hands with the British. U.S.S. *Panay* and three

Standard Oil ships had been sunk or burned, with casualties, and H.M. ships *Ladybird*, *Bee*, *Cricket*, and *Scarab* had been bombed and shot up, also with casualties.

Both in America and in Japan there was lively recollection of how Spain found herself involved in disastrous 1898 conflict with the United States as result of the blowing up in Havana Harbor of the American battleship *Maine*. America's slogan then had become "Remember the *Maine*!" and feeling against Japan was now already so acute throughout the United States, as result of six years of Nipponese harassment of China, that "Remember the *Panay*!" seemed an even more fitting 1937 slogan. After all, to this day the precise circumstances of or responsibility for the *Maine* sinking have never been disclosed, while even the first reports of the attacks on the *Panay* and other American and British ships left no doubt that the onslaughts had been deliberate acts by Japanese planes under orders to do precisely what they did.

One of Japan's prime mischief-makers, Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, a man of fascist political slant who had only recently rejoined the Army after expulsion resulting from the 1936 military revolt, was senior military officer on the scene, with headquarters at Wuhu. He had ordered attack on every vessel moving on the Yangtze. His responsibility was clear, although it was not certain whether Hashimoto had gone off half-cocked because of his own anti-foreign ideas or had been under orders from above. That type of uncertainty always prevails after every sort of Nipponese *coup*, and it has become recognized as part of the pattern of jujitsu deception through which Japanese imperialistic policy has been implemented for years. Of course the Japanese diplomats were full of explanation and apology and insistence that it was all a mistake—further routine tactics in the militarists' game, no doubt often employed without intentional connivance on the diplomats' part.

Underlying reasons why we and the British contented ourselves finally with acceptance of apologies and indemnities, both of which were readily forthcoming, may remain a mystery for many years. True, we were not ready, but neither was Japan. My own guess is that Washington and London desired to keep Anglo-American actions in step, and that for perfectly valid reasons each nation heightened the other's irresolution. Britain was aware of gathering war

clouds in Europe. America knew herself unprepared for war. At any rate, to the considerable surprise and relief of a great many people in Tokyo, the crisis finally passed without Far East war. As soon as Tokyo could regain balance there was an immediate resumption of Nipponese dual policy of direct attack on China coupled with needling of China's friends. There were, of course, no more affairs comparable to the *Panay* sinking—even the Japanese war lords could see that was going too far for a regular diet.

One of the few amusing anecdotes I have found about a most unamusing stage of history has been given by *Time* magazine, which termed it "probably apocryphal." On hearing of the *Panay* affair President Roosevelt is reported to have summoned Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy and asked:

"Bill, what will it take to lick Japan?"

"Fifty billion dollars a year—and I'd like the job."

"It's too much," the President is said to have replied. "Send for Cordell Hull."

Devotees of the Roosevelt-spendthrift theory may dig up or whittle out their own anecdotes. Leahy later got his full share of the job anyway—not until after long years of demanding more and bigger battleships and in 1938 telling a House Naval Affairs Committee, "In defending our territory in war, we cannot assume an attitude of passive defense." But meanwhile the task of staving off what finally proved to be the inevitable was assigned to the State Department.

So a wearisome round developed of protest note after protest note, out of both Washington and London, while the Gaimusho for its part ground out a regular grist of utterly insincere and often shockingly impudent retorts, sometimes lamely "explaining" but more frequently seeking to justify all Japan's acts as measures of necessity. The burden of this propaganda song was that China's chaotic conditions had become a world menace, that Japan was engaged in a sanitary cleaning-up job, and that if such slackers as America and Britain couldn't pitch in and help they should at any rate quit complaining over occasional accidental bumps from the broom handle. Undoubtedly to the Japanese home public, shut off as it was from any clear picture of Chinese actualities or the full text of occidental complaints, this nonsense made sense in support

of Japan's official position. Meanwhile, though America gradually but inexorably imposed one punitive restriction after another upon Japan, both China and Japan still refrained from formal declaration of war, which meant that the Neutrality Act could not be applied as quarantine measure. Washington naturally did not want to apply it against China anyhow. (China and Japan both declared war just after Pearl Harbor.)

It was a situation full of complications and frustration. The Chinese were quick to complain over such obvious facts as the continued sale of American scrap metal to Japan. American scrap went to China too. But Japan could make greater use of it, while the Chinese could use it mostly only as a topic for argument. From a Chinese point of view the Americans were guilty of moral crime—an attitude many Americans enthusiastically took against themselves. But there is a great deal of evidence to support the judicial conclusion that President Roosevelt moved against Japan about as rapidly as American public opinion—and Congress—allowed. One can never exclude suspicion that he might have put America into war against Japan over the *Panay* affair, and that such war would have been for the best as things finally worked out. For though America was not prepared, Japan's war machine was similarly far from developed to its point of December 1941. Yet there were submerged factors not yet fully known regarding America's international relations, coupled with home political opposition which seems almost incredible in retrospect (when we can all always be wiser). Take the single issue of Guam: Minor harbor improvements were sought, but Congress refused on the ground that the Japanese might consider this as fortification of nearby territory, and nothing should be done to inflame Japan's feeling against America! Japan, meanwhile, was grimly and silently proceeding with her own Mandate Islands and other fortification work, much of it in defiance of her pledges and treaty obligations.

So the American people in the late 1930s and early 1940s felt more and more silly and inept with regard to the whole Far East picture. They sympathized deeply with China but felt they were doing too little to help her. They were subject to repeated and often deliberate offense by Japan, but could not bring themselves to demand war against Japan. The isolationists had plenty of stomach

for fighting in Washington or in the columns of publications cordial toward their views, but none for taking a really big stick and drubbing the daylighters out of Tokyo's militarists. Meanwhile China was resisting Japan with a stanch spirit and at any rate a great deal more material help from America than America, to put the shoe on the other foot, had ever in any sort of distress received from China. Such crass statement of the case was totally avoided by all Chinese and all American friends of China, but much bombast and some nonsense over our help to Japan was spread abroad by Americans.

It will be remembered, for instance, that we accused ourselves of having sold to Japan the scrap from New York's dismantled Third Avenue "L." Some said that we got part of it back later in the form of bombs at and after Pearl Harbor. The truth was that not one ounce of that particular scrap ever got into Japan's hands; Washington and the private interests concerned were in agreement that this should be avoided, and it was. Still the legend pops up now and then as part of America's dangerous tendency toward undue self-criticism. As recently as 1945 it had to be denied publicly once again.

The reason that it was dangerous from the viewpoint of China's interest to blacken America and at the same time to overglorify China's resistance was that for every action there comes finally a reaction. It took quite a while for reaction to set in against China, but when the kickback came it was a lulu. No one could date such a thing more than generally, but in my own experience I first became acutely conscious of it in 1943, when, after two years' absence, I made my fourth wartime visit to Chungking.

Undoubtedly things in Chungking had changed since my last visit in early 1941, when I did a series of articles which became incorporated in a small Shanghai-published book, *Chungking Today*. These whooped it up heartily for the National Government. It was not result of complete unsophistication, for I had been in China uninterruptedly for ten years, to say nothing of earlier residence stretching back the greater part of another decade; I had known the National Government at Nanking before the war, flown to Hankow to visit it there in early 1938, and had visited Chungking in 1939 and 1940. At all these periods the Chinese Government had looked pretty good.

American "Flying Tigers" had won world renown before Pearl Harbor, was carrying on for the U. S. Army Air Forces in China through operation of the Fourteenth Air Force based far eastward along a string of fields stretching almost up against the Japanese lines. The rugged Fourteenth used Chennault tactics to win victories over Japanese planes which in many ways were technically superior. Men of the Fourteenth wore a message in Chinese on their backs, and when they went down they were helped back to their bases by an admiring Chinese peasantry. Everywhere they went they were greeted by upflung thumbs and the cry, "Ting hao!" (pronounced "Ding how" and meaning "Swell!") Of their popularity and the popularity of Americans generally there could be no doubt, while many of these Americans were extremely fond of the Chinese people. Yet as months went by, at army hostels in Kunming and eastward and at Chungking's Press Hostel, murmurs began to go up. Americans were being "taken for a ride" in China, it was said with a thousand variants. It was true that the Chinese flocked to build airfields for America's fighting fliers, contracted for at ruinous prices extorted by Chinese profiteers, but who paid for those fields?—not China, but America!—and not even by U.S. cash exchanged on China's illicit open or "black" market for 450, 500, maybe 600 or 700 Chinese dollars to one American dollar, but at the old and now wholly artificial "official" rate of 20 to 1. During June 1945 the rate reached 3200 to 1 after sensationally fast rises. In other words, everybody was getting rich but Uncle Sam. This was only the starting point of argument which went back to such things as corruption and inefficiency on the Burma Road and forward to Chinese military non-co-operation "because they know that America and Britain have got to lick Japan finally, so why shouldn't the Chinese take it easy and get fat off us?"

By the autumn of 1944, when I returned to China once more, bubbling dissatisfactions on both sides had finally boiled over in the "Stilwell Affair" of late October. I had learned through Chinese friends in America that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, presumed by all Americans to be immensely pleased with his Chinese-speaking hard-hitting American chief of staff, had secretly demanded that General Stilwell be recalled. Somehow or other in Chiang's eyes the "Uncle Joe" aspects of Stilwell's character had given place to the

"Vinegar Joe" aspects. I couldn't believe that this apparent childishness would come to anything. Yet as I paused at Accra, on the West African Gold Coast, General Stilwell and party flew through in the opposite direction, bound for America. And that night our news bulletins announced that he had indeed been recalled because of personal friction with the Generalissimo.

When I reached Chungking a few days later I found a sentiment among American civilians and officials alike which seemed completely epitomized in a song giving title to this chapter.

"Uncle Chump from Over the Hump," the song's title, expressed how the Americans in China now regarded themselves and their country. Uncle Sam had turned into Uncle Chump, the rich half-wit with no more sense than to be "taken" by the Chinese. It was a bitter, cynical song, composed by Walt Rundle of the United Press to the tune of "Mademoiselle from Armentières."

As with many ballads of this sort, the words were featured by more wit than delicacy. "Uncle Chump" will never be copyrighted. The general idea of the song, and of the deep annoyance which brought it into being, can be conveyed by description of a single couplet of its many. This dealt with the thought that Uncle Chump had come over the Hump to build fighter plane fields (with his own money), to which he hauled gasoline (paid for by himself) for his own planes; after which his sole reward from the Chinese was a kick in, shall we say, the pantaloons. All this was put briefly and spicily in the version which the gentlemen of the Press Hostel used to troll out lustily under leadership of the composer, and with incidental aid from Chungking's potent locally fabricated vodka. Our U. S. Navy doctor insisted that this concoction should be numbered among the major perils of Chungking, much more dangerous than Japanese bombing.

Since I have spoken of the blunt aspects of General Stilwell, I believe it no more than fair to say that, to many, Generalissimo Chiang had similarly become difficult. It was not an American but a Chinese, and one who had held high government positions at that, who told me in late 1944 that the Generalissimo had grown to regard himself as "not merely omnipotent, but omniscient." A great many were finding him difficult to work with, and none too stable to depend upon. Perhaps the long strain was beginning to tell, al-

American "Flying Tigers" had won world renown before Pearl Harbor, was carrying on for the U. S. Army Air Forces in China through operation of the Fourteenth Air Force based far eastward along a string of fields stretching almost up against the Japanese lines. The rugged Fourteenth used Chennault tactics to win victories over Japanese planes which in many ways were technically superior. Men of the Fourteenth wore a message in Chinese on their backs, and when they went down they were helped back to their bases by an admiring Chinese peasantry. Everywhere they went they were greeted by upflung thumbs and the cry, "Ting hao!" (pronounced "Ding how" and meaning "Swell!") Of their popularity and the popularity of Americans generally there could be no doubt, while many of these Americans were extremely fond of the Chinese people. Yet as months went by, at army hostels in Kunming and eastward and at Chungking's Press Hostel, murmurs began to go up. Americans were being "taken for a ride" in China, it was said with a thousand variants. It was true that the Chinese flocked to build airfields for America's fighting fliers, contracted for at ruinous prices extorted by Chinese profiteers, but who paid for those fields?—not China, but America!—and not even by U.S. cash exchanged on China's illicit open or "black" market for 450, 500, maybe 600 or 700 Chinese dollars to one American dollar, but at the old and now wholly artificial "official" rate of 20 to 1. During June 1945 the rate reached 3200 to 1 after sensationally fast rises. In other words, everybody was getting rich but Uncle Sam. This was only the starting point of argument which went back to such things as corruption and inefficiency on the Burma Road and forward to Chinese military non-co-operation "because they know that America and Britain have got to lick Japan finally, so why shouldn't the Chinese take it easy and get fat off us?"

By the autumn of 1944, when I returned to China once more, bubbling dissatisfactions on both sides had finally boiled over in the "Stilwell Affair" of late October. I had learned through Chinese friends in America that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, presumed by all Americans to be immensely pleased with his Chinese-speaking hard-hitting American chief of staff, had secretly demanded that General Stilwell be recalled. Somehow or other in Chiang's eyes the "Uncle Joe" aspects of Stilwell's character had given place to the

"Vinegar Joe" aspects. I couldn't believe that this apparent childishness would come to anything. Yet as I paused at Accra, on the West African Gold Coast, General Stilwell and party flew through in the opposite direction, bound for America. And that night our news bulletins announced that he had indeed been recalled because of personal friction with the Generalissimo.

When I reached Chungking a few days later I found a sentiment among American civilians and officials alike which seemed completely epitomized in a song giving title to this chapter.

"Uncle Chump from Over the Hump," the song's title, expressed how the Americans in China now regarded themselves and their country. Uncle Sam had turned into Uncle Chump, the rich half-wit with no more sense than to be "taken" by the Chinese. It was a bitter, cynical song, composed by Walt Rundle of the United Press to the tune of "Mademoiselle from Armentières."

As with many ballads of this sort, the words were featured by more wit than delicacy. "Uncle Chump" will never be copyrighted. The general idea of the song, and of the deep annoyance which brought it into being, can be conveyed by description of a single couplet of its many. This dealt with the thought that Uncle Chump had come over the Hump to build fighter plane fields (with his own money), to which he hauled gasoline (paid for by himself) for his own planes; after which his sole reward from the Chinese was a kick in, shall we say, the pantaloons. All this was put briefly and spicily in the version which the gentlemen of the Press Hostel used to troll out lustily under leadership of the composer, and with incidental aid from Chungking's potent locally fabricated vodka. Our U. S. Navy doctor insisted that this concoction should be numbered among the major perils of Chungking, much more dangerous than Japanese bombing.

Since I have spoken of the blunt aspects of General Stilwell, I believe it no more than fair to say that, to many, Generalissimo Chiang had similarly become difficult. It was not an American but a Chinese, and one who had held high government positions at that, who told me in late 1944 that the Generalissimo had grown to regard himself as "not merely omnipotent, but omniscient." A great many were finding him difficult to work with, and none too stable to depend upon. Perhaps the long strain was beginning to tell, al-

though in a personal meeting I myself found him still gracious and prepared to take straight talk if put frankly and with a smile. Ambassador Gauss, who by his own confession doesn't "find it too easy to smile," had found it possible to administer some rather direct statements of American policy without offense to the Generalissimo if he included a smile—something Stilwell may have overlooked. But there is no denying that things Chungkingese had become difficult for Americans in all their dealings, from the Generalissimo on down.

Censorship was an ever present irritant working day and night upon inmates of the Press Hostel. (I prefer the word "inmates" to "guests.") Not only did they batter against an erratic and sometimes oppressive Chinese censorship, but on dispatches involving the U.S. forces in China they had to deal with American military censorship too. However, the American censorship was based on grounds of military security, while the Chinese censorship often spread to take in political subjects or even protection of favored individuals. Indeed, at times its limits could hardly be found except in the crania of high-up officials too numerous to identify. Certainly there was no help in China's Publication Law with its wartime provision allowing the censors in effect a completely free hand, and gradually the fascist tendency moved to include downright barring from China of critical correspondents. Few Chinese could see anything important about the admittedly harsh wartime censorship in Chungking. But those who lived close to the correspondents were aware that the matter was much more than a question of what went from Chungking to the outside world. Of even greater importance were two further factors:

1. The correspondents themselves become poisoned by pent-up frustration and resentment. Time after time they found their best stories cut up or "killed." From mid-1945 even continued China residence was in jeopardy, for two correspondents were barred from the country. The Chinese censorship was humanely administered in one sense, for the correspondents had direct access to and even social contacts with the censors, who are actually their friends in a personal sense. Also, the censorship was at times quite lenient. But there was no sense of security, because the severity was unpredictable and varying, nor was there any feeling that relations

could become normal without some fundamental changes. The correspondents felt that because they could not send other than generally innocuous news they were not well regarded by their home offices as frequent sources of news and headlines, though this was through no fault of their own.

2. On the part of the home offices there was a tendency to write off their China correspondents as close to dead losses—productive only of human-interest copy in Chinese matters, plus "glory stories" about the exploits of the U.S. flying forces. This led to numerous alleged "inside stories" from sources not in China and usually relatively unacquainted with things Chinese, though brazenly claiming scoops. New York and Washington columnists frequently cashed in on the Chungking censorship by printing purported exposés of things Chinese. Magazines were increasingly regarded in America as important sources of news from China because of their articles by "experts" long out of China, or never in China. The newspapers ran last, instead of first, though they alone had up-to-date daily dispatches direct from China. There was a progressive withdrawal of correspondents from so sterile a field. Those who remained or arrived as replacements were explicably bitter and insecure. When they in turn went home they joined their voices with those of the home-staying experts in telling "what's wrong with China," since up to then the censorship had gagged them. And finally the registration law began to bar these free speakers from return, virtually as the war emergency passed.

A second major source of intense dissatisfaction, and of criticism, was the U. S. Army. Unlike the correspondents, army personnel found themselves often in direct conflict with the Chinese. The great majority of army men had gone to China with little preparation for what they were to find, aside from some "briefing" and a valuable little official booklet made up by a man who knew the Chinese well. There was of course a background of sentiment such as was shared by the entire American nation for years, and this only laid the way for shock when certain contemporary Chinese realities struck in.

Most American army people went out expecting to find a tooth-and-nail resistance to the Japanese foe. Promptly they were shocked at the difficulty in locating any war at all. They came up sharply

against the fact that many of the Chinese whom they met were calmly, frankly looking after themselves and family first, and the nation a poor last. China, they found, felt that the war against Japan had already been won. Certainly it didn't look that way to an American as yet, but the Chinese from the very day of Pearl Harbor were more confident of Allied victory than were the general run of Americans and Britons who knew they had taken on a back-breaking job. Of course there were subsequent events discouraging even to a Chinese, but China is used to taking a long view; Japan was certain to get her licking sooner or later. The Chinese found a certain smug satisfaction in their conviction, mistaken as later events proved, that it was going to be necessary for America to establish a large China military foothold and pour in tremendous quantities of supplies before it would be possible to defeat Japan. Mingled with this feeling was a knowledge of present profit through the American air force in China, and an expectation that the future would see much greater profit together with a residue of trucks, food, and other valuables which the Americans would leave to China when their campaign was finished. Thus the atomic bomb, and its devastatingly quick end to the war, was in some degree a shock to China as well as to Japan.

Even during that earlier long period when China was up against Japan alone, it was urgently necessary for most Chinese to think first about No. 1. Millions of them were refugees, all of them were confronting daily economic strain, and China has no system of public relief worth mention.

If American soldiers fresh on the China scene could have arrived with a little China background they might not have been so jolted by the individual Chinese preoccupation in making as good a living as possible. They could have seen the urgent necessities of the matter. Also, they might have seen something of the good-humored but immensely courageous fight, under tremendously adverse odds, that Chinese soldiers had put up through the years. But as it was, many indignant young Americans went out and promptly jumped to the conclusion that China's war against Japan was a sour joke, considerably less important in Kuomintang eyes than the ever incipient conflict with the Communists.

There were plenty of things to disillusion them, certainly. For

example, there was the sorry administration of the Chinese conscription law. Sometimes miserable half-starved peasants would be seen dragging through the streets, roped together like prisoners; at the same time prosperous and eminently draft-worthy Chinese youths would be free and happily engaged in war profiteering. The phrase "draft-worthy" is used to express the American point of view—such lads would be ideal draft material in the United States, but by special order of the Generalissimo himself it had been decreed that those with education should be automatically exempt, on the theory that it was necessary for the nation that they be conserved. (This was one of several regulations finally changed.) In case other expedients failed, it was common practice to buy one's way out of the loose conscription network.

During a 1943 visit to Kweilin I happened to think of the draft as I was chatting with a husky young newspaperman. Had he ever been drafted, I inquired? Oh yes, he answered, but that made no difference—he had paid his way out.

"Back in our own Civil War days it used to be possible to pay a substitute," I recalled. "Is that the system here?"

"No, no!" protested my companion. "You bribe the draft officials to forget about the whole business."

Such an attitude on the part of the youth of the land was not calculated to impress eager young Americans, many of them drafted by their home government, with the notion that China was terribly eager to slug it out with the Japanese. Neither was the sight of Japanese-made goods publicly exposed for sale in the shop windows of every town and city, including the capital. Coming from a United States starved for rubber and conducting drives to collect every spare scrap of it, I myself was jolted in Chungking in 1943 to find every shoe shop displaying rubber-soled shoes just up from Japanese-occupied Shanghai.

But that was nothing to the jar I had when from official American sources, including special investigators seeking to promote the war effort, I learned of some of Free China's exports to the Japanese. In Chungking there was vociferous defense of imports from the Japanese; take away all the goods possible from Occupied China, it was urged—"the more that is taken the less there will be for the Japanese and their puppets to use." Not only was such im-

port tolerated by the National Government, but it was even fostered by official machinery. Smuggling was frowned on, as cheating Chungking of tariff dues.

But to buy such goods something had to be given in exchange. The "something" took various forms, including U.S. currency paid by our Government to its soldiers in China and exchanged by them on the Chinese black market to avoid the ruinous official exchange rate—such currency was much valued by the canny Japanese and their puppets, who evidently had their own postwar programs.

How regularized this "trading with the enemy" had become by early 1945 may be judged by an announcement of new regulations imposed by the Supreme National Defense Council and effective March 1. It was officially stated that Commodity Clearing Export Permits would henceforth be required for all goods valued at more than 10,000 Chinese dollars which went from Free to Occupied China. These rules were in addition to already existing Wartime Import and Export Regulations, which among other things provided that Chinese businessmen desiring to export goods to customers in Occupied China were required to import goods of equal value in return, within a period of not longer than four months. Under special circumstances an additional four months might be granted. Exporters were required to post a guarantee either in the form of a cash deposit equal to 30 per cent of the value of the goods involved, or in the form of a bond by a responsible guarantor, this deposit being returned as soon as the equivalent imports arrived in Free China. If such goods were not acquired, the deposit might be confiscated. Timber and other raw materials were the usual "trade goods," exchanged as exports for cheap manufactured products of the occupied areas.

But that was not all. Into Japanese hands went China's tungsten, a strategic mineral of tremendous value in steelmaking. It was one of China's most vital resources, and a product so essential that America was taking it out of China by airplane. Yet it was also seeping out of Kwangsi and Yunnan provinces into Japanese hands. Such a trade, described to me by hard-boiled experienced American experts and admitted shamefacedly by the Chinese, seemed incredible under war conditions. After all—remember how the Chinese had made great capital out of America's sale of scrap iron to Japan

at a time when the United States herself was not at war with Japan!

I went into this subject pretty thoroughly both in China and later in America. It appeared that the Japanese weren't solely dependent on Free China for tungsten by any means. But their other sources were to the south and involved shipping difficulties. Even more to the point, they hoped to diminish the supplies available for the Allies by drawing as much as possible away in their own direction. One authority called it "preclusive buying." They paid good prices, in U.S. money if necessary. Tungsten is supposed to be controlled by China's National Resources Commission, but there were leaks in this as in other controls. We had such leaks in our own controls, but they weren't so vital.

One of the points which was a constant cinder in the eye of the American Army was terrific profiteering of the Chinese with regard to construction of airfields, and indeed every aspect of maintaining U.S. forces in China. I was told that the original Allied idea was that airfields would be supplied by the Chinese—but this didn't produce the fields. So "Uncle Chump" took the task on himself. This involved, in the first instance, making arrangement with some Chinese contractor who was to provide labor and materials and do the work. Contracts had to be negotiated by the Army without official Chinese help, it was declared, and there was such combination of the contractors that all the prices were exorbitant. Then there was a quiet process of subcontracting. In the case of one notorious project the first contractor passed his contract on down to a second, at a handsome profit to himself. The second sold it to a third. Work was finally started by a fourth, who had taken the contract at a poor price and who before long had a field-coolie strike on his hands. Representatives of the coolies went to the unsuspecting Americans and reprimanded them for refusing to pay living wages! Startled, the Americans investigated and discovered that the contractor was starving his workers and putting the blame on the allegedly penurious U. S. Army.

Moreover, the money to be paid for such contracts had to be in Chinese national currency, and our arrangements were not "reverse lend-lease" by which we might have got something (such as tungsten) in return from the lend-lease goods we sent in. The Chinese

insisted on a 20-to-1 rate on their own goods if we took reverse lend-lease, and we wouldn't pay it. But we had to pay the official 20-to-1 rate on our necessary military outlays, piling up big credit balances in the United States for the Chinese Government in U.S. dollars while in return we received in China annoyingly small amounts of printing-press Chinese notes. The Army didn't subject its own personnel to this but gave officers and men their pay in American notes, which they took to the black market. But the American Government settled for most of its tremendous construction of airfields in Free China at the 20-to-1 rate until finally things got "too thick," when for several months in 1944 all payments were suspended pending discussion of the matter. Finally, through Washington arrangements made by Dr. H. H. Kung, payments were at least temporarily straightened out on a basis not explained publicly. In catching up on the intervening period when no payments were made, the U. S. Treasury handed over U.S. \$210,000,000—which gives some idea of the way China's foreign-exchange balance fattened in wartime. The Chinese currency had no set conversion value in gold, silver, or chop suey.

Gold advanced to China on loan by "Uncle Chump," however, figured in some peculiar transactions. On the perfectly valid theory that it could help to retire some of the Chinese printing-press currency, some of this gold was sold by the National Government. It had been acquired at a book-debit value of U.S. \$35 an ounce—that is, China paid nothing but was given gold at this rate against U.S. \$200,000,000 of a total half-billion loan. Such a cost price, if passed on to the Chinese public at the 20-to-1 exchange rate, would have worked out at 700 Chinese dollars an ounce. But the Chinese Government didn't provide any such bargain price—instead the price was first set at 20,000 Chinese dollars an ounce. Even at that, buyers flocked in, because there was so little else which could be used as investment against mounting inflation. Suddenly in early 1945 the price was jumped from 20,000 to 35,000 Chinese dollars an ounce, equivalent to an exchange rate of 1000 to 1 instead of the official 20 to 1! Before long the price rose again to 50,000 dollars an ounce, and in August 1945 it was up to 170,000. The Chinese Government had by then bought back C.N. \$62,500,000,000 of its huge note issue by this means.

It is so general a thing for American soldiers abroad to holler that they are being "robbed" by the local citizenry that in the case of China we had better sidestep such a question. Actually, not much that was attractive to a U.S. soldier could be bought in Free China. It was no tourist's dream of a place. For what the G.I. wanted, and was available, cigarettes from the American "PX" provided the most lucrative medium of exchange. But sometimes the U.S. soldier and his correspondent or O.W.I. associates saw American goods on view in China under circumstances suggesting not merely profiteering but something rather worse.

Let me cite one example. An American friend at Kweiyang in late 1944 found American-made gloves originally issued by the American Army at U.S. \$1.00 a pair for sale in a Chinese store at ten times that price. During the course of the Sino-American evacuation at Kweilin, just before, such gloves had been given away by the American authorities to the Chinese Army. In order to check up more closely, my friend pretended that he could not find his exact size and asked the shopkeeper to rummage through stock. This revealed that the gloves were still tied together in bundles. What had happened was no case of sale by individual Chinese soldiers, though their miserable living conditions always caused them promptly to dispose of any "luxury" American issues promptly, to get food for their flat stomachs, but rather a bulk sale to black-market dealers by Chinese officers who never let the goods get into the hands of their men. Now you may begin to understand some of the discouraging aspects of handing over American supplies to the Chinese, whose lot was so bad that virtually anything regarded by an occidental army as a basic necessity was bound to be looked on by Chinese troops or officers as a luxury to be sold as quickly as possible.

There was, too, the old story of "hoarding" even of guns and ammunition provided by the Americans for use of the Chinese Army. That has been discussed in such tiresome reiteration that I have no desire to give much space to the arguments. The usual theory was that the National Government saved all it could for use against the Communists. Some of the old-time Americans had an additional theory based on their knowledge of Chinese psychology. They said that centuries of poverty had rooted a basic instinct of frugality in

every Chinese heart, and that this more than any specific plot for civil war was responsible for excessive conservation, often to a wasteful degree, in the case of perishable munitions. In other words, if any Chinese commander was given as much as two of anything—field guns, for instance—he would put only about half his new wealth into active service and then hide the rest off in the hills somewhere for no obvious or immediate reason. His instinctive theory was that there might not be any continuing supply and that in future there was bound to be fresh need.

I think there might be something to this explanation. But in the minds of most of the U. S. Army people I encountered, and many others, it was firmly established that Chungking had much more interest in possible future war with the Communists than in a certainty of present war with the Japanese—and that Chungking was accordingly all too frugal in its current outlay. Mid-1945 brought reports of National Government use of American arms against the Chinese Communists, and with the peace there was instant trouble over both U.S. and Japanese arms.

Even more direct irritants plagued and perplexed Uncle Sam's armed forces. They had to lock their jeeps with chains and padlocks any time these handy little vehicles were left for a moment. Otherwise the jeeps disappeared, sometimes for good and sometimes to be found later picked bare as a skeleton of all salable parts. Incidentally, in Chungking especially it was annoying to Americans plodding over the rocky hills when civilian Chinese buzzed past them in good American jeeps retrieved from Burma disasters, or fruit of American lend-lease. Lend-lease, to the Chinese, always meant outright gift. This was painfully evident when the American armed forces needed jeeps, trucks, and other property and tried to recover lend-lease equipment, only to find that repurchase was in the long run cheaper than argument. Also, when it came to purchase of Chinese trucks or anything else, no National Government efforts to assist the Americans ever seemed to bring results in the way of plentiful supply at a low price—no truck was too big, no egg too small, to be kept out of the way until the canny Chinese seller was assured of a sky-high price, so the Army declared.

Major General Claire Chennault finally publicly acknowledged one of the most outrageous situations I had heard of in China when

at Kunming on April 7, 1945, he gave out a statement saying (in the words of a United Press dispatch) that "American Army ammunition weapons and vehicles have been stolen by organized bands of Chinese." Warning that the thefts were "adversely affecting the war effort" in China, he said that tires and wheels had been taken from P-51 Mustang fighters vitally needed in the aerial war against Japanese military installations and transportation systems. "Indispensable parts of bombs have been stolen, making the bombs useless until replacement parts have been flown in," the dispatch continued.

Worst of all to my way of thinking, and a thing I had often heard about from bitterly angry American pilots, was this: "Emergency jungle kits have been looted from parachutes, causing [said Chennault] 'probable losses of life among fliers forced to bail out.'" These jungle kits contain knives, rations, bandages, medicine, mosquito head nets, and similar articles. Stealthy visitors so constantly looted these kits from the U.S. equipment, I was told, that it was considered almost impossible to be sure they were ready for emergency.

General Chennault recognized that responsible Chinese were as much against such practice as any Americans. This was shown by the way that he finally broke silence. His announcement was in the form of an appeal to the Chinese press and public to help curb the loss of U. S. Government property and black-market sales of stolen goods.

One American official whom I met at Kunming in 1943 had lived in China before. He went out in a state of keen anxiety to serve the war effort. What he found was so shattering that he said he wanted to get home again as soon as possible—"If I stay here much longer I'll become so bitter that I can never make a living in China again," he declared. It wasn't long before he got a transfer. His case was rather extreme, but mainly so because he happened to have a job which gave him unusual access to disturbing but wholly authentic information.

James Burke, born and brought up in China of missionary parents, was in charge of the Kunming branch of the Office of War Information at this period. Kunming was a lively center for what the sailors called "scuttlebutt," or gossip, because there was an unusually large American force there. Of course Jim kept quiet like other

officials. But finally Jim quit the O.W.I. In an article published by *Harper's* magazine for December 1944, he tried to give a fair weighing of relations between the American forces and the Chinese. The American G.I., he made clear, is to the Chinese "a refreshing phenomenon" whose "uninhibited friendliness and direct, efficient way of approaching problems slightly shock the custom-bound Chinese sometimes, and may even irritate a few," but on the whole "relations between the U. S. Army and the Chinese people have been very smooth." Accent should be put on the word "people" in that last quotation, since almost all of the trouble with the Chinese has involved specialized classes—profiteers, officials, or plain bandits. Wrote Burke:

It would be stupid to suggest that all American troops in China have been perfect little diplomats all the time in their contacts with the Chinese. There are officers and men who occasionally get drunk to a somewhat offensive degree. And a few respectable girls have had their moments of embarrassment. But it's certainly no worse than with American troops quartered in England, or even in the United States. And the Chinese capacity for understanding human frailties shouldn't be underrated.

To balance the picture, it must be said that the native opportunists and profiteers who have been bred in China's unbridled war economy have justified some American bitterness about the way China fights a war. This spring [1944], for example, when Chinese fighting fronts were collapsing in Honan and Hunan, a group of officials and businessmen in Yunnan Province were cornering the market on material needed by U. S. Army forces for new buildings. The American sense of thrift and fair play was also hurt by Chungking's insistence on an exchange rate of twenty Chinese dollars to one U.S. dollar in all official transactions . . . making [airfield] cost to us fantastically high.

What must be recognized, of course, is that the profiteering and corruption in China do not represent the Chinese people any more than our own black markets represent the American people. Respectable Chinese are as quick to denounce them as are Americans. . . .

The trouble lay in our own human tendency to expect more from the other fellow than from ourselves. Americans going for the first time to China after Pearl Harbor were, as they saw it, engaged in a crusade—joining in China's years-old heroic struggle of which they had heard so much. They didn't merely expect to find at least

as great a percentage of Chinese young men in the Chinese Army as the American draft had taken from America's youth for the American Army—they expected to find *more*. They didn't expect to see anything less than a total war. They had heard a great deal of Chinese honesty, so they expected less corruption than at home, rather than the converse. Surprises were not limited to relatively uninformed American boys; they came even to some Old China Hands. One might include such American experts as Donald Nelson, who went out to help improve China's industries as an aid to the Allied war effort but who constantly ran into a Chinese inability or unwillingness to distinguish between "war" needs and "postwar" prospects for profit.

Climaxing this phase of Sino-American relations came the recall from the Far East of General Joseph W. Stilwell. A White House announcement on October 28, 1944, said that Stilwell had been relieved as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang, as deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, British commander of the Southeast Asia command, and as U.S. commander of the China-Burma-India theater. At the same time this theater was split in two, one part consisting of China alone. In charge of the latter, Major General A. C. Wedemeyer was moved up from a post as deputy chief under Mountbatten, and he replaced Stilwell as chief under Chiang. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, deputy commander of the former China-Burma-India theater, was made commander of the new India-Burma theater.

Off went Stilwell in his silver transport plane facetiously known as "Uncle Joe's Chariot." With the dust of his departure mingled a smoke screen of conjecture. President Roosevelt on October 31 took heed of this gossip to the extent of elucidating briefly. He spoke at a press conference, where his words could not be directly quoted, but a Washington representative of the *New York Times* reported thus:

One of General Stilwell's posts, he [the President] explained, was serving as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. They had had certain fallings out quite a while ago, he continued, and these culminated the other day when the Generalissimo asked for someone else to be appointed to that post. Accordingly, the command held by General Stilwell was reorganized and other officers were assigned to the command positions in the area.

The President emphasized that the Generalissimo was chief of state, head of the Government and commander in chief of the Chinese Army. Therefore the only thing to do was to recall General Stilwell. It was just as if he had come to dislike some Briton stationed here, Mr. Roosevelt said, and asked for his recall. Of course, he added, in such an event Prime Minister Churchill would withdraw the officer.

This was taken as a precise statement as far as it went. Having flown back with Stilwell after two years' work in China, Brooks Atkinson gave the *New York Times* a considerably longer account of the situation. After some delay it was cleared by the War Department for publication. I myself was flying toward China, and I heard lengthy extracts from the Atkinson report broadcast by loud-speaker from several army entertainment huts. Among other things Atkinson said:

For the last two months negotiations had been going on between President Roosevelt's personal representative (soon to be ambassador), Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese ground and air forces under the Generalissimo and to increase China's participation in the counter-offensive against Japan. Although the Generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell's appointment as commander, he decided later that he would accept any American commander except General Stilwell.

His attitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile. At a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee this month he announced the terms of his personal ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and governmental reform. He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American lend-lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced by Americans into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt agreed to the Generalissimo's demand for General Stilwell's recall. . . .

Then Atkinson went on to a lengthy and blistering analysis of "how come." Stilwell, he said, after a career of more than twenty years largely devoted to military affairs in China and two years and

eight months as commander of U. S. Army forces there, "has now concluded a busy and constantly frustrated attempt to help China stay in the war and to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese forces." Reciting Stilwell's qualifications as one who spoke Chinese and knew more about China than most foreigners, as well as being regarded as "the ablest field commander in China since 'Chinese' Gordon," Atkinson declared that "the decision to relieve General Stilwell has the most profound implications for China as well as American policy toward China and the Allied war effort in the Far East. It may mean that the United States has decided from now on to discount China's part in a counter-offensive."

This statement by an able and respected newspaperman, head of the Foreign Correspondents Association in Chungking and just emerged from hampering China censorship to clear his copy with Washington direct, hit the Far East like a bomb. It was coupled with scorching criticism of what had been going on in China. Atkinson asserted:

The fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell has been that the latter has been eager to fight the Japanese in China without delay and that the Generalissimo had hoped that he would not have to. . . . The Generalissimo has one positive virtue for which America is now indebted; he has never made peace with the Japanese . . . but the technique of preserving his ticklish balance of political power in China keeps him a passive man. . . . The Generalissimo is determined to maintain his group of aging reactionaries in power until the war is over, when, it is generally believed, he will resume his war against the Chinese Communists without distraction. . . . Relieving General Stilwell and appointing a successor has the effect of making us acquiesce in an unenlightened, cold-hearted, autocratic political regime.

Our "Uncle Chump from Over the Hump" concept of ourselves was at its height, and Brooks was its spokesman. We could concede that perhaps Stilwell had been inclined to overemphasize the importance of regaining Burma, from which he himself had earlier been driven out after what he candidly had termed "a hell of a licking"; we could see that Chiang was now embarrassed by a menace of Japanese thrust from the east, into Kweichow; we could see that, as Atkinson remarked, "General Stilwell is no diplomat . . . he is

plain and salty. He is personally incapable of assuming a reverential mood toward the Generalissimo, and he is impatient with incompetent meddling in military command." But we felt justified in exasperation. We had a to-hell-with-it-all attitude.

At this time, without explanation, our veteran ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned. He was almost immediately replaced by General Hurley, already on the scene.

When I reached Chungking in early November I found the dust and smoke of the Stilwell departure just beginning to clear. The Chinese were in a thoroughly chastened frame of mind, having won a victory against their most valued ally and now having had time to think over its possible cost. The Americans knew China to be in a tight situation from a dozen points of view. However deep our annoyance over various matters, we were aware that much of our individual fate and substantial share of the Allied cause hung on the discovery of solutions. Already this mutual feeling was beginning to work as a solvent. T. V. Soong had termed the recall "entirely a matter of personality" which had nothing to do with any difference in policy between China and the United States.

General Chennault's retirement from the China scene in July 1945 came after high U.S. military policy had starved his famous Fourteenth of aviation gasoline and other supplies and finally made him subordinate to a man certainly outranking him but with no such record in Chinese aviation history. Some attributed the move to Chennault's love for the Chinese, and saw a fresh shift in American policy, this time toward the more hard-boiled tactics of Gauss and Stilwell. Certainly Chennault was devoted to China, where his inspired pursuit tactics had worked miracles against larger enemy forces of faster planes, and the Chinese worshiped him for good reason. But it seems safer to attribute his troubles to "military politics" than to politics in the broader sphere. Chennault, like MacArthur, has always had his foes among the Big Brass of his own country.

So far I have mentioned only the two major immediate American groups in China shaping home opinion—the correspondents and the Army. Let me briefly speak of others. The American business element in China would under ordinary circumstances have been a powerful factor, but not during a war. Such American firms as still

carried on in China are mostly represented by Chinese, or other non-Americans. Washington, and the commanding general on the scene, rightly took a most serious view of the war effort—but wrongly, to my way of thinking, they carried this so far as to render it most difficult for any American trade representative even to get out to China at all. At times this military barrier was put up to an almost fanatical degree which left us in a bad commercial position when peace came.

This was in contrast with the attitude of the British, who, temporarily pushed to the wall in many parts of the world, still kept in mind that even a military machine travels on its stomach and that business is valuable in keeping that stomach filled. They know that taxes and tariffs pay official costs, but few American bureaucrats do, whether military or civil. A Briton vital to the Empire concept, which has business decidedly to the fore, still got into China, war or no war—and he might have his wife with him. Few Americans got in without official jobs, and none took wives! It seems the natural thing for our officialdom to sniff at business during a war, but this is a too narrow attitude, because we should not artificially divide off one part of either war or peacetime efforts from other parts. Our national structure depends on trade. Even though China were so blockaded that little in the way of goods could pass in or out, still as an instrument of national policy we should have encouraged business to keep representation in China, as did the sophisticated British. They carried on two banks in wartime Chungking; we had none anywhere in China. They participated in China insurance with support of their government. In short they were always on the job, a good old British habit we should have emulated.

Aside from our officials, who must remain officially silent, the only other important American category in Free China was the Christian missionaries. They provided the single great exception to the otherwise general and cynical "Uncle Chump" attitude. War taxed them severely, but it heightened their prestige with the Chinese people and improved their standing with the Chinese Government. Great as have been their losses, they may look for compensating gains from now on. Of course a great many missionaries were captured by the enemy, and others went home, but Washington was relatively generous even while the war was on in allowing not

merely men missionaries but women as well to return to such parts of the China field as were still open. The war thus stimulated the missions in certain ways, it was a call of fresh service to the Chinese, and it provided basis for hope of great future expansion.

The missionaries don't feel that their country has acted the "chump" in the eyes of either the Chinese or God. Their attitude has throughout been generally hopeful and dynamic. On the home front it played some part in stemming the wave of criticism against and disillusion over China. At the same time it should be said that in my experience and observation, the wartime missionary report on China was honest and accurate so far as the individual missionary was able to see the situation. Some, it is true, stuck doggedly to an attitude of uncritical praise of the Chinese (just as some American missionaries from Japan skirted perilously close to American disloyalty in their loyalty to everything Japanese—an attitude which caused considerable stir aboard the first repatriation ships). But I have heard missionaries give the fairest of appraisals before audiences which expected and even wanted them to show bias on the conservative side. So though the China missionaries didn't go overboard with bitterness against the Chinese, either Government or people, neither did they all fight against unpleasant China truths. In my view their general effect has been to give a stabilizing influence both in China and at home, owing to their sympathetic attitude toward things Chinese coupled with their usually long experience on the Chinese scene.

This stabilizing influence speedily began to be manifested in other more conspicuous ways. General Wedemeyer, a tall, handsome chap of pleasant personality, went out of his way to tell the Chinese (and, by no means incidentally, the correspondents) that he regarded himself as in no way the boss of any Chinese. He made clear that as the Generalissimo's chief of staff his function was to help, not to command. His attitude was completely self-respecting, not at all subservient, but strictly that of an adviser. As soon as the Chinese grasped this point they were effusive in trying to thrust authority at him. Suavely he held to his position of complete correctness.

Well—at any rate the Chinese could give him someone agreeable to work with. Out of his long-held War Ministership went General Ho Ying-chin, target of much criticism, and replacing him came

General Cheng Chien, who was promptly termed by Wedemeyer and his associates "an excellent man to work with." Ho still retained high military place, but signs of co-operation were immediately apparent. Sino-American military union was cemented in a common effort, employing Chinese troops and American transport planes, to repulse Japan's dangerous thrust into Kweichow. Then came measures to change China's conscription methods, to get rid of useless Chinese troops and obtain good ones, to fight malnutrition as currently the most dangerous foe of the Chinese Army, and to tighten up military matters in general. That this never resulted in the expected big onslaught against Japanese occupation forces does not alter the fact of Chinese military rejuvenation.

General Hurley went out to smooth things for Stilwell, and in this he failed. But initially he seemed a great diplomatic success even before he took over as ambassador. He was an Oklahoma sophisticate, experienced in the ways of our wicked world but boylike in his enjoyment of everything about him. Like Wedemeyer, he was good-looking, agreeable, modest; and he had a few tricks of his own. One of these was to ask some new acquaintance whether he had ever heard an Oklahoma Indian war whoop. When told "no" the general would lose no time in emitting his own vociferous version. All sorts of Chungkingites were so favored—among them the retiring Madame Sun Yat-sen, who loved it, though I wonder whether the later Hurley sounded so good. Hurley brought a new face and new fashions to a town jaded with too much war and the same old people. Both our two previous ambassadors had been men conscientious and serious-minded; Hurley, the first specialist in Indian war whoops ever to reach Chungking, brought a flavor of American novelty. Friends insisted that he also had shrewd capability—as I was reminded by Dr. T. V. Soong, who was just in process of becoming a sort of acting Premier. "Don't fool yourself about General Hurley!" he said. "Hurley didn't get where he is in the world by only doing war whoops. Watch him and you'll see that he has a tremendous capacity for concentrating on what he's going after. We like him and admire him."

But once the Hurley honeymoon was over it began to be said that in his enthusiastic inexperience the new ambassador had been "taken into camp" by Chiang, Soong, and others. It was regarded

as significant and (from an American viewpoint) depressing that he busied himself with weeding out and sending home his most knowledgeable subordinates, men whose liking for things Chinese was tempered with long experience of a disillusioning country. Some felt that it was tragic to shift, as they saw it, from a pro-American to a pro-Chungking position. This they found particularly startling because of Mr. Hurley's first stress on the obvious need for pressing all factions toward a Chinese unity through which China could give her whole power to the war effort. But only time could work out the complexities of result in this shift of our top diplomats. Undoubtedly Hurley tried to contribute a new dynamic, but he was a green hand in China. The end of the war and Moscow's vote for Chungking helped briefly, but soon Dick Watts, formerly of OWI, was writing: "After a year of Mr. Hurley's hysterical meddling and the ineptness of our foreign policy, not only is there civil war in China but American troops are helping to wage it by giving aid to the most reactionary force in that unhappy country. . . ."

Likewise in this period Donald M. Nelson left his imprint on the China scene. A terrifically mounting China inflation had not only raised the price of all goods sky-high but had discouraged Chinese industry, which often found that it could hardly get enough for a finished product to purchase fresh raw material and continue the cycle of manufacture. China was asking from America, through lend-lease, steel and other products she could turn out cheaper for herself. Mr. Nelson made quick appraisal, then gave constructive advice as to how the Chinese could help themselves. It caught hold of the imaginations of such modern-minded Chinese as Dr. Wang Wen-hao, Minister of Economics, who became head of a Chinese War Production Board. The press took up a theme of industrial hope. And so from another source an improved feeling about China, and about Sino-American co-operation, began to spring forth.

Meanwhile Uncle Sam (whether Uncle Chump or not) kept humping over the hazardous Hump. The growth of this air traffic was tremendous. From an average freight of 3,000 tons in September 1943 the figure grew—with introduction of night flying and other improvements—to 10,000 tons three months later and 23,500 tons a year later. On a single day 616 flights crossed the Hump with 2,600,000 tons, meaning an average of one C-46 or C-47 every two

and a half minutes through the twenty-four hours. Japanese fighters destroyed some, engines failed in subzero altitudes, but still the freight went through. Allied arms were scoring successes below this great air artery, and presently the new Ledo Road was opened. As a gracious gesture, Generalissimo Chiang named it the Stilwell Road, while Chinese, British, and American troops fought on together to reopen the old Burma Road. (Shortly after victory it was somewhat ironically announced that the Stilwell Road would be abandoned.)

All was not yet pleasant, easy, or clarified. Between Chinese and Americans there were still causes for friction. The British were lucky in playing only a small part in China, temporarily. Both sides were ready to criticize themselves as well as each other, at any rate, and this helped greatly. Certainly it was disheartening to see Chinese infantry pushed back and American-built airfields blasted by retiring ground crews, although later these fields were retaken in the form of rubble never restored to use before the peace. Silently Chinese watched the American war effort in the Pacific concentrating exclusively against island objectives without touching the politics-ridden Asiatic mainland. Okinawa and Iwo Jima furnished the bomber take-off bases which the Chinese had thought must be established in Shantung and Chekiang. Perhaps the Chinese were for once too complacent. Feeling that America must call on them and their territory finally, China failed to achieve internal accord. While Chungking required it to be the American Government's policy not to furnish munitions to the Chinese Communists, it was explicable that no American commander, whether navy or army, would be anxious to make a tough China coast landing where he would find himself hampered by such a rule or embroiled in a political quarrel between contending Chinese factions whose guerrilla help he desperately needed.

Perhaps it was another matter to collaborate with the National Government after victory in helping the latter to take over from the Japanese, but there were both Chinese and Americans who felt that American forces were taking sides and strengthening China's ruling faction. General Stratemeyer, contributing U.S. troops and air-transporting National Government soldiers while saying "This is purely a Chinese show," was quoted by correspondent Dixie Tighe as eliciting from some unidentified GI the sardonic rejoinder,

"Maybe it's a Chinese production, but they're using a hell of a lot of American actors."

With the peace there was inevitably some feeling of disappointment among Chinese who had hoped that their country would take a more glorious part in the concluding days of the war. Less vocal were those who saw lend-lease at an end without salvage of importance from the residue of America's military effort in China. In the peace there was the making of a new struggle, however covered in a gloss of amity, for material help to a China no longer a war ally. Americans pondered. They wanted to work with China, but certainly not in any role of "Uncle Chump from Over the Hump," even though now it could once more be over the Pacific. With all friendship for China it was felt that businesslike dealing rather than sentimental gifts was what the United States should tender the Chinese.

10

THE CHINESE MILITARY POTENTIAL

Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

—Sun Tzu, 6th Century B.C.

BASIC TO ANY CONCEPT of Chinese military affairs is the individual soldier, the *lao ping*. He is the patient, ill-clothed, underfed, abused, yet hardy, courageous, and cheerful product of China's great peasantry. His strength lies in the root strength of the nation from which he springs; his weaknesses come from poor leadership, neglect, bad health, and a defeatist tradition.

We have all heard that the Chinese are pacifists. Some of us have heard that their scorn for the Army is expressed in a saying, "Don't use good iron for nails or good sons for soldiers." But it would be a mistake to generalize too far from these things. If the Chinese love peace, that is only an expression of their hard-won sound sense rather than any proof that they can't fight. They merely know that war doesn't pay. This is mostly because they have been embroiled in some sort of war almost constantly except during unusual and mostly brief periods, a point to consider before writing them off as hundred-per-cent pacifists in the ordinary sense.

General Stilwell was latest in a long line of foreign military experts who came to the conclusion that there is no better soldier

alive than China's *lao ping* when he is properly handled and looked after. The very qualities which make him superb under the right conditions can also be sources of weakness under the wrong conditions. He lacks the fire and dash of the Indian Gurkha. He has no education and infrequent literacy, in contrast with most Western soldiers. His leadership has been so almost uniformly bad that he tends to expect hardship and defeat, in a spirit of gentle resignation. The astonishing thing is the performance which he turns in under circumstances that would utterly stop any other soldier on earth in his tracks. And given even a tiny taste of what other soldiers consider a normal minimum of good treatment, you have a tough, willing, obedient yet resourceful fighting man such as any officer may be proud to lead.

My own experiences of the Chinese soldier goes back into the war-lord days of North China. I can still remember the thrill of an autumn evening when the late H. K. Kwong, Princeton-educated managing editor of the Chinese paper I was serving in Peking and later to be consul general at Manila while I was there, strolled into our office with the suggestion, "Suppose you walk down to the *ta chieh* [big street] and see what's happening." I hurried through the powdery dust of the path along the Jade Canal until I reached a wide macadamized east-west thoroughfare, now strangely deserted. Through the night drifted a distant sound—the jingle of horses' harness, the pounding of gun carriages. Soon the artillery loomed out of the dark before me. After it marched long lines of Chinese soldiers, quietly padding along on their cloth sandals. Each carried his spare quota of equipment, including an umbrella, his teapot, perhaps a little rice bag, his rifle, and a big executioner's sword slung across his back in lieu of bayonet. That was all they had to meet every sort of foe, including rain, snow, blazing sun, hunger, thirst, and (almost incidentally) the human enemy. As I was to see in years to come, they could endure beyond any and fight as well as most.

The soldier of that day was not popular, and farmers did not give their sons to the war-lord armies willingly. Often the rigors of the troops' life turned them into semibandits because they had no alternative. It was at best a pinched existence, broken by occasional orgies of looting after victory. Leaders consistently bluffed and sold

out whenever opportunity offered. Yet even then there were exceptions. Chang Tso-lin of Mukden, himself risen from banditry to Japan-fostered respectability, bred and trained a tough northland soldier considerably above the current average. Most amazing of all the leaders was the "Christian general" Feng Yu-hsiang, whose soldiers helped the peasantry by building roads and dikes; I saw them do it, and observed their strict discipline and their friendly ways toward the people of the countryside.

Even in those relatively primitive days there were some real battles. I was sickened yet deeply impressed when on occasional field trips I saw the fortitude of the wounded, who suffered uncomplainingly and managed to survive a degree of neglect which was shocking to anyone accustomed to ministrations of Western army doctors and the Red Cross. Even now, the Chinese Army medical service is sketchy; then, and well into the present Sino-Japanese war, it hardly existed. For the matter of that, it was notorious that young Chinese doctors who gained entrance to the Rockefeller-endowed Peking Union Medical College for training were subsequently willing to resort to anything to remain at the P.U.M.C. instead of making their knowledge available to the interior parts of China and the Chinese troops. There were reasons. Life in the interior was hard and primitive. There was no tradition of self-sacrifice. This situation, like much else in China, has taken a sharp turn for the better.

But in all the intermittent warfare of those days, which was usually portrayed by visiting writers as pure comic opera, one thing was lacking—a cause. A cause came to the fore when Canton's army swept up from the South behind the banner of Nationalism in 1926 and 1927. Then those who fought for a new China were irresistible against a nominal "foe" who not only was of the same blood and country but who knew himself to be on the wrong side, with the mass of his people against him. But in 1932, when General Tsai Ting-kai's Nineteenth Route Army stood up against the Japanese in six weeks of bitter battle at Shanghai, we saw for the first time how a Chinese soldier could handle himself against an enemy better led, better armed, better supplied, better educated, better in everything except as to the cause for which he was fighting.

At Shanghai's famous "Windy Corner," one of the International Settlement defense blockhouses on the border of Chinese Chapei,

we foreigners peered through rifle slits day after day to watch a Chinese machine gunner at his post in the second story of a rickety wooden shop building across the street. He was nicknamed "Charlie Chan" by reporters, and the local papers finally made him famous because of the way he held out against a hail of Japanese fire directed at him for days from many points. Possibly he was not, in fact, always the same man. We couldn't see much of him, and replacements may have crawled in sometimes from the ruins of other buildings behind. But we could always see his cheerful grin and hear his gun let off a burst whenever a Japanese was sighted in any direction.

"Charlie Chan" grew to typify the whole spirit of Chinese resistance, now showing itself, for the first time, a force to reckon with. The Japanese were deeply surprised, as we were all surprised. When that first abortive "war," never openly supported by Nanking, was finally called off, Japan's military men had a solid cud of thought to chew on. If they had extracted more nourishment from it they would have been saved a lot of trouble later.

During the early Nationalist period in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek accepted the aid of an able German military mission headed successively by Colonel Max Bauer, General von Seeckt, and finally by General Baron von Falkenhausen. These seasoned experts had under them sixty highly trained officers who did more than any other single factor to build up a modern Chinese army. Though they were Germans first and Nazis a poor second, if at all, unquestionably Hitler hoped through their influence to guide Nanking thought along lines favorable to his cause. Another arm of Germany's policy was China's Eurasia Aviation Corporation, in which the German Lufthansa had a minority interest and for which it furnished planes—first single-engined, later the famed trimotored JU-52s which the Germans were to employ in European warfare as troop transports. Eurasia expected to link China with Germany, but ran into many snags, including the Russians, whose territories lay across its path.

Another quite impressive item of foreign military aid to China during this period was an Italian air mission. Its officers were resplendent in beautiful blue uniforms, beside which an American independent and unofficial group of seventeen flight trainers under

Colonel John Jouett seemed drab indeed. The Italians had their Government behind them, while Uncle Sam expressly and emphatically washed his hands of the American group. So the Italians were able to swagger about Shanghai on active status in their lovely uniforms, building up Rome's prestige, while the Americans stayed down on their field at Chienchao, near Hangchow, south of Shanghai, and with Harry Rowland driving them they did a seven-day week of pilot training. Not only did the Americans not wear uniforms, but they were very hard-boiled in their training. If a Chinese boy betrayed what the Americans deemed a lack of inherent flying ability—that subtle something which no one can measure and which won't keep a pilot from flying but which may keep him from doing the right thing by instinct in emergency—in such case the Americans grimly "washed him out." There was no prejudice, but no favor either. This amazed certain influential Chinese, who were sure that, once the Americans understood that Pilot Candidate So-and-so was the nephew of the important Chinese General Such-and-which, everything would be fixed up and regrets expressed that the washout had ever been ordered. However, the Americans were not having any of that. They refused to go on training any lad who didn't seem to them to belong in the air.

The Italians were more considerate. Setting up a school up-country, they were charmed to take any boy handed over to them, and if he were well sponsored, they wouldn't throw him out for anything. He had been sent to learn how to fly, and he would be kept till he had learned how to fly. If he wrecked a few airplanes in the process, why—Italy manufactured and had for sale some more wonderful airplanes!

It was a boom time for aircraft representatives of all nations. Shanghai and Nanking and Nanchang saw hair-curling aerial acrobatics by flying stars imported to impress the Chinese with the performance features of the planes they demonstrated. Jimmy Doolittle went out, and what he did in a Curtiss Hawk was spectacular indeed. Bad weather didn't deter him, and once I saw him do stunts at Lunghwa Field with a cloud ceiling of little more than five hundred feet. When he looped the loop he was out of sight during more than half of it. He twisted along the surface of the field in that

excruciatingly precise operation, the slow roll. A few days afterward a less competent American pilot rolled himself and plane into a ball by trying a low-altitude slow roll and discovering at cost of life and ship that a plane has little support when its wings are turned at right angles to the ground. Mario de Bernardi, Italian veteran who had thrice won the Schneider speed trophy after setting up a great combat reputation in World War I, came out with a special-built Italian stunt plane, and I had two rides. He gave me some of the most expert acrobatic piloting I've ever experienced or seen.

But the Chinese heard so much about the big names of these renowned pilots that they began to forget there were other factors involved. Frank Hawks came out, was ballyhooed like the rest, demonstrated a twin-engined transport with retractable landing gear, and absent-mindedly landed the ship on its belly with wheels still up. It was a dickens of a job jacking the plane up off the ground, as this happened at an upcountry field. Also, new propellers had to be fitted. The Chinese told Frank he was a hero—obviously, they said, some grave though mysterious emergency must have occurred, the plane had failed, and his safe landing under such hazardous circumstances saved their lives and showed that his big reputation as a pilot was well deserved! Frank protested that he was "just dumb and absent-minded," but the explanation was brushed aside politely. To the exasperation of Bill Pawley, his sponsor, the airplane under demonstration got an undeservedly bad reputation and finally had to be virtually given away. However, Bill and his competitors all did a land-office business on the whole, and China rapidly though expensively accumulated a mixed bag of all sorts of aircraft—the American instructors trying their best, with no help from their home Government, to standardize on U.S.-made equipment, and the Italian mission throwing on all pressure to sell Italian planes with Rome's help. Mussolini even gave Chiang Kai-shek a trimotored monstrosity which could fly nearly as fast sidewise as straight ahead. In the long run this aerial white elephant helped sell American planes.

The outbreak of major hostilities between Japan and China in 1937 found the Chinese with thirty-one divisions, or about half a million men, well trained, fairly well equipped, and eager; also a group of young Chinese pilots, selected in the first instance because

they came from good families, though the Americans had done what weeding out they could, flying a conglomeration of aircraft of various makes, types, and countries of origin. China's air force didn't do too well. Disregarding expert counsel, it wasted its time and strength in unsuccessful foolish efforts to sink the decrepit Japanese flagship *Idzumo*, a sitting duck in the Whangpoo off the Japanese Consulate General at Shanghai. This four-stack relic should have been sunk by the Japanese themselves, but it had comfortable living quarters for the admiral. Historically, its greatest service to its country was in wasting the time, bombs and aircraft of the Chinese Air Force which might have been employed on something useful such as blasting Japan's fighting units (of which the decrepit *Idzumo* emphatically was not a part). Misplaced Chinese air bombs killed more than two thousand Chinese and several Americans and Europeans.

But the Chinese soldier proved himself once again, as in 1931. He held out at Shanghai through three long months of terrific slugging combat, the details of which would make a book in themselves. This was of great and perhaps decisive importance to the morale of the country. China suddenly realized she could stand up against Japan. In those days of Shanghai struggle the concept of an ultimate Chinese victory over the "island dwarfs" was forged. Through some bleaker days to come, Chinese faith seldom wavered and never was destroyed.

As in 1931, the Japanese finally broke their Shanghai deadlock by a flanking operation. Chiang's German advisers had prepared an elaborate and scientific plan for withdrawal toward Nanking, but it was not carried out. Perhaps the Chinese high command had grown a little cocky over the hand-to-hand prowess of its *lao ping*. My own impression all through the two Shanghai wars was that unstinted credit should be given the troops, but considerably less generous praise to the officers—and, sometimes, the less praise the higher one went.

One night during the 1937 Shanghai fighting I ventured out behind the Chinese lines under Chinese escort, and in company with an American colonel then in charge of the U. S. Fourth Marines stationed at Shanghai. We were looking for the Chinese commander of the whole area. Our guide presumably knew where the commander was, as our mission was official. But we floundered around

the whole flat lower-Yangtze countryside for hours, unable to use headlights for fear of attracting Japanese fire, and following in turn all manner of successive conflicting directions. Finally my companion the colonel burst out with a remark I have remembered through the years. With deep feeling said he: "By God, the Chinese have a veritable genius for disorganization!"

This genius for disorganization seems to have ruled the withdrawal to, and out of, Nanking. It was a bad business, a helter-skelter unplanned affair with great loss of men, equipment, and morale. Savage atrocities were inflicted on the helpless civilian population of Nanking for weeks after the Japanese arrived. At any rate it taught lessons. Among other things it showed the value of German advice. Such aid had been disregarded at Nanking, but later it was to be chiefly responsible for one of China's few outstanding victories. By a carefully conceived scheme, Chinese forces overwhelmed the Japanese at Taierchwang, though later they were forced to leave strategic Hsuechow heroically. Now the Japanese were stirred to complain in Berlin against help to the Chinese by their Axis ally. So the German mission was ordered to withdraw after about a year of war service, in the middle of 1938, though a few of the Germans broke their home ties and stayed on. At the same time Soviet Russia was beginning to send aid of various sorts, including fighter and bombing planes and pilots.

During the subsequent war years, the general record was one which the world could and did admire. "Scorched earth"—Chinese destruction of whatever assets might benefit the invader—became an integral part of strategy. So did guerrilla warfare. In my opinion rather too much emphasis for a time was laid by the Chinese on the value of guerrilla resistance. This began to be stressed during the Hankow period, 1938. While we all admired the tenacity of Chinese guerrilla operations, it was quietly pointed out by competent American and other experts that however hampering to an enemy may be the effect of guerrilla work, it doesn't win wars.

"The Chinese will be getting into a dangerous state of mind if they let themselves be too pleased with guerrilla warfare," said one such foreign expert to me at Hankow during the spring of 1938. "Guerrillas can harass an enemy but seldom defeat him; never in the long

run. Also, there is a tendency for guerrilla warfare to die down gradually, because no resident population can indefinitely withstand the retaliations which such brutes as the Japanese will inflict."

All this was painfully true. Therefore a tendency grew up, with the passage of time, for guerrillas to become intensely unpopular in many areas of China. Any point which grew to be known as a focus of guerrilla operation was presently visited by a well-armed, cold-blooded detachment of Japanese who calmly burned all the houses, killed most of the people, and carried away all the food. Such tactics were pretty effective. Only the Chinese Communists had much luck in holding out against them and in retaining the support of the peasantry behind guerrilla warfare. This was because the agrarian Reds made such warfare a responsibility of the peasantry as active participants, instead of quartering strange fighters upon them as oppressors in some ways more objectionable than the Japanese. Anyone who will accept the principle of Chinese peasant warfare, with all its implications dangerous to landlords and "big business" generally, can draw on historic wells of strength. Out come long spears and crude swords and primitive firearms, used by the peasants' forefathers as rural militia fighting against bandit bands. The Chinese Reds court such support. For explicable reasons the Kuomintang prefers to use its own army.

But many of the National Government's efforts to stand in force against the enemy met with disaster. In a head-on fight, Japanese mechanized units and heavy artillery supported by strafing and bombing aircraft pulverized even the most heroic Chinese defense. The Chinese simply didn't "have the stuff"—heavy artillery, tanks, planes, anything of that general category. What they had was mostly (in addition to iron nerves) rifles, bayonets, swords, and machine guns, all excellent in their way but not up to what the Japanese could bring to bear. Also, there were shocking instances of mismanagement forever cropping up.

One story was told of a Yangtze River point believed to be impregnable. It had guns mounted to command the few approaches. Attack seemed suicidal. So the Chinese commander was off one night enjoying a good time in the local village taverns, having left strict orders to "do nothing till you hear from me." The Japanese moved in, took the defenses without a shot, and at their leisure

gathered up the Chinese commander from amidst his empty wine-pots.

Such incidents weren't much publicized in China, but the word got around and did no good to the morale of the poor *lao ping*. In Japanese propaganda, incidents of this sort were not only fully reported but exaggerated; reading the Japanese press, one would gather that all Chinese soldiers had to be chained to their posts lest they run away. Pictures of dead men so chained appeared in Tokyo.

So the war went on, with few ups and a good many downs but with *lao ping* still fighting and the National Government stubbornly overcoming all obstacles one by one. Gradually certain political divisions, as between Kuomintang and Communists, caused open cleavage between sections of the National Army. Not merely did this represent division in what had been a theoretically unified army under a united political front, but actual hostilities. During 1939 forces regarded as Kuomintang destroyed the rear echelon of the Communist-led New Fourth Army. From that time on, civil conflict was intermittent, though never at such point of all-out warfare as prevailed during the first decade of the National Government's existence.

Today it is more than ever difficult to present anything like closely checked statistics on China's Army. There have been large claims to around six million men, yet shortly before the war's end Chungking admitted a lack of effective replacements to maintain the strength of divisions in East China and Burma. The Chinese News Service reported that in an effort to improve the fighting quality of the Army, drastic reduction was enforced which by April 1945 had reduced the total from 5,700,000 by 1,100,000 men, and it was then planned by the War Ministry to have the strength of the Army at 3,500,000 men by the end of 1945. Guerrilla fighters have always been an uncertain numerical quantity, but the official China Handbook estimated a total of 356,000 guerrillas as of 1943.

During my last China visit, in November 1944, I made an effort to shake down the military figures but found it a virtually hopeless task. Some unofficial sources thought that there might be as many as a million and a half useful troops in the National Government command, but few would grant more. Large quantities of soldiers were regarded as useless for one reason or another, including mal-

nutrition and dubious allegiance, while many officers had been forced by their personal needs in a period of runaway inflation to resort to old-time tricks of falsifying figures. Thus they would line their pockets by drawing extra pay and supplies. As many as half a million of what were considered the best troops had been immobilized in blockading the Chinese Communists. Some said only 150,000 were tied up in this way. An average estimate was thirty divisions, or 300,000 troops. At one moment of crisis 60,000 of these were assembled to be sent by American planes to a fighting front, but only 37,000 turned out to be in such physical condition as to warrant the transportation—a fact eloquent of the level of inefficiency to which almost the whole Army had sunk. Eight years of war, the Chinese claim, brought a total of 3,156,163 Chinese troop casualties.

As for the Communists, a special factor entered into any calculation of their strength. It was the fact that they actively solicited mass support and indeed declared that no other program was suitable for an all-China resistance to Japan. Those friendly to the Communists said that the Eighth Route Army in North China shortly before the close of the war numbered about 400,000 and the New Fourth Army in Central China another 200,000, giving a total of 600,000 men. To this was added a claimed 2,000,000 farmer militia, or guerrillas, in the north and 600,000 in the Yangtze Valley. There was considerable dispute as to who controlled those along the coastal areas. National Government authorities whittled Red estimates by varying amounts, some insisting that when it came to actually trained troops the Communists could claim no more than a mere 80,000. So it can be seen how wide was the field of disagreement on a question vital to domestic settlement, because it had long been the contention of the Government that the Reds wanted supplies for more troops than they actually had, or should have.

Judging from the testimony of neutral observers who traveled among both Kuomintang and Communist forces, morale was more uniformly high among the latter than the former, and they had better relations with the Chinese people. This facilitated their war-time guerrilla operations, which was about all they had the strength for anyway. Relations between Kuomintang-led troops and the local populations were poor to bad, and in the spring of 1944 this caused

downright disaster in Honan. During the previous year there had been famine. Instead of relief, the people found oppression at the hands of their civil officials. The Government was not foresighted earlier, and later its orders were disobeyed or neglected. Starving people were deprived of their grain; there was graft and theft. The general in charge of the area became a leading tobacco speculator. Finally, when the Japanese drove in, the desperate peasantry turned against such of their own soldiers as remained—most officers had fled with their wealth—and disarmed fifty thousand of them.

It was a frightening experience for those who had believed China could never crack under Nippon's pressure. No doubt it played its part in American strategic decisions not to force any final issue against Japan on Chinese soil. Certainly it gave a great deal to think over and provided impetus for reform.

Many critics who were familiar at first hand with conditions in the field were impatient with the official Chungking excuse that National Government armies were weak because of lack of equipment. Betty Graham traveled through important fighting areas in 1944, including Yangtze territory around Ichang, and subsequently found in this factor only a partial explanation for general military disintegration. She did, however, find that "lack of equipment is certainly an important factor in the current demoralization that is creating record desertion rates," but she pointed out that the Allies were not sole culprits, as many well-intentioned American and other writers have implied. She remarked that at the time of Pearl Harbor there was an American survey of the Free China armament industry which resulted in a conclusion that Chungking could keep its armies quite adequately supplied with at least small arms and ammunition, but by early 1944 fourteen of the eighteen iron foundries in Chungking had closed down and one out of every four steel plants of war-time China was idle. Reasons were subject of much discussion. Miss Graham contended that they lay primarily in Chungking economic policies "which have continued to favor the wealthy landlords even at the expense of the industrialists," but many felt inflation to be unavoidable, as well as an inevitable cause of creeping economic paralysis. Donald Nelson's 1944 China missions were to deal with this in the role of physician.

Self-criticism, always a sign of health however vestigial, finally

began to manifest itself. With it came efforts at improvement. Two Chinese battalion commanders were executed after they had fled from a Japanese attack, leaving one regimental commander in charge. Later five officers were shot for murdering one hundred of their own troops, some of whom were buried alive. Such executions were not unprecedented, but they had become highly unusual. Just as there had been political unity in the hot fervor of early hostilities, so there had been stern army discipline. When General Li Fu-ying evacuated Tatung, in northern Shansi, he was court-martialed and shot. Even more sensational was the case of General Han Fu-chu, governor of Shantung and commander of army forces in that province. This renowned chief failed to obey an explicit government order to hold his ground during late 1937 but instead tried to withdraw westward into Shensi. He was arrested during January 1938, found guilty, and executed January 24. Han had been a "big man," and the country, far from being dismayed over his weakness, which was humanly understandable, felt a rush of strength over the firm resolution of the National Government. But those things were at the start of the long war. Lately the "disciplinary measures" had been of political flavor and mostly directed against the Communists. People found it good to see moves to restore military discipline among forces unquestionably the Government's own, and it was also good that censorship at least intermittently allowed press criticism of matters both military and economic.

Reforms of army administration, supply, and equipment had been announced at intervals through the years, but they materialized mostly on paper. Evidence of more solid change became apparent with the arrival in China of General Wedemeyer late in 1944, soon followed by the appointment of the co-operative General Cheng Chien as China's War Minister. All the initial statements were optimistic, but eight months later, in the course of a 5,000-mile tour of six Chinese provinces, General Wedemeyer told a Chinese audience that upon his arrival he had found "almost half the Chinese soldiers starving." Basic policies which he had recommended and which he said must be continued and expanded included, first, the conscription of none but able-bodied men without regard to wealth or position, and second, adequate and wholesome food for the troops.

Almost immediately after General Wedemeyer took hold the Chinese army pay went up. This was a vital point, because without increase which could at least in some degree compensate for the terrific inflation, graft and commercial traffic by officers and men alike had become necessary for their livelihood. Effective from October 1944 salaries were boosted from twenty to forty times the pre-war scale. An official publication of the Information Ministry in announcing this went on to say:

Although the increase still lags behind the rise of commodity prices, it goes a long way in improving the livelihood of the Chinese soldier, and will strengthen the striking power of the Chinese Army. . . . A Chinese enlisted man now receives about \$1,000 (Chinese currency) a month plus special allowances in kind. . . . Army rations have also been improved. . . . Medical, educational, traveling, and service allowances have been increased tenfold. Burial expenses have been increased in proportion. The construction and repair of barracks are under way. . . . Army service stations dot the roads, providing shelters, tea, food, and medical attention for the men in transit. . . . The Ministry of War has established a \$100,000,000 military hospital on the north bank of Chungking. It has more than sixty doctors, ninety nurses, and the latest improvement and facilities. Improvements are being made in other military hospitals.

Perhaps even more important, Chinese soldiers' food was improved in both quantity and quality. Leading American army nutrition experts early in 1945 worked out a new army ration for Chinese soldiers which was issued from April. At the same time a new ration and procurement system was adopted with approval of the National Military Council in order to put the new food regime into effect, in accordance with recommendations by two officers sent out by the U. S. War Department at General Wedemeyer's request. Seventy-five more were called for to help implement the scheme.

The general plan, drawn up after a searching examination of seventeen hundred Chinese soldiers drawn from seven different localities, was expected to result in a great improvement in the health, vigor, and fighting capabilities of Chinese troops. It involved an entirely new system of procuring and issuing food, after the estab-

lishment of marketing centers strategically located near sources of supply and troop concentrations.

Instead of the old meager ration of rice and salt, supplemented by a small money allowance for purchase of other food, the new scheme substituted a complete daily ration assuring each soldier a minimum of 3,650 calories plus nearly one hundred grams of protein and a satisfactory quantity of minerals and vitamins. Not being calorie-minded myself, I pick up for comparison a current statement that the average American citizen in wartime has been getting 3,600 calories a day, which is regarded as far over the world average for civilians and certainly much in excess of what any Chinese soldier has ever had before.

Components of the basic ration include twenty-five Chinese ounces of rice, two ounces of beans, one ounce of shelled peanuts, nine tenths of an ounce of fresh vegetable oils, half an ounce of salt, an ounce of fresh meat, ten ounces of fresh vegetables, and a quantity of fuel, since the soldier ordinarily prepares his own "chow." The rice is partly undermilled to insure presence of vitamin-B complex, lost in China's ordinary polished rice. Beans consist mostly of soybeans. The salt is iodized for goiter prevention. Meat is supposed to be two-thirds pork and one-third beef. Vegetables include cabbage, carrots, sweet and Irish potatoes, and turnips. Fifty-three substitute foods have been listed, all locally grown, to allow dietary variety and avoid shortages in certain areas. From U.S. army stocks, vitamin tablets are provided for treatment of Chinese troops showing conspicuous deficiencies.

Along with this, there was recognition of the already demonstrated fact that many of the Chinese troops were a drag on the war effort rather than a help. Of the seventeen hundred soldiers examined, 57 per cent had one or more nutritional deficiencies, additional to which were such afflictions as scabies which were not due to bad nutrition but had been aggravated by lack of proper food. Some could be improved, but many were felt to be best weeded out of the Army. During March of 1945 the new War Minister announced that 396,000 men considered unfit for combat had been discharged, and that it was expected that the number of those disbanded would total 1,800,000 by the end of the year.

At the same time the Army was making a fresh effort to get the

right kind of recruits. Policy had changed with regard to passing over educated youths, and these were being encouraged to join the Army voluntarily, with prospects for advancement and responsibility in keeping with their abilities. Recruiting for 100,000 of these was started. Thus it was hoped that the former power of the student movement, which before 1937 pressed the National Government to embark on war with Japan, might be employed in an army service never before of a character to appeal to educated young Chinese or their parents.

Although malnutrition was recognized to be one of the greatest immediate handicaps to the fighting effectiveness of the Chinese Army, there were two other important points on which American help could be most useful. One was the shortage of munitions, the other was expert training. Both these matters were included in the plans discussed by General Wedemeyer and his Chinese "opposite numbers," notably Generalissimo Chiang and General Cheng. A great deal of this was only partly visible under a veil of military secrecy. But it was presently made known that the U.S. army forces in China were engaged in "the largest military education program of its kind in the world" to increase the combat efficiency of Chinese troops. That covered a great deal of ground. General Stilwell had flown picked Chinese over the Hump to India months before, for special training together with a program of proper nutrition and medical attention. In Burma they proved top-rank fighters. There seemed every reason to believe that if the new, mutually chastened spirit of Sino-American military co-operation could continue to expand under the revivifying influence of success, the Stilwell-Chiang mess might finally be considered to have paid dividends.

Nevertheless this brighter aspect was not without shadows. Before the People's Political Council on July 11, 1945, Conscription Minister Lu Chung-lin admitted that three thousand of a group of five thousand new Southwest recruits had died soon after induction into the Army, mostly from starvation. Members of the Council reported that the people of their areas still shirked military service because they feared treatment like that accorded criminals. In some localities it was said that "conscription" was a word synonymous with "press-gang." No man dared walk in unfrequented parts of Kiangsi, it was said. In Kweichow the supply of able-bodied men

available for army service had been exhausted despite the prevalent idea that China is an inexhaustible reservoir of man power.

Finally, there still remained the quarrel with the Communists, which was not merely a political affair but one with important military aspects for the present and future. Whatever General Wedemeyer might think about a wasteful tying up of both Kuomintang and Communist troops in double blockade, there was nothing he could do, so he skirted around the whole matter, and the war ended with this issue unresolved. Wedemeyer made clear that his instructions were to aid and supply only China's National Government troops, and that he could not even turn over to the Communists captured Japanese munitions, since Chungking did not approve—though Chungking finally did allow some American medical supplies to go in. Most of the Communist arms had been captured from the Japanese. Peace put China's military problems clearly and exclusively back into the domestic sphere. By no means to be overlooked in the long view was the Communist charge that American military help was directly serviceable in the prolongation of Kuomintang one-party political control. Yet the alternative seemed a completely hands-off attitude out of line with American desire to aid China.

If it is going to be necessary that a modern and united China maintain an army in the future, no one will deny that such an army ought to be a far better army than has ever been the case in the past. Perhaps idealistic hopes will be fulfilled and, by terms of the peace and her own internal readjustments, China will be warranted in disbanding all or most of her troops. It could happen. To follow such a course would be in the line of the common-sense Chinese psychology, even though past efforts at disbandment by weak governments have been blocked by political and other considerations. Or it could be that we are only helping build a modern Kuomintang army for later civil war.

But suppose a strong, sane peace is capitalized on by a strong, united, and enlightened Chinese Government. The improvements now being wrought in the lot of the Chinese lowly *lao ping* could mean that these troops, turned back to civil life, would be in superior physical and mental condition to grapple with the problems of making a living for themselves and their families. In a new, demo-

cratic China requiring both brains and brawn from its people, these disbanded soldiers would not become cast-off beggars as in old days. Rather they could take positions of community leadership.

For a Chinese soldier to be respected as a source of strength, both moral and physical, would be something really new and really good.

11

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE LAND

MOST WRITERS deal separately with the two subjects of this chapter, and few handle them both. That is odd. In future, China must think of them together, because with the restoration of peaceful conditions there has once more begun a process well started before mid-1937, a process of setting up new balances of livelihood within a great country hitherto 80 per cent agricultural. Counting in households, an old Chinese habit, more than sixty million of an estimated eighty million Chinese households live from the soil.

Some seem to think that this may speedily change to 80 per cent industrial, or an approximation. There is reason for a certain amount of industrialization of China. But I devoutly hope we shall never see an abandonment of China's good earth for the sake of a headlong plunge into what one may term "exploitational industrialization"—the sort of thing in which Japan imitated the worst features of the West, and the sort of thing which created in certain Shanghai prewar factories a set of conditions compared with which a New York sweatshop would seem paradise.

Industrialization offers a path to quick profits, and therefore many of China's landlord class (who have not benefited as handsomely by the poor condition of the Chinese peasantry as many presume) are turning to industry as rapidly as permitted by peacetime conditions, which have allowed renewed access to the coastal areas. Upcountry there were many handicaps to the development of industry in spite of all we heard of China's wartime factories. Labor shortage in what has been hitherto regarded as a land of endless cheap labor was one of the more surprising factors. With this came

a startling rise in most labor costs. High-priced raw materials, the uncertainties of a rising spiral of inflation, and poor communications also played a part during wartime exile in China's Far West. With peace, deflation and other problems of readjustment also applied brakes, but unemployment has produced a fresh flow of cheap labor, there are more and cheaper materials, and access has been restored to a broader market, to some extent including the whole world. So there is likely to be a tendency toward rapid retreat from the land, and rapid growth of industry. Both landlords and tenants will be willing participants.

Well-meaning experts new to China or perhaps giving their advice without ever having seen China are apt to press toward rapid and large-scale industrialization as in their view offering the best solution for China's many postwar problems. That would make China more in their usual pattern of a "modern country." During April 1945 Howard Coonley, a former president of the National Association of Manufacturers, spoke in New York City after a visit to China during which he took a leading part in the extremely useful work of Donald M. Nelson in setting up a Chinese War Production Board. But whereas I had noticed in Chungking the previous November that Mr. Nelson kept his attention scrupulously to the job of winning the war, refusing even to discuss future postwar industrial questions which the Chinese constantly sought to press upon him, Mr. Coonley said:

"Unless China is industrialized, the future safety of the East is in jeopardy."

One could with justification reverse that remark to read: "If China is industrialized too rapidly and in wrong fashion, the future safety of China is in jeopardy." Perhaps Mr. Coonley himself had a few "hedgies" in the text of his complete speech; the only other sentence which was released to the press contained what may or may not have been an escape clause. It read, "Gradual industrialization of the eastern nation is a 'must' for the welfare of the world." If one puts emphasis on the word "gradual," there is a lot of sense in the sentence. But, unfortunately, enthusiasts on manufacturing are likely to emphasize the "must." I didn't hear how Mr. Coonley said it.

Confucius seems generally regarded by many Chinese today as an

old authoritarian fuddy-duddy, and I am not one to quarrel with that view in many of its aspects. However, it is notable that the Chinese still tend to live by Confucius in more ways than they readily admit or often realize. One brief but important remark by Confucius was, "Never be in a hurry." Its spirit carries on in China. As regards China's industrialization, I believe Confucius had something.

T. A. Bisson, in his recent book, *America's Far Eastern Policy*, neatly ties together much of what I have been saying. Mr. Bisson writes:

Industrialization is usually considered to lie at the heart of the reconstruction program. Too limited an approach, however, cannot be made to what is in fact an exceedingly complex undertaking. The cardinal mistake would be to industrialize under forced pressure without reference to the accompanying changes which need to be effected in China's rural economy. As yet industrialization has modified relatively small segments of Chinese society. More than three quarters of the population are still dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood. Under typical conditions, the mass of the tenants and small owner-farmers is held to a poverty-stricken level by an archaic system of land tenure, exorbitant rents and taxes, and usurious interest rates. The attempt to superimpose large-scale industry on this backward rural economy would court a repetition of the disastrous results which have attended such an effort in Japan. Living standards of the farmers would remain depressed, while the wages of industrial workers would be kept abnormally low. Attainment of an expanding internal market through a steady growth in mass purchasing power would be thwarted.

Sound policy requires that industrialization be so handled as to reverse this process. Success will primarily depend not on how quickly certain large enterprises in basic industry are built and placed in operation, but on how well the new industries are related to the rural districts and geared into the needed reform of agrarian conditions. It should not be expected that outmoded agricultural relations will be automatically transformed by the establishment of industries. Positive steps must be taken to distribute land more equitably and to limit abnormal rent, tax, and interest exactions. In this field, as in no other, one is dealing with the economic welfare of the vast majority of the Chinese population. A substantial rise in China's national income is dependent, in the first instance, on a rise in the living standards of the farmer. Industrialization which moves forward on the basis of progressive expan-

sion of the home market, through betterment of the farmers' livelihood, carries with it adequate sureties of uninterrupted advance and constructive results.

Those findings would be concurred in, I am sure, by a great many of China's most thoughtful students possessing intimate contact with the realities firsthand. There is astounding divergence as between those who theorize on China and those who painfully dig their knowledge out of the living rock of experience. To spare susceptibilities I will refrain from mentioning anybody in the first category. But it is a pleasure to pay tribute to the services to China of such people as Eleanor M. Hinder, Australia-born former chief of the Industrial and Social Division of the Shanghai Municipal Council of the International Settlement; to her former factory inspector, Rewi Alley, of New Zealand, who left Shanghai to serve the wartime Chinese Industrial Co-operatives throughout the Free China hinterland; to Dr. J. Lossing Buck, American authority on China's land problems, who has worked with the University of Nanking both on its home territory and with Chengtu as his base; and to such Chinese experts on wartime industry as Dr. Hsiao-tung Fei, of National Yünnan University, and his younger colleagues, including Kuo-heng Shih, Ju-k'ang T'ien and Francis L. K. Hsu. Many more could be mentioned, but those cited should give force to my statement that there exists an informed international group of thinkers on China's industrialization and land problems who have won their facts independently for the most part but whose findings and programs seem in substantial agreement. We need not feel that we walk in the dark when we seek solutions in this field.

Let us look first toward the land, which is the historic base of every Chinese. Man seems in China to belong to the soil, not the soil to man. Few reflective travelers can have escaped such a thought as they watched China's blue-clad farmers grubbing with animal patience among the graves of their ancestors—graves that stud the plain clear to the horizon, in tiny round mounds. One can easily work up considerable sentiment, gazing upon this centuries-tilled source of China's strength and reflecting that the man we watch wielding his primitive hoe was probably born in this spot and will die here, as did his father before him, and his father's father. A

visit to the peasant's nearby home, however, will give ground for less pleasing thought; a rude mud hut practically without furnishings and within which an oil lamp will be startling luxury, it more nearly resembles the pen of some animal than the abode of him whom we call the son of God.

Now it may be that some of us have rather gone off the deep end about the bad circumstances of the China farmer. We may blame landlordism, as an institution, too much. I cannot disregard the view of J. Lossing Buck when Dr. Buck says that in his opinion the evils of farm tenancy in China are stressed far beyond their true proportion. Farm tenancy is a specialized matter. There certainly are bad landlords, but that isn't the whole story. It may be fact that the hard lot of China in general has tended to magnify every evil as though it were a sole cause rather than a contributing factor.

Nonetheless there is a solid weight of opinion, both foreign and Chinese, behind David Nelson Rowe when he writes: "It seems clear that in China today we have a recurrence of critical maldistribution of the ownership of land and an abuse of the privileges connected with that ownership." (*China Among the Powers*.) As example he cites northern Kiangsu province (in the delta regions of the Yangtze and Pearl rivers there is 70 per cent tenancy), where, he says:

Landlords owning up to 3,000 acres live in mud castles, having their own armed forces with which they control both the local magistrates and the peasantry. In the same region there are large tracts of land belonging to temples. One of these amounts to about 30,000 acres. Temples also have their own private armed forces. They can easily dominate the local government and prevent the central government from carrying out its policies in the area.

There we find some common ground as between such divergencies of view as exist. Dr. Buck agrees that there are localized abuses, and he also points out that where an atmosphere of mutual suspicion has grown up between landlords and tenants, with middlemen involved when there are absentee landlords, it is hard to improve conditions. The main thesis which he seeks to establish, in a recent manuscript made available to me in New York City, is that the landlord-tenant system is prevalent in most countries, it is no

greater in China than in other countries, and that as a system it "cannot be said to be inherently wrong if one accepts the idea of private property."

That strikes an interesting snag, the question of whether private property in the land is a good thing for China. What about property other than the soil? Here's a surprise. It is not generally realized, but the conservative Kuomintang-dominated National Government of China follows a policy of nationalizing all China's mineral resources. The first section of the Chinese Mining Law as promulgated May 26, 1930, and revised July 22, 1938, to meet wartime demands, starts off with the words: "All mineral resources within the boundary of the Republic of China belong to the state." What lies below the surface of the ground isn't subject to private ownership. If you, the reader, happen to be an American earning good dividends from your part ownership of an American oil well or a coal, gold, or silver mine, you are likely to explode suddenly at this point. Surely, you will say, if such socialistic practice represents Kuomintang conservatism, the renowned Chinese Communists certainly must be putting through a terrific all-out program of socialized farm ownership!

But think again. Not even the Chinese Communists have at any time collectivized the surface of the land. In their most violent period of the early 1930s in Kiangsi province they merely slaughtered or chased off the landlords and turned the soil over to new owners—the men who tilled it. In time that essentially begging-the-question practice would, in my opinion, have developed a new landlord class, with the old problem bobbing up again, unless meantime new laws had been enacted. These might have forced the farmer to keep his landholdings within the limits of what he could till, preventing him from going off on holiday as absentee landlord, and so on. At any rate, today what the Chinese Communists seek is not collectivization of the land but equalization of its ownership, together with fair rentals and similar ameliorations.

Literally the name of the Chinese Communists—Kungchantang—means "Share in Production Party." Even in China it is seldom realized how similar are the immediate objectives of Kuomintang and Kungchantang. Government officials have admitted to me that

there is substantial identity at the present time, although the Communists insist that they are Marxists at heart and that they hope to bring a development of orthodox Communism when China is ready for it—a sort of Kungchantang application of the “pie in the sky by and by” attitude! Meanwhile the Communists have cashed in heavily by applying themselves to the local problems of agrarian reform. Their attitude puts them in logical line of succession to many past peasant rebellions. The Kuomintang, carrying a burden of national and international considerations, as well as being under an unusual domination of the landlord class since the Government was compelled to remove to China’s interior, have never as yet applied themselves so directly to the problems of the peasantry. Thus agrarian reform measures become more than ever a political football. But bear in mind that the present—not future, but present—program of the Chinese Reds does not even go so far as to be a “farmer-labor movement,” since only the farmers are in, and not labor. That is why Trotsky was so bitter over what he called the Chinese Communists “abandonment” of the industrial proletariat from which alone true communism could be built. The postwar future may see a re-inclusion of the industrial workers in an enlarged, more truly communistic movement.

There is considerable variation in the extent of landlordism through different parts of the country. Farm tenantry is more prevalent in South China, the rice region, than in the North or wheat areas. In the South it is estimated that only about 25 per cent of the peasants own their land, while in the North this rises to 75 per cent. In Szechuen, where the wartime capital is located, a recent survey shows that only 31 per cent own their land, while 22 per cent are part owners and 47 per cent are tenants—and comparison of figures through the years shows that tenancy is on the increase. For the country as a whole, according to Buck, over half the peasants are owners, less than a quarter are part owners, and less than a quarter are tenants, which leads to Dr. Buck’s finding that “compared with other countries the prevalence of tenancy is no greater in China.” For instance, England has 75 per cent tenants, the United States 42 per cent, Germany 25 per cent, and Japan 27 per cent.

"Misuse of the system causes injustices," writes Dr. Buck, "and leads would-be reformers to condemn the whole system of tenancy, the good along with the bad."

It is Dr. Buck's view that much of the evil in Chinese farm tenancy arises from the use of a third party to take care of the business of an absentee landlord—a sort of application of the Chinese business "compradore" system to agriculture. That there are evils surely is past denial; the most ready and striking proof perhaps lies in the success of the Communists in basing their whole bid for political power upon, in an initial phase, the elimination of then-existing landlords, and more recently the modification of bad aspects of landlordism. Specific examples of abuse have been cited by innumerable investigators. Of course war may have wrought change in these as in other respects, but it is doubtful whether many were for the better.

In Kiangsu a form of serfdom has been found. Moneylenders put owner-farmers into debt at high interest and finally got the land from these owners, who were additionally forced to sign a document that each of them and his descendants as well would farm the land for the new landlords and their descendants forever. At another point the agents of the landlords were in the habit of making indebted tenants go to prison under extremely bad conditions. One of the most curious customs was that of double ownership, one man (actually the landlord) owning the "soil" and the tenant owning the "surface." By this system permanence of the tenants was assured; they had a semblance of privilege in that they possessed an exclusive right to lease the surface from the soil owner for cultivation, while the possessor of the soil could not cultivate but must lease the rights of cultivation. The tenant or "surface" owner could not be expelled unless his overdue rent on the lease grew to equal the value which had been set upon his surface holding. But the landlord or "soil" owner had a lifelong tenant, unless the "surface" owner defaulted his rent to a point where the "soil" owner became the "surface" owner as well, in which case he owned everything and could proceed as he wished.

Obviously the whole agrarian position is complicated. The more one studies, the more there is to study. Often the fact is cited that landlords' rentals amount to payment of half the crop in such points

as southern Anhwei. Yet rents as high as that are deceptive in implication because they entail services by the landlords, including often the contribution of farm equipment, livestock, fertilizer, and sometimes a certain amount of management, as against the tenant's contribution of labor, operating expenses, and management. In such case the landlord-tenant relation is an informal partnership, having its uses if the landlord is actively on the job. Rents are paid in various ways ranging from cash (popular in South China, though with the lowest return, and best liked by absentee landlords) to share cropping (with relatively high return, more prevalent in North China, where the risks of farming are greater). In nine studies cited by Buck the landlord's income on investment varied from 8.1 to 13.8 per cent per annum and averaged 10.1 per cent, at a time when modern banks in China were paying 9 per cent on fixed deposits. I have seen a great many figures on interest and profits, but believe they are likely to be misleading even to the experts, particularly so recently, when inflation has been depreciating the national currency at a rate stated to average 5 per cent a month toward the end of 1944 and rising sharply thereafter.

Despite such points favorable to the landlords, one seems unable to get away from the fact that the Chinese farmer has been an underprivileged and overburdened semi-animal in many parts of China. As in Japan, the peasant has often groaned under a burden of debt. He has felt bleak despair and a lack of security, which tended to drive him off the land at the slightest opportunity. If he could not go himself he was inclined to send his children into the slavery of the savage super-sweatshops of Shanghai. Think of Wang Yu-chuan's citation of southern Shantung ("The Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung"), where interest sometimes ran as high as 100 per cent, and "once the peasant sank into the mire of debt, he was sure to be submerged forever." Chinese landlordism has frequently been tied to a control of rural finance and a partnership with rural moneylenders through which, in the words of Rowe, "the pressure on the peasantry becomes intensified to an often unbearable degree." Similarly the landlords gained control over local government officials, or took office themselves, so that by one means or another the rural gentry as a class gained power over the tax-collection machinery and the outlay of local pub-

lic funds. No wonder, as Buck mentions, the landlords sometimes could get better tax rates for their tenants than the owner-farmer could command!—a type of “service” pressing with other factors to drive the peasants into a condition of often serflike tenantry. At the same time it created an influence causing the peasants to welcome any reform group—whether calling itself Communist or anything else—which offered economic and political relief. It is easy to imagine an overburdened, uneducated man, blindly conscious only that he had no way out from the overlordship of local gentry in control of his land, his access to capital, and his contacts with governing officials. Imagine this man presented with even the mildest of “new deals,” promised lower rents, more reasonable loan rates, and a chance to take part in choosing his own local government. I hardly believe he would be critical of labels. He would know and care little about either Kuomintang or Kungchantang, but he would welcome whichever went to work first in his area with a program of concrete reform.

It is by no means only the Kungchantang or Communist party which have projected rural reform. I have already spoken of the Rural Reconstructionists, devoted to economic-educational reconstruction of the villages under the guidance of “Jimmy” Yen. Other groups have expressed generally similar views and have done what they could within the framework of the Kuomintang. Dr. Buck, accepting the thesis of Kuomintang tutelage, feels that evolutionary measures under the present National Government can cope with the correction of special evils in scattered localities without involving any generalized condemnation of the partnership aspects of the tenancy system. Enforcement of the Government’s New Land Law is recommended by Dr. Buck, with special reference to progressive taxation of absentee landlords with large holdings, legal provision for farm-lease contracts and enforcement, and a national land-credit organization granting loans at a reasonable rate for the purchase of land by bona fide farmers. Dr. Buck suggests that this “reasonable rate” should probably not be more than 4 per cent per annum. Under wartime inflationary conditions this would have represented a major subsidy to the farmer-owner. However, we are up against that sort of problem all over the world, and wartime China provided subsidies to industry by making money available

at abnormally low interest rates (a mere 20 per cent a year!) under advice from Donald Nelson. With a peacetime stabilization of China's currency this problem should become simpler.

Concluding this brief discussion of the land in China before joining to it some consideration of industrial potentials, I would like to stress again that there is a vast difference between the abstract academic and practical policies and politics. It may be that quite a case can be built up for China's landlords to show that they are not the grasping bloodsuckers many have portrayed. But if the peasantry suffers under subhuman living conditions it is bound to grasp at whatever means may offer for knocking out the landlords. That's fact, not theory. It is all very well to talk of a tenant-landlord partnership, yet if such arrangement doesn't look like a partnership to the tenant, but rather a relation of master and slave, violent rebellion can never be excluded from the possibilities. We cannot forget the lessons of past peasant revolt, not merely in China but in many other countries as well. We should not overlook the fact that the Chinese Communists left Wuhan in 1927 with very little strength, and by winning peasant support were able to get a foothold in Kiangsi and to hold out against Nanking's "punitive expeditions" for a decade before Japan through aggressive policies created the Chinese United Front.

It may be that seeming solutions offered by the Chinese Reds were illusory. But they attracted popular support and at least temporarily improved the conditions of the people in some ways at some places. The violent overturns of the immediate post-1927 phase might only have led to conditions of fresh landlordism within a few years. From that point of view the subsequent softer "Red" policies of lower rents, greater local political participation, and similar reforms were probably more fundamental, though they seemed less radical. At any rate these policies of the Reds greatly resemble the *hsien* (county) reforms advocated by Generalissimo Chiang and put into effect on a limited scale by such men as Jimmy Yen. There are such similarities of present direction in reforms which the Kungchintang has put into effect, and the Kuomintang has professed willingness to put into effect, that most of the differences between these two groups as regards the present agrarian problems of China boil down to a struggle for power. Both, or any other

party, will finally come up against greater basic problems, including the impact of industrialization and the rise of population.

Population pressure in China must affect both farm and factory problems. Dr. C. C. Wu spoke before the Chinese Institute of Engineers at Washington, D.C., in May 1944, assuming that China's industrialization program should be planned and executed within thirty years and that China might by 1974 have a population not of the present estimated 450 million but rather of 550 million. He supposed that there would be less negative population check (war, famines, disease, etc.) and not enough positive population check (birth control). J. Lossing Buck has estimated that if the present rate of growth be maintained, China's population would be doubled after sixty-five years! Assuming that somehow, and utterly contrary to precedent elsewhere, the Chinese population can be kept stationary within thirty years of industrial growth, Dr. Wu estimated that 1974 would find a working population of 180 million (40 per cent of 450 million). Suppose that only 50 per cent of the population are farmers in 1974, in place of more than 75 per cent today. Then the industrial population would total 90,000,000, as compared with a present 15,000,000 in America today, or 10,000,000 in Great Britain.

"Up to now," continued Dr. Wu, "we know that the natural resources of China are not comparable to those of the U.S.A., the British Dominions, or the U.S.S.R. Our cultivated land is limited; now we have some 180 to 280 million acres, and the most optimistic estimate is 700 million acres for the future. This area is to support 450 to 550 million people and to be farmed by 90 million farmers. In the U.S.A. there are 350 million acres, farmed by 10 million farmers, to support 130 million people."

Dr. Wu's conclusions were that China cannot hope for American living standards even after thirty years of industrialization; that with finite Chinese natural resources and improving technology, employment by China's industry will approach a saturation point (industry may not, he says, be able to absorb 45 millions released from the land). Overpopulation may become an obstacle to industrialization. And he estimates that the optimum number of China's population, the number to produce best results, should be about 280,000,000.

Commenting upon this, H. C. Weng says that since China's present 450,000,000 population can't readily be cut to an optimum of 280,000,000, at any rate there should be an effort to maintain population at a "reasonable optimum" and certainly not to let it jump ahead to the 550,000,000 within thirty years which would be in accordance with experience in other countries under industrialization. He also advocates the exploitation of new resources through technological progress, both in agriculture and in industry, at the same time maintaining highest production with "a logical distribution system." All these recommendations are sound. The trouble, in my view, is that many offhand theorists (I'm not talking of Mr. Weng) feel that to point to such remedial action is to put it into effect. From a practical point of view this is seldom the case. It reminds me of the famous Arnstein expert inquiry into bad conditions on the Burma Road. That was a perfectly good inquiry which found out about a lot of evils, well known to others previously, and which apparently assumed that such findings would fix everything up. Unhappily the road transport capacity only drifted to worse. History has amply proved that China doesn't improve situations that way. So we may wish for a check in Chinese population pressure, and seek to apply scientific methods to Chinese agriculture and industry, and find great merit in top production and rational distribution, but those things will begin to happen only through the application of Chinese sweat, blood, and tears to the problems. Outsiders for the most part can furnish only technical help, a fact which has begun to be realized and acted on by thinking Chinese.

During the prewar years, China's rapidly growing yet still young industrialization centered on Shanghai and the lower Yangtze area in general. Shanghai was the largest city in China, with a 1937 estimated population of 3,809,000, which, being overwhelmingly Chinese, constituted a tremendous labor reservoir. In May 1934 Professor Charles Richet, of the French Academy of Sciences, had announced that Shanghai's annual growth in ratio to population was the largest of the world's great cities and that by 1944 the top-population cities of the world should be, in order (D.v.), New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, Berlin, Moscow, London, Chicago. Matters so fell out that populations were tremendously affected by war and few censuses were being taken by the year mentioned, but at any

rate the calculations now have interest for the presumably more peaceful future. Shanghai was greatly diminished by a wartime exodus estimated to have removed fifty million people from Occupied to Free China in one of the great migrations of history. The vast proportion of these emigres never lost their intense desire to return to former homes, even when such "homes" were hovels in the industrial slums of Shanghai—warrens worse than the peasants' mud huts.

Before the Sino-Japanese war broke out in mid-1937 Shanghai held something in excess of 40 per cent of China's industrial capital. It was center of 43 per cent of China's industrial workers. It produced half of all China's industrial output, under conditions varying from fair and good to incredibly bad and atrocious. The textile industry was Shanghai's most important single enterprise, with more than 50 per cent of the nation's total looms and spindleage concentrated in the city.

Throughout the country there was a serious depression during the period of 1933-35. This was chiefly due to the fact that China's currency was still based on silver. The United States Government had yielded to pressure by its "silver senators" and had launched a silver-buying program which included not merely domestic silver but also metal from abroad, including China and India. This had far-reaching effects on China's millions. These knew nothing about Washington but couldn't miss, however little they understood, the impact of higher international valuation of Chinese silver currency. The more valuable China's money on the exchange markets, the higher priced grew her goods when exported. That meant that demand for Chinese products fell off, and therefore industry fell into a decline.

Finally, in 1935, the Chinese Government abandoned silver and went over to a "managed currency" basis, pegging the Chinese yuan or dollar against both the U.S. dollar and Britain's pound sterling at a rate slightly under 3 to 1, or around 29 U.S. cents to one Chinese yuan. On this basis industry and export sales began to pick up, and by the first half of 1937 an industrial boom was on. Three months of Sino-Japanese hostilities caused industry to take terrific losses from burning, bombing, shellfire, and looting. Estimates varied widely, but an estimate by the assistant U.S. commer-

cial attaché stated the industrial destruction to be 350,000,000 Chinese dollars (yuan) in a total Shanghai loss of 800,000,000 yuan.

This was an industrial loss of around a hundred million American dollars at the then prevailing rate of exchange. Actually the loss was much greater than even such a figure indicates. The Chinese dollar then was worth more, in terms of China purchase, than its foreign exchange value of about a third of an American dollar. Think of this loss as representing a sizable segment of the industrial machine which turned out half of China's consumer goods. The Chinese are, however, ingenious. They carried away for use in interior China more than 120,000 tons of machinery and other equipment, at the same time aiding the transfer of about one hundred thousand factory workers and foremen into the interior from coastal China. This did much to offset the loss, during the initial year and a half of the war, of all China's chief industrial centers and around 95 per cent of her industrial equipment.

Preference was given, in selecting plants for removal, to those which had military importance or which might be particularly valuable in developing new industries. As a result of this about two thousand manufacturing establishments became based in Free China, including machine works, paper mills, electrical-appliance factories, alcohol distilleries, oil refineries, spinning and weaving mills, chemical plants, and cement factories. This experiment took a turn for the worse after a time, but certainly it represented a bold concept and a substantial achievement. No one can forget the sight who has seen straining coolies at work, on river boats and ashore, transporting heavy iron machinery inland. Nor can one forget how a horde of primitive but efficient factories sprang up over a large area outside Chungking. Their workers often had as their only flooring the bare ground, while overhead were layers of mat roofs intended to detonate possible Japanese air bombs at a height sufficient to spare the precious machinery underneath. Great courage and tenacity were shown in this whole enterprise. Credit should be allocated to the National Government, the factory owners, and the factory workers. Each contributed a share. Some, at least, of this new decentralized industry will remain upcountry, and in time it may be built on as a base.

So much has been made of the primitive stage of China's pre-war industries, and the damage suffered by industry through war, that a great many Chinese tend to be overmodest or downright uninformed about the variety of things produced in their country. They know about cloth, and cigarettes, and even vacuum bottles and a few other items, but they are astonished to discover that anything larger or more complex was ever made. It used to be a minor hobby of mine in China to check up on the point of origin of many kinds of manufactured articles, and I have often been surprised at what I learned.

Take, for example, the things that provided the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury* with an emigree Chungking edition. To find our print shop one had to toil up a rocky slope of the Chungking peninsula till one came to the entrance of a cave overlooking the Yangtze River, several hundred feet below. There is nothing very modern about a hole in the ground, or rather a hole in the rock, but in Chungking it was a handy place to work because it was an ideal natural bombproof. Once inside, the gloom was pierced by a row of electric lights. They were made by Chinese labor. Below these lights were wooden type cases made in Chungking. These contained type freshly cast from molds by the Chinese printers here in the shop, who understood not one letter that they made so well. When the type had been set in English unintelligible to the compositors, and proofs pulled with China-made ink, on a primitive "proof press," it was assembled within a China-made iron frame or "chase" and put on a made-in-China press. A Chinese leather belt led to an electric motor manufactured by a Chinese manufacturing plant in Shanghai. The current to this motor, and to the electric lights, passed through wires manufactured somewhere in Szechuen province. When we come to the powerhouse, however, we get into the realm of heavy machinery not generally made in China as yet; the Chungking power station uses imported German generators.

Without any doubt the Chinese are going to be producing heavy articles too in the near future, although in certain categories, such as motorcars, there are in America or other countries such mass-production low costs coupled with technological research for further speedy advances that China should think twice before ventur-

ing too far too fast in wasteful competition. Some Chinese argue that their country should do a bit of everything in order to be completely self-sufficient. If we can't provide a good peace there may in time be many followers of such argument. But if China can feel that the peace has brought her a reasonably secure defense position (her latest Soviet treaty already guarantees her against Japan), and with a fair degree of international economic give-and-take of products assured, it seems to me probable that her advances along industrial as well as other lines should be rational, in line with her natural resources and capabilities.

This question of rationality strikes out in many directions. Were lines of industrial development especially rational during the period before Sino-Japanese hostilities set up their great boundary line? It is helpful to glance briefly at the status of wartime industry, which is admittedly abnormal but which has caused thought among intelligent observers. Finally there is the question of future industrial development of China, which may blindly imitate some of the worst features of the West, as was the case before the war, or which may grow on a uniquely Chinese pattern, conserving certain old values and supplementing rather than supplanting Chinese main reliance on agriculture. In this last consideration there is also the point as to whether China's industry of the future will produce primarily for the people of China or for export, since, as in the case of Japan, that is likely to have great bearing on the whole future course of the country.

Not all the factories of Shanghai and other industrial centers were bad. But too many factories capitalized on and accentuated a living standard of industrial workers which was among the lowest in the world. With Rewi Alley, at that time Eleanor Hinder's chief assistant, I visited a variety of small plants around the International Settlement. It was an eye-opener as to how bad such places could be, though we did not concentrate exclusively upon the worst. Many such plants employed children, brought in from the poverty-stricken rural districts by labor contractors who virtually had bought these infants from poor parents. For a term of years it would be necessary that each child slave in a fetid chamber for twelve, fourteen, or more hours a day, ruining his eyes at some such task as assembling tiny and complex parts of electrical equipment. Most of these so-

called factories had conserved space by inserting floors halfway up the side of the room so that there were two floors in space originally meant for one. A grown person had to crouch low in getting around. None of these animal burrows was fit for human occupancy as regards light, ventilation, or heat in winter, while summer temperatures ran to near the boiling point. And not only were the workers' tasks rigorous and confining, the quarters inadequate and unsanitary, and safety precautions often lacking when dangerous machinery was used, but these children were fed a meager ration so poorly balanced as to give rise to beriberi and other diseases of malnutrition.

While I have no desire to make out a case for my own people, the fact was that American, British, and even Japanese factory owners at Shanghai and elsewhere provided far better conditions for their workers than did the general run of Chinese employers. Of course the foreigner usually had more capital. He was almost certain to have had more experience, and he knew that too low wages didn't pay him any more than the laborer. Also, Chinese workers demanded more from the foreigner. This was true of the worker as an individual, and it was also the fact that as of this period, after widespread killing of Chinese labor leaders in Shanghai at the time of 1927 political turmoil, there were no demands by Chinese labor unions except upon the relatively "well-heeled" foreigner. In other words the subsequent so-called labor leaders were really mere racketeers. As Nym Wales remarked in *The Chinese Labor Movement*, virtually the whole of China's brief and stormy labor movement actually deserving of the name was tied up with groups calling themselves communistic. After the left-wing split of the late 1920s, "of all the important leaders of the Kuomintang, only Madame Sun Yat-sen remained steadfastly in support of strong labor unions and the agrarian movement, in accordance with the original program of Sun Yat-sen and the reorganized Kuomintang from 1924 to 1927. . . . From the 1931-32 period to the present no organized labor movement can be said to have existed in China, except in Communist areas where political power was based upon the organization of peasants and workers." Such areas had very little industry because they were primarily rural.

In the wartime period the unsettled condition of labor, and its

tendency to leave jobs for little or no reason, caused conservative industrialists within the Kuomintang territory to realize possible benefit might lie in a true labor movement which would fight for the welfare of the workers but at the same time would provide industry with a permanent reservoir of labor such as is now lacking, and which may be almost equally lacking in future if industrial employment is not made more attractive. China was suffering not merely from the normal labor shortages any country must expect in time of war, but also from the heritage of years of almost total disintegration of any sort of organization to afford some measure of protection to Chinese workers. After a 1927-31 period of sporadic efforts to survive, anything even remotely resembling a legitimate Shanghai labor movement perished. In its place came self-styled labor organizers who were gangsters preying on workers and employers alike. They proved this by blackmail of the latter and total indifference to conditions of any workers who needed union protection. However, they saw personal profit in the workers already comparatively well off, usually in the employ of big foreign interests. These could be exploited, and so the fake union chiefs "organized" them by terrorist methods. They forced the workers to join their so-called unions, and they made clear to the foreign factory owners that only they could furnish or shut off the supply of labor. Thus they sometimes got more money for the workers, but were always careful to see to it that a major share went into their own pockets. I obtained firsthand information as to how the union racket was worked against the big foreign cigarette factories, for example; and it is important to note that the unions of this period were totally uninterested in improving the lot of the really exploited masses employed in the smaller industries. That those smaller industries happened to be almost altogether Chinese-owned is a detail. Any Chinese who rose to control of a big factory was shaken down by these pseudo union organizers with the utmost promptness, and his workers received the blessings of cash-on-the-line organization very promptly, as was not the case so long as the employer was small and unable to pay much. By 1939 the Japanese saw ways to foment trouble at a profit, and Nippon-sponsored "labor unions" bobbed up to harass British and American factories.

Virtual anarchy prevailed among the factories of the International Settlement during the 1930s so far as legal controls were concerned, because the Chinese Government and the Shanghai Municipal Council could not get together on rules for administering China's new progressive Factory Law. The Ministry of Industries had promulgated a series of laws concerning labor, between 1927 and 1932, and these deserve special notice because they will apply to labor in the approaching period of new development. The Factory Law regulated in general terms such matters as physical conditions and hours of work, the relation of wages to cost of living, accident compensation, employment termination, factory councils and apprenticeships. There were also laws on unions, arbitration, and similar subjects. It was desired by the Chinese Government that it be allowed to inspect factories in the Settlement and eventually to regulate, but the Shanghai Municipal Council resisted on various grounds. Finally when on August 1, 1931, the Chinese declared that the Factory Act was in force, the Council issued a statement endorsing the principles of industrial regulation and indicating intent to work toward safe and healthful conditions. By 1933 it had been decided to use the Council's licensing powers as an instrument.

Eleanor Hinder, an expert of international background and a warmhearted human being, was employed by the Council. She started a decade of experiment in creating an administrative social instrument for one of China's major cities. Not even the Japanese occupation of Shanghai after Pearl Harbor stopped her efforts and those of the devoted Chinese staff she had trained. They were all handicapped by lack of specific administrative power, but they displayed a startling talent in persuading Shanghai factory owners toward more enlightened courses. Recently in her book, *Life and Labour in Shanghai*, Miss Hinder said:

Almost all the phases of work which were developed in Shanghai were to a large extent the product of the ideas and the plans and the execution of qualified Chinese staff members. Some of this exhibited great imagination in conceiving methods of procedure and carrying them out. To work with them was an inspiration. Though in the service of an international administration, they were never anything but ardent Chinese patriots devoted to their country and to their people. Indeed, not once but many times was the hope expressed that the laboratory

work upon which they were engaged might mean that they could more adequately be of use in the future of their beloved country.

Miss Hinder and her associates would have been glad to be able to fall back on Chinese or any other enlightened law on industrial procedure. The peculiar nature of the Settlement under extraterritoriality, with a variety of national laws more or less in effect under as many courts, forced the Industrial and Social Division to rely considerably more on its own ingenuity than upon the police. Quite likely this would have been the case in any event because of the spirit motivating the work. It was a spirit in which compulsion would have been subordinated to persuasion whenever possible, although without a doubt Miss Hinder would have been pleased occasionally to be able to drop some large, heavy legal object upon a few recalcitrants. Thus she later welcomed the renunciation of special rights in China by the United States and Great Britain as heralding a day when Shanghai will be wholly in the hands of the Government of China. Clearly she shares little of the pessimism shown, especially in the past, by some of her fellow-Westerners. Her experience has proved both that the right kind of Chinese administrators can be developed and that industry if properly shown is able to recognize how modern methods work for its own best interest.

The Shanghai experiments undoubtedly will be continued in their original setting now that the war is won, though China's industries can and should spread out. However, Shanghai didn't grow as an industrial center by accident or wholly because of foreign jurisdiction. The city's geographic position at the foot of the Yangtze, in mid-China, inevitably must tend to make it a center for future industrial growth. Already it has been a center both for large modern factories and for slum horrors. Miss Hinder's department caused improvement of the latter in so many ways as to exceed the limits of this space, but at least these things may be said: Factory owners accepted safety precautions. They installed better, safer equipment. Men in critical jobs received training, even though they were illiterates. Progress was made toward better pay and shorter hours. Sanitation, lighting, and other factors were improved. The "dormitory system" of housing workers on factory

premises, much used for girl workers in Japan but presenting definite social handicaps, was largely headed off. Accompanying this latter were some achievements toward better housing. By demonstration just before the 1937 war it was proved that employers could feed their workers an adequately balanced ration, giving insurance against diet deficiency diseases, at actually less cost than the ordinary inadequate food.

The relationship between industry and the land was always kept in sight during those days of Shanghai tests. Miss Hinder writes:

Earnings in Shanghai's industry should no longer be determined solely by the fact that earnings on the land nearby are low; indeed, it is hoped that farm earnings also will rise.

And in her next sentence she touches upon another point worth thought:

The excellently equipped cotton mills in Shanghai which will be restored even if they are in part destroyed upon Japanese withdrawal should not be operated in world competition with workers paid less than a subsistence wage.

So fascinating was this period of Shanghai experiment, and so much may be said about it, that it is hard to pass on to the next phase—the war period. Factories which had been removed up-country ran into difficulties only dimly anticipated and still not generally realized. The physical job of moving heavy machinery was terrific; then skilled workers had to be moved after the machinery to serve at least as nucleus for building up complete staffs; and finally it developed that no amount of effort could create a really stable supply of labor during this abnormal period. The much-publicized Chinese Industrial Co-operatives were another matter. They did a tremendous and valuable war work by providing useful employment, in relatively small units, for uprooted refugees who would otherwise have been idle and destitute. Through the co-ops the refugees found dignified and productive escape from starvation and the National Government received hundreds of thousands of much-needed blankets and other products essential to the Chinese Army. It is noteworthy that "Indusco" capitalized upon a fundamental urge in the Chinese people to work together co-

operatively. Finally this enterprise fell upon troubled times. First, political strife developed between the Government and Indusco's foreign supporters, and next there was lack of capital because of inflation which affected every sort of industry. Yet Indusco unquestionably represented a successful experiment within its limits. In the industrial co-ops, built on a foundation of earlier co-operative enterprises of various sorts, there is a pattern which may have tremendous future peacetime importance.

But Free China factories of conventional type, whether privately or government owned, found little of the smooth going which was ecstatically but inaccurately portrayed by certain writers. There was a great surge of patriotic enterprise at the outset. Factory owners spent their all, and more, to move their machinery fifteen hundred miles. The Government gave financial and other aid. Workers underwent great personal hardships to follow emigree factories. But China's war was not a thing of weeks or months: it ran into years, and problems multiplied. Upcountry factories had to use the unwholesome dormitory system against which Miss Hinder fought at Shanghai. Within the factories there grew up class distinctions as between the coastal skilled "high-caste" workers and the more numerous local people fresh off the farm who fell into a low caste. The latter showed little taste for industrialism, they felt with some justice that they were discriminated against, they developed no loyalty for their jobs, and they found none of the old personal relation with the employer. Turnover and absenteeism became terrific. A seven-months study of one Yunnan factory by the Yenching-Yunnan Station for Sociological Research showed a turnover of unskilled labor (mostly local) of about 18 per cent a month; while even for skilled workers the turnover averaged 10 per cent a month. Paternalistic efforts by factory owners to help the laborers were mostly ineffective. The desire to escape military recruitment was found by investigators to constitute the major motive for recruitment of local unskilled workers, who entered an undesirable low category among industrial associates and gained no prestige among their farm friends and relatives by becoming factory hands. Women told questioners that they entered factories mostly to escape family and social troubles and bondage.

A recently published study, *China Enters the Machine Age*, by

Kuo-heng Shih and translated by Hsiao-tung Fei and Francis L. K. Hsu, gives illuminating details. In a Kunming factory apparently typical of China's wartime industry there was none of the unionism so often complained of by American and other industrialists. Yet there was the startling turnover just mentioned—a thing to appall any employer anywhere—and a great deal of haphazard, often almost aimless trouble, taking the form of “unorganized disturbances over trivial and personal issues.” A fundamental change in labor issues had taken place during the war—“there has been no organized strike in any factory and in fact I do not know of any factory labor organization that exercises the function of collective bargaining.”

Thus in wartime China we had what might at first blush appear to be an employers' utopia—no troublesome unions, everything seemingly the boss's own way. But it takes no great amount of thought to see that if this resulted in absenteeism, sit-downs and walk-outs for trivial causes, all sorts of childish troubles, and finally a labor turnover running as high as 20 per cent a month, this was no paradise for employers after all. Every year, moreover, one third of the local workers recruited into industry quit industrialism for keeps. That was a “back to the farm” movement with a vengeance, indicating both that farm conditions (at least during wartime) couldn't have been quite as bad as generally thought, and that industry was failing to meet one major test. Clearly it could not be offering satisfactory inducements to its workers.

Of course there can be no doubt that a return to normal peacetime circumstances is producing all sorts of changes. If satisfactory farm reforms are not effected in areas where agrarian evils exist, peasant workers of both sexes and all ages will be forced toward industry. That was the case in Shanghai, and to a great extent in Canton and elsewhere, before the war. But it is a sad thing to picture a country whose people are merely buffeted back and forth between twin ills, unable to decide finally which is the worse. In pre-war Shanghai starvation caused men from bordering farm territory to pull rickshas in the city streets where the poor *wan-pao-tso* could not gain enough to give himself and family even minimum support—though monopolistic rental hong's netted from 100 to 300 per cent annual profit. This was merely one form of big-city industrial-

ism, called to public notice because people saw these human draft animals toiling through the streets, whereas the stifled factory children in their lofts were to be found only through search.

A special Ricksha Committee reported in 1934 on living conditions of the pullers, "mostly destitute farmers [who] can barely subsist on the lowest standard of living":

From five to eight men will huddle together like pigs in a loft ten feet by three or four, in a shed used by the contractor as a shelter for rickshas. Though prey to innumerable bugs while asleep under a blanket, they are insensible of them on account of the strenuous labor of ricksha pulling. The inconvenience of men and women huddling together in one and the same apartment compels ricksha pullers with families to cook and sleep in low huts constructed of bamboo, wood, broken mats, and scraps of iron, on vacant lots or on the banks of filthy creeks. Their food is usually coarse and unsavory and contains little nutriment . . .

After Shanghai became in mid-1937 a refuge for millions of poor folk driven in by war, pathetic hut villages multiplied everywhere that squatters could establish themselves. A corresponding horde of small starvation industries sprung up, employing refugees in precarious and often unsafe jobs. With such background, scant wonder that industry has not built up much prestige among the masses of China! On the other hand, thoughtful industrialists must be starting to ponder ways of improving their own lot through making peacetime factory labor more attractive, whether by paternalistic methods (not very successful in wartime as noted in the Kunming study) or even by recognizing that legitimate labor organization might pay dividends to both employed and employer. A sound labor movement should raise both workers' morale and workers' conditions, thus helping to create that dependable labor supply without which Chinese industry cannot expand.

Looking toward the future, it seems certain that China must stand not upon one leg but two. There cannot be a modern China resting almost wholly on the soil, as in the past, but for many reasons it will be desirable and probably necessary to go a little slow on the road to large-scale industrialization. Past and present experiences cannot be ignored in charting future courses. We should never forget the family, the soil, the social advantages of old small-

scale industries. Meanwhile, difficulties due to inflation and other causes may finally prove to have been disguised blessings. At least they kept China from further tendency to plunge headlong into wrong courses.

One chapter in *China Enters the Machine Age* presents Dr. Hsiao-tung Fei's own thought on industrial problems vexing not only China but the Western world as well. He had made personal observations in China and talked with experts in America. Granting that China cannot close her doors and live on forever in an ancient agrarian tradition, Dr. Fei points out: "But Western civilization for all the attraction of its superior material comfort does not wholly recommend itself to Chinese trained for a thousand years in the virtue of serenity." For the matter of that, many Westerners are full of self-questioning.

So Dr. Fei finds the Chinese asking what is of value or essential in the culture of what they used to call the "foreign devils," continuing: "Japan—the ape of the West—once powerful and much praised, has suddenly imitated the material power cultures. And where has it led her? Where has it led the world?" Certainly it hasn't dealt effectively with, for example, the causes of war. Industrialization is a destroyer of certain personal contentments formerly known to China. This certainly offsets at least in some measure the obvious hardships and lacks in China. It is understandable that Dr. Fei has it in his heart to wish that the future organization of Chinese industry may prove "utterly unlike any present-day type now existing in the West or elsewhere in the world."

Foreign-mission thought has applied itself to this same problem. In a memorandum on "The Christian Movement in China in Relation to Emerging Problems of Labor and Industry," prepared by Miss Talitha Gerlach and Everett M. Stowe in November 1944 for the Post-War Planning Committee on China, Foreign Missions Conference of North America, is the statement: "Pending changes may make either for enrichment of life or may precipitate new social strains of great intensity." These changes were expected to include a displacement by big factories of handicraft production based on relations of apprentices or workmen with an intimately known proprietor; increased population movement and break-up of the clan as chief economic unit, therefore profoundly altering family ties and

relations; while "agrarian reform, central tenet of Chinese communism, will keep before the people new patterns of rural organization and relationships."

"China's economy is at the flash-point of transformation," declared this analysis. Among evidences of this were cited: The industrial co-ops' demonstration that "possibilities for economic betterment are immediately available, given the needed spirit and organization"; the sending abroad of Chinese industrial trainees to gain knowledge and skills with which to direct industrial enterprises in China; and the existence of nation-wide projects for new transportation facilities, industrial plants, mining, irrigation, and so on, which "will carry forward the amazing progress in evidence in China in the seven years just before the Sino-Japanese war broke out."

Certainly China is at a "flash-point of transformation," but that only heightens interest in the question of whether such transformation is to be blind and selfish, or enlightened and altruistic. It is possible that Dr. Fei speaks in rather too altruistic a vein (he is not, after all, a Chinese factory owner!) when he says: "To us, efficiency is a means, not an end. If we are asked to choose between producing more and better goods at the expense of our social integrity and producing fewer goods of lower quality, we will unhesitatingly choose the latter if by such choice we avoid pain and disaster to our people." At any rate he points to a desirable goal. The fact that China has elected to conduct her future economic development on a basis of government planning, and governmental aid to and co-operation with private Chinese and foreign enterprise, puts a weapon in the hand of such social-minded thinkers. China can produce something new and better in the way of joint industrial and agricultural progress. There is solid reason for belief that she will.

12

CHINA'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

PEACETIME CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM may be vitally affected by decisions made in wartime Chungking toward the close of 1944. The pattern then established may shape the growing structure of a modernized China for generations to come. I am careful to say "may" rather than a positive "will" because in economic as in diplomatic affairs, the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* prevails; circumstances alter cases; additionally, strong-minded people often alter circumstances!

Before embarking on details I must warn readers that though I regard this chapter as highly important, it may be tough to take. Detour to Chapter 13 at this point if you wish. Some of what I want to record has not previously appeared in any book, therefore special precision on source material is called for. It is an unfortunate fact that many things highly important to our lives, such as for instance the detailed workings of the atomic bomb or what causes the common cold, are not easy to understand. But our world of the future is going to be complex, so perhaps we should steel ourselves for something special in the way of mental effort to cope with it.

The Chinese economic decisions came as culmination of a period of months of quiet struggle between conflicting schools of thought. In essence, they represented victory for Dr. Sun Yat-sen's theory that there must be an international development of China. Proponents of economic nationalism were given what appeared to be a knock-out blow. At the same time Chinese private enterprise won out in a parallel struggle for freedom of operation. In this it overcame the views of fascist-inclined officials who for years had tried to subordi-

nate private business to government monopolies in almost every important field.

China's modern economic history is so brief that it is not necessary to go back many years to touch on all developments playing any very direct role in shaping this new economic policy. For centuries the Chinese maintained a virtually closed economy. Some Chinese traveled, but they came from a relatively small southern area. Some foreigners traded with the Chinese, but they were restricted as much as possible. The country's life was predominately agricultural and self-contained. When it might have been possible for China to develop freer policies on exports and imports, the first was blocked by ungenerous tariff barriers set up by other countries, while the second fell over the hurdle of the first. Demonstration was given of the truth of Secretary Hull's later preachments on the necessity for two-way economic traffic. China was for years held down to a 5 per cent maximum tariff imposed by Powers to whom she had become indebted. This was why Dr. Sun in 1924 said, in the course of the first of his famous series of Canton lectures, that "China's maritime customs are entirely in the hands of foreigners. The customs duties are fixed by the foreign Powers, and China cannot freely alter them. Thus, China not only has no protective tariff, but the tariff is increased on native goods to protect foreign goods." And he bitterly added: "As a result of foreign economic oppression, China is becoming a colony of the Powers. Many still think we are only a 'semi-colony.' In fact we are a 'hypo-colony.'" (*Frank W. Price summary-translation.*)

The important point about the foregoing is that while Chinese industry was stifled in some degree, as Dr. Sun thought, still China by no means became a great dumping ground for the industries of other countries, as doubtless the other countries had hoped. China lacked buying power. Even though non-missionary Americans in Peking at that period gloried in the privilege of buying American cigarettes at two-thirds the cost of those same cigarettes when bought at home, due to the freedom of export goods from U.S. internal revenue tax, that didn't help the Chinese coolie to buy such cigarettes. Instead he got along contentedly with a vile (to Americans) native cigarette produced under deplorable conditions. In fact, as Carl Crow has entertainingly related in his *Four Hundred*

Million Customers, when high-pressure advertising methods were applied to the Chinese cigarette consumer on behalf of American cigarettes it was discovered that he actually didn't like the elegant American blend-type smoke. After one trial he quit. His taste was set on a basis of a straight Virginia tobacco (grown in Shantung), and anybody who thought he could be made a hypo-colonist of the Chesterfield-Camel-Lucky Strike salesman was having himself a pipe dream! Thus we had hurt our own trade by our own shortsightedness. We had created a vicious cycle harmful to both the Chinese and ourselves. First we rejected China's products and limited her export market, then we discovered that we had a China with neither buying power for our products or much initial desire for our goods anyway.

That latter difficulty was easy enough to get over, even before China could begin to develop much buying power. While it runs ahead of my story to mention the fact, there has been a steadily developing desire for foreign goods all over China in recent years. The Chinese are anxious to ride in American motorcars, see American movies, eat American goodies, even cultivate new smoking tastes. Greater national prosperity developed through the middle of the 1930s, but it was still hard for the Chinese masses to extend their buying habits of foreign goods very fast or far. And of course the period of Sino-Japanese hostilities struck hard at the nation's whole economy, as well as creating a blockade against the physical entry of consumer goods except from the Japanese-occupied areas and India.

But it was amusing to see (if I may hark back to cigarettes again) that at bustling Kweilin, in 1943, the street stalls displayed a wide variety of seemingly American products, actually imitation American cigarettes! As these were made of the usual straight Virginia-type native tobacco, no doubt they suited the taste of Chinese customers better than real American blends would have done, though I believe that the American fighter pilots never had any trouble disposing of any surplus PX issue. I collected at Kweilin four quite close imitations of the familiar Chesterfield package (one called "Ostrich," another "New Yorker"), three imitations of Camels (one was "Dromedary," with an appropriate picture), and various others. There was a spurious Lucky Strike in a package imitating the Amer-

ican prewar pack; "Lucky Strike green" might have "gone to war" in America, but not in China! There was a Pall Mall cigarette in the familiar slender red package bearing a claim that the smoke filtered further, but on examination it became apparent that the cigarettes were not true King Size but only a trifle longer than the average; the long effect of the package was gained by packing fewer cigarettes!

Kweilin, subsequently captured by the Japanese, was a particularly lively town, full of refugees from commercially and politically go-getter Kwangtung province. In Chungking a year later I continued my observations in the cigarette business, as it seemed a good indicator by which to measure the growth of Chinese interest in foreign goods or at least limitations of foreign goods. Though Chungking was less up and coming, I did find a few choice examples of Chinese ingenuity, not alone in the field of tobacco but also including such things as flashlight batteries covered with a locally woodblock-printed "Eveready" label. There was a Lucky Strike cigarette in a white, green, and red package, manufactured by the Huan Chiu Tobacco Company. With sublime gall, these makers printed on the side of their package: "Notice. No body is allowed to manufacture this kind of cigarettes." In case the alarmed American originators of Lucky Strike want to have a look, I still have a pack of the Huan Chiu product in my desk. But I don't regard it as my best exhibit. That is a smaller pack put up by the "Pu Yee Tobacco Manueactory China" and bearing the impressive figure of an old-time Chinese warrior with drawn sword. The picture is calculated to strike awe into the heart of any beholder. This I believe is the reason the makers chose to affix their slightly ambiguous yet striking English title, "Aweful Cigarettes."

Such entertaining yet pathetic signs show how little merit there is to the old belief that the Chinese instinctively turn their backs on the foreigner, his ways, and his products. Actually the Chinese have a most normal and vivid human craving for novelties and luxuries. It would be strange indeed if the world's greatest gastronomes were to turn up their noses at whatever things the foreigner could bring them which were good to eat, drink, wear, smell, smoke, ride in, sit on, lie on, or play with. Chinese are not merely eaters of tasty viands—they have the instinct of hedonism in general, although it so hap-

pens that their greatest national advances in the arts of enjoying life have been (apart from such minor matters as philosophy) in the realm of cookery. But they manifest the greatest zest in improving on their own sometimes backward ideas, whenever the foreigner can show that they have overlooked possible enjoyment. We haven't much to teach them about the art of eating aside from ice cream. They were quick to see the merit of the motorcar and then of the airplane. Their own ornately carved chairs are incredibly uncomfortable, but I have seldom rested my tired rear on anything softer than the imported air-filled upholstery of the chairs in prewar days to be found in the Nanking Ministry of Railways. And so on through leather- and rubber-soled shoes, scotch whisky (there should be a law against drinking China's fiery *kaoliang*, though it works fine in cigarette lighters), fountain pens, and a million other tricks and trinkets to which the West has exposed China and at which the Chinese have grabbed with artless cries of delight.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was not in the traditional Chinese hedonist pattern. He was an ascetic intellectual, though a very warm human being with a heart for all the people of his country. Not because he personally wanted to drink the foreigner's champagne or ice-cream soda, but because he knew that through enlightened economic development policies his nation could prosper, he wrote a remarkable and for years neglected book called *The International Development of China*. Madame Sun Yat-sen gave me a copy at Hankow in May of 1927. It was not a period when I was in a very receptive mood, because the world seemed to be coming down around our ears. This book expressed far-flung ideas which then seemed all too visionary. Nobody beside myself seemed in those days to have a copy. I had never before heard of it, though it bore a 1922 copyright notice. Dry stuff, said I to myself as I turned the pages—fantastic notions.

But I respected Madame Sun's judgment enough to persevere. As I read, it gradually came to me that her husband hadn't been as impractical as the average Treaty Port foreigner pictured him. Here was a tremendously comprehensive scheme, perhaps too detailed to be carried out just as he had blueprinted it (since after all Dr. Sun was not a technical expert), but soundly based in its fundamentals.

Briefly, it provided for a ten-point program calculated to benefit not merely China but the whole world. Dr. Sun felt that instead of

trying to make China a "dumping ground" for foreign goods, friendly nations should regard it as an "economic ocean" capable of absorbing all surplus capital. It was his view—well worth close review at the corresponding phase after World War II—that conclusion of the first World War, then just ended, was bound to create maladjustments and cause economic depression, and that a rational development of China could go far to solve this problem. First, China would give profitable use for the world's surplus capital. Next, a more prosperous China with greater buying power would be able to take an increased flow of goods produced by what Dr. Sun called the "second industrial revolution"—caused by unification and nationalization of industries. He expected such developments to produce a more far-reaching increase in productivity than had the first industrial revolution in which manual labor was largely displaced by machinery. If there were lacking some such new development in the world as a great international plan to build a more modern China, Dr. Sun saw breakers ahead for everyone involved. Events have proved him right, at least to the extent that his plan was not followed and we had a world depression; had his plan been carried out with honesty and intelligence, there certainly would have been a considerable cushion against the crash from which we all suffered.

Here is a brief summary of what Dr. Sun proposed. Some of his projects have already been carried out, though more slowly and less organized than he desired. Some may never be carried out, yet his thinking was a stimulant to evolution of more technically expert planning.

1. Development of a communications system, including 100,000 miles of railways, a million miles of macadam roads, improvement of existing canals and construction of new ones, river conservancy, and construction of more telegraph lines and telephone and wireless systems throughout China.

2. Development of commercial harbors. Dr. Sun proposed three large ocean ports of New York City dimensions to be in North, Central, and South China (the first on the Gulf of Pechili, the second on Hangchow Bay, south of Chapu, as he deemed Shanghai unsuitable for major development, and the third at Canton). He also wanted small commercial and fishing harbors along the coast, and commercial docks to be constructed along all navigable rivers.

3. Modern cities with public utilities to be constructed in all railway centers, termini, and alongside harbors.
4. Water-power development.
5. Iron and steel works and cement works "on the largest scale in order to supply the above needs."
6. Mineral development.
7. Agricultural development.
8. Irrigational work on "the largest scale" in Mongolia and Sinkiang.
9. Reforestation in Central and North China (much of this being bare land, subject to devastating floods).
10. Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and Tibet.

For details, go direct to Dr. Sun's book, which has gradually come more into public notice as result of National Government decisions stated to be based on his thinking. Observe that Dr. Sun was fair in his attitude toward the foreign countries whose help he sought. He did not intend to fight "colonial dumping" on China by some sort of tricky countereffort to exploit the foreigner. Picturing a developed China as "another New World in the economic sense," he said that "the nations which will take part in this development will reap immense advantages," which included, but were not exclusively to consist of, a strengthening of the brotherhood of man and the establishment of a keystone for the League of Nations. He realized that interest must be paid and principal repaid, also that guarantees were necessary.

Dr. Sun proposed that the various governments of the "capital-supplying Powers" agree on joint action and a unified policy to form an international organization to formulate plans and standardize materials to prevent waste and facilitate work. Then he desired that the confidence of the Chinese people be secured in order to gain their co-operation and enthusiastic support. Finally negotiations would be opened for final contract with the Chinese Government—following lines of fairness to both parties, and eschewing old-time policies which had involved bribery of Chinese officials and therefore had been later blocked by the Chinese people.

It was significant that at the outset of what he termed "Program I" Dr. Sun said that China's industrial development should be car-

ried out both by private enterprise and by national undertaking. "All matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise," he wrote, "should be left to private hands, which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws." This is a most important statement, because it links up directly with events of the present period. Dr. Sun's grand scheme for international collaboration to develop China on a basis of unified capital and program is perhaps too idealistic; however China's Government might subscribe to such planning, there is always the problem of getting the "capital-supplying Powers" together and keeping them together. So perhaps the plan for international development is most important today as representing a fundamental principle, which China might follow in accordance with opportunity granted her by her capital-possessing friends. But the question of private enterprise vs. nationalization is a wholly internal matter on which there has been much division of Chinese thinking during the past several years. On this the National Government has finally established its policy in what seems to me precisely the Sun Yat-sen pattern of thought.

Dr. Sun advocated improvement of the tax system, reform of the currency, and so on, remarking that "all matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should be taken up as national undertakings. . . . In this . . . foreign capital has to be invited, foreign experts and organizers have to be enlisted, and gigantic methods have to be adopted." Dr. Sun made a point not only of the fact that capital must be repaid and interest must be paid to the foreigner by China, but that before this had been accomplished there must be management and supervision by foreign experts under Chinese employment. As one of their obligations, such experts would have to train Chinese assistants to take their places in future; once the capital and interest of each undertaking had been paid off, the Chinese Government would have the option to employ either foreigners or Chinese to manage the concern.

The foregoing should convey what is of interest to the ordinary reader. It would have been of no interest to anybody, I am afraid, during the years of the early 1930s when the still-new National Government was beginning to feel its oats. Memorial meetings honoring Dr. Sun were held on schedule, due respect was paid to

his portrait and will, but few spoke of his ideas on international development of China. On the contrary, the emphasis was on Chinese self-development and China's need for abolishing foreign extra-territoriality as a symbol and instrument of foreign privilege. Those of us who deeply sympathized with such Chinese aspirations seemed unable to elicit any response to our suggestions that an end to extra-territoriality might be but the beginning of better times. Nanking, it seemed, was taking what the British call "a dim view" of the China future of the foreigner. Along with that was development of a similar attitude toward private Chinese enterprise. It began to look as though the National Government favored the fascist approach to business. Nanking wanted not merely such things as government railways, which it inherited, and nationalized mineral resources, which it had written into the law of the country, but a considerable extension of this nationalization principle into fields previously sacred to private enterprise—sometimes Chinese, sometimes foreign.

The Shanghai fish market monopoly was such an example. Without warning, on May 11, 1936, the Chinese authorities suddenly set up an official fish monopoly on Point Island, down the Whangpoo River from the foreign municipalities of Shanghai. H. G. W. Woodhead's *Oriental Affairs* magazine of June recalls to mind how fishing craft which tried to proceed upriver to the old Nantao market, center of distribution for fish supply, were held up and compelled to unload at Point Island. A few boats that ran the gauntlet were forcibly prevented from landing their cargoes at Nantao. Many of the fish hong's had been in business for half a century or more. They owned costly refrigerating plants and storage godowns, and they resented this attempt to stop their business as merchants and convert them into fish brokers. So the biggest hong's went on strike.

This constituted a menace to the food supply of the foreign areas. The French *chargé d'affaires* lodged emphatic protest with the National Government against this official monopoly, while the French consul general protested to the authorities of Greater Shanghai, the Chinese-controlled municipality. Other foreign officials felt less disposed to take such direct action, chiefly because it was only the French who were in sole charge of an area (the French Concession), while the others held the International Settlement jointly. The incident primarily affected the Chinese themselves anyway, and for-

eigners hesitated to incur criticism that they were interfering in the affairs of the Chinese Government. But the uproar left an unpleasant impression, reminiscent of the gangster monopolies of beer-racketeering days in prohibition America. No high public purpose seemed to be served by the fish-monopoly scheme. It had disturbing implications. First, official status was being used to cloak an enterprise likely to line private pockets. Next, it perhaps foreshadowed further such moves—against the foreigner—when foreign extraterritoriality was relinquished. Finally, it seemed to show a growth of Chinese official thinking along totalitarian lines.

Another surprise move which was met by no resistance and little publicity was the National Government's decision to nationalize the field of industrial insurance. The owner of our newspaper made his money from a variety of enterprises, distinctly not including journalism, and especially including insurance. Mr. Starr and his associates, all forward-looking people, had noticed the new possible field of industrial insurance and moved to get into it. When the Government saw fit to step in, however, they promptly stepped out without argument. Their whole concept of operation in China was almost unique among foreign enterprise of the period. They knew that the Chinese owned China and must eventually take over full control. They had always worked in friendship with the Chinese and had no intention of placing themselves in a false position of trying to oppose whatever the Chinese Government might decide to do, whether wisely or otherwise. But those of us who knew of this industrial-insurance extension of the Government's arms were again disturbed; it seemed to us that a lot of people up in Nanking were deviating from established practice of democratic capitalism. Had we then been keeping up on our reading of Dr. Sun's works we might have pointed also to Nanking deviation from the master's views. However, it is doubtful whether we should have received thanks or other encouragement, since no nation or individual is likely to be grateful when an outsider tries to pick flaws in its logic.

Japan, meanwhile, was galloping down the Axis road hell for leather. Business big and small in Japan was being given such a regimentation as it had never dreamed of. Since 1931 the militarists had gained full ascendancy over the other three guiding groups, and they had the national economics firmly harnessed to their war

chariot. Just as they had forced out of business Japan's only independent news agency, the Nippon Dempo Tsushinsha, compelling it to merge in 1936 with its semiofficial rival the Nippon Rengo to serve militarism's propaganda purposes as the present official Domei News Agency, so everything else which lent itself to merger and central official control was similarly lined up. War was the purpose of the Tokyo war lords, just as it was the purpose of their unsavory mentors in Berlin and Rome. In Nanking many well-meaning, enthusiastic, but unsophisticated Chinese officials fell into the error of thinking that totalitarianism might have its points. That was the only explanation we could find for what was happening in the way of fascist developments in many China fields. True, there were some wiser Chinese seasoned in democratic thought who resisted all such trends. Their difficulties may be understood if we will search our recollections as to how we ourselves divided about the "efficiency" of totalitarianism. Democracy didn't have too easy a row to hoe even in America during the period under consideration. Small wonder that a China conscious of economic backwardness, of Japan's proximity, of the need for haste in self-development, found among her highest councils some leaders who thought it might work to fight the devil with fire. Japan was making great progress in various enterprises, including the rapid dismemberment of China. What more natural than to think China might increase her capacity to resist Japan through resorting to Japan's methods? It was fallacious thinking, but we shouldn't be too hard on it as a passing phase. We too have been tempted.

Then came 1937 and the outbreak of war. With it came great material losses for China, losses which might be expected to represent economic setback of many decades. I have seen estimates that it would take China a hundred years or more to recover. Such notions are overalarmist. There were stupendous losses. No one would deny it. But among the losses were some things which could be spared, including the idea that Japan's example was a thing for China to copy. As for the material setback, of course there is no help for the loss of life, the mutilations, the horrible hardships suffered by the people. Military casualties exceeded three million, civilian probably ten million or more. But a strong united China, friendly toward other nations and following policies which command their friend-

ship and respect, can not merely rebuild the material losses but build far beyond anything yet known, within a relatively few years. As for population, China's postwar population problem is not likely to involve scarcity, to put the matter mildly indeed.

It was toward a "long view" that Chungking leadership sought to direct its eyes. During the initial period of the Szechuen-based wartime National emigre Government, as during the earlier opening years at Nanking, there was plenty to perplex in the immediate foreground. But many feel that this Government did better than its critics believed in keeping an attitude above and beyond anti-social influences.

The Nationalist regime from the outset in 1927 endorsed the principle of capitalism. In common with various minority groups it has never excluded a degree of state ownership and nationalized control. In the case of the Kuomintang, this took in such things as government ownership of railways and nationalization of mineral resources. Carsun Chang's National Socialist party "expects to see socialism realized," in the words of its 1938 United Front endorsement. The Chinese Communists, in spite of their present moderate practice, are committed to ultimate Marxism.

All these groups are self-confessed victims of arrested development. Edgar Snow has said that "the ultimate aim of Chinese Communists is a true and complete Socialist State of the Marx-Leninist conception," but Borodin said that nothing like this was possible for many years, nor has it proved to be. The National Socialist and other unarmed minorities have been impotent save in the field of ideas. The Kuomintang, by candid statement of its own leaders, paused in the progress outlined by Sun Yat-sen and allowed the war to protract its period of political tutelage far beyond expectations. Economic progress similarly suffered.

In examining this last point it is pertinent to ask whether or not this protracted one-party period was calculated, the result of a plot perhaps fostered by those supporting the Kuomintang and benefiting by it. Many now tend to think the worst. While not condoning an unnecessary and undesirable state of affairs, I refuse to follow all-out. I regard the Kuomintang's long retention of power as rather a result of drift and inertia than of scheming.

One cannot ignore the obvious part played by specialized capi-

talistic classes. But I think too much can be built up through efforts to oversimplify an extremely complex and very Chinese situation. Not long ago I chatted with K. P. Chen, chairman of the board of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, who arranged the first loan for Chiang Kai-shek after establishment of the National Government at Nanking. He declared that the bankers had put no strings on what they did, despite published charges to the contrary; "we were tired of misgovernment," he said, "and we wanted fulfillment of Sun Yat-sen's program. We got nothing for ourselves out of it." Before commenting on that I would mention a headline of the January 14, 1945, issue of the Chungking edition, Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*. It read: "Budget for 1945 Depends Largely on Big Landowners." The story below quoted a government spokesman as revealing that the budget "will be financed almost entirely by landowners . . . [who will] further be required to make contributions primarily for the amelioration of living conditions of the troops, and to sell additional products to the government at controlled prices considerably below the current levels."

Mr. Chen's words were sincere but are bound to be interpreted by the reader in accordance with his own personal ideas. "Misgovernment" to a capitalist might be the best sort of government to a radical. Nanking's overthrow of Wuhan spelled reaction to many idealists. Madame Sun Yat-sen and others felt that Nanking stood for a very reverse of Dr. Sun's doctrines. It is clear enough that, as things turned out, the Sun Yat-sen political program was not briskly pushed through. But Mr. Chen seems to me significant in his statement because I think he expressed an honest conviction on the part of the men who did most to put Chiang's new Nanking group on its feet. They did stand for their own interpretation of Sun Yat-sen, they wanted peace and order after disorders, and they didn't put any obvious strings on the new Government. However, when it came to enforced removal upcountry a decade later the Government found itself confronting new problems and subject to new influences. Initially it could hardly gain foothold in an interior long ruled by the Szechuen and other war lords. Generalissimo Chiang had to take over the provincial governorship himself on top of his national burdens, for a while, because at the outset he could not force his own nominee into the job. The landlords were a great power, virtually

the only economic power of the area, comparing with the bankers and industrialists of the coastal area. Yet although they have undoubtedly played some part in shaping the Government's thinking (as toward the Communists), it seems to me that they have not fastened fetters on the National Government.

Argument could go on forever about points not susceptible to concrete demonstration. In finally setting up its "new economic policy" at the end of 1944, however, the National Government provided a solid point of proof that it was at last following the Sun Yat-sen line of economic thought in looking toward another postwar period. There had been months and years of conflict as to which way the Government was to go. Contending forces were in sharp divergence within the Kuomintang. Government leaders themselves admit it. When I had first word of the Government's decision, in the course of a Chungking interview with newly appointed Finance Minister O. K. Yui on November 21, it was through his jubilant declaration, "The die-hards have fallen back." This amused me. The word "die-hard" is ordinarily used in China to refer to a foreign old-timer of set, conservative, and usually anti-Chinese view. Yet this former mayor of Greater Shanghai, who had known plenty of Shanghai foreign die-hards, now deliberately chose "die-hard" to describe the reactionary Chinese. I thought it delicious and symbolic of a new time in which we have neither the political institution of extraterritoriality nor any distinction between stubborn reactionaries, whether Chinese or foreign. Now, I thought, we are getting somewhere!

What Minister Yui was telling me was that quite recently—during the past three weeks, in fact—it had become certain that foreign capital and other aid would be both welcomed and rewarded in China. I mentioned to him a much-discussed New York *Times* dispatch sent from Chungking a few months earlier by Brooks Atkinson. This message said in effect that the National Government was likely to make it impossible for the foreigner to participate in China's reconstruction. Brooks spoke of proposals then under discussion for denying fruits of their efforts to any who might try to work for China. While he did not say that any definite decisions to such effect had been reached, he painted a thoroughly gloomy picture of the possibilities or probabilities.

Many in New York City and elsewhere had viewed this dispatch

with understandable alarm. I had been unable to deny that some such school of thought existed in Chungking, although I felt certain that Atkinson had got hold of only part of the story. I could not ignore fundamental decisions which had been reached by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang during a visit I had made the previous autumn. In September 1943 there had been declarations of policy removing all restrictions as to percentage of foreign participation and management in Chinese-foreign joint enterprises, allowing foreigners to set up branch and independent businesses in conformity with Chinese laws, laying down the rule that there would be no tax discrimination against foreigners, and generally stating an "open-door policy" toward the foreigner while providing for conduct of further detailed studies and conferences with a view to further decisions. Atkinson had heard some bad news about what was being put forward at the conferences resulting from this.

Naturally the forces of economic reaction in China would be making themselves heard. But I felt that it was premature to presume victory by such forces, just as it would have been in error to do so when they were gaining an upper and fascist type of hand in the 1936-37 period, before the outbreak of the war. In other words, while I was not prepared to say that Brooks was wrong in the rumors he had been picking up, I felt that we had all better keep our powder dry—and persevere in strengthening the hands of Chinese who stood for enlightened ways.

What Minister Yui told me was indication that things had worked out as hoped. Soon I had further confirmation from Chinese business friends and from Dr. Sun Fo, who with Dr. Wang Chung-hui was co-head of the National Defense Council Committee responsible for the final decisions. Dr. Sun called attention to a statement just made in America by Li Ming, chairman of the board of the Chekiang Industrial Bank and to my mind one of the most rational and civilized thinkers I have ever known. Working in the United States on problems of postwar planning in association with former Communications Minister Chang Kia-ngau, Mr. Li had never entertained any illusion that Uncle Sam meant to be an Uncle Chump in furnishing postwar largess to China. He and Mr. Chang and other such men as K. P. Chen had consistently told Chungking that only

businesslike proposals for help should be put forward. Only such a policy could attract foreign capital and technical skill. Americans had no slightest desire to exploit the Chinese, Chungking was told, but they did expect fair treatment and a just reward for whatever risk and effort they might plow into China's future prosperity. As to China's need for help, these present-day Chinese like Dr. Sun before them clearly recognized Chinese lack of internal resource. China simply didn't have within herself enough with which to build up a strong economic structure without outside help, as Soviet Russia had to do and did.

"Even before the war," Li Ming told the International Business Conference at Rye, N.Y., in mid-November 1944, "China was not a rich country, and after seven years of war, the small savings which her people had accumulated have been exhausted by the destructions of war. Therefore, she will have to depend upon her foreign friends for financial assistance to carry out these programs after the war.

"During the last three years, her businessmen and financiers have been very much concerned with this great task. Naturally, they have been exerting all their efforts to persuade their Government to adopt a liberal and equitable policy in order to justify an influx of foreign capital to assist in her economic development."

Li Ming for the first time revealed in this speech what I was discovering simultaneously in Chungking—that the Chinese Government had finally decided on courses recommended by her most modern leaders, working with the Kuomintang but many of them not Kuomintang members, based on understanding of the fact that China and her foreign friends must profit together in the postwar era if both are to be satisfied.

In his discussion Mr. Li went into details of investments, plans for repayment, the social objectives of capital, uniform taxation of foreigner and Chinese, and the position of private enterprise. "All those enterprises which are suitable for private undertaking," he said, "will be left to private interests and accorded encouragement and legal protection by the Government." On the other hand, the Government expected to handle such big undertakings as seemed not suited to private development.

Great arguments preceded the adoption of this view. During many

months it was thought that the Government would monopolize what was loosely called "heavy industry," but at last this concept was abandoned completely, one reason being the extreme difficulty in drawing lines of distinction between heavy and light industry. It was finally decided that the Government ought to participate as a financial backer, with the status of ordinary shareholder, in any enterprise where such help was needed and the undertaking was of importance to the national welfare. But no monopolistic position would be taken, nor would there be special favoritism for certain companies through tax exemptions or similar discrimination. (Later it appeared that the Government meant to monopolize all radio broadcasting. If this is carried out it will be for political rather than economic reasons.)

K. P. Chen, at the same meeting, emphasized that China would repay any loans made—"Unless we are sure we can repay, we will not borrow"—but he added significantly that it would be necessary "to have free access to the world market for the export of our agricultural, mineral, and handicraft products" in order to effect such repayment. Mr. Chen said that China "has great potentials for industrial development and for the creation of a vast market for the products of other countries," and that "we are looking for the kind of economic co-operation which will lead to a long-term investment in the profitable and peacefully expanding industries in post-war China." He declared that the Chinese Government welcomed foreign investment and pledged: "All regulations and laws being adopted by the Chinese Government are directed toward giving foreign investment fair treatment."

Referring to Mr. Li's statement as "in full accord with the latest decisions of the Government on the economic policy of postwar China . . . the first pronouncement even of a semiofficial nature on the subject," Dr. Sun Fo in Chungking went into greater detail. "A complete break," he said, "was made in the past theories of rigid spheres of interest for state and private capital. Such a solution of our problem of a mixed economy was considered too rigid and therefore too impractical. It could only work out on paper." He underscored the limitation which had been placed on the number and kinds of state enterprises, those strictly belonging to the state including only postal and tele-communications, important national

railways, large hydroelectric power plants, arsenals and mints, and such public works as harbor construction, irrigation, and conservancy projects. All others should be open to private undertaking, ownership, and operation, with equality of opportunity as between Chinese and foreign capital. As to the matter of specific legal implementation of these decisions, Dr. Sun (himself president of the Legislative Yuan) said:

"The Legislative Yuan has before it motions for the approval of laws designed to carry these principles into effect, as well as amendments of the existing laws which are contrary to these principles.

"Our courts of law and the competent authorities for administering the laws will pay attention to these principles, which should go a long way to assuring our own people as well as our foreign friends that China is determined to progress along the road now being trodden by modern democratic countries. And in the postwar period China will prove, given the unity of purpose demanded by a constitutional democratic country, a worth-while and safe field for foreign investment."

On December 28 the Supreme National Defense Council of China adopted a resolution which officially set forth the guiding principles which had been adopted. This may be regarded as the charter for China's new economic policy. It has vital importance and will repay careful reading. The text follows:

SCOPE OF STATE ENTERPRISE

I. The industrial development of China should be carried out along two lines, (1) by private enterprises and (2) by state enterprises.

II. In order to facilitate the division of labor under a general plan for economic reconstruction the following provisions concerning economic enterprises are to be observed:

(1) The kinds of state monopolies should not be too numerous. Such monopolies include (a) postal service and tele-communications, (b) arsenals, (c) mints, (d) principal railroads, and (e) large-scale hydraulic power plants.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

(2) Private capital may engage in any enterprise other than state monopolies.

(3) The Government may, on its own account or in co-operation with Chinese or foreign capital, engage in enterprises which private

capital is not fully capable of developing or which the Government regards as being of special importance, such as large-scale petroleum fields, steel plants, air and water transportations.

(4) All enterprises which are operated by the Government in co-operation with Chinese or foreign capital should be organized in the form of business corporations. The Government, apart from exercising such administrative supervision as provided by law, is entitled to participate in the management of all matters relating to the business, finance, and personnel of such corporations solely in its capacity as a share holder.

(5) With the exception of state monopolies, all enterprises operated by the Government, whether with or without the co-operation of Chinese or foreign capital, insofar as they are of a commercial character, should, as regards their rights and obligations, be treated in the same manner as private enterprises of a like character.

III. The establishment of any important private enterprise should, according to law, be submitted to the examination and approval of the Government on the basis of the general plan for economic reconstruction. (Important matters to be considered include location of the projected plant, production capacity, kind and quality of output, issuance of shares and bonds, etc.)

To all private enterprises that conform to the general plan for economic reconstruction, the Government should give special encouragement including financial aid and transportation facilities, so that they may achieve their scheduled programs.

FOREIGN PARTICIPATION

IV. No restriction shall be placed on the percentage of foreign shares of capital in any Sino-foreign enterprise. In the organization of such a corporation it shall not be made a fixed rule that the general manager be a Chinese, although the chairman of the board of directors must be a Chinese.

V. State enterprises may contract foreign loans or seek foreign investments through competent Government organs, provided that they first be approved by the Government on the basis of the general plan for economic reconstruction. Private enterprises may also directly undertake such negotiations, provided that similar approval of the competent government organs is obtained.

VI. All enterprises in China which are directly financed and operated by foreign nationals on their own account should observe Chinese laws and regulations. In the case of certain special enterprises which

would require special authorization for the establishment and operation, special charters or franchises may be granted to foreign nationals upon application to and approval by the Chinese Government.

VII. Persons in the Government service are forbidden to participate in the operation and management of any enterprise that falls within the scope of their supervisory functions.

It seems inevitable that the existing laws and regulations concerned will be found in some cases to be in conflict with the above-stated principles. Such case should be referred to the Legislative Yuan for revision with a view to harmonizing all existing legislation on the subject.

In this as in all else the proof of the pudding must be in the eating. Every country is familiar with the difficulties as between putting an idea down on paper and making it work. But perhaps the Chinese will be helped by the very skepticism which confronts them in many quarters. They don't hope to achieve any administrative miracles, but they know the grim necessities they are up against. It is to be expected that they will apply their best efforts to the task of making their new economic policy work because it is for their own best interest.

So far as American business is concerned, it may be pertinent to note that I have assurance from Miss A. Viola Smith, in Shanghai for years registrar of the China Trade Act, that the act is still operative in its vital aspects to relieve eligible companies from the burden of American (and therefore presumably double) taxation. Relinquishment of extraterritoriality has made some provisions of the act inoperative, such as those referring to the no longer extant United States Court for China, but this did not touch the taxation structure or prevent the formation of new China Trade Act companies. Whether Chinese law will allow continuation of China Trade Act companies is another question.

During the war period it was most difficult for American firms to maintain offices, under American direction, in Free China. Neither our military men nor many civil officials took interest in the need for such war or postwar enterprise. My personal view is that if some of these gentry had to meet a pay roll, or find sustenance elsewhere than through Uncle Sam's monthly checks, or make a solid study of the tax sources from which their checks come, we would note quick and substantial progress toward the British way of thought. This

regards trade extension as a matter not merely for private enterprise but also for government assistance, both direct and indirect. American bankers have been sensitive over references to their indisposition to lose money at Chungking by opening branches there. Quite likely they were right in their decision to go slow, and I am sure that our Government wouldn't have lifted a finger to make things any easier if they had gone ahead. Still the British operated in Chungking branches of both the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank—neither of these making any money, both just conducting simple deposit business, both clearly encouraged by their home Government. British participation in Chungking insurance must have had some sort of official backing. British overseas business has always been in there fighting, ready to drop several present shillings in order to pick up many future pounds. Britain's Foreign Office fights alongside for the Empire cause, be the Government Tory or Labor.

Toward the end of the war period I heard good reports of the State Department's and Embassy's help to American business in the matter of compulsory Chinese registration. It was accepted that American and other foreign business must come under Chinese law, which in due course must entail registration of companies. But during wartime there were cogent reasons for going slow. The company law was in a confused state, with revisions promised and in progress. Its exact meaning was in dispute, but certain provisions seemed to threaten prohibitive taxation, especially of companies which were staying in the China field mostly as a good-will gesture and without making profit. There was even a shortage of Chinese lawyers to represent overseas companies operating in Chungking. With great difficulties, the American Embassy was able to achieve successive postponements in the registration requirement until the war emergency had passed.

During the autumn of 1945 there were disturbing reports that the Chinese Government was taking an increasingly legalistic attitude toward foreign operations within its territories. For example, it seemed that certain major public utility companies could no longer maintain their American status but must re-incorporate under Chinese law merely because they did not operate both in their own countries and in China, while under the same "territorial theory"

the whole existence of China Trade Act companies was threatened. On the eve of his return to China, Judge Cornell S. Franklin, leading Shanghai lawyer and former chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, sounded a salutary warning:

"It would seem that some Chinese are under the impression that American business is determined to go into China regardless of the conditions imposed by Chinese law and regulations. They seem to think that Americans are standing with hat in hand begging for the opportunity to pour money into China; that we are not concerned with the 'climate' in which American or Sino-American business in China must come into being and develop. For the good of China, this attitude of some of our Chinese friends is unfortunate. They should face facts. They should realize that every country in the world is seeking American capital and that our capital will go where it finds the most favorable conditions. Capital is never sentimental. Capital goes where it finds safety, a reasonable opportunity for a reasonable return, and favorable conditions."

As to the new Chinese company laws, Judge Franklin suggested that in emulating present-day laws in America or other countries not now in need of capital from abroad, the Chinese were making a mistake. Not the American laws of 1945 but those of 1845 or earlier should be the model, he pointed out—"It is all very well for the Chinese to investigate our present laws and regulations, but they should be more interested in our laws and regulations when we needed outside help."

Here was the beginning of an inevitable friendly peacetime tug of war between China's officialdom and the private American enterprise with which—rather than the U. S. Government—China must work in the long run. Nothing but good can come from candid exchange of views if all concerned are determined to work for the common interest. Throughout the war period, as already indicated, Washington sought to the best of its ability to support a constructive Chinese view on such technical points as registration, and at the same time our government was laying the basis for future Chinese progress by its economic aid in many fields.

When China's blockade cut down the amount of U.S. lend-lease goods that could be moved in, the ingenious Cultural Relations Division of the State Department flew in a swarm of American

experts. I remember one high American official, long overseas, remarking, amusement mingled with indignation, "What's so damned cultural about an artificial inseminationist?" Another technical authority had high standing in the green field of potato culture. With him stood, or lay, many bags of seed potatoes which (we heard) occupied his berth while he occupied the aisle of an American train taking him to his port of embarkation for the Orient. One of the toughest culture spots was occupied by Floyd Taylor, a highly competent New York newspaperman who found himself loaned by the State Department to the Chinese Information Ministry, where he was set to editing Chinese propaganda for transmission abroad. Floyd's Chinese bosses were gentlemen, who recognized that he had a conscience and was an American. So he got into no trouble, but returned home after a year. An "anonymous donor" who looked suspiciously like Uncle Sam set up a Chungking School of Journalism which operated for two years, then stopped with the peace.

The Chinese Government has been interested in national economic planning since 1933, when a National Defense Planning Commission was set up with the aim of creating industries to supply munitions. In 1936 a three-year heavy-industry plan was mapped and work began under the National Resources Commission in the three provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh, then believed impregnable to attack but unfortunately later lost to Japan. Today more than ever the National Government wants to see China's industries built up in accordance with plan, as is shown by Section III of the new economic policy charter, providing that establishment of important private enterprise shall be "submitted to the examination and approval of the Government on the basis of the general plan for economic reconstruction."

The U. S. Foreign Economic Administration has compiled, by suggestion of Lauchlin Currie, a twelve-volume *Guide to China's Industry*, resulting from eighteen months of specialized study by fifty experts. This is not supposed to provide any full blueprint but rather background data on China's estimated needs over a five-year period from which, in the words of Alex Taub, who was formerly chief engineer for FEA, "The Chinese can make their own determination." Later the Chinese raised this guide to the level of a plan. Here is another sentence from Mr. Taub: "No one is so naïve as to

believe that industry is an unmixed blessing." He stressed a need for considering social consequences of industrialization and said that preventive medicine must be spread, and preparations made for provision of medical care for workers and their families, all the sort of advice China should get from Americans.

Looking toward the postwar future, the Sixth National Kuomintang Congress in May 1945 adopted a resolution stating that "the industrial reconstruction of China will be based on an over-all plan drawn up by the Government. The underlying idea is to develop an industrial base in order to realize the dual objective of national defense and people's livelihood." This resolution generally followed the theories already laid down for the new economic policy, mentioning among other things that state industry was to be confined largely to heavy industry, also participating in agricultural development, and taking care of "the two basic services essential to industrialization—power and communications," which must be accorded the highest priority and developed according to the needs of the industrial plan. This plan was still nebulous, but its outlines were roughed in by mention of such details as a division of the country into industrial regions according to natural resources and other factors. Private industries were to be in accordance with this plan but to receive "the utmost assistance." Aid was also to be given by the Government to handicraft industries and co-operatives. The educational policy should help industrialization, and invention and scientific research should be subsidized or otherwise helped. Finally, "foreign investments should be welcomed" with no restriction except in the munitions industry. Where there was a question of joint Sino-foreign enterprise, it was felt that if large capital were required, "it is best for the state to participate so as to realize Dr. Sun Yat-sen's industrial program. If a private enterprise participates in a corporation with foreign interest, the sanction of the state is necessary."

Dr. Sun Fo wrote me from Chungking late in the spring of 1945, expressing gratification that "the liberal policies which are now being followed by the Government in solving our economic problems have had a favorable reaction in the United States." He added: "Unless we have liberal policies not only in political affairs but also in economic matters throughout the world we shall all run

up against some considerable difficulties in the future." Then he went on to say:

In order to implement the policies which have been announced by various officials you will be glad to learn that the Legislative Yuan is engaged in the revision of some of the relevant laws which will enable these liberal policies to be put into operation. For example, we are engaged in drafting a new Company Law which will take the place of the former one. In this new draft of the Company Law provision will be made for the operation of foreign enterprises in accordance with the spirit of the new liberal policy.

The principle of planned economy is to be accepted in the case of China particularly in view of the need for guidance of private interests participating in the development of industry and commerce in the post-war period. Without this guidance along the lines determined by the Government, there would be a dissipation of financial and material resources of foreign as well as Chinese interests. Where a central economic plan is to exercise such guidance it can only work to the advantage of the individual entrepreneur.

The principle of the control of capital and labor conditions according to Min Seng Chu I should limit the development of the worst features of capitalism, while the strong communal instincts of the people should call forth a demand in the future (when Chinese industry can supply the small units of machinery and equipment needed) which would tend toward socialistic organization of industry. Rural industry along the lines of the Industrial Co-operatives, selling through their own consumer co-operatives, and not through the middlemen of the local markets, may well play a part in raising the standard of living of the same rural populations in which the production and consumer co-operatives operate.

To produce is one thing, but to find and create a market is another thing. Distribution must be planned in the same way as production, otherwise we shall make one of the same fundamental mistakes which beset and still beset capitalistic economy.

In the previously mentioned work of Donald M. Nelson and his expert group there was a conspicuous and deservedly well-publicized evidence of the influence the American Government is having on wartime China. A great many things had gone wrong in the Chinese industrial setup by the time Mr. Nelson made his first Chungking visit in the summer of 1944. When, after home consul-

tation, he returned to China in the fall, he made clear that he came maybe as a species of Mr. Fix-It but decidedly not as Santa Claus. Henry Wallace, months before, had tried to convey that thought; but nevertheless while Chinese industry had slowed to 50, 20, sometimes 10 per cent of capacity, the Chinese were asking America for lend-lease material which in many cases China herself could supply if she would.

Mr. Nelson and his experts went in as patient fact finders. One of the first, most obvious, and most decisive troubles they ran into was the fact of runaway inflation which had hit everything from the industrial co-operatives to the biggest wartime industries. Selling prices were insufficient to catch up with the even faster rise in cost of raw materials. This tended to check the cycle of manufacture.

Consider: At Chungking in March of 1945 it was estimated that the February price index stood at 873 times the basic figure of June 1937, as compared with a January index of 655. A government spokesman explained that the January level represented a 35 per cent increase over December. By May the index had accelerated to 1,435 times June, 1937; by June it was 1,579 times. Even the indices failed to picture the situation fully, inasmuch as many items were selling in March for as much as 2,000 times the 1937 prices. While the Government doggedly held on to its official exchange rate of twenty Chinese dollars to one American dollar, wild surges in the black market were washing up to a level of 3,200 to 1 at times. But peace in August brought prices down on the run, boosted the Chinese dollar spectacularly, and temporarily removed all black-market demand for U.S. currency at any price.

Into all this complexity barged the solid pipe-smoking Mr. Nelson, resisting Chinese pressure to divert his attention from present war needs to postwar enterprises. What he wanted to do, he made clear, was to help the Chinese help themselves economically, and thus assist them to make greater contribution to the Allied war effort. He ran into despondent arguments that it was a mistake to try to get Chinese industry to produce more—such a course, he was told, would only add to inflation. Instantly and devastatingly he replied, "We'll cure the inflation in a hurry, then. All we have to do is stop *all* Chinese industrial production!" The point was seen.

A modern-minded Chinese of high type, Dr. Wong Wen-hao,

Minister of Economics, worked with Mr. Nelson and in November became chief of a Chinese War Production Board. It was found possible to bring China's bankers and industrialists together, to guarantee the factory owners against loss by what I judge to be a modified cost-plus plan, and to make capital available at as little as 20 per cent a year. This, in time of inflation, was a major subsidy to industry. But something of the sort had to be done if goods were to flow once more.

The goods did in fact begin to flow out of China's wartime factories again. By May 1945 production of twenty basic raw materials was up 28 per cent as against November 1944. We had witnessed a dramatic instance of Sino-American collaboration in the new pattern. A great many Chinese, from the Generalissimo down, had been behind such work in principle. China's new economic plan appeared to be settling into its pattern for the peace.

As a new era began after more than eight years of war, one great problem came increasingly to the fore. Was "government planning" of China's economy to bring a new form of over-all control, not based necessarily on any large number of government monopolies yet nevertheless rigidly limiting private enterprise? There was evidence that this might be developing. Certain Chinese firms negotiated American loans, only to have their own Government block them as "contrary to plan."

It is plain that in China, as in America, there is bound to be a period of conflict between the instinct and tradition of individualism and the war-born trend toward greater controls by government. Certainly the businessmen and industrialists and farmers of China, like their American counterparts, will put up a strong battle for freedom. But this is merely one front in the general postwar fight between the institutions of private enterprise as against state controls leading up to one form or another of totalitarianism. Finally the issues must be decided on such points as which works the best and which the mass of the people (presuming a survival of democracy) prefer. It is as impossible to forecast about China as it is about the United States. But at any rate we may be assured that fundamental factors in this struggle are much the same in both countries, although the two are at dramatically different stages of political and economic evolution.

13

HAVE CHRISTIAN MISSIONS A CHINA FUTURE?

W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM is the man, and *On a Chinese Screen* is the book. That man and that book hurt Christian missions more than anything in the history of English literature. They made no head-on attack, they dealt with a variety of other subjects, but they probed at certain tender spots and oh, how they stung! In the long run and accompanied by other painful treatment they did a lot of good.

An odd feature is that many missionaries never heard of Maugham or his little book of deceptively simple short stories, published in 1922. For that matter there are a great many other people who seem never to have read a particularly brutal fable, "The Stranger," yet who know its malicious outline. Briefly, it tells how a stranger visited a hot Chinese city in midsummer and could find no Protestant missionaries, who were up in the cool hills conserving their health. The mission schools were closed, the mission hospitals likewise, and the stranger was told that "there are no sick between May and September, but if there are they have to put up with the native dispensers"; however, he could try the Roman Catholics, who took no holidays. The stranger said his name was Christ.

A few months after I first read the story I went through the Japan earthquake of September 1923. As soon as communications were restored we had a flood of anxious cablegrams pouring in from the United States to ask about the safety of American missionaries in Japan. We found that the missionaries were safe, snug, and cool, still on holiday up at Karuizawa. Aha, said I and my newspaper colleagues, Maugham was right!

Later in Peking, and Shanghai, and other parts of China, I

found that summer "conferences" were regarded as urgently necessary in Protestant mission circles, and that such conferences had to be held on the heights of Kuling or Mokanshan or at least by the sea at Peitaho. I was also irked to find that at least some of these missionaries lived in quite nice detached houses like the "homeside" sort, whereas in Peking I lived in a none too elegant Chinese house (though I preferred it to foreign style) and in Shanghai I made out with an apartment. They had periodic home leave, not so frequent as that of the Standard Oil and banking fraternity, but at least guaranteed, whereas I got to America precisely once in twenty years. So the evil spirit of jealousy grew up, not in my bosom alone but in others as well. We felt that the missionaries had a pretty soft time. We warned each other not to hire Chinese Christian cooks, since we were sure they were all "rice Christians" both hypocritical and extra dishonest.

Today I am pretty ashamed of myself about missionaries. I still take many, perhaps even most, Chinese Christians with reservations, notwithstanding the fact that Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek are Christians. So are many other high National Government officials. I have found reason to respect the religious convictions and practices of the persons mentioned. My distrust arises very simply, from a factor mentioned in the Chinese-edited China Year-book when it says:

The Chinese as a people are not very religious. Except a small minority, the greater portion of the people are both eclectic and tolerant in religion. An average Chinese may worship his ancestors, participate in Buddhist rituals, join in Taoist adventures, and follow Christian customs without feeling the slightest incongruity or inconsistency. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to give the figures of *bona fide* believers in any religion in China in spite of claims of the different beliefs.

Christian missions have traditionally offered solid advantages to underprivileged Chinese. Their spiritual offering was wrapped in such tempting things as food, medical service, education. With education a poor Chinese could get ahead in the world. China is not a land of universal free schools or of numerous hospitals. Relatively tiny as is the Protestant half-million-communicant drop in the 450-million ocean of China's great population, the Protestants at the

beginning of Sino-Japanese hostilities had 268 mission hospitals with 75 per cent of the total number of civilian hospital beds in all China; their schools were everywhere and ranged from primary instruction through to such fine universities as St. John's, Yenching, and Tsing Hua. As for the Catholics, estimated at around four millions, there were Catholic hospitals in every China province, a total of about 330 at the beginning of the war, and even during the war years giving beds to over 100,000 patients a year as well as dispensary treatment to over 10,000,000; while even during the war years there were nearly 40,000 Chinese children in Catholic schools which in 1938-39 included four universities and colleges, 91 middle schools, and 3,614 primary schools. More striking than any figures, which tend to be confusing about virtually every subject in China, is the clear fact that the Christian missions stood out for enlightenment and progress in a land where there was little to compete with them in any of their enterprises except the strictly religious.

In the religious field they have always been numerically swamped. It is quite impossible to make any estimate of the number of Chinese to whom ancestor worship means something, but I believe it includes the vast majority. Spiritual life of ancient China began with the personification into god and worship of all the important phenomena of nature. The Gods of Rain, Wind, and Rivers, the Spirit of Wayside, and particularly the God of Kitchen, are still living realities to most Chinese today. Many a good missionary housewife has been startled to find the God of Kitchen gaudily portrayed in a poster appropriately placed within her own Christian household.

We may skip Confucianism, still pervasive but a philosophy rather than a religion. Taoism started as a philosophy but developed into a sort of religion in which Lao-tse's teachings degenerated seven centuries after his death into "a ritual embodying a polytheistic hodgepodge of witchcraft and demonology." It has its hundreds of temples, its ritual, and its bible.

Buddhism is tremendously important in China, which has strongly set its stamp on the India original. Today there are in China 267,000 Buddhist temples, 738,000 monks and nuns, with five times that many laymen and laywomen under vow, and untold millions of believers.

Lamaism, a form of Buddhism dominant in Mongolia and the state religion of Tibet, is similarly difficult to enumerate. But a large part of the populations of its area of influence are lamas, and a single monastery in the sparsely populated territory near Lhasa (the Djerpung) has four abbots and 7,700 lamas. Living Buddhas abound and as petty gods control the whole life of their areas under such resounding titles as that of Jehol's Tsahantarkhan Hutukhtu. (Irreverent newsmen at Peking used to chant something about "the Hutukhtu, the Hutukh-three, the Hutukh-four or five.")

Finally there is Mohammedanism. Islam claims to number a total of 48,000,000 in China, with 30,000,000 in the Northwest. This may be exaggerated, but there probably are no less than 10 to 15 million for China proper plus 5 million in the Northwest. Moham-medans are individualistic and can be aggressive religionists.

Not only was it obvious in an older China day that the Christian missionary and his convert were few as compared with China's whole. We of the non-mission community had grievances such as were earlier outlined, and additionally we felt snubbed. We heard tales of British-American Tobacco Company men who chanced into remote missionary establishments upcountry at Christmastime, and though they were not turned away, they ate at another table because of the nefarious traffic which was their livelihood. Missionaries spoke in a professional jargon and were fierce in diverse prejudices. We felt that the hundreds of thousands of back-home contributors to missions were being deceived about the extent and potency of mission work. Maugham spoke for a great many outsiders when he said that a certain missionary lady lived "a life of convictions harassed by never a doubt"; he went considerably beyond the usual facts but no doubt built further anti-missionary feeling when he portrayed a Seventh Day Adventist who "was ignorant of the history, art, and literature of China" and who thought the Chinese ignorant because they did not know the same things he did.

All through my China experience I have looked for the missionary fanatic I have heard so much about. Certainly he does exist here and there, infrequent representative of some little back-home sect narrow and bigoted. But my own experience has been so almost completely with a broader, better type that even before I began to make any real effort to understand missionaries and what they were

doing in China, I unconsciously softened under a subtle missionary influence of warmth, humanity, tolerance, and honest desire for service. That came to me firsthand, through contacts initially accidental. I found myself saying, defensively, "Well, I know he's a missionary, but he's really not so bad!"

For such condescension here freely confessed I hope that my present missionary friends will forgive me. I now know a sufficient number of them well enough to realize that in earlier days I was deficient in many liberal qualities. Even a little more curiosity, the quality on which I prided myself as a newsman, might have taught me interesting things about missionaries. But it is only fair to both the missionaries and to myself to say that as a class they themselves have changed and are changing. If they ever were unduly smug and self-satisfied and closed-minded, events did much to purge them of any such qualities.

Some of those events were internal, among the mission organizations and their back-home supporters. Others were external. Of that latter, the most important was war. Japan's attack on China raised hundreds, nay thousands, of Christian missionaries from the status of nice, devoted, but rather humdrum workers in the vineyard of the Lord to that of true heroes and heroines. If they had any nonsense in them, war knocked it out; I know that it knocked out a lot of nonsense from the rest of us, less on the front line than they. It was a time of supreme test which Christian missionaries met superbly. They braved Japanese bombs and bayonets to save hundreds of thousands of Chinese lives, they saved Chinese women from outrage, they protected property, and as best it could, where it could, their work went on. Critics of Christian missions were stilled, by their own volition. No honest person of any race or nationality could watch the Christian missionary in China during Japan's brutal onslaught and feel anything but fervent admiration.

What happened to the internal workings of the missionary movement seems to me mostly the missionaries' own business. I recall that there was a layman's investigation of the whole mission field; can the diabolical yet shrewd Mr. Maugham have had anything to do with that? Probably not, but I suspect he was symptomatic of growing criticism. Not all was right with foreign missions, the investigation decided after judicial inquiry. It laid down corrective sugges-

tions, and these began to be carried out. The spirit of criticism still prevails. It seems to me a healthy thing which should serve to keep the missionary movement on the right track through difficult and puzzling times.

There were echoes in China of the fundamentalist-modernist squabbles back home. The Chinese never have been able to figure out much about sectarian division among the Protestants, nor have other Orientals. It was one of religious history's greatest ironies that Japan in late 1940 staged a sudden *coup* against the missionaries which "unified" the Protestants into one group and was apparently well on its way toward even more sensational forceful "unification" of Protestants and Catholics when Pearl Harbor dropped its curtain. What Japan did was merely a dirty trick, anti-foreign in motive, promoted by the militarists and with the Salvation Army as its first target—because the swaggering samurai disliked the concept of a civilian-military religious organization controlled from abroad. They particularly disliked uniforms and officer titles for women!

Things moved rapidly from their beginnings on July 31, 1940, a time when most of Japan's 680 American missionaries were somnolently "conferring" in the cool of the lovely Japanese mountains. By the time the surprised foreigners had heard of the first gendarme arrests of seven Japanese Salvationists at Kobe, a spirit of surrender was already spreading everywhere among Japanese Christian leaders. The Salvationists agreed to change their name to "Salvation Group" (not Army), to sever all connections with their control office in London, to refuse further foreign monetary aid, and to send back to Europe their three British missionaries. Hard on the heels of this the Japanese Bishop of Osaka, the Right Reverend Yasutaro Naide, suddenly decided to forestall what he feared might prove similar action directed against his own denomination. In the words of a Church Mission Society statement he "entered into an undertaking that the Church would immediately become financially independent, refusing all aid from abroad, and that foreign bishops and clergy would not be allowed to retain their position in the church in which they have hitherto served on equal terms with their Japanese colleagues." This action, understood to have been at the instigation of "a certain government department," threw the fat in the fire. It immediately became apparent that none was to be exempt from the

necessity for change, first faintly foreshadowed by a religious-bodies law which had been passed by Japan's Diet some time previous. Christianity in Japan was being recognized officially, as had long been sought, but certainly not in the way desired.

This is not the place to dwell at length on a most interesting and complex development which, with Japan as its center, profoundly affected the whole Orient. We had watched some earlier phases of official controls by the Japanese, particularly their requirement of Shinto observances by Christian institutions. Some accepted the necessity gracefully, excusing their compliance on the ground that Shinto was more a patriotic philosophy than a religion; others took a stiffer view and either got into trouble or retired of their own volition. Church unification was an issue that couldn't be straddled. The missionaries never had a chance. They had suffered their own Pearl Harbor surprise a year and a half ahead of the rest of us, though some for a while refused to accept it as such. But they had to face the facts that their personal status was precarious, that no church in Japan could any longer expect donations from abroad, and that the forty Protestant sects represented in the country (including perhaps 200,000 communicants) were being forcibly thrown together in an official sack, with strong probability that these would soon be joined by the Catholics with another 100,000 members. Some of the Japanese Christians were no doubt courageous and loyal to their foreign mentors. The Reverend Mr. Shuji Saito of the Chuo Methodist Church in Kobe took issue, in fact, with the view that there was any crisis at all; in his opinion "there is never a crisis for God." But foreign missionaries throughout Japan's broadening sphere of empire felt uneasily in their individual bones that for *them* there was a crisis. Many went further and felt they had lost a crucial battle. Japan's subsequent surrender caused a cancellation of these oppressive regulations, and generally restored the foreign-mission position. But there had been a terrific shock doing a great deal of irreparable damage.

In China, Japan's actions and attitude had two effects. There was a considerable physical sphere of Japanese influence over Chinese territory by this time—Manchuria, North China, not to mention such outlying precincts as Jehol and Inner Mongolia. Wherever the Japanese Army posted its glowering sentries there were bound

to be bad times for the Christian missionaries, on whom the militarists rightly looked as their spiritual foes and covert inciters to Chinese resistance. At the same time, though the missionaries had already gained a great deal of prestige in both unofficial and official Chinese eyes for their conduct in protecting Chinese wherever the Japanese had come in, there was still a pretty independent spirit prevailing at Nanking, though it never went so far as to be anti-Christian. In certain respects China's National Government already showed a tendency to follow the Axis model, with Japan as local exponent. There was no guarantee that Nanking would not emulate Tokyo in the matter of religion, even though it might be a delayed reaction.

Tokyo had said: "Religion, like everything else in the national life, must henceforth subordinate itself strictly to the service and welfare of the state." The same Chinese politicians who thought it a wonderful idea to set up a sudden Shanghai fish-market monopoly might equally easily decide that a monopoly of Christianity was a good idea. Or they might take the less challenging course of merely putting a block in the way of Christian teaching. Already, during the 1926-29 period, the National Government had refused to register primary schools that taught religion or maintained religious services. Later the compulsory teaching of Christianity in mission institutions was forbidden—a ban later raised in recognition of the wartime heroism of the Christian missionary.

Whatever might have happened, relatively little did happen at the time except the great fact of the war. And as already indicated, war's impact upon Christian missions was a fierce hot blast that had hardening quality. More, it provided even a species of church-unification movement, though this time of a sort not found objectionable by anyone concerned. Quite the contrary, in fact. It brought together not merely the sects, but the Protestants and the Catholics. The Chinese officially said:

"Foreign missions in China, both Protestant and Catholic, have faced the challenge of the war with the same spirit of fortitude and triumph. War, for all the untold pain and agony it brings to the masses, has proven a great melting pot in which even conflicting groups can be molded together. This has been true of the Protestant and Catholic missions in wartime China. They have co-operated

fully and wholeheartedly as never before in the task of ministering to the needs of a nation at war.

"When Christians in various cities organized local war relief committees, one of the principles governing the disbursement of foreign relief funds to these committees by the National Christian Council of China reads: 'Only one relief committee would be dealt with in a community, which should be, so far as possible, international and interdenominational, including both Protestants and Roman Catholics.' "

The Chinese officially cited evidences of such co-operation, including Honan famine relief, a translation of the Chinese classics undertaken through a joint society composed of Protestant, Catholic, and non-Christian members, and the fact that Generalissimo Chiang, although a baptized Protestant, has been officially recognized by the Catholics as "a leading member of the great comity of Christians in China."

An independent Chinese-edited English-language weekly of Shanghai, the *China Critic*, had not always been too charitable in its editorial judgments of things missionary and Western, but in 1939 it said:

One of the many things that have come out of the present war has been the realization that, whatever doubts may have existed in the past, the Christian missions in China fully and indispensably justify their existence. . . . How without a moment's hesitation they faced the test and were not found wanting will remain one of the most dramatic and epoch-making pages in the history of Christian missions throughout the world. Today, after two years of hostilities, the Christian missions in China have built themselves a record of which they may be justly proud. They have preached the gospel not with words, but by a practical demonstration of the love of God and the brotherhood of man. They have definitely found their place in the life of the nation, fulfilling great human needs in its hour of travail.

Shanghai, which liked to call itself "the Paris of the East" and delighted in a reputation for being a godless town, actually was headquarters for Christian enterprise stretching throughout China. (Apparently aiming at gentle satire, the *Encyclopaedia Sinica* in 1917 carried this definition: "MODEL SETTLEMENT, THE, a term

used by Shanghai people for Shanghai, with more or less justice.”) In an effort to balance up the sheep with the goats and bring understanding among them, a semisecret American club known as the Committee of Thirty was formed in Shanghai. This consisted of a membership always kept up to fifteen missionaries and fifteen businessmen, with alternates including both groups from which substitutes could be drawn, so that there were always thirty persons evenly divided between missionaries and businessmen at each meeting. It was very hush-hush, everything was “off the record,” and at the monthly dinners (no wine!) many notable visitors spoke frankly. The subsequent questioning often revealed sharp divisions of view as between the businessmen and the missionaries. But the chief point is that there was a growing tendency for the two viewpoints to converge.

I well remember one meeting in about 1940 when, with surprise, somebody pointed out that there was now substantially no difference in missionary-business opinion on any point having to do with American policy toward China or individual Americans' concept of and attitude toward the Chinese! This represented sound revisions on the part of both parties, as well as perhaps some changes on the part of some Chinese. Certainly it was all to the good. Equally certainly it meant strength for the missionaries in new quarters, not always friendly in former days.

If one were to sum up the change of attitude on the part of businessman toward missionary, it would include frank and unstinted admiration of the stanchness shown under fire by a great many missionary men and women. Of those who came under my own eye I wish particularly to name M. Searle Bates, of the University of Nanking. Dr. Bates could be passed over in any crowd. He is a quiet and modest person. But he has a straight look in his eye and firm resolution about his mouth. When the Japanese reached Nanking in late 1937 and embarked on a program of atrocities without parallel in modern history up to that time (Manila was to come nearly eight years later), Dr. Bates stood firm, along with many others such as George Fitch of the Y.M.C.A.

The case would be incomplete if we dealt only with stories of individual heroism, of course. But Dr. Bates's record seems typical of many. I merely happen to have heard a particularly large number

of reports on how Dr. Bates protected and sheltered Chinese, patiently negotiated with Japanese whose arrogance and cruelty were beyond belief, and by seeming miracle escaped joining the ranks of martyrs himself. More, he lived on in Nanking, as did others after the weeks of immediate fury had passed. He watched the unfolding program of Japanese wrongs, including their establishment of public opium shops, and he published periodic detailed reports on this systematic drugging of the Chinese people. He made visits to Japan for conference there with his colleagues. For calm, levelheaded standing up to emergency on behalf of others, Searle Bates strikes me as a model for anybody. We non-missionaries were prompt to concede that we were learning something of high serene courage uniformly shown by the missionaries everywhere in the path of Japanese conquest. These were certainly more than "a bunch of Bible thumpers," and once our eyes were opened we could see that their specialized work, particularly in education and medicine, was proving of great good to the country.

We learned also that the general scoffers' concept of the missionary relation to the Chinese people was unfair. Not all missionaries were perfect, not all were understanding. But the best missionaries had an approach of equality which any businessman should emulate in future if he expects to prosper in China. The finest attitude of the finest missionaries is gently and humorously portrayed by Presbyterian John J. Espey in his recent book, *Minor Heresies*. Under the chapter heading "She Bringeth Her Bread from Afar," he tells of a great teacher and a great woman—Miss Mary Elizabeth Cogdal, for years head of the Shanghai South Gate Girls' School. Writes Mr. Espey:

She had no unctuous condescension in her, none of the superior laughter that shrills through many an Old China Hand's remarks on the *quaintness*, the *oddity*, the *weirdness* (all meaning the inferiority) of the Chinese. . . . To Miss Cogdal nothing was weird, odd, or quaint simply because it was not Kansas. She never confused difference in manner with difference in quality. She was that rarest of foreigners in China, one who accepted unconsciously the right of the Chinese to think, to act, to be human beings. She accepted everything until Kansas common sense told her that something was wrong, and once she was convinced a thing was wrong she flew to remedy it, not with superior

cluckings and shakes of the head, but with a clean heart and an impassioned spirit. . . . The Chinese were not the Chinese to Miss Cogdal; the Chinese were honest-to-God people. . . .

During the last decade or so a hot controversy on the value of foreign missions has burned. At times I have found myself in sympathy with the more severe critics, but always at some point I stop. The case for foreign missions is entirely Mary Elizabeth Cogdal's case.

As I read press dispatches, a few weeks before the war's end, telling of Japanese occupation of the Maryknoll Leper Colony in southern Kwangtung, I recalled old friendships in Manila and Shanghai with American Maryknoll Fathers; a fine, self-sacrificing lot. Most of the Catholics we encountered in China were European, and therefore we Americans knew more about the Protestants, predominantly American or British. But when I visited Kiangsi after intense Communist-Nanking civil war there, the Americans in our party spent a merry evening with a group of French Fathers who had quietly refused to run but had served their Chinese community bravely through every vicissitude. On that same trip Eugene Turner, of the Y.M.C.A., acting temporarily in place of George Shepherd as executive secretary of the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union, showed us a new type of interdenominational Christian enterprise including a variety of rehabilitation work. The Union was providing schools for children, classes in home handicraft for women, assistance in running rural co-operatives, and even education in diversified food production, since this fertile area had been failing through ignorance to grow many vegetables which could thrive there. Generalissimo and Madame Chiang were giving major financial aid.

"We thought that if communism had any appeal," Turner explained, "Christianity should have more. So we felt we had better get out into the ex-communist districts and aid rehabilitation."

So far as I have been able to observe, neither in this nor other instances has Christianity taken sides in Chinese internal affairs. I quote the foregoing merely to show how missionary endeavor has felt the spur of challenging conditions, winning praise from Communists as well as the Government. In the matter of Japanese aggression there was a different attitude. Christianity there met an opposing and evil force, and there was nothing for any true Chris-

tian to do but combat it, openly at times, more discreetly where necessary.

Something should be said briefly of the background and extent of the China mission endeavor. Roman Catholicism came first to China, its initial but less fruitful period extending from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries and its more profitable second span dating from the work of the Italian Matteo Ricci. He reached Macao in 1582, ingratiated himself with various Chinese officials, and after adventures, hardships, and imprisonment reached Peking on January 4, 1601. The emperor Wan Li was delighted with clocks and other gifts he brought from Europe. (The missionary has always been an unconscious traveling advance agent for the foreign businessman!)

Ricci and his fellow Jesuits succeeded in converting many high officials and others, though they also precipitated the famous "Rites Controversy" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries regarding the Chinese name for God and whether ancestral worship was allowable. Ricci himself preferred the term *T'ien-chu*, or Lord of Heaven, as most appropriate for designating God in Chinese, but by study of the Classics he became convinced that the single word *T'ien* (Heaven), or *Shangti* (Supreme Ruler), equally well designated the supreme being. So he allowed converts to use the three indiscriminately. There was violent conflict about this. Sinologues later upheld Ricci, but Pope Clement XI, without deciding the meaning of the last two terms, forbade converts to use them on account of the danger they offered because of their literal interpretation.

As to ancestor worship, Ricci allowed simple rites which seemed to him similar in spirit to the respect and thanks owed parents and teachers; with regard to honors specifically paid Confucius, he allowed only those compulsory upon literati successful in their examination, but he did not permit the more solemn honors or sacrifices paid before Confucius's tablet at the equinoxes. Again there was controversy, but in general the Jesuits followed the Ricci line. When the Dominican Friars entered China in 1631, however, they were scandalized at any toleration of ancestral rites as savoring of "superstition." In 1645 they got a ruling on their side from Rome, only to have it later set aside in 1656 on a basis of new information. This

merely added fuel to the fire, and subsequent years were filled with the fury of controversy. A Holy Office decree of 1704, approved by Pope Clement XI, prohibited the usages *T'ien* and *Shangti* and forbade certain honors previously allowed in worshiping ancestors and Confucius. There were various delays and new problems, including rebellion by converts from the literary and official classes who preferred to keep accepted ritual usage (and their jobs) rather than to follow rules made on the other side of the world. The emperor K'ang Hsi in 1717 finally ordered the Board of Rites to outlaw the Christian religion throughout the Empire. There were temporary concessions by the Church, persecution and an even stiffer Chinese ban in 1724, but a Papal Bull in 1742 revoked all modification and confirmed Clement's rulings.

The Jesuits always had promoted science and philosophy, and some few were able to remain in China in their scientific capacities. But the ban on Christianity was not lifted until the French reopened the Chinese door to Catholicism through treaty provision in 1844. Soon this tolerance was extended to the Protestants, who had been trying to gain foothold since arrival of the Rev. Mr. Robert Morrison of the London Missionary Society at Canton in 1807. It appears that the early importance of the Protestants was rather as linguists than in a religious way, for they acted as interpreters for the traders. Also, they prepared dictionaries and started to translate Western works into Chinese and vice versa, at the same time initiating medical activities. Thus they laid the way for what later grew into cultural contributions of tremendous importance.

The missionaries often displayed curiosity and daring, penetrating into the interior, although in theory they were forbidden to do so. This resulted in occasional trouble, including murders. It was the new treaties of 1844-58 which gave permission for missionary travel and interior residence. The treaties had other, more spectacular features, including a legalization of opium import into China, the opening of eleven new ports, right diplomatic residence at Peking, and the setting of a fixed tariff schedule of 5 per cent. (One begins to see why Sun Yat-sen called China under such regulation a "hypocolony.") The American treaty contained a stipulation for toleration of missionaries and converts without specifying where they were to live and work. This for the first time put the missionaries on a

treaty basis; the British treaty had similar provision, while the French additionally stipulated protection for missionaries in the interior.

Development of mission work was rapid from that time on, though there was frequent trouble when the missionaries (like the traders) insisted on entering parts of the country where they were not initially understood and welcomed. Treaty rights were strictly construed by the foreign Powers, and successive weak Chinese regimes floundered along as best they could, often held to answer for "incidents" in areas of foreign penetration. During the late 1920s, I recall, the American Government and certain missionaries both became impatient over the official necessity to insist on extraterritorial rights for missionaries in the remote interior, and a mission declaration at Tientsin expressed readiness to relinquish individual extraterritoriality. Washington might have been inwardly glad to grant this, but in practice nothing of the sort was possible—bandits would merely treat all Americans as without extraterritoriality—so it was necessary to go along for further years, during which the missionary troubles in a time of China unrest were the subject of frequent diplomatic protests to Chinese governments.

To trace more than superficially the growth of mission enterprise and its impact upon China is a task for volumes. Unfortunately much portrayal of this field has been partisan or sectarian. There has been no intent to deceive, but each writer's attention naturally fastens upon that which has occupied his own life. Thus an author will give statistics and other information about "Christian missions," and presently the reader will discover that the whole field of Roman Catholicism has been left out, because the writer was a Protestant and neither informed about nor interested in what the Catholics were doing. This is particularly easy for American Protestants to slip into because they have had so many sectarian divisions that it was a major task to sum up the Protestant effort alone, without pausing to remember that there are Catholics, mostly of European origin. Of late, in keeping with the unifying influence exerted by the impact of war, there has been much more tendency to consider the Christian field as a whole. Among the Protestants, the National Christian Council of China, under the presidency of Dr. Wu Yi-fang, represents a major unifying factor and an instrument of consultation, ex-

change of information, and co-operation. A total of 102 mission organizations and twenty affiliates of the United States and Canada are joined in a Foreign Missions Conference of North America, which has a valuable Committee on East Asia serving its sixty-seven groups normally working in China and Japan.

The number of missionaries and of communicants in China is a poor measuring stick for several reasons when it comes to summing up Christianity in China. For one thing, it is extraordinarily hard to say what makes a Christian—in China, or even in America! The China Handbook says:

The Protestant Christian Movement includes over one hundred mission organizations holding a variety of views as to what constitutes church membership. Some practice infant baptism and would count as members of the church infants so baptized. Others do not and include in their statistics only people baptized at the age of discretion or adults. Some have confirmation, others do not. Some practice neither baptism nor confirmation. Another difficulty lies in the turning over of the responsibility for the local collection of figures by church authorities to those less statistically minded.

As to the Roman Catholics, they speak of their "population" and take in a broad field.

Bearing this in mind, here are a few figures. A table from Boynton's *Handbook of the Christian Movement in China* gives the total of China Protestant communicants as 55,093 in 1893, 112,808 in 1903, 268,652 in 1915, 366,527 in 1920, 446,631 in 1928, and 536,089 in 1936. The total "community," however, was reckoned at around one million. This last year showed a total of 2,135 ordained Chinese, 11,662 full-time workers, and 132 North American societies plus twenty-one unions. As to the Roman Catholics, statistics for 1938-39 from the Jesuits at Siccawei, Shanghai, and the Lazarists at Peiping reported a "Roman Catholic population" in China of 3,182,950, with annual adult augmentation of about one hundred thousand. The Catholic Foreign Missionary Society of America (Maryknoll) reported 651 priests and religious of both sexes serving in China, though the proportion of Americans was small.

Rather wild statistics are sometimes cited concerning the invest-

ment in mission enterprise. C. F. Remer estimates that, in 1900, American Protestant mission property was valued at \$5,000,000, as compared with business and financial holdings of \$19,700,000; in 1914 the comparative figures were \$10,000,000 and \$49,200,000; for 1930 he estimated the American Protestant mission property at \$27,355,720, the American Catholic societies' property at \$1,022,422, philanthropic and educational institutions at \$13,526,747, and business and financial holdings of property and securities at \$196,800,000. Complicating factors include fluctuating foreign-exchange rates, the passing of originally foreign property into the hands of Chinese Christian churches, and the sometimes extensive property holdings (particularly in the case of the Catholics) by the Church in China. The property of thirteen Protestant colleges and universities was valued in 1938 at \$11,685,438.

Studies of what is required to keep missions going seem rather deficient. C. H. Fahs has dealt with "Trends in Protestant Giving" covering living donors in fifteen living Protestant bodies. This showed gifts of \$5.3 million in 1901, \$29.7 million in 1920, \$41 million in 1928, dropping to \$22.5 million in 1933, and up again to \$24.3 million in 1940. The Foreign Missions Conference figures include a much larger number of societies than do those of Fahs, and its totals seem to run about 25 to 30 per cent over the Fahs group. Exchange and buying-power variants must be calculated exhaustively for really full appraisal by experts, but the foregoing should give some general idea. The Catholics require little in the way of income from abroad, as their large landholding and other factors make them virtually self-supporting.

Christianity has provided scientific research from the earliest Jesuits, whose ancient astronomical instruments may still be seen on Peiping's Tartar Wall unless the Japanese perhaps looted them for their scrap-iron value. Up to Pearl Harbor, the Jesuits' Siccawei Observatory was the leading weather station of the Far East. The medical aid given China by Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, is beyond estimation. A particularly striking example is the Rockefeller-endowed Peiping Union Medical Hospital. The Rockefeller Foundation has contributed largely to innumerable constructive enterprises throughout the Far East, but mostly in China. There is the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and Yale in China, and literally

scores of other cultural institutions built on a foundation of those earlier days of the dictionary makers and tract translators. Christian schools in wartime had rough going, like everything else, but they stood firm as long as possible and removed to Free China when the time came. Dr. J. Leighton Stuart and colleagues foreign and Chinese kept Yenching University open even after the Japanese gained control over Peiping, and a Catholic institution similarly stood its ground. Finally after Pearl Harbor, Dr. Stuart and others became prisoners of Japan, to be released only with the peace in many cases, including that of Dr. Stuart.

Wartime changes of course were tremendous, though there was much less reduction in missionary personnel than might be expected as result of the Sino-Japanese war; reports of fourteen mission boards showed that between the summer of 1937 and the spring of 1939, only 5 per cent of their missionaries had withdrawn or retired. After Pearl Harbor there remained in occupied China, including Hong Kong, a total of 766 missionaries, of whom about 450 remained after the first *Gripsholm* repatriation, while in Free China there were 850 North American missionaries, as compared with nearly three thousand on the normal list. Property damage was heavy. Within two years of the 1937 outbreak of war, more than 150 mission compounds were known to have been destroyed or damaged by bombing alone. Looting and wanton destruction of properties were frequent. Where the missionaries had to leave, it was the practice to put most church buildings, and some schools and hospitals, in the hands of local congregations who had to operate under Japanese direction. As Japan's path of conquest spread, Japanese Christians were used by the directing military as instruments of enlisting support by native populations in various areas. In both North China and the Yangtze region Japan forced a Protestant union with Japanese in charge.

There was extensive wartime migration into Free China by both medical and educational personnel. It was reported that early in the war all of the thirteen Christian colleges and universities had been dislocated, while 170 out of 261 middle schools reporting were closed or shifted, and 60 hospitals out of 268 reporting were damaged or closed. West China became a center for Christian schools and hospitals. Out of the thirteen colleges just mentioned, which

function under the Associated Boards for Christian Colleges in China, the following found wartime refuge on the campus of West China Union University at Chengtu: West China Union University, University of Nanking, Ginling College, Shantung Christian University, Cheeloo University, and Yenching University. The Hua Chung University, formerly in Wuchang, went to Hsichow, near the Burma border, in Yünnan. The School of Commerce of Shanghai University and the School of Law of Soochow University co-operated in a night school in Chungking, with closure of other parts of both universities. St. John's University in Shanghai continued to function, but alumni of this famous institution began work to open an institution of the same name, in Chungking, with the idea of uniting with Shanghai University after the war. Hangchow University shut down. Hwa Nan College, formerly in Foochow, operated under a Chinese staff in Yenping. Fukien Christian University, formerly in Foochow, removed to Shaowu. Lingnan University, formerly in Canton, was not running, but students and faculty were reported to be gathering in Hei Hsien, near Swatow. Schools for the blind, deaf, and mute also moved upcountry and continued their work.

An official wartime Chinese survey listed twenty-eight Protestant hospitals while Chengtu, Chungking, and Kunming became centers for emigree educational institutions ranging from university rank down. More, the war stimulated a dynamic urge to build upon all that had gone before—to extend every sort of rural advancement, to assist in intelligent development of the new Chinese industrialism, to furnish not only emergency medical and other relief but to set up permanent improvements; and throughout all this to promote evangelism to strengthen the Chinese Church and develop more and better Chinese Christians. This impetus was of immense value in starting to cope with fresh problems of the peace, when Christian institutions swept back toward the coast and re-established their former bases.

The influence of Christianity has gone far beyond the mere question of numerical adherents. The work and example of the Christian missionaries has been tremendous. This was made clear by the way students during wartime underwent long, hazardous trips to follow their schools upcountry, Chinese figures citing 105 wartime

middle schools in Free China with thirty thousand students. They wanted what the missionaries had made available. There has been great prestige for Christianity in the large percentage of National Government officials who were Christians, from the Generalissimo down, and from the war work of such Catholics as Father Jacquinot, who established the Shanghai wartime "safety zone." Bishop Paul Yu Pin, Vicar Apostolic of Nanking, is world known and much traveled. In Chungking he became a member of the People's Political Council. China's Government has representation at the Vatican in the person of Cheou-kang Sie, who as delegate provides direct communion between Chinese Catholics and the Pope.

My thought on all this may be summed up by answering the question which heads this chapter with a strong affirmative. Christianity in China has risen to meet its tests victoriously. Its prestige was never higher than at the end of its wartime travail, nor was there ever such prospect for future constructive work. The attitude of the Christian missionary in self-questioning, self-improvement, and eager search for more fields of service seems to me to demonstrate a continuing force with great future implications for good.

I don't want to paint a too rosy picture. There are vast problems and adjustments ahead. It cannot be guaranteed that the Chinese as an individual will ever be a completely satisfactory convert to any single religious faith, for his nature is to tolerate a large number of beliefs. Often, I suspect, the fervor of Christian missionaries is met with inner reservations on the part of the outwardly docile Chinese. It may even set up barriers between missionary and Chinese, as between missionary Westerner and his businessman opposite number. On the other hand, the missionary view appears to be developing a solid realism which breaks barricades by means of intelligence instead of driving against them with faith alone.

Recently I have seen a few instances of what struck me as mistaken missionary tactics. For example, a group of Chinese-speaking Americans was sought for war service in China. Because missionaries study Chinese the group turned out to be almost all missionary in complexion, though this was not a religious job. One businessman finally quit because, he told me, "the missionaries insist on praying when we start the day, and then they pray some more when we wind up—I couldn't stand it, because it seemed to me out of place."

To him prayer, like patriotism, ought to be a privilege, not an obligation. Whatever the full facts of that particular incident, I believe many Chinese feel the same way. Certain professional missionary phrases and words—"fellowship" is an example—grow so familiar to missionaries that they fail to realize the possibly adverse impact they may have on others. Of course there is a much bigger and other side to the picture; Western businessmen, by careless speech and act and their frequently free use of tobacco and liquor, must often shock missionaries who feel that such conduct hurts the whole cause of Christian example. But the missionary has to deal with his modern world as it is and by modern methods. I believe he is showing great competence to shift tactics when need arises without altering fundamental principle. With peace has come obvious need for certain such changes in approach.

In a booklet called *Missions in Far Eastern Cultural Relations*, Searle Bates recently pointed out many interesting factors of difficulty and possible progress. He remarked that missions have learned to despise Western prestige in the ordinary sense of artificial privilege and unreal favor, hence they welcomed the abolition of extra-territoriality. He said:

Reaction in the Far East may, however, go so far as to harm real values. If the United Nations win a sweeping, not-too-long-delayed military victory, and if fairly successful co-operation of America and Britain with China is maintained through a peace settlement largely satisfactory to the Chinese people, the problem may not be acute. . . . In China there has been widespread popular appreciation of the value of Christian services and their steadfastness in time of crisis. . . . Voices in all ranks of the Government and among Communist leaders have joined with private persons in expressing their cordial thanks. . . .

To maintain this situation, Dr. Bates suggested that, in China, cultural activity might assist in the taking apart of wartime patterns in the western provinces and reintegration along with reoccupation of the East and North, together with similar work in other Far East countries.

"The need for missions and other constructive cultural effort remains," Dr. Bates affirmed, while adding that "the long prospect of missions in cultural relations is heavily dependent upon completion

of the war with a genuine peace, with free international co-operation for mutual welfare as its principle." As a footnote it may be mentioned that Dr. Bates, like many other missionaries, returned to China before the war had ended.

Unquestionably the whole issue of mission advance keys closely with the sort of peacetime conditions we are to have in China, and whether China herself is to find in peace a chance for real union, leadership, and progress. But even if China does not fare too well in the immediate future, Christian missions have shown their stanch capacity to "take it." I believe that they are bound to be a leading factor in helping China to find right paths.

14

DELETED BY CENSOR

ALL THROUGH my double decade of Far East journalism I was plagued by censors—and they by me. An exception may be made of the two years I spent at Manila. The Philippines of that peaceful period had no censorship of any description, even moral. I well recall the public service performed by one of the United Press's client newspapers in a small southern island city where, it appears, there was prevalent what is euphemistically known as "social disease." On its front page one day this paper published the names of all the town's ladies of joy who had been submitted to medical test and had triumphantly passed as, if not technically pure, at least uncontaminated. No one questioned the legality or the taste of this bit of Fourth Estate enterprise.

It was considerably earlier in my Orient residence, when I first arrived in Japan, that I first became aware of the Big Bad Censor. He seems to have been a feature of the press landscape in Dai Nippon throughout Japan's modern history, but this was an easygoing period when foreigners were popular and housewives passed out dainties to the corner gendarmes. Working on English-language dailies, I heard little about any censorship, although we knew that such a thing existed. It was applied sporadically, on special occasions. About the only fixed rule well understood in every news office was that special respect must be shown the imperial family. Our Japanese colleagues at that period made fun of the divinity theory and were entirely aware that the current incumbent of the Throne, in addition to being balmy, had sprung from ancestors considerably more fleshly than any Sun Goddess; but still they took care, even on

the American-owned *Japan Advertiser*, to put notes of any imperial journeyings at the very top of the personal column.

On the other hand there was little or no attempt to harass the foreign correspondents. There weren't many regularly stationed in Tokyo. Hearst maintained the late Duke Parry, but he was less concerned about news coverage than in selling American comic strips to the Japanese vernacular press, which had an appetite for novelties. The routine was to obtain advance proofs from America, paste blank bits of paper over the speech "balloons," then letter in approximate Japanese translations in syllabic *kana*. Duke's big problem was with the immediately popular Jiggs and Maggie. Their preoccupation with corned beef and cabbage set a major obstacle, for Japan had no knowledge of any such dainty. Finally he reluctantly authorized the substitution of *sukuyaki*, a sort of Japanese equivalent of chop suey. It was a party dish, customarily prepared in a smoking pan over a charcoal *hibachi* set before each guest, but the Japanese bill of fare gave scant room for choice, so it was *sukuyaki* which tempted Jiggs in Tokyo.

Suddenly one morning our routine of producing the afternoon *Japan Times* was shattered by the panting arrival of Rod Matheson of the Chicago *Tribune*. He bore tidings that he had just witnessed an attempt on the life of the popular young Prince Regent (now Emperor Hirohito) only a few yards away, at the Toronomon street intersection. As the Regent sped along in his red motorcar flanked by motorcycle escort, someone—a Korean, no doubt—had fired a shot at him with a home-fabricated walking-stick pistol. This weapon carried wide of the mark, but there was a tremendous story anyway. The question was, how could we print it? Certainly no open mention of the matter would be allowed by the police in advance of some carefully concocted official release which could not be expected for many hours. And we were an afternoon newspaper.

My American journalistic blood curdled at the thought of our appearing on the streets with no mention of such a whale of a yarn. But the Japanese shook their heads doubtfully; as eager newsmen as I, they were still deterred by knowledge that news treatment normal to me would be lese majesty in the eyes of the cops. Finally I evolved a ridiculous scheme, far from the heart's desire but at least slightly

"saving face" for us in the view of readers expecting The News from us always, somehow.

I had our composing room set a page-wide banner headline reading PRINCE REGENT ATTACKED. At the same time the linotypes set a full story of the Toronomon "incident," as it later came to be known, with double-column large-type introduction. Then we took a chisel and did a lovely job of mutilating the introduction and part of the body of our news story. We left just enough type so that a very patient reader might with great pains eventually make out the drift of its meaning. Finally, having thus self-censored ourselves to camouflage an appearance that official censors had given us a working over, we reversed the letters of the big black headline so that it gave an Alice-in-Wonderland effect and read: ECNIRP TNEGER DEKCATTA. Then we started the press. After accumulating a good supply of these fantastic papers, we let our carrier boys burst forth with them.

Of course the foreign community caught on and laughed its sides out. The police were so dumfuddled that it was a couple of hours before anybody came around calling, and even then they were hesitant and bewildered as to just what had happened. None of the Japanese-vernacular newspapers mentioned the Toronomon affair during that day, so for what it was worth we had a clean scoop—in the English language, badly scrambled! Late in the afternoon the police figured that something odd had occurred, and halfheartedly impounded a couple of dozen remaining copies of the paper, carefully set aside by the pressroom in anticipation of such action. And that was the last we heard of it. It was extremely lucky for us that this happened in early 1924, not in the militaristic period which started with 1931.

Soon I was over in Peking, cabling news and (more frequently) rumors out of that then lively capital. My first home connection was with the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, which at that time still had a big staff abroad but was beginning to wonder why. The *Ledger* wasn't a hard taskmaster. (Later the *Ledger* dispensed with its foreign staff, and not long after that Philadelphia dispensed with the *Ledger*, from which all foreign correspondents would be disposed to draw a moral.) Most of my dispatches were mild as goose milk, so I had little censorship trouble, though I knew that our telegrams

were in theory being gone over by two or three sets of Chinese censors representing the police, the Waichiaopu or Foreign Office, and the Chiaotungpu or Communications Ministry, as I recall. One afternoon I was up at the home of the late Jimmy Butts, a congenial fellow correspondent, when he received a phone call about trouble at the palace of the Provisional Chief Executive. It developed that testy old Marshal Tsao Kun, irritated over an *en masse* visitation by a throng of students who didn't like corruption in what (for lack of a better term) was called his government, had ordered machine guns to spray on the crowd. Two or three hundred boys and girls had been mowed down. It was a hell of a story.

Jimmy and I knew we had been slow in getting off the mark. But anyway we typed off dispatches to the *Ledger* and the *Chicago Daily News* and spurred our rickshas to high haste in getting over to the Great Northern Cable office, where we filed to America via Europe at the then press rate of a shilling a word to London. Sure enough, our competitors had been there already; inside the wicket we could see a mountain of their messages.

Came evening, and also came irate complaints by wire from all our home offices. Why hadn't we filed on the big ruckus at Tsao Kun's yamen? But we had filed, so we knew the answer—censorship. Someone, I believe it was John Goette of I.N.S., had slipped a message through while the censors still napped; but the rest of us were caught.

A day later we discovered what had happened. Not two or three sets of censors, but five, headed by several big ignorant brutes sent by Tsao Kun personally, had picked up that mountain of messages and lugged it off to parts unknown. The messages lay unsent and incommunicado while there was debate as to what should be done. Tsao would have preferred to forget about the whole massacre, as by this time it bored him. But Chinese legations and consulates abroad were prompt to cable that the news had somehow escaped. So finally Tsao said a Chinese equivalent of "Nuts! Never mind," and the censors brought back the messages to the cable office in a bushel basket. They turned the basket over, lifted it off, and authorized the telegraphers to deal from the top. So Jimmy Butts and Randall Gould were credited in America with the first really complete coverage of the story.

Those Peking days were wonderful. The city was a romantic dream, and we foreign correspondents trundled about together in our rickshas, carefully keeping an eye on one another except when sudden emergency scattered us on our own. Usually our procession was imposingly headed by Goette, who had a ricksha of not only the customary one coolie-power but also one police-dog-power. John's puller held back desperately on his shafts while Peter, John's dog, panted along underneath, shoving mightily with his backbone ridge up against the ricksha axle. This wasn't John's idea or the coolie's; it was all Peter's, and it certainly made for rapid transit. Ray Marshall of United Press had the biggest coolie of our lot, but also the laziest except when it came to a fight with his fellow pullers. The late Charlie Dailey of the Chicago *Tribune* would greet any unexpected official announcement with a reflective, "Hmm, I knew that was coming and I sent a mailer on it, let's see, oh, about four weeks ago—they've got it right on their desks or in the paper already, so I don't need to file!" Shortly thereafter he would vanish from our ricksha cavalcade. One or two suspicious characters finally made a test by whizzing through short-cut *hutungs* to the cable office. Sure enough, there was Charlie guiltily scribbling off a "flash," urgent triple rate. After that we saw to it that if the rest of the crowd elected to stop by the Peking Club of a hot noontime to cool off by shaking dice for one or two gimlets—lovely mixtures of gin, lime juice, and ice cubes—Charlie was firmly brought along too. So we had a little self-censorship of our own, if you could call it that. Customs of the pack began to have a force of law, even among unruly newsfolk.

Later, when I found myself at bustling commercial Shanghai, first with United Press and later with the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, I began to run into censorships with teeth. There was none at the beginning, in my U.P. period. But when I joined the *Post* and later took on a correspondenceship for the *Christian Science Monitor* the political situation had advanced (or retrogressed) as result of Japan's invasion of Manchuria. The Chinese, though without ordinary legal jurisdiction in extraterritorial foreign Shanghai, were able to establish the position that censorship of cable and radio facilities was justified because of the international tensions then existing. After a while the foreign consuls advised officials of

the International Settlement and French Concession that Chinese censorship should be permitted. From then on, some odd things happened.

First, the Chinese censors cut our outgoing dispatches to ribbons, metaphorically speaking (actually they drew Chinese ink brushes through the words to be deleted). There was a legend that one message especially obnoxious to Nanking went through as follows: "Stop stop stop stop stop. Jones." The word "stop" is used in press messages to indicate a period, and everything between these divisions had been censored. But even more enraging was the discovery that if we ever referred to "Manchukuo," Japan's pseudo state in Manchuria, the patriotic Nanking censors took it on themselves to insert "puppet state of" before the obnoxious word; if we mentioned Manchukuo's emperor, the former Manchu boy emperor expelled from Peking years before by the Christian general, the word "puppet" was similarly prefixed. The extra words had to be paid for by the recipient, of course. Not only did we receive call-downs from home offices because of this apparent editorializing on our part, but we feared worse. No one could tell when some particularly enterprising censor might write in a whole essay of his own, to go to some American newspaper over the signature of its unsuspecting correspondent. Notification of excisions or additions was never given the correspondents. We complained to Nanking and to our own diplomats.

This resulted in the welcome appointment of Hollington K. Tong to be chief censor at Shanghai. When I heard "Holly" being thoroughly kicked around as an oppressive censor in Chungking years later, I remembered how conscientiously he had cleaned up a bad situation of that earlier time. A graduate of the University of Missouri School of Journalism and a director of Dr. Charles James Fox's American daily *North China Star* at Tientsin, Dr. Tong had been my first boss in China, though I never saw him. He was at least nominally the managing director of the *Pei-ching Jih Pao* or *Peking Daily News*, a small English-language daily read mostly by students and subject to every political storm, one of which blew me rather promptly out of that initial job. Holly had nothing to do with it. As to the Shanghai censorship, there was no lack of perception on

Holly's part about why the correspondents were angry. Without delay he laid down new rules.

Hereafter, it was decided, the censorship must notify any correspondent when changes were to be made in his copy before transmission. Such changes would be made only because of wrong facts. Under no circumstances would the censors insert any words. The correspondent might put up his side of the case in rebuttal of the censor's attitude.

We were all skeptical. But behold, Holly made good. It was usually he himself rather than a subordinate who phoned the correspondent in case of a projected deletion. If necessary he would meet the correspondent personally. Sometimes the correspondent was able to convince Holly that the facts were as stated, in which case the message went off unchanged. Sometimes Holly convinced the correspondent that he had fallen for a false rumor, in which case the correspondent was saved from consequences unpleasant to himself. There was no more monkey business about adding unauthorized text. China had finally, we realized, developed a censorship as nearly ideal as any censorship could be. It seemed too good to be true. In fact it was too good to be true permanently. The censorship as administered by Holly at Chungking later was a very different thing, but blame may be spread broadly. And within the first week of peace Holly fulfilled past vows by resigning public office to get back to the print shop.

There were some odd evasions of the Shanghai censorship even under Holly. One method was to send stories by mail steamer to British Hong Kong or to Tokyo, either about two days away. If Nanking didn't like a story, it was usually a safe bet that the British and the Japanese *would* like it, and that neither would hold it up. A few correspondents who were particularly in the Japanese good graces were able to use a Japanese-owned cable to Japan through Nagasaki. This involved translating the message into Japanese and having someone at the other end to turn it back into English before it was retransmitted to America. This was a nuisance, but could be arranged for certain people whose views on China were in line with those of the Japanese.

Photographers were particularly irked by the Chinese censorship

of pictures. It was the rule that no undeveloped film could go out of the country. This was bad enough as it affected black-and-white film, but such film could be processed in Shanghai. It was an impossible requirement in the case of color film, for which the necessary complex development facilities were totally lacking. As an experiment, my friends George Lacks and Alex Buchman once locked themselves in Lacks's darkroom with some Leica-exposed Kodachrome and an elaborate equipment of directions and chemicals. Hours later they fell out with some tasty-looking pictures of colored billboards, vowing that once was enough for that kind of torture. No one even tried to develop color movie film. But now and then a reel would be smuggled quietly aboard a southbound steamer, whose purser would turn it over to Pan-American Airways officials at Hong Kong for plane transmission to Rochester, N. Y.

On the Shanghai *Evening Post* we were having troubles in other directions. I have previously mentioned that our adverse view of Japan's Manchuria invasion in the autumn of 1931 didn't meet with the approval of many others in our emigree community. Some Americans saw things our way, but there were fewer than five thousand Americans and about twice that many British. Most of the British (as Secretary Stimson was discovering) felt that Japan was only trying to catch up with the international procession by developing wholesome Empire ideas. Colonel Amery said in London, with murmurs of approval from Shanghai:

"I confess that I see no reason why, whether in act, or in word, or in sympathy, we should go individually or internationally against Japan in this matter. . . . Who is there among us to cast the first stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continuous aggression of a vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands condemned if we condemn Japan."

The *Post* was happy to throw a first stone, but we got it right back, between the eyes. If we couldn't keep subversive ideas to ourselves, it was muttered in influential local quarters, perhaps some sort of censorship of the press was overdue. While this was still in the air we found ourselves one night plunged into the sudden "first Shanghai war" of early 1932. With Neil Starr's approval, irrespec-

tive of what the rest of the town might think, Ted Thackrey and I handed a daily editorial drubbing to the embattled Japanese.

Our front-page statement which we entitled "To Those Who Have Abused a Trust—Get Out!" was the climax of this campaign. It nearly ruined the paper. My recollection is that Ted first got the idea for it one Saturday afternoon. Then I caught fire and hammered it out at ninety words a minute after Ted had gone home. On Sunday, out at Ted's Hungjao Road house, we looked it over in cool blood and tried to figure how sore the Japanese would get. What we didn't fully realize was how sore a lot of Britons and Americans would get. I think if we had known we'd have gone ahead all the faster. Anyway, Monday afternoon's front page carried a straightforward, not to say vitriolic, piece which began:

Japanese military forces and gunmen have not only lost their usefulness as a part of Shanghai's defense scheme; they have forfeited their right to remain on International Settlement soil.

Today we are no more concerned with the technicalities of the Japanese position than the Japanese have thus far been concerned with the rights, property, and lives of the rest of us.

The plain fact is that Japan is waging war against China—and is most improperly using the International Settlement's neutral soil as a base for such war.

Not only has she jeopardized the whole future status of the Settlement by such activity but she also has taken over police power from Settlement authorities in a way which we consider undesirable in the extreme, she has extended the power to an area never before contemplated by others at the outset, and she has misused that power in a variety of acts, including arson and murderous attacks upon helpless prisoners.

Without delay International Settlement authorities should publicly disassociate themselves from these excesses.

By the time the Settlement authorities, the Foreign Defense Force officers, and the foreign consuls had read that far, they were apoplectic with rage—not rage at the Japanese, but at the *Post* and everybody connected with the *Post*. What we had done, they felt, was not so much to attack the Japanese as to throw squarely in their faces the shortcomings of the foreign administrators, who were mainly Britons and Americans. We had artlessly given away the

whole show. Here in cold type was a statement that the Japanese had been allowed to go beyond their rights as members of the joint Foreign Defense Force. We had even mentioned Japanese atrocities. Both Thackrey and I had gone out and seen atrocities and had reported on them, but most of the club-bar and bridge-table devotees were not prepared to believe that such gentlemen as the Japanese Army, Navy, and Marines could ever forget their much-advertised code of *bushido*. Therefore the *Post* must no doubt be subsidized by the Chinese Government, else it would not say such things. Commercial-minded Shanghai thought mostly in terms of money.

We said more in that particular piece. We demanded that the foreign Powers, and individual Shanghai nationals of such Powers, make it clear that they were in no way associated with any offensive warfare against the Chinese nation. We urged a re-enunciation of the traditional neutral status of the International Settlement. To restore that neutrality ("at the moment besmirched"), we said that the following immediate steps should be taken: A demand for evacuation of all Japanese armed forces, the disarming of the so-called *ronin* or Japanese plain-clothes operatives, "who have proved themselves as a body headstrong and irresponsible at best, brutal and ruffianly at worst," and cessation of all further landing of Japanese armed military forces on the Settlement area. We concluded:

Nothing can wipe out the tragic error of Japan's blunder. We cannot forecast what Japan may achieve either in overwhelming or in conciliating the Chinese. The only thing that can be done is to make plain that Japan is plowing a lonely furrow. . . . To armed Japanese, who have used the Settlement as a base for war and who have grossly abused a trust confided in them, but two words can now be said: "Get out!"

It would be too much to say that the Japanese liked this. But they behaved better than our foreign friends, who with few exceptions squalled like scalded cats. Rumors hit us from every quarter. There was a move in the American Consulate General to shut down the *Post* permanently. Censorship was to be imposed, we heard, for the first time on all local publications by authorities of the International Settlement and the French Concession (we were just over the boundary line, Avenue Edward VII, in the Concession). Legal ac-

tion might be taken in the U. S. Court for China against the Messrs. Starr, Thackrey, and Gould on charges of disturbing the peace—this at a time when Japanese bombs were doing a pretty good job of that in their own way!

Finally all this furor came to nothing. The foreign authorities put none of our advice into effect, but neither did they move against the *Post*. We gathered that Washington perhaps had more sympathy with our view than that of our excited opponents. Six weeks of hostilities came to an end, and the Japanese and Chinese patched up a precarious peace. All there was to remind us of our newsprint heroism was a lot of canceled advertising contracts. We had sold a lot of newspapers, but that isn't what makes the mare go.

Oddly, the Japanese consular officials seemed in a quiet way to admire us. They invited us to all their geisha parties as usual, and so did the Japanese armed forces. If the question of our editorial policy came up, they would only grin. We continued to hammer at their Manchuria and North China incursions, but we took pains to be accurate and fair in every criticism. More, when anything Japanese deserved a "break" we did not withhold our praise. We supported their case against too much British domination of International Settlement administration. Americans were a fellow minority at Shanghai after all. We tried to strengthen the hands of the saner Japanese elements. Whenever we made a mistake about anybody, even or especially a Japanese, we published a prompt correction without prompting. This puzzled the Japanese plenty, but at least they concluded we were honest. There was constant temptation to presume a Chinese subsidy, but we criticized the Chinese too, on occasion. So although the Osaka *Mainichi* once ran a slanderous story about me, during a Japan visit, stating that I got half a million Chinese dollars a year from the Chinese Government, I won a retraction after considerable negotiating. There were always a few Japanese who at least admired our spunk.

Of course some of our fellow Americans, and some Britons, felt the same way. The number grew as time went on, as Japan's national program grew clearer, and as the Anglo-American ox began to be gored along with the Chinese. Ted Thackrey and our business staff, mostly comprising Dave and Dorothea Buick, won back some of the lost advertising contracts. But Ted found himself up against one or two factors which had us permanently licked.

One grumpy old Briton who ran a department store on mid-Victorian lines was approached with the suggestion that since many Shanghailanders read the *Post*, an ad from his store should attract new customers.

"Customers!" snarled the ancient. "Customers! Customers are the curse of the business!"

Another argument had us even worse beat. As Shanghai is located almost precisely on the opposite side of the world from New York, our afternoon paper went to press at an hour when American and British people had gone to sleep and their day's doings had been fully radioed out to the Far East. Until the *Post* rose to prominence in its field of four English-language papers, the other three papers—all morning publications—could hold this news for hours and then give it to their readers simultaneously. We argued, with justice, that the *Post* was so favored by the construction of the globe that virtually everything arriving by telegraph from America and Europe could be read in our paper the evening before our competitors printed it.

"That's just the trouble," replied devoted readers of our local equivalent of the London *Times*, the *North China Daily News*, better known as the Old Lady of the Bund. "Your paper gets all the news, and that spoils enjoyment of the morning paper. And we have always read the morning paper."

Those were the days in Shanghai when whatever had been, must be, forever and ever amen. Thus the Japanese had always been regarded as part of the foreign community and acceptable at the supremely long bar of the Shanghai Club, though Chinese were excluded. So why should they be insulted merely for standing up against the "dirty Chinese"—no doubt, if all the facts were known, on behalf of the rights of all foreigners? Anyone who went against the tide of that period was certainly courting some kind of censorship, even though it took such indirect forms as the withholding of advertising patronage or the administering of a sound scolding.

Then we went into the Chinese-language news field and met our first solid local censorship.

The reasoning behind this move seemed sound. Whereas ten thousand was a big circulation for an English-language paper in Shanghai, there ought (so we felt) to be almost no ceiling whatever

on circulation for a Chinese-language paper. In literate Japan newspaper circulations ran up to three million or so. China was less literate but had more people. Moreover a lot of our big ramshackle four-story brick building was going to waste. Originally the ground floor had been a saloon, the second floor a dance hall, the third floor a gambling den, and the fourth floor was divided into tiny little rooms each just big enough to hold a bed. Ted and I reasoned that the first floor was all right for business offices and print shop, the second floor for *Post* editorial and other offices, and that even if we virtually wasted the top floor on prosaic and unremunerative newspaper files, there was very little excuse for not using the remaining third floor in getting out a Chinese edition, using our name in Chinese—*Ta Mei Wan Pao*, or literally Great American Evening Paper. So the thing was done.

Not long afterward Ted departed for the United States, where he presently became editor of another *Post*, the New York *Post*. Meanwhile as editor in Shanghai of our own *Post*, plus *Ta Mei*, I ran into adventures enough for a book in themselves. In fact several others in comparable circumstances have already done books, but I know of nobody who had an English-language paper on one shoulder and a Chinese version on the other. My escape was to make as little work and as much fun of it all as possible.

Mark Gayn in his *Journey from the East* tells of a working week on our friendly competitor the *China Press* "seldom below seventy-two hours." George Bruce, our general manager with whom in the usual business-editorial style I carried on a feud for several years till we learned better and began to work in harmony, once in the earlier period complained to Neil Starr that he doubted whether I put in more than two hours a day at my work of editing. Perhaps remembering Lincoln's response to criticism of Grant's drinking, Neil blandly replied in effect that he wished he had more such loafers who could turn out as much work. Bruce quit worrying about me and did a sound job of getting us out of red ink and into the black. At the height of his personal prosperity came wartime internment and sudden death from a heart attack.

Occasionally my luck ran out. Before motoring off for a Mokanshan week end I once furiously boiled down two or three magazine articles to serve as filler material following more important subjects

in the editorial column. It was always my habit to have a lot of type lying ready for use. On this particular occasion the weather was warm, I enjoyed the bamboo and fresh air of Mokanshan, and I didn't start home till Monday morning. So the task of throwing together the editorial page fell on our executive editor, M. C. "Henry" Ford. Henry's week end had been among the city night spots. This perhaps contributed both to a certain thoughtlessness and to his appreciation of one of my reprint digests. Anyway, Neil on that fateful Monday landed in Shanghai after ship travel from Singapore to pick up his newspaper and find in the top honor position of its editorial columns a discourse on the best cure for hangovers! This was one of the few times that his calm deserted him and he audibly wondered whether he didn't need another editor. At first I was inclined to agree with him. On my own part, at least, saner councils later prevailed. My final conclusion was that Shanghai probably derived more benefit from that editorial than from many a piece on which I'd toiled harder. For months afterwards, boozy readers were thanking me for my public spirit in pointing out the existence of a potent tablet called acetidine which combines the beneficent influences of aspirin, caffeine, and phenacetin. Before we had gone far with our *Ta Mei* publication I was needing it myself.

In the first place, it's a tough job to run a newspaper in a language one reads very imperfectly, as was my case. Years before in Peking I had watched the late B. Lenox Simpson (Putnam Weale) operate a bilingual daily half English, half Chinese. One morning he woke up to the fact that the two sections were pursuing not only different but diametrically opposite editorial policies. In the case of *Ta Mei* I sought to escape this fate by various means, including the employment of successive Chinese translator-secretaries and efforts to make the *Ta Mei* staff translate the *Post* into Chinese. They argued that their Chinese readers had been corrupted by the influence of Shanghai's "mosquito" press, so that their customers demanded an even spicier diet than the by no means flavorless *Post* provided. These "mosquito" papers were so called because they stung, fluttered about, and despite diligent police search couldn't be tracked down as to offices of origin. Therefore *Ta Mei* had to provide scandal, gossip, and (despite our insistence that it was an

American paper in Chinese) patriotic service to China whenever the editors thought they could get away with it. This was particularly true after those terrific days of the 1937 "second Shanghai war," which gave us news stories too big for any newspaper and which later provided *Ta Mei's* golden opportunity by putting out of business all Chinese papers not of foreign registry.

We thought the 1932 hostilities had been pretty exciting, but in terms of 1937 they seemed only a warmup. Journalistically, 1932 had provided not only headlines but a lot of side byplay. The late Floyd Gibbons and others had come out on a junket, to pick up China local color and reputation they could cash in on later through radio broadcasting and magazine articles. Floyd, an engaging, flamboyant character with a white patch over the socket of an eye missing since World War I, did a series of articles for the Hearst press. Each began in radio style "Hello, everybody!" They included one especially touching piece of Shanghai battle coverage from the alleged vantage point of a rowboat floating down the Whangpoo by night. Then there was a pause of several days, with nothing out of Floyd. Competitive news service grew restive—what could the Old Master be cooking up for their discomfiture? United Press's New York headquarters sent a frantic radio to their Shanghai correspondent, "Nothing printed from Gibbons lately. Find what he's doing. Report fully." I dropped in to discover the U.P. bureau manager brooding over this in a state of annoyed despondency. On impulse I typed out a frivolous suggested reply, and left. I discovered later that the manager finally fired off my joke message to his New York bosses and went home in disgust. That night U.P.'s visiting chief Far East correspondent, Miles W. "Peg" Vaughn, was horrified to find this response to the head-office query in the file of outgoing Shanghai messages: "Gibbons in Cathay Hotel bar. Shall we cover?" For once, New York had nothing more to say.

But on August 14, 1937, during a single day and in each instance within a half mile of our office, we experienced two accidental air bombings which proved this wasn't to be fun. The first of these (striking among other things the Cathay Hotel just mentioned) cost about 850 lives. The second (which massacred Chinese refugees milling about a street intersection) occurred half an hour later,

with a death toll in excess of sixteen hundred. Meanwhile anti-aircraft fragments were falling all about us, killing or wounding many, and every sort of shell and bullet was passing overhead. The *Post* rolled special editions off its rickety flat-bed press as fast as they could be thrown together. *Ta Mei Wan Pao* ran up a big circulation with the advantage of a rotary press. Soon we also started a morning edition called simply the *Ta Mei Pao*. This latter paper, hastily staffed with men picked up from other papers which shut up shop as the Japanese began increasingly to dominate Shanghai life, was where my real headaches began.

Not long after retirement of the Chinese Army from the Shanghai area in November 1937, editors of all the surviving vernacular newspapers were summoned to a conference with officials of the Shanghai Municipal Council, who made clear they were speaking for both Settlement and French Concession. We included a number of foreigners such as "Judge" Norwood F. Allman, who had assumed charge of the *Shun Pao*, and Hal P. Mills, new editor of the *Hwa Mei Wan Pao*. It was explained to us that censorship of newspapers in the foreign areas had been avoided up to then, and it would still be avoided in the case of the English-language press, but that with regard to the Chinese papers we must face the fact of Japan's control of Chinese territory surrounding Shanghai. If we would co-operate with the authorities and prevent publication by the Chinese press of news and views calculated to inflame the local population (and simultaneously to irritate the Japanese), all would be well. But the Japanese military had made it clear that if Settlement and Concession officials couldn't control the Chinese papers, they were prepared to take over the job themselves.

"All right," we chorused. We could see the seriousness of the situation. I immediately had a talk with my chief go-between, popular Sammy Chang, who was Neil Starr's life insurance agency superintendent but had previously been assistant to Lee Choy in the Kuo Min News Agency. From the outset he had taken a leading part in the operation of our *Ta Mei* papers. We went over the rules as laid down by the S.M.C., and I stressed that it was particularly requested that no Chinese papers publish the full text of official Chinese Government statements, especially speeches by the Generalissimo. All these things were picked up by private radios. We

could give extracts coupled with our own résumés of the sense of such documents, but not their complete and precise wordings. I pointed out that we didn't have space anyway and that such extensive publication was not justified on a basis of news value. Sammy was agreeable and promised to pass the word to our Chinese news editors.

Two days later the Generalissimo delivered a long speech, and our morning edition published it word for word.

I went up in the air, and the outraged Council officials provided plenty of impetus. From upstairs came apologies and promises. Sammy was a little downcast and inclined to grumble about the official rules, but he said that nothing of the sort would happen again. Within a week it *had* happened again, over a mild speech by Chiang about economic problems before the National Production Council. The foreign authorities promptly banned *Ta Mei Pao* for two weeks.

"The *Ta Mei* papers are American," we said. "How are you going to stop us from printing?" We cabled a protest to Secretary Hull at the same time.

The answer was that nobody cared to stop us from printing. We could print and be damned. But the French police threw a cordon around our plant and grimly intimated that even though we printed our building full of papers, still not one would be allowed to circulate. Secretary Hull made no reply to our message. We reconsidered, and saved our newsprint. The *Post* and the afternoon *Ta Mei* weren't affected.

That taught us something about official censorship, at the very moment that the foreign correspondents were finally being relieved from their own problems. Of course the Chinese censors had been chased out of the radio and cable offices by the Japanese, who quietly flowed into every part of foreign Shanghai where the Chinese had formerly been allowed to maintain any official setup. But a skilled American communications man, Al Lusey, opened a new office for the American newspapers' communications company, Press Wireless. He made clear that no Japanese, Chinese, or any other sort of censors would interfere with its handling of press messages to the United States as long as he was in charge at Shanghai. So the American newsmen deserted R.C.A., Mackay, and Com-

mercial Pacific Cables and filed by Press Wireless, unhampered. Press Wireless was later to be censored at Chungking by Chinese.

Frustrated at one important point, the Japanese sought other means of gagging free expression. Terrorism was the most obvious, though it was to prove the least effective.

Our first hint of this new plan of attack came with a bang. In fact it was a bomb blast right in our office. About five o'clock one morning some person unknown moseyed up the stairs in our building and deposited a hand grenade in the hall just outside my office on the second floor. The explosion occurred directly under a wooden bench on which a delivery coolie was sleeping in the casual way common to China's poor. Luckily for him, this proved one of those freak instances of directional blast—the full force of the bomb went sidewise, and the coolie above was quite unharmed, though he certainly woke up fast. Glass was shattered in the wall of my office and that of our British columnist H. G. W. Woodhead, C.B.E., while a small hole was blown in the wall of the United Press office across the hall from us. The *North China Daily News* promptly carried an amusing cartoon by its Russian artist "Sapajou" portraying the Messrs. Woodhead, Gould, and John Morris of U.P. in excited debate, each claiming credit for having attracted all this notoriety!

A few days later there was another early morning bomb blast, this time in our revolving door downstairs. (Why these callers usually came around 5 A.M. I could never make out, unless it was because of special solicitude for my personal safety; even though George Bruce slandered me a little in saying I worked only two hours daily, I certainly never was on the job at any such clammy hour as five o'clock in the morning.) This dastardly attack on our revolving door was perpetrated by two Chinese boys riding a single bicycle. They were seen by a Chinese cop, overhauled, taken into custody, and given sufficient going over to elicit interesting details. We learned of the very room in the very building from which they had been sent forth with a fifty-dollar "bombing fee."

The building in question was "North of the Creek," in a territory held firmly though illegally by the Japanese Naval Landing Party. Soochow Creek, bisecting the Settlement and flowing into the Whangpoo, was a dividing line between Settlement and Japanese control. Despite our mounting troubles I had never broken

off contact with various official Japanese, so in a spirit of idle amusement I dropped by the Japanese Consulate General and gave the facts to an acquaintance in high position. A few days later he asked me to call again. I did so and was both amazed and entertained to receive a full dossier resulting from his investigation. Yes, he confirmed, our attackers had indeed come from Room 327 of the Bridge House apartment building off Szechuen Road. They were in the pay of a certain Colonel Nakamura. This colonel had recently arrived from North China, bringing with him some sixty Chinese thugs—"very bad people," my Japanese official friend remarked, shaking his head gravely. Apparently it was the colonel's idea to correct the Chinese-language press single-handed and by strong-arm methods. This was not approved by the Consulate General, but nobody could do anything about it. "*Okii-no doku sama*," literally meaning "My spirit is poisoned" but more usually translated "I am very sorry for you."

Rather to my surprise, I later heard that the spirited colonel had been moved out of the Shanghai picture by his superiors. But by then we were in even worse trouble. Wang Ching-wei's puppet gangsters had set up literally blood-and-thunder headquarters in a machine-gun-guarded stronghold on the outskirts at 76 Jessfield Road. Their chief racket was "patriotic" kidnaping. Wealthy Chinese were whisked away and told they might win escape only by joining the new Nanking regime under Wang, plus payment of a big ransom. Sometimes the ransom alone was sufficient, if it was big enough. Relatives who showed insufficient alacrity in bailing out their absent family connections soon received ears, fingers, and other tokens through the mail. Severed heads began to turn up, of mornings, on residential streets of Settlement and Concession. While it was plain that 76 Jessfield Road was operated primarily for revenue, the fortress needed a window dressing of other functions, and these soon were found to include solicitude for the right press attitude. We, naturally, were a top-priority target.

Bombings of our plant continued, rather ineffectually. But added to this the Jessfield gentry began a program of assassination of our staff. Several of our Chinese were shot in the streets. Other papers suffered likewise. Most publications were located on the same main thoroughfare, and private guards were employed, to which the Set-

tlement and Concession authorities added their own police. There were occasional pitched battles, one costing the life of a prominent American saloon proprietor who stopped a stray bullet. The French police displayed special energy in precautionary measures around the *Post*. We had two armored cars on permanent duty there, plus a new cement pillbox at the corner facing us, plus a sentry box on the Rue Montauban side; within this latter, a Chinese policeman of the French force was shot dead by the pistol-armed companion of a man who had just placed a bomb in our press. Luckily that bomb, as well as one or two others, happened to be discovered and disabled just in time.

Throughout all this I continued to be invited to frequent parties given by the Japanese civil and military authorities. Always I attended punctiliously, though I much preferred Chinese hospitality such as the old-time dinners of former mayor Wu Te-chen, one of the world's great hosts. Sometimes a Japanese army officer would ask one or two of us newspapermen to an intimate affair where geisha girls were lavish with sake, beer, and whisky. It was a point of honor at these usually painful tête-à-têtes to make the Japanese outtalk us, and no great trouble either, for they mixed their drinks indiscriminately and had no heads for liquor. The whole foreign news colony was mortified when a visiting American newspaperwoman took part in one of these parties, misjudged her capacity, and had to be carried out by head and heels to a taxi. Mostly such affairs were entertaining. I recall one tremendous gathering at the famous Rokusan Gardens geisha establishment in Chapei district, where the Japanese army, navy, and diplomatic spokesmen were joint hosts. An ordinarily dignified navy man suddenly pranced forth in attire reminiscent of that of the Duke at the famous theatrical performance described by Mark Twain in *Huckleberry Finn*; on the officer's fat stomach was painted a face, and by contracting and relaxing his tummy muscles he was able to make the crudely outlined mouth close and open, to the joy if not edification of the assembled throng. I think it was this party which honored a group of correspondents visiting from Tokyo. After speeches in English by the Japanese spokesmen, Iowa-born Percy Whiteing, later repatriated to America with a Japanese wife and three children, rose and delivered a reply in spicy colloquial Japanese. One of the Japanese

hosts then translated this into English for Percy's non-Nipponese-speaking fellow Americans.

It was not my opinion then, nor is it now, that the Japanese exerted any very direct control over the puppet Chinese thugs of 76 Jessfield Road. They merely hoped that if we were subjected to enough alternate kind treatment from themselves and bad treatment from the gangster Chinese, we would come to the view that Japanese were nice people and it paid to support Japan. In this they had little or no success. A few publications in Shanghai had always been pro-Japanese, for reasons obviously financial. They continued in their line. The rest of us went along giving Japanese imperialism the worst press we knew how, discriminating between decent patriotic Chinese and the wrong sort, and hoping for some sort of an improvement in a steadily worsening situation.

Finally came July 1940. The Japanese and their puppets by now knew that neither the patriotic Chinese nor their foreign friends were going to change their ways. There remained just one more course of action—all-out terrorism to kill us off or scare us out.

On July 3 the pro-Wang Ching-wei press published a list of names of eighty-three Chinese in Shanghai who were to be "arrested." These included such prominent men as Li Ming, the banker. Several on the list were at once killed in the street or in their homes, while others disappeared without trace.

On July 15 the Executive Yuan of the pseudo-"National Government" under Wang at Nanking issued an order to "Mayor" Fu Siao-en of the Shanghai Chinese Municipality to "expel" from Shanghai six Americans, including myself, and one Briton. The meaning of this order, like the previous one against Chinese, was clear enough, since Wang and Fu had no power either to arrest anybody in Shanghai or deport anybody from Shanghai. Those on the foreign list were:

Norwood F. Allman, American, lawyer and member of the Shanghai Municipal Council, included because of his editorship of the *Shun Pao*.

John B. Powell, American, publisher and editor of the *China Weekly Review*.

Cornelius V. Starr, American, in his capacity as publisher of the Shanghai *Evening Post* and the *Ta Mei* papers.

Randall Gould, American, as editor of the *Post* and the *Ta Mei* papers, and chief Far East correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Hal P. Mills, American, editor-publisher of the *Hwa Mei Wan Pao*.

Carroll D. Alcott, American, cable editor of the *China Press*, but especially prominent as sardonic news commentator for the American radio station XMHA.

J. A. E. Sanders-Bates, Briton, publisher of the *Ta Ying Yeh Pao*.

This announcement came out on a Monday, together with a statement signed by Chief Puppet Wang Ching-wei. Wang charged that we were "important elements participating in subversive activities," consisting of "conspiracy to overthrow the National Government of China." Bear in mind that Wang was talking of his own ridiculous made-in-Japan fake regime at Nanking. China's official National Government promptly recorded its attitude through telegrams of support and reassurance to us from Generalissimo Chiang and other leaders.

Neil Starr and I immediately published a front-page jointly signed statement of policy. We commented on the "order of deportation" as having no pretense of legality or any chance of legal execution. We reprinted part of an earlier statement we had issued during December 1937 in which we had said that our papers strove to follow the best American newspaper tradition of "free speech, of fearless and hard-hitting editorials, realistic and non-partisan, and of straight news presentation, devoid of editorial bias." We stressed that "they submit to censorship from nobody." We said that "our policy has been at all times sympathetic to the only recognized Government of China" and that though we sought to be reasonable and not blindly defiant, "outrage and illegality are not weapons that can change us."

That was Wednesday. On Friday afternoon I was called off the Columbia Country Club tennis courts by three simultaneous phone messages telling of the assassination of Sammy Chang, my colleague and best Chinese friend. Sam had stopped in a café for a cup of tea. It was his habit to stop there. His name had been on the list of eighty-three Chinese, and only the day before I had asked if he was carrying a pistol. He had lifted his gown and showed one

strapped around his waist. On the day of his death he wore it, but he committed two major errors. One was to follow a usual habit in stopping at a public place. The other was to sit with his back to the door. Two Chinese gunmen walked in, shot Sam instantly dead from behind, and walked out again—killing on their way a Pole who tried to stop them.

For days Shanghai was in an uproar. Sam was regarded as practically an American—he had an American-born Chinese wife—and the outrage was taken as clear evidence that henceforth nobody mentioned on a Nanking “black list” was safe. There was a big funeral from Community Church. Tributes to Sam and expressions of anxiety for the rest of us poured in from Free China. A public fund was raised for the family of the dead Pole. But at the same time the *Shun Pao* had another severe bombing, Hal Mills was putting a concrete front on his frequently damaged newspaper plant, portly Carroll Alcott had himself fitted for a bulletproof vest, and the French police sent an official to Neil and myself with warning that they had “information” of intended attempts on our lives within the next week.

There is no profit in elaborating on this phase of censorship. Within a few months it was blotted out by Pearl Harbor. But at the time it certainly had its exciting aspects. Despite a grimly mounting toll of Chinese deaths, and the fact that our Chinese staff lived in a state of virtual siege within the building, there were also amusing sides. Neil and I both refused police bodyguards as a largely useless nuisance, but I consented to go armed, and I was escorted by police from door to motorcar each morning. Judge Milton J. Helmick of the U. S. Court let me have a slightly used automatic which had been officially impounded after a despondent visiting American had proved its lethal utility on himself. I let Dud Squires, who mostly sold me tennis balls, fit me with an armpit holster. The Settlement police gave me an interesting and gratis course of pistol practice on a range where mechanical figures bobbed in and out to simulate gangster tactics. One lasting lesson imparted to me by the instructor was, “Never mind the head—always shoot for the belly!” I also was advised never to sit with my back to a door. I still hate to do so.

Neil mentioned to the French police that his motorcar agency

had an armor-plated car and promised to use it. A week later the police were back to order such a job for their chief. Gangsters had waylaid their acting chief as he drove to work. He was wounded but shot it out with them. The chief wanted to be better protected by his car walls if they tried to bushwhack him. Actually there was no additional armored car available. Starr offered the chief the one he was using—and the chief accepted it!

One day a quiet Chinese walked up our stairs, entered the news room, and sat down with L. Z. Yuan, our Chinese city editor. After he had left, Yuan came in to me and said, "You know, that fellow described every movement I have made all around Shanghai during the past four days!" The caller had come from the puppet Gestapo out at 76 Jessfield Road. They wanted to let Yuan know he was being shadowed, mostly to worry him, I suspected. The emissary had put a proposition to pay Yuan several times his monthly salary if he would give allegiance to Wang Ching-wei. It was not desired that he quit us—quite the contrary—rather that he spy on us, and of course quit giving us information detrimental to the repute of the Nanking regime and its Shanghai representatives, who lived in a constant state of fear. They were afraid of everything, from adverse publicity to patriot countergangsters. "Mayor" Fu Siao-en was suddenly hacked to pieces about this time by his trusted cook. Yuan didn't join the opposition, but he did take a quick trip to British-protected Hong Kong to conserve his health. Later he "sat out" the war safely under an assumed name in Manila.

For our part, we decided that our stairs needed a couple of Sikh guards. These looked very imposing with their black whiskers, but courteously passed everybody who wanted to come up.

George Bruce actually made contact with the boys at 76 Jessfield Road, had one of them in to negotiate, and invited me down to join the party. It was all quiet and agreeable, but we wouldn't pay the price demanded, figuring it was not likely to buy much security anyway.

I went back upstairs to more excitement than bombs. Emily ("Mickey") Hahn had called with her pet gibbon, Mr. Mills. "Sir George" Woodhead had his black spaniel Puppety loose in the next office. Mr. Mills prospected around, discovered Puppety, and the ensuing melee was almost as destructive as the blasts to which we were becoming accustomed.

One of the most interesting demonstrations of Nipponese censorship was aimed at Carroll Alcott's news broadcasts over U. S. Harkson's radio station. "Al," formerly our own cable editor, had developed a mocking style studded by wisecracks which needled the Japanese terribly. So they set up a buzzer interference gadget in their own area north of Soochow Creek, away from the current jurisdiction of the Shanghai Municipal Police. When Carroll went on the air they went on too in an effort to drown him out. He changed wave lengths and so did they. However, Harkson provided enough excess power so that the interference was not fully effective, and Carroll gained in following. Attempts were made to kidnap and otherwise molest Alcott; in fact the ingenuity of the enemy seemed to have no bounds, though fortunately his efficiency was seldom anything to brag about. Not long before Pearl Harbor, J. B. Powell was struck on the shoulder by a hand grenade which bounced off and failed to explode. But our own organization lost more than a score of men by murder, and the plant was bombed eight or ten times.

Early in 1941 I joined Neil in New York, where his group of companies had set up headquarters for further expansion in the United States and Latin America. I was succeeded as Shanghai editor by F. B. "Fritz" Oppen, grandson of the famous cartoonist F. Oppen, who should be remembered for his political cartoons but actually is best recalled as creator of Happy Hooligan and Maude the Mule. Fritz carried on vigorously against the Japanese imperialists and their Nanking puppets, was caught in Shanghai at the time of Pearl Harbor, and spent several dismal weeks in imprisonment with J. B. Powell and other newsmen at the Bridge House, which by then had been turned into a prison. Repatriated on the first *Gripsholm* trip, Fritz went out to Free China with me in the summer of 1943 to become editor of our new Chungking edition, Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, which followed by a few months our establishment in New York City of an American edition.

Censorship problems had meanwhile multiplied. Both the United States and China were now in states of officially declared war. Even our American edition came under provisions of the "voluntary code" applying to the whole U.S. press, but we never found the New York

and Washington censors unduly restrictive. They censored for security purposes only. Political considerations didn't enter.

In Chungking a double censorship difficulty developed. The first part, of which the American public heard most, involved the handling of press dispatches from Free China to the outside world. The second was quite different, with other rules and other officials in charge, and it had to do with the contents of local publications within China. As a correspondent I ran into the first, as executive of a Chungking newspaper I ran into the second. Despite China's relative isolation from the world and the high illiteracy percentage of the Chinese people, press relations have been a major concern of the Government. The Information Ministry maintained its unique Chungking Press Hostel, to give foreign correspondents accommodation in a primitive city suffering from a permanent housing shortage. Yet the Chinese censorship was so frequently oppressive, going far beyond the requirements of military security, that this hostel became a center for grumbling, and the outside world grew doubtful of such news as could struggle through the censorship.

There was never any question of the legality of the Chinese censorship, whether of dispatches abroad or control of the press at home. The trouble has been that the regulations were so broad and loose as to give dictatorial power to those who administered them, a complaint heard about other laws in China as well. So much leeway has been afforded that sometimes the censorship proved easy and reasonable, sometimes extravagant, in accordance with the personal views of the officials in charge. They in turn were often subject to pressure from above, exerted by people with little knowledge of press affairs but a good deal of power to make things uncomfortable for the censors. In other words there was not alone a lack of protection for the press, but for the censors too; often the censors had to apply a viewpoint not their own, and privately regarded by themselves as contrary to the spirit of the law. But the law failed to make adequately clear where division lines should be drawn.

Judge for yourself. It is stated in the official China Handbook that "Chapter Four of the revised Publication Law broadly outlines the kinds of news items that should be suppressed." According to the article, no publication shall carry any speeches or propaganda calculated to undermine the Kuomintang or violate the Three Prin-

ciples of the People, or to overthrow the National Government and damage the interests of the Chinese Republic, or to disturb public order, or to carry anything affecting good morals and customs, or discussion of a court case *sub judice*. Article XXIV of the law, which is listed under the chapter, reads: "In war, emergency, or time of necessity under special circumstances, publications shall be forbidden or restricted, in accordance with the orders of the National Government may then issue, to carry items dealing with politics, military and foreign affairs, or district peace and order." One of the first announcements of the National Government after Japan's surrender was to insist that strict censorship could not be relinquished.

There were occasional revisions of wartime news-censorship standards designed to make their administration easier from the censors' viewpoint. But in the opinion of the censors themselves, as I was able to ascertain it through private conversation, technical provisions of the law remain relatively unimportant as compared with the attitude of the higher officials. Censorship of local publications was carried on by the Wartime Press Censorship Bureau under the National Military Council, which appointed censors to various places in Free China. When it came to telegraphed dispatches or mail copy for abroad, censorship was carried out at Chungking by the International Department of the Ministry of Information so far as matter relating to China was concerned. Everything cleared through Chungking. If a given story involved the military affairs of an Ally, either the Chinese censors or the correspondent himself had to take it up with the appropriate officials of the Allied nation. Thus American correspondents in dealing with some Sino-American military subject could not file their copy for transmission until it had received the rubber-stamp O.K. "chop" of both the Chinese censor and a censor at American military headquarters. At Kunming I found during a 1943 visit that further complication was provided through the fact that public-relations offices were maintained not only by Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force which provided all of the news for that area, but also by Stilwell's still higher army headquarters several miles away at the other side of the town; the correspondents had to go to first one, then the other of these two American censorships before their copy could be cleared!

This was a nuisance, but at any rate only military security considerations prevailed.

Time after time, Americans asked me:

"Do you think that the Chungking censorship is worse than that in Moscow?"

My answer was an unequivocal "No." I have never been in Moscow, but I know many correspondents who have worked there. A. T. Steele is universally conceded to be about as balanced and well-informed a correspondent as we have anywhere. On a basis of experience in both Moscow and Chungking, Arch has told me that he found Russia's censorship incomparably the worse. Other reliable sources confirmed this view.

Nevertheless both Steele and others found Chungking censorship a great deal worse than it formerly had been at Shanghai, and a great deal worse than there was any good reason for it to be. Chinese told me the same thing.

Without hesitation one could endorse the physical operation of the censorship. Hollington Tong, who provided and lived near the Press Hostel, administered the handling of dispatches sent abroad. His staff of subordinate censors consisted mostly of bright, friendly, and co-operative men who also lived on the premises and were in hourly contact with the correspondents both at work and at play. No one, for example, was more fun-loving and popular at the frequent Hostel vodka-and-orange-juice parties than "Jimmy" Wei, who might be found exchanging hearty back-slaps with correspondents whose copy he had been censoring a few yards away a few minutes earlier.

The censorship was not conducted in a vacuum. A correspondent wrote his copy in triplicate and walked up to the censors' office without stopping to put a hat on. He sat down and watched the censor read his stuff. If there was no question, the censor "chopped" all three sets of copy, retained one for his own file, and handed back two sets—one for the correspondent's file and one for transmission by Press Wireless which had its office immediately downstairs. Under ideal conditions the whole process was run through so fast that a correspondent could write a quick flash, put it through the mill, and be back in his room within ten minutes. So far, dandy.

But perhaps the censor struck a snag. Usually he would discuss

the matter with the correspondent then and there. That was an excellent course, and if mere factuality, or military security, were the point at issue, solution could quickly be reached as a rule. If he desired, the correspondent could appeal to higher authority without any bad feeling—H. P. Tseng, Hollington Tong's assistant, or Holly himself. But what was more likely was that the censor himself would take the matter higher, particularly in the case of specialized problems where individual judgment came into play. At any rate the procedure was open. The correspondent was not left in the dark as to what was going on. So far as the general machinery was concerned there was little if any room for complaint. The complaint came about the end product, the amount of copy finally passed. While at times the censorship was rational by ordinary standards, there were other and longer times when so little got through that both the correspondents and their home offices doubted whether it was much use to maintain China representation.

Not only the Chinese censorship, but the American censors as well, drove the American correspondents to the verge of insanity just before I reached China in the fall of 1944, at the time of the "Stilwell affair." This situation is summed up by a short Associated Press item carried from China on October 30 and reading as follows:

"CHUNGKING, Oct. 29—Stilwell is known to have taken formal leave of Chiang—

"(EDITOR: American censor excised 388 words and Chinese censor 104 words, leaving only foregoing excerpt from one sentence.)"

The comparatively heavy American share of the censorship on that particular dispatch was due to the fact that the American army censor got first bite. He took out everything he didn't want Spencer Moosa to say about American aspects of the Stilwell recall, and the Chinese censor then attended to everything Spencer had said about why the Chinese wanted Stilwell removed. Ultimately the American censorship was relaxed on this story and a great deal was revealed, mostly through Washington. But so far as the Chinese could control filings from Chungking, they kept the cork in the bottle.

Here is an example on the other and better side. During my 1943 visit to Chungking, Admiral Lord Mountbatten flew up from India. There were sound security reasons for keeping quiet about the visit.

Even though the press remained silent, Japan's Zeros went into action against the "Burma Road of the Air" over the Himalayan Hump and shot down six American transport planes in a single day—none of them, fortunately, containing the distinguished visitor. Throughout this period the Chinese censors had flat orders to delete the name of Mountbatten wherever it appeared in the copy of any correspondent.

I ran into this ban in trying to clear a text for a radio broadcast, written before Mountbatten's arrival. The *Christian Science Monitor's* able and amiable foreign editor, Charles E. Gratke, had maneuvered me into doing a series of brief radio talks at the unearthly hour of 5:30 A.M. Chungking time, that being 6:30 in the Boston evening. Because transmission was often poor, with a chance that my speech might have to be read by someone else at the other end of the line, I had been instructed to telegraph the full text a day or two ahead of scheduled verbal delivery in "Mike" Peng's Voice of Chungking broadcast studio. It so happened that one script involved Mountbatten in such a way that to take out his name meant to scrap the whole job. My talk was on general lines and had no bearing on Mountbatten's whereabouts. Yet the censors crossed out "Mountbatten" everywhere it appeared, acting under their strict though temporary orders. So in exasperation I went direct to Hollington Tong. I pointed out not only that my text involved no security consideration whatever, but that the general orders were stupid and possibly self-defeating. The very fact that the name of Mountbatten, ordinarily mentioned fairly often by the Chungking correspondents, was suddenly disappearing entirely from all press messages was bound to be a suspicious factor to the Japanese, who copied every word going out of Chungking by radio and were extremely smart in drawing deductions.

Holly saw the point. He not only authorized the restoration of my text to its original form, but I believe he sent down an amended order, leaving the whole question to the censors' personal discretion in any future instances. Holly appreciated my presentation, and his response to it was not merely kindly but intelligent. I know that his subordinate censors were glad about what had happened, for they told me so. It was never a pleasure for them to have to take arbitrary action. But their jobs depended on carrying out orders, naturally.

Instances could be multiplied. But the foregoing gives essential facts about how the machinery operated. Mostly the problem was one of pressure not from the censors, or from Holly as top censor, but from officials about Holly. He had the rank of Vice-Minister and did not care to presume too much upon the personal support of the Generalissimo. Even the Generalissimo sometimes took a hand in telling Holly how to run the censorship. Not reading English himself, he could on occasion be misled by others who gave him distorted versions of what some or another correspondent had been able to wangle through the censorship. Then Holly was likely to be called on the carpet. Such being the circumstances, it implies no deterioration in Holly's own liberal and enlightened nature when I say that censorship at Chungking was much stricter than it used to be at Shanghai under the same man. Whether peace will relax this, as promised, remains to be demonstrated. At any rate Holly is well out of it.

As I knew that the Generalissimo took an active interest in this subject, I spoke to him about it when we met in late November of 1944. He made no effort to dodge or to scold me for my rather frank statements. Instead he agreed that the censorship had not always been of the wisest, but he made what I regarded as a rather good case for maintaining a tougher censorship at Chungking than is necessary at Washington or London. He based his case on the known fact of Japanese interception of press and other messages. Chungking has no cable connection with the outside world, so all international telegraphic communication has to be by radio, which the foe can monitor. The Generalissimo felt that while other countries could interpret military security considerations rather literally, Chungking had to bear in mind that quite a variety of information was susceptible to immediate enemy use in one fashion or another, even when it did not have to do with military matters but included political and economic matter as well. I will not say that I was 100 per cent convinced, but the Generalissimo carried me along say 25 or 30 per cent!

About this time Holly regained a former and quite liberal chief in the person of Wang Shih-chieh. Dr. Wang's earlier administration of the Information Ministry was relatively satisfactory to the correspondents. I had a talk with him before my departure and found

him ready to admit that the tight censorship was doing China much harm abroad. We agreed that if the prestige of the Chungking correspondents continued to suffer because of their inability to tell a full story, that would only play into the hands of American keyhole columnists and stay-at-home magazine strategists who could command an even greater following for what they termed their "inside stuff on China—what the Chungking censors won't pass." My impression is that Dr. Wang allowed Hollington Tong and his subordinates a considerably freer hand in dealing with the correspondents than had been formerly the case. With the end of the war, having already become Foreign Minister, he quit and K. C. Wu took over.

Now for a few words about the local China censorships. Since there is no longer any extraterritorial privilege for foreigners in China, and no areas of foreign control, any American or other foreign-owned publication comes fully under Chinese law and Chinese officials, which is as should be. But, at least under war conditions, this means a terrific initial job in getting the necessary license to permit publication, and after that it means pre-censorship of what goes into the publication. In starting a Chungking edition of the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury* in the fall of 1943, Fritz Oppen and I had the advantage of great good will which had been built up among Chinese public and officials all the way up to and including the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang by the attitude of our former publications, the original *Post* and the *Ta Mei* vernacular papers. Even so, it was still necessary for us to get the permission of five different sets of officials before a license was promised. We pulled all possible strings. Hollington Tong and many other old friends helped. Madame Chiang offered to assist if necessary. We bribed nobody. However, we did sign a contract with a print shop owned by the Foreign Office. It was the only suitable shop.

Finally, we made clear that we didn't intend to print editorials as in Shanghai, friendly toward China as those editorials had been—we would print no editorials whatever, as long as censorship of such editorials before publication was required. This at first caused a sigh of relief on the part of certain friends, who indicated that the question of editorials was certainly pertinent. But after the license had finally been promised, we were told that editorials "of

the right kind" would be welcomed as an expression of American friendship. Perhaps a bit stiffly, Fritz and I indicated that, friendly as we were, Neil Starr nevertheless hadn't sent us out on a propaganda enterprise. We would try to make this an American newspaper only by printing true news, but we would completely avoid any question as to whether our editorial ideas might in some official's view be right or wrong in a given instance. The job of getting under way took only weeks, not months, as for a while we feared.

During our first year of operation Fritz had no special trouble over censorship, aside from a few misunderstandings as to procedure. We specialized mostly on American news, of the lighter sort, sent out by radio. But gradually Fritz developed sources of Chinese news which wasn't appearing freely in the vernacular press, and he gave more and more space to it. By the time Charles S. Miner arrived to work with Fritz and later to take over, we had a good many English-reading Chinese subscribers, including government officials, who read the *Post* to get China news they could not find in their own newspapers.

So, early in 1945, Miner suddenly found the local censors taking lively interest in our paper. They had previously been rather easygoing in their censorship excisions. I remember being shown a proof of a story on the Stilwell removal, and the censor had merely cut out a section linking this with the immediately subsequent resignation of U. S. Ambassador Clarence Gauss. That sort of thing mildly annoyed us, but it was not extreme.

But one week during the height of the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations, after Charlie had successfully passed through the international censorship and filed to New York a full account of this still unconcluded squabble, he was advised by the local censors that he could print nothing whatever on the subject in our Chungking edition. Normally a patient and conservative man, Charlie began to emit steam from his ears when he was told that he couldn't even publish a statement just issued by the Information Minister. (Apparently the censors feared Chou En-lai would then demand space for his retort.) Charlie radioed me in New York, saying that he proposed to print the substance of what he had been allowed to file telegraphically to us "unless forcibly restrained."

I am usually all for a fight on freedom of the press. But in this instance I felt it necessary to point out to Charlie that we operated under Chinese law, that we didn't want to defy that law, and that we should consider seriously whether he wanted to make an issue of this particular matter. However, if he finally felt his position to be intolerable he was authorized to close down.

It so happened that Neil Starr was away and I had to guess what he, as owner of the property, would say, but as he offered no subsequent criticism I believe that I followed his line of thought. Charlie decided that I would prefer that he cool down. So he put out the next (February 18) issue without anything concerning the political fracas, as instructed by the censors, but with a "box" announcing that he was forced to omit an important news item. The heading was "Long Story Deleted from This Issue." Readers were invited to read the story in question in our American edition if they could get hold of it!

Under the heading, "Hot Times in Chungking," I wrote an editorial for the February 23 American edition in which I dealt with the incident rather lightly, by intent; I didn't want to magnify it out of proportion, but I closed with a paragraph worth quoting as expressive of my view for the future:

As the Chungking edition is published in China, it is subject to Chinese regulations which must be obeyed however unreasonable they may be. However, there is no law compelling the publication of the paper. We can understand that the recent unpleasantness was a special case. It didn't seem worth while to take an extreme position in this one instance. But unless Chungking's local censorship, hitherto reasonable (at least toward our newspaper) allows facts to be published to a degree reasonably close to accepted American standards, there will be no point in continuing to issue an American publication in Chungking. Subscribers pay for news. We don't intend to start taking money under false pretenses.

The Chungking edition was suspended at the end of June, after a life of twenty months, under orders by myself after consultation with Neil and on a basis of frequent disturbing reports from Charlie. Not only was he constantly forced into unsought dispute with the local censorship, but despite his best efforts to comply with the

censors' erratic requirements by eliminating objectionable matter it was learned that there was a secret file of more than fifty complaints against stories which got into print. We had no desire to put Charlie into further jeopardy, and in any event the game simply wasn't worth the candle. In fact we were tired of playing games anyhow—what we had intended was not to play games but to print a newspaper. So we ordered Charlie to liquidate our paper and thereafter to operate as a correspondent of the American edition. A statement radioed to Chungking was published on the front page of the final issue as follows:

DELETED BY CENSOR

An experiment concludes with this issue of the Chungking edition, Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*.

In an announcement published in the first number, appearing Oct. 31, 1943, we reviewed the record. Fifteen years previously a group of young men had started an American daily newspaper in Shanghai. They surmounted many difficulties, added a Chinese-language affiliate, but suspended by Japanese compulsion from Dec. 6, 1941.

On Jan. 1, 1943, we started a weekly American edition of the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury* in New York City. In introducing our Chungking edition ten months later we said: "Though the appearance and frequency of our present publications under war conditions necessarily differ from the original *Post*, we intend to preserve the original character and principles whose primary interest was always straight news."

We have now come to the conclusion that publication of an American newspaper in the *Post's* tradition has become clearly impossible in China under wartime censorship restrictions which go far beyond considerations of military security. Therefore, we are suspending until victory has been won, when we expect to resume daily publication in Shanghai.

Meanwhile our American edition, which represents news and editorial policies of the former Shanghai paper, is continuing. Subscribers to the Chungking edition are offered an option of their money back for the amount of unfilled subscriptions, or the American edition by mail, subject to operations of the Chinese censorship.

C. V. STARR
RANDALL GOULD
CHARLES S. MINER

An editorial published by the American edition expressed regret over the suspension, saying that twenty months' operation had demonstrated the need and public demand for a Free China English-language newspaper in the *Post* tradition but it had also demonstrated that China's wartime censorship is not prepared to content itself with considerations of military security.

"Instead," the editorial went on, "it lays its oppressive hand over virtually every field where bureaucracy has interests. We'd not care to keep on printing a paper in China or anywhere else under such conditions."

The editorial remarked on the management's willingness to accept a reasonable censorship, but declared that "what we got in China went beyond reason," concluding:

"Our guiding motive has always been to serve the best interest of both the United States and China. In publishing a gagged newspaper we were doing neither. Such being the case, our only dignified and decent course is to suspend until victory brings a return to free press principles in every genuinely democratic land."

It need hardly be pointed out that this last was a constructive effort to support Chinese liberal leadership, which has continually striven toward democracy but which has frequently been thrown for heavy losses—often immediately after apparent gains. Thus there is possibility that victory over Japan may only be preliminary to new reaction in China at the very time when democratic forces would seem to be in an ascendant.

China's officials still claim to support the theory of freedom of the press and to excuse past excesses as product of wartime necessity. During the spring of 1945 U. S. Ambassador Hurley was assured by both Dr. T. V. Soong, as acting President of the Executive Yuan, and Dr. Wang Shih-chieh as Minister of Information, that news should be more fully presented to the public and that they agreed to liberalization of the censorship. Dr. Wang also told the correspondents that censorship was not to be a permanent China institution.

Nevertheless within a few weeks Chungking clamped down upon the correspondents new and unprecedentedly harsh rules concerning "registration certificates," long required but previously a mere formality. It was now provided that the Foreign Office might cancel

existing certificates or refuse to issue them to writers deemed to have "maliciously maligned China and her allies by making false statements about them." Anyone who left the country for more than thirty days must obtain new credentials for re-entry. While these rules were still being anxiously discussed, the Government suddenly declined to permit the re-entry of two American correspondents—Darrell Berrigan, formerly of United Press but returning as chief Far East correspondent for the *New York Post*, and Harold Isaacs of *Newsweek* magazine. It was understood that Chinese officials felt their records "may be deemed to have endangered friendly relations between China and her allies," but no case to that effect was made publicly, or attempted.

Dr. Wang's reassuring statement quoted above was made just before a mildly amusing incident reported in one of the last issues of our now deceased Chungking edition of the *Post*. Three touring American newspaper editors who visited China as a "Freedom of the Press Party" were being liberally entertained and conferred with by various persons who, in the words of Chinese News Service, pledged "enthusiastic Chinese support" to their views. The *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*, Chungking organ theoretically expressing the attitude of the Chinese Communists, sought to comment on all this. But in the words of our Chungking edition, it "was forced to content itself with a large expanse of blank space in its editorial column. Everything in its editorial on freedom of the press was censored except the headlines."

With the peace, there arose hope that censorship in China would instantly be no more. But one of the first announcements issued by the National Government after Japan's surrender was that censorship could not yet be relinquished. This was not taken lying down; by September 15 a total of twenty publications in Chungking had taken formal stand that they would not submit their products to the tender ministrations of the censors any longer. On October 1 China's wartime censorship was stated to be abolished—but only in Free China. On the plea that military operations were still in progress in areas of Japanese occupation, the lid remained on there. Soon after arrival in Shanghai, Charlie Miner found that the Chinese censors objected to a full portrayal of the chaotic political-economic situation either through local publication or in radio messages home.

Nevertheless it was decided to resume publication of the daily Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*. Charlie was at first denied entry to our plant by a Japanese sentry posted at the door, although this was a month after Tokyo's surrender. He employed flanking tactics and went in through a window. Much of our equipment had been stolen. Even after Charlie was grudgingly granted free entry, he had a terrific job on his hands in restoring enough order to the print shop to permit renewed operation. Also, it was made clear by the Chinese authorities that we must promise to submit to censorship if we wanted permission to publish again. Charlie queried Neil and myself in New York City, and we told him to go ahead, accepting all Chinese regulations on the presumption that fairness and common sense would prevail.

"Victory Brings Rebirth" read a front-page statement signed by Neil, Charlie, and myself in the first issue of the new *Post* appearing September 24. We declared that "the problems of reconstruction and of new construction offer a great challenge to us all," recalled that our paper "has always stood for true news and independent views," and pointed out that "today, as never before, those things should serve the best interests of China and the United States."

It seemed time for me to get back to China. My wife and I prepared to return. When the last proof of this book has been read we shall be on our way. How long we shall stay in China depends quite largely, I suspect, on how firmly the new China believes in eliminating censorship of every kind and upholding the democratic principle of the free press.

15

"IS IT TRUE WHAT THEY SAY . . . ?"

LEGEND HAS IT that once upon a time the beautiful Chinese movie actress Anna May Wong, of American birth and Hollywood fame, came into New York Harbor on an ocean liner and was met by the ship-news reporters.

They asked her the usual questions, the photographers posed her for the routine "cheesecake shots," and then the newspaper crowd went into a huddle. Finally they all drew matches. The chap who got the short match sidled up to the Chinese girl sheepishly and for a few seconds was tongue-tied, while she looked at him in a puzzled sort of way which gradually changed to tentative comprehension.

"What the fellows wanted me to ask you was, uhr, about Chinese women," the reporter finally stammered. "I don't know just how to put it, but—is it true what they say . . . ?" And he could get no further.

Nothing more was necessary. The movie lady smiled graciously and said, "I know just what you mean, and the answer is 'No.' "

To some the foregoing anecdote may be incomprehensible. I regret to say that I am too busy to fill in additional details. Many China gossip queries of greater moment require some sort of answer, and it is not my intention to dodge any questions about China which have fundamental significance. It has annoyed me, as it has annoyed a great many other Old China Hands, that seeming China trivia, usually having to do with personalities, occupy the minds of so many Americans. But maybe such things are not always trivial. If they concern people of importance in Chinese affairs it is desirable that curiosity be satisfied as completely and speedily as possible, if only that we may next direct attention to the really important subjects.

Even seemingly unimportant figures on the China scene are sometimes more consequential than they appear at first glance.

China is an earthy country. That doesn't make Chinese personal rumors any worse than in, say, "advanced" America—nothing could, for our cult of the gossip column (China's mosquito sheets refined to an ultimate unrefined degree) has given us leadership in that respect as in other, better things. But China can on occasion be singularly direct in dealing with rumor, and an example was given in 1944 by two notable leaders, no less than Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

For months, malicious yarns about them had been going the rounds, first in Chungking and then at such far points as New York City. In the summer Madame Chiang was to start for America because of the poor state of her health. Realizing that this might accentuate the tall tales, the Generalissimo and his wife acted with characteristic straightforwardness. They called together for a tea party on July 5 at the presidential summer residence at Koloshan a group including all members of the Cabinet, as well as a number of Americans. Among the latter was A. T. Steele, then of the *Chicago Daily News*, and George A. Fitch, of the Y.M.C.A.

Speaking first, Generalissimo Chiang said that a number of rumors, which had evidently been circulating for some time, had only recently been brought to his attention. At first he thought it best to ignore them, he said. Then he realized that the rumors were directed against the nation more than just against himself. He felt that the enemy had failed in its attempt to destroy China, and so it was now trying to discredit China. Therefore he felt that he had to bring these stories into the light.

The first rumor was that he had been unfaithful to his wife, that he had irregular relations with another woman and that a child had been born to them. The second was that he had grown slack in his attention to the duties of state and was not attending his offices regularly.

As to the first, Generalissimo Chiang declared that his relations with his wife were ideal. As a Christian he had faithfully kept the Commandments. His record was an open book that everyone could check. For the sake of the people he dared not do wrong. China, he said, is a weak nation; to achieve victory her only hope is in the

moral rectitude of her leaders. There was nothing in his life that he could not tell publicly, and he hoped his chief contribution to China's welfare would be a moral one.

As to the second rumor, the Generalissimo explained briefly how his fall during the period of Sian captivity (when he seriously injured his spine) still made it impossible for him to sit quietly for more than an hour or two. He then gave a sketch of his daily and weekly programs, which are known to be very crowded.

Madame Chiang subsequently spoke along essentially the same line.

One American present at the meeting later declared that all in the group appeared to be convinced of the Generalissimo's complete sincerity. He said it was not known in Chungking whether such rumors had been prevalent in America, but that they had been going the rounds in the Far East. Those close to the Generalissimo felt that plain speaking was necessary to deal with them, although it was obviously difficult to find means of effectively squashing what was essentially a whispering campaign.

The Generalissimo's idea apparently was at the outset to limit these statements to the circle of those immediately around him. Later it was decided that fuller dissemination of them was desirable. The story appeared in the American edition, Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, on October 13. Even this did not stop the talk, and finally New York daily newspapers late in 1944 printed a London dispatch saying that the Chiangs had made a definite break "after an open disagreement at a Chungking tea party." Obviously this reference was to the party at which precisely opposite sentiments had been made clear. The *Post's* story was therefore distributed throughout America, and the New York *Times* and other papers republished it with a clarifying statement.

Madame Chiang had been ill for years. Throughout the war it had been necessary, as long as that was possible, for her to fly periodically to Hong Kong, where she usually stayed with her elder sister, Madame Kung, and received medical treatment for several ailments. Both she and the Generalissimo required extensive dental care, which over several years they received from an American dentist at Shanghai, Dr. "Danny" Collins. While visiting the Shanghai war front with her close associate, W. H. Donald, in the autumn

of 1937, Madame Chiang's motorcar overturned and she suffered a severely wrenched back; lack of proper treatment caused this to give chronic trouble over several years. Even more harassing was a form of hives known as erythema, a maddening skin irritation. So disturbing is the continual itch from this ailment that the patient cannot remain quiet, appetite is destroyed, and sleep becomes almost impossible for long periods. Yet, like stomachache, it is one of those troubles likely to be dismissed as unimportant by persons who haven't suffered from it. Erythema is an apparently hereditary ailment of the Soong family, and several other members are bothered by it off and on.

When it comes to what the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang think of one another, I can add slightly to what they themselves have said. The Generalissimo seems extremely devoted to his wife. On occasion he has said she was worth several divisions of troops to him. I don't believe that he can or does take time and effort from his heavy duties to indulge in illicit amours. He's no Mussolini in any respect. Neither is he in his first youth, though he is not an old man; to be precise, he was born at Fenghua in 1888. Those who know him best laugh at the credulity of outsiders who perhaps betray submerged wishful thoughts interesting to the Freudians when they insist that he must have a concubine or concubines. As to Madame Chiang, I have been acquainted with her since 1925. Repeatedly, in personal conversation, she has spoken of her husband with devoted affection. She respects him highly and feels that his war leadership is vital to the national welfare. Even if her personal love for him were to cool, Madame Chiang is the type of person to stick to the Generalissimo as a matter of principle, patriotism, and religion. Christianity is a living thing to her, and she has a strong, almost dramatic, sense of duty which to me settles this question, quite apart from other considerations. Her return to China in the autumn of 1945 after medical treatment in New York City disproved one persistent yarn that she and the Generalissimo had separated for keeps.

Family ties mean a great deal to all three of the Soong sisters. In the case of Madame Sun Yat-sen she has for years been in a difficult position. As a widow and an idealistic intellectual she gives primary allegiance to the memory of her late husband. Incidentally, nothing

makes her more annoyed than to have people speak of Dr. Sun as "idealistic" if there is the slightest intimation that the intent is to convey "impractically idealistic"; Madame Sun is firmly convinced that Dr. Sun's idealism was of a completely practical sort, whereas opportunistic deviations from his line will ultimately fail, so they represent the actually impractical. I am no expert on the subject of Sun Yat-senism, but I fully support Madame Sun's general theory. Nothing in her devotion to the memory of Sun Yat-sen, however, implies a necessity to break personal ties with her blood relations.

I recall one afternoon in the early 1930s when I was waiting in Dr. Sun's house in Rue Molière, of the Shanghai French Concession, for the return home of Madame Sun. Suddenly the door opened and in trooped the three sisters, Chingling, Meiling, and Eling, laughing and chattering like schoolgirls. This was at a period when Madame Sun was being watched by plain-clothes agents of the Nanking regime, which she had refused to join even though she attended the 1929 Purple Mountain funeral rites over Dr. Sun's body. It was a time when the sound of her typewriter clacking away by night was reported to the Government as "a secret radio set communicating with Moscow." Yet here was Madame Sun bringing home, with every appearance of constant familiarity, the wives of two of the highest officials of the National Government against which she had set her face because she felt it had betrayed Dr. Sun while wrapping itself in his mantle. They were her sisters. That was all that mattered to any of them. Later, Ted Thackrey and I were entertained by Madame Kung (Eling) at a gay tea party in the Kung home with the other two sisters as fellow guests. Still later Madame Sun was to collaborate—rather gingerly—with the National Government for resistance to Japan. She remained in Chungking throughout the war because she believed in the United Front, although she wished it had been better implemented. In July 1945 she wrote me in New York that "any political or social movement which will further the interests of the Chinese people will have my ardent sympathy now and in the future as in the past."

Through Madame Chiang's American visit in 1942 her beauty and public personality became known to many thousands of Americans. Madame Sun, lovely in a more delicate and noble way, is the object of a deep devotion by the relatively few, while some others

who do not know her suspect her on the mistaken assumption that her political views, actually liberal rather than radical, are "Red." Probably the least known, and certainly the most slandered, of the three sisters is Madame Kung. She too is a beautiful woman, more mature than the others but even more attractive than they by classic Chinese notions because of the contours of her oval "melon-seed" face. That is unimportant, however, as compared with the rumors that for years she has made huge sums of money through speculation backed by inside information out of official sources. I am not in position to give an authoritative judgment on that. Others, who have been very self-assured in spreading bad stories of Madame Kung, seemed on close interrogation to be in no better position, if as good. Not once has anyone to my knowledge tried to back rumor with proof. That is odd if there is so much going on as is industriously gossiped about.

All I can say to sum up is that, to me, Madame Kung is not the bad person often alleged; on the contrary I know of many kindly and helpful things she has done, without advertising them. Certainly she has power and capability; of that there is no question. I feel that she has sound sense and a good heart. We have never been close, but I have talked with her often, and I never caught her in an uncharitable word or a hypocritical attitude. She is refreshing contrast to the many phonies, high up or only wishing they were. This is not intended as a defense, because I have just confessed my lack of information. Perhaps it is indeed Madame Kung's hobby to make money. If so, it seems a frivolous and unnecessary occupation; the family has at least adequate means, and none of them lives in ostentatious luxury. Anyway I am not a broker. The only activities of Madame Kung of which I have had personal knowledge have been such as were of benefit to others.

During recent years the tendency loftily to dismiss Dr. Kung as a stupid man has markedly died down. One doesn't remain China's Finance Minister for more than a decade by being stupid, especially when most of that period is a time of war. Dr. Kung is perhaps handicapped by being known as a direct descendant of Confucius. In such a man one would expect an appearance of deep wisdom and an utter lack of interest in finance. He happens to fit the popular concept of a jovial Buddha more than that of Confucius, and he is

essentially a businessman. So he has been easy game for the puller-downers, who among other things have built up a legend of perennial strife and rivalry between Dr. Kung and his brilliant brother-in-law, Dr. T. V. Soong.

A good many people, I think, have finally begun to be bored with the continual stories of "he's up, he's down, he's up!" involving Kung and Soong. There has been a certain alternation between the ascendancies of their respective political stars, but I personally believe they derive secret amusement in keeping the legend alive. Quite likely they also work it for their own ends at times. Their natures are certainly different. But both are practical men, and neither is a fool—get that point straight, if no other! And they have their like sides. For one thing, each can be candid, sometimes devastatingly so; it is a gift with both good and bad points.

My first realization of Dr. Kung's straightforwardness came belatedly and after many years of casual acquaintance with him. It was during the 1938 months when Wuhan (or Hankow) was the wartime capital. Dr. Kung as Finance Minister was then enduring, and for years to come was to endure, a terrific strain, mostly with unruffled good humor and sane judgment. Whether one thinks he has been a good influence or a bad influence in the National Government, I don't see how anyone can fail to admire the way he "took it" and stood up under all kinds of punishment so long. He held the Finance Ministership from 1933 to late 1944. Early 1945 found him sitting up in a New York hospital bed after a serious operation and keeping three secretaries on the jump. Anyway, back in 1938 the war was still only a few months old, and though inflation was being whispered about as a possibility, it was not yet in evidence. I felt rather daring in even putting to Dr. Kung a question as to the prospects for inflation; incredible as it may seem now, such things were not regarded as nice to talk about then. To my surprise, the Minister met the query with level factuality.

"No country has ever been involved in a long war without suffering finally, in some degree, from inflation," he said. Even as much later as 1940 there was still so little inflation in evidence that I wrote a story for *Editor and Publisher* magazine describing how the American correspondents were able to get board and room at the Press Hostel for an equivalent, in Chinese currency, of less than two

American dollars a month (though the addition of any foreign imported luxury such as canned milk would promptly double or triple this). By middle 1945 the same Press Hostel accommodation at the then "journalistic rate" of 40-to-1 exchange would have cost over \$1,000 a month. Actually everyone by then found some means of patronizing the black market and bringing the cost down to below \$100. Dr. Kung and many others were being not only openly but drastically criticized for failing to check the inflation. Perhaps more could have been done in the way of price controls and other measures. But Free China was quite thoroughly blockaded with almost complete stoppage of most consumers' goods, and no measures could have been more than amelioratory.

Many people do not care for T. V. Soong, though they respect his ability. He has been friendly and helpful to me, which I regard as a compliment, since he does not tolerate fools gladly. His bluntness arises partly from a nervously organized, impatient nature, partly from inborn shyness. On occasion he can be downright rude, but though this side is less known, he can also be sensitive, considerate, and thoughtful. When he was Finance Minister in Shanghai, everybody went to him with troubles of all sorts. He was the one man who got results in settling such problems, whether they had to do with the military arrest of a Chinese civilian friend, as happened once to Samuel Chang, or some sort of illegal tax against American movies in Canton. His methods were so abrupt and drastic that many Chinese called him "too foreign," but to foreigners he represented a welcome element in the then new National Government. It is significant that he did well at the San Francisco Conference and in reaching accord with Russia in 1945. I believe that he and his sister Chingling (Madame Sun) have always had a special personal fondness for each other. They were closely associated in the earlier Wuhan Government. T.V. in degree shared Madame Sun's misgivings about the new Nanking regime, but felt that he owed it his services in the interest of unifying the nation. Undoubtedly T.V. has been on varying terms with a great many people, including the Generalissimo and Dr. Kung. But my advice about the pseudo-expert habit of reaching loose and easy conclusions regarding the personal relations of all these people is, like Mr. Punch's famed advice about getting married—"Don't!"

A number of foreigners have been close to the top people in the National Government at one time or another. Probably the best known of these was W. H. Donald, previously mentioned as escort to Madame Chiang on her 1937 Shanghai war-front visit. He has been variously portrayed as a man of mystery, a tight-lipped, secret operative, a power behind the throne. All of this, let me say emphatically, is so much idiotic nonsense. "Uncle Don," as he was affectionately called by Madame Chiang, came from Australia years ago as a newspaperman. He worked his way along the China coast, and at the time I reached Peking he was with the Chinese Bureau of Economic Information there. His associate, Herbert Elliston, now with the *Washington Post*, wrote of him as a warm human being in a *Saturday Evening Post* article several years ago; we of the news fraternity knew him well and liked him. Presently he became associated with the Young Marshal of Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, and was of tremendous service by causing his protégé to be cured of the opium habit. Donald's share in the "Sian incident" of 1936 has been often described. He was on cordial terms with all parties, and when young Chang went off to a form of exile, Donald remained attached to the Chiangs as their good friend—certainly not as their mentor, though I presume that he gave advice when it was asked for. Madame Chiang needed someone around on whose loyalty she could rely implicitly. Donald filled that bill. He had plenty of horse sense. He refused to become entangled in Chinese politics. In fact, it was almost an "act" for him to know nothing about the Chinese language and even to refuse Chinese food.

Naturally Donald didn't go around looking for people to unburden himself to, and equally naturally a lot of curiosity seekers tried without success to get acquainted with him and to make him talk. That created the silly legend of his being inaccessible and closemouthed. To his friends he said, "I always reserve the right of discreet indiscretion." If he knew a person whom he regarded as worthy of confidence and likely to profit by straight information, he would speak freely of the many things on which he had unexcelled firsthand knowledge. During the years just before Pearl Harbor, Donald was often in Hong Kong, resting and enjoying a harbor sail. He stayed at the Gloucester but kept his room number secret. When I knew he was around I would send him a "chit" and he would usually ask

me to breakfast next morning, when we would have a good talk; often he would arrange for me to call on Madame Chiang if she was in town.

Donald was not getting any younger, and he felt he should retire. Finally he got away to Tahiti in 1941, but from Chungking came repeated summonses for him to return. His deep affection for the Chiangs finally started him on his way back, and Pearl Harbor caught him by chance at Manila. During the period of the fighting, General MacArthur offered him airplane transportation to his native Australia, but Donald declined. He was finally interned, under his own name. The Japanese came looking for him, but could not believe he would have the audacity to attempt no disguise of his identity; also, they were expecting to find a younger man. So they decided he was another Donald than the one they sought, and he sat out the war till MacArthur came back. It was one of many cases where Nipponese stupidity let much-wanted men slip through their fingers.

Writing me from the west coast just after arrival from the Philippines in May 1945, Donald gave a characteristic glimpse of his character and temperament unimpaired by captivity. Though camp life had thinned and weakened him, he said, "I passed the doctor here the other day with flying colors. 'Marvelous,' said he. 'At your age [70] it is wonderful to find nothing wrong. Your blood-pressure of 120 is unique. You'll live to 150.' So that's that. Probably I'll die next week."

He told how good it felt to be "free from the hanging sword" but added:

In the camp I did not worry; I was protected by the fact that no China Japanese came to Manila, and also by the loyalty of fellow internees who maintained my secret. Time went swiftly for me. I was rescued from Los Banos Camp. A swell rescue. Like a movie, with paratroopers landing and co-operating with guerrillas, who swarmed into the camp from the jungles, firing upon the Japanese guard boxed around the camp. Over 100 Japs were killed, and 2,146 white people were rescued and on the lake in amptanks in two hours, with the camp in flames behind them. I lost everything I had, and am now reduced to one handbag. Enough for any man. My trials and tribulations with baggage have disappeared. Why aggravate life with lots of encumbrances?

One is reminded of Henry Kinney's identical reactions after he lost everything in the Japan earthquake. Kinney, retired in Tahiti, frequently inquired after Donald during the war, and I thought it interesting that these two could with equally clear conscience have served the Japanese and the Chinese respectively. My own personal relations with Kinney were always close, despite differences on political matters. It may be said in passing that few Americans, or other Westerners, served Japan in any policy capacity except for mercenary reasons; I class Kinney and Fred Moore as among the few outstanding exceptions. Both of them dealt with a high class of Japanese who perhaps satisfied an aristocratic side of their nature, repelled by China's earthy masses. I think both of them sincerely believed that they served America, and the cause of peace, in what they did for Japan. They were unfortunate in failing to recognize China's essential civilization and rightness. As with Donald, so with Kinney and Moore, those of us who knew them well found reason to respect them. We all knew that there was room for differences of feeling and of opinion as the Far East groped its way toward solution.

Those of us who, like Donald, sided with the Chinese were lucky in the long run. But if one deals with the highest types among any of the oriental peoples it is easy to be entangled deeply in deep-rooted personal friendships often tending to confuse one's mind on issues where detachment is vital for sane judgment. That is no doubt true about any country. But the Orientals are so courteous, so anxious for advice, so glad to soothe one with perhaps undeserved deference, that it often happens that their foreign friends get an undue notion of their own importance or an exaggerated reputation for shaping oriental events. None of the men I have just been mentioning comes in the first category, let me hasten to add with emphasis; actually, such men as Donald in particular are most modest.

Any writer finds it a distressing task to dispel romantic illusions. But the hard fact is that most of "what they say" concerning men of genius and figures of mystery guiding Chinese destinies is so much unmitigated bosh. The truth is that in keeping with the nature of this hard, primitive land and its imperturbable inhabitants, events have worked out mostly on the basis of earnest effort. Trial and error, not inspiration, have been responsible for practically all the

progress China has made. This is for the best. Emotional peoples, forever looking for wonderful things to happen, can be grossly misled, as we have seen in the cases of the Italians and the Germans. If I exclude the Japanese it is because I feel that they were less eager in embracing illusion. There has never been much jubilation in the hearts of the people of Japan even though they went their full hundred per cent behind the leaders of their nation-family when policy had been laid down. In fact I think that the whole Orient is more weighted by centuries of hard living conditions than are most parts of the Occident, therefore neither China nor any other Far East country is likely to grow dewy-eyed over some modern messiah.

If I were to look for China's No. 1 "foreign-adviser man of mystery" I would not pick Donald, nor would I choose any such colorful freebooter as General Francis Arthur "One-Arm" Sutton of Manchuria, or General Morris "Two-Gun" Cohen. Instead I would startle the experts, and the object of my choice, by naming Dr. Arthur Nichols Young. The name is "Nichols," not "Nickles."

Dr. Young is a moonfaced, placid, fact-minded mass of contradictions to whom adventures happen because the stars played a joke on him. He is a master of the dark art of economics who went to China in 1929 with the Kemmerer Commission of Financial Experts and stayed on as American adviser to the Finance Minister. Naturally and by intent he is totally devoid of any externally outstanding points. You would not only pass him in a crowd—you'd hurry, preoccupied with adventures of your own. You'd never dream he had ever been to such a far-off place as China, to look at him. And he didn't seek to go—he was sent for, along with others of the Kemmerer group who made a learned inquiry into China's currency problems and then mostly went their ways. Arthur remained to work first under the Finance Ministership of T. V. Soong, later with H. H. Kung, and on into the regime of O. K. Yui. That was a record in itself, since in general the Soong-Kung groups don't mix. Japan's attack didn't scare Arthur, and he went with the National Government from Nanking to Hankow to Chungking. In the latter city he has experienced innumerable enemy air bombings, taking them with his usual mild calm, as usual escaping unscathed. So far as I know he never so much as sat on a sharp rock in an air-raided tunnel. One thing about Arthur—though he lets adventures happen

to him he keeps them under close control, as befits a former member of the State Department.

He looks like no athlete, but my acquaintance with him started through a mutual interest in tennis and continued on the squash-racket court. (Sometimes he would be carrying documents so secret that he'd bring them into the squash court with him and prop his briefcase against the end wall as an extra hazard.) He is no airplane pilot, but as director of China National Aviation Corporation and close associate of China's great he has flown all over China, in every sort of weather; he was "first over the Hump" on a pioneer exploration trip, and he has flown it innumerable times since, as well as having ridden many times by air across both Pacific and Atlantic. He used to be organist at Community Church in Shanghai and is a member of the American Guild of Organists, along with the American Economic Association, the Academy of Political Science, Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Gamma Delta, and the Presbyterian Club. He has degrees of A.B., A.M., PH.D., LL.B., and LL.D. He has been university professor, adviser on taxation to the Mexican Government, Commerce Department investigator of financial conditions in Spain, State Department economist, financial adviser to Honduras, chairman of a U. S. Interdepartmental Committee on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, member of the committee which established the Central Reserve Bank of China, and participant in innumerable world conferences. He used to play the piano, accompanying General Dawes on the violin when they were not more seriously engaged in framing the Dawes Plan. Once in Shanghai his son Allen, then attending the American School, said: "Pop, they want a paper at school on the 'Most Favored Nations' Clause"—do you know anything about it?" His father replied, "I wrote it."

It will by now be apparent that in the usual romantic trappings, my candidate for "man of mystery" is quite lacking. Yet he has his mysterious side. That is due simply and solely to Arthur's capacity not to discuss other people's business. Undoubtedly it is the reason why he has stayed in his job so long, coupled of course with abilities implicit in his international record. He will talk, but not about what the Finance Ministry of China pays him to do. At times it is obvious that he is participating in loan negotiations, or advising at some such conference as Bretton Woods. But what you find out about Arthur Young is strictly up to you.

Many people refuse to think my way about such matters. I'll admit that Arthur Young seems quite drab when compared with, say, the much-written-up One-Arm Sutton. This former mortar maker to the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin is said to have been at one time a sergeant in the British Army; however that was, he rated a generalship when he got to Mukden and showed the Manchuria war lord how relatively unskilled Chinese workers could turn out various small arms (notably a light mortar, reputedly invented for the China scene by Sutton himself) with which to afflict civil-war opponents.

Sutton really has but one arm, which only adds to his romantic aspect. The single limb serves him well at work or play. During his hours of ease he finds one arm amply sufficient for shooting a top game of golf or indulging in occupations common to Far East club bars. After things went to the dogs, or rather the Japs, in Manchuria, Sutton was frequently seen in the lobbies of fashionable hotels at Shanghai and particularly Hong Kong. There he was center of many a wild story, usually having to do with gun running, gold mines, or something of the sort. The Far East swarmed with all kinds of adventurers in the period of the mid-1930s, and Sutton unquestionably classed in the top flight. They contributed color to the China coast scene—but they contributed nothing substantial to any ultimate solutions.

Morris Cohen was unlike many of the would-be aviators and similar ornaments of the Hongkong Hotel lobby in that he kept himself employed by and close to the Chinese. He took pride in this and was careful to preserve a sound professional status, though he didn't let that interfere with his being amusing company. One thing could make him huffy, and that was when some new acquaintance thought to display familiarity with his record by speaking of him as former bodyguard to Sun Yat-sen. It could be that his name of "Two-Gun" dated from the Sun-Yat-sen period, but Morris felt that such a role as bodyguard was far below the dignity of a general. I believe he preferred the designation "aide-de-camp." When he became attached to General Wu Te-chen, jovial ex-mayor of Greater Shanghai, he shuttled back and forth between Canton, Wu's headquarters, and Hong Kong, where he could mingle with visitors passing through.

My conviction is that at an early age General Cohen must have kissed some Jewish equivalent of the Blarney Stone. He was a lively addition to General Wu's frequent and popular luncheons and dinners. Quite likely he was a valuable contact man for Wu up to Pearl Harbor, when he was caught at Hong Kong and subsequently interned. The Japanese were rumored to have executed him. They did interrogate him, but it is a safe bet that he outtalked them. Repatriated to his native Canada, he promptly demonstrated a continued capacity for the unexpected by ending his many years of bachelor status.

The late Fennimore Lynch has been advertised as another "mystery man" in a way this gay though fastidious soul wouldn't have appreciated. He was an exchange expert who, like Dr. Young, went out to China in 1929 with Dr. Kemmerer and stayed on in Chinese employ. An able man in his line, he never to my knowledge stepped out of his proper role or did any behind-the-scenes skulduggery, though of course he knew a great deal and he made an impressive sartorial appearance. Always careful of his wardrobe, he was the best-dressed man in Chungking; there wasn't much competition, it's true, but anyway he was a charming chap. He met tragic death when an airplane crashed just after take-off at Kunming several years ago.

"Is it true what they say about China's secret police?" That question bobs up constantly and requires a rather detailed answer. There is no single great terrorist-police net, keeping the citizens in mortal terror; but there are several forms of special police organizations, and at times they can be a nuisance, though nothing approximating those of Germany, Italy, Russia, or Japan. The chief such group is headed by Major General Tai Li (pronounced "Die Lee"). This Chinese Himmler has kept his name out of the China Handbook and other standard reference works, but he is well known to his fellow countrymen, who find it wholesome practice, however, to play dumb when he is mentioned. Your Chinese friends will not appreciate interrogation on the point. They may reluctantly admit, when pressed, that Tai Li is boss of the police operated under direction of the Military Affairs Committee. His technical title is apparently that of "director of the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statis-

tics," which sounds harmless but roughly corresponds to a Gestapo or NKVD.

At an earlier stage Tai Li, born in Chekiang in 1902, was reputed to be chief of the famous but (if you took Nanking's word for it) totally non-existent Blue Shirts, whose chief target during prewar years was communism. As a cadet at the Whampoa Military Academy he had been under Chiang Kai-shek and developed a close personal attachment common to many of that group. His ostensible job under the new National Government of the early 1930s became that of director of the Finance Ministry's Anti-Smuggling Service, which lent itself wonderfully to the construction of a secret spy machine utilizing many of the least fragrant ornaments of the Ch'ing Pang and Hung Men, as well as candidly underworld characters. Later the title was changed and Tai Li's "investigation and statistics bureau" functioned under the National Military Council. One thing it has never given any statistics about is itself, but they would be interesting. I have seen estimates of his plain-clothes agents as totaling between 150,000 and 180,000, with say 40,000 on a full-time basis and the rest of them "special contact men," which is probably a nice way of saying stool pigeons. Uniformed operatives would, it is guessed, swell the total under Tai Li to around 300,000. These people during the war operated in both Free China, excluding Communist territory, and in areas of Japanese occupation, giving Tai Li much power over guerrillas friendly to the Kuomintang. The general nature of the network was such as to afford Tai a control of internal communication and transport, including Chinese air lines, highways, railways and telephone, telegraph and radio systems. Wartime travel thus was closely supervised by Tai Li's men, who on occasion did not hesitate to arrest or even liquidate persons deemed expendable. The question is whether such things can continue in peace.

With end of the war came publication of facts on the mysterious organization utilizing the services of 50,000 Chinese and 1,800 Americans under the mystic name of "SACO," which meant "Sino-American Co-operative Organization." The American side of the group centered under Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles, who kept himself about as mysterious as General Tai Li. Few were much surprised to learn that "Mary" Miles's opposite number was indeed

Tai Li. SACO worked in occupied territory, utilized portable radios, and reported a variety of things ranging from weather to Japanese activities. It depended on the Tai Li group for intelligence material. There were intimations that Tai Li got at least as much as he gave, for purposes of his own. Certainly the U. S. Navy can have had few stranger bedfellows.

There have been instances where Tai Li's men misstepped and jeopardized their influential chief's prospects. I recall one sensational error in judgment the group was said to have made at Kunming just before I was there in 1943, when it rubbed out certain exceptionally well-connected officials. There was no doubt but that they'd been up to the wrong things, but that isn't always the whole story in China or in other parts of the world.

Tai Li's far from merry men form only one, though the most powerful, of several groups of secret police whose status—nebulous but potent—often verges suspiciously close to that of gangsters in other countries. What, for instance, can be said in easy summary of a man like Tu Yueh-sen? His is another significant case history, and a book-length story of his life, if handled with full detail and utter frankness, would be extremely revealing of a thousand aspects of life in China. It would also demonstrate further none too elevating similarities between life in China and America.

Tu was born of a poor coolie family near Shanghai in 1887, and his start in gaining a livelihood took the form of selling fruit to Yangtze steamship passengers. China is on occasion more a land of opportunity than is generally realized. It so happened that Tu befriended Chiang Kai-shek during a time that young Chiang was working in Shanghai as a broker. Also, he developed leadership in the secret Green Circle (Ch'ing Peng). These two circumstances dovetailed when the fates brought Chiang to Shanghai as head of an army in the spring of 1927. Who could serve better than Tu's comrades of the Ch'ing Peng to work with Tai Li's Blue Shirts in assisting Chiang to seize the Chinese-administered Shanghai area and break up the Chinese Communist labor unions which had attempted to build power ahead of the Kuomintang armies? The Communists, still politically united with the Kuomintang, thought themselves the advance guard of a new time. Instead they were destroyed and their reins of power taken over. Tu, having proved

invaluable through the services of his Ch'ing Peng braves, armed with weapons from the French Concession police chief, now found himself firmly entrenched as supporter of Chiang's new Nanking right-wing regime and was not long in taking fresh steps. One of these, somewhat ironically, was to set up new "official" labor unions in place of the Communist groups just wiped out by violence. To-day one of Tu's followers, Chu Hsueh-fan, is head of the National Government-controlled Chinese Association of Labor, and customarily represents "Chinese labor" at meetings of the International Labor Organization.

Among the numerous economic enterprises of the big-city secret groups was the operation of a highly lucrative opium racket. So when the Government decided on "opium suppression" by means of "regulation," a system regarded with suspicion by many authorities, including the League of Nations and the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, Tu and his business colleagues of the lower-Yangtze narcotics traffic were hired as officials! It was argued that they were experts, and nobody could deny that. Tu, incidentally, is much admired by fellow Chinese because he cured himself of the drug habit. But he is admired for many other things. By 1933 he had achieved great respectability, and the 1933 edition of the China Year Book described him as follows:

Most influential resident, French Concession. Well-known public welfare worker. . . . Councillor, French Municipal Council. . . . President, Chung Wai Bank and Tung Wai Bank, Shanghai. Founder and chairman, board of directors, Cheng Shih Middle School. President, Shanghai Emergency Hospital. Member, Supervisory Committee, General Chamber of Commerce. Managing Director, Hua Feng Paper Mill, Hangchow. Director, Commercial Bank of China, Kiangsu and Chekiang Bank, Great China University, Chinese Cotton Goods Exchange, and China Merchants Steam Navigation Co., etc. President, Jen Chi Hospital, Ningpo.

He founded several orphanages and a model rural center run on co-operative lines. In 1935 he was decorated by a grateful National Government for "munificent contributions toward flood relief and the purchase of airplanes." An ultimate touch—he became a newspaperman!—or at least the managing director of the China Press. I met him at a journalistic cocktail party and thought I had never seen

a milder version of the late Frank Munsey. By this time, anyone so rash as to mention opium in connection with Tu's name was told that he held the imposing title of director of the Shanghai Bureau of Opium Suppression. It was distinctly bad form to recall a flagrant scandal of 1932, when Tu's then highly unofficial fostering of illicit opium imports from Persia and elsewhere, along with the manufacture and sale of heroin and morphine, cost the French Concession chief of police his job along with the jobs of many subordinates in the police force, while the consul general went on sudden leave and died at Hong Kong on his way home. Thereafter Tu had concentrated his efforts on Chinese territory, which led to a struggle for power beneficently resolved by the eventual achievement of official status.

When war came, Tu and many others stuck with the Government, and it was a good thing all around. He proceeded first to Hong Kong, where he resisted tempting Japanese offers for his personal services and that of the Ch'ing Peng in promoting their own China drug trade as well as extending their spy system. Tu took a patriotic position, became vice-president of the board of the Chinese Red Cross and member of the standing committee of the National Relief Commission, and later went to Chungking. There, in high esteem as an industrialist, banker, and philanthropist, Tu employed his organization and personal talents in promoting trade with Occupied China along surprisingly enterprising lines. Goods sent into Japan's areas are said to have included tungsten, wool, rice, tung oil, and occasionally military supplies. On the other hand he provided Free China with many urgently needed commodities, including manufactured goods from Shanghai and Japan, but with a quota of luxury goods and some opium. His gangs smuggled a great deal of Japanese military equipment and other supplies which he sold to the Chinese Army at prices not wholly disadvantageous to himself. This general position led to the development of the official controls previously mentioned.

Tu's gangs in Shanghai were kept relatively intact, and they gave useful wartime help in eliminating Nippon-inclined Chinese quislings, dropping a bomb here and a bomb there and supplementing Tai Li's espionage and guerrilla operations within Occupied China. There were malicious rumors that some of these organizations

worked both ends for the benefit of their own middles by supplying espionage service within Free China to the Japanese, but that is no doubt largely slander. Around such many-sided figures as that of Tu Yueh-sen, to say nothing of Tai Li, a great many tales were bound to grow up. Chinese have a sort of superstition to the effect that those who work against such men, or even speak poorly of them, are likely to meet with fatal accidents.

A Chinese friend who used to know Tu intimately in Shanghai days, and who holds him in high esteem, recently heard a story about Miss Ralf Sues. Miss Sues believed that she was victim of an unsuccessful poison plot by Tu Yueh-sen agents in America, because of opium references in her book *Shark's Fins and Millet*. The friend was emphatic in disbelief. He didn't base his theory on the famous high moral character of Tu Yueh-sen or anything of that sort. No, the whole proof of Tu's innocence, in his opinion, lay in the fact that Miss Sues was still around to tell her tale. "If Tu Yueh-sen wanted to poison her she would be dead," remarked my friend with finality.

Another important quasi-secret-police organization has been headed by the famed Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu, rather well publicized for their rightist political views. It devoted special war-time attention to the intellectuals in Free China, including students and professors. Chen Li-fu, whom I have interviewed, was formerly Minister of Education. This brought him in close touch with Chinese educators and educated and gave a handy mark for his cohorts to shoot at in their search for radical thought. Chen was frank in fervent opposition to communism, and he had a somewhat fanatical attitude common to a good many others of his philosophy, which included a strongly nationalistic feeling. Though he had taken his M.A. at Pittsburgh, he was not disposed to think that the West had anything to teach China save technical skill. It was during his period as Education Minister that the famous effort at "thought control" occurred—in essence, a plan to post political agents in America and other countries to spy on the thought and action of Chinese students abroad, and to send them home if they showed signs of what the Japanese used to call "dangerous thoughts." This scheme backfired because of too much publicity plus opposition at Harvard and elsewhere. Late in 1944 Chen Li-fu was shifted to a

perhaps even more important post as Kuomintang Minister of Organization, a patronage-dispensing position.

His brother Kuo-fu, a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, is less widely known but is also regarded as a strong man of reactionary stamp. All this group was felt to have undergone a reverse with the Government's adoption of its "new economic policy," which among other things made a special bid for close foreign participation in the future development of China. But the C. C. P'ai or clique continues a factor in repression of labor and co-operative organizations, and even the new economic policy has shown signs of old tricks bearing its fingerprints. In general it upholds the fascist-like attitude which was in evidence at Nanking in the period immediately preceding outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. Neither democracy at home nor internationalism abroad appears to appeal to leaders of this type, whether in war or in peace.

Many questions constantly arise concerning the attitudes and potency of Chinese Army leaders. Unquestionably Generalissimo Chiang kept the strongest men, with the best troops, quite solidly behind him. Some powerful generals like the famed "Christian general" Feng were no longer left in control of any armed forces, but contented themselves with political positions holding more honor than duties. Others have been assimilated together with their commands into the complex inner circle. None would doubt the power of the former War Minister and later chief of staff, General Ho Ying-chin, who is close to and so personally devoted to the Generalissimo that there is no possibility of his standing forth as an independent figure. Similarly, the modern-minded and able General Cheng Chien, who succeeded General Ho as War Minister, devoted his efforts, in conjunction with American aid under General Wedemeyer, toward building a more efficient fighting machine for the controlling group. General Hu Tsung-nan, commander of the Generalissimo's First Army, which was the great Northwest blockading force against the Communists, is regarded as an able man whose military abilities should have been employed against the Japanese.

Notable among military leaders of a more independent type, though still far from the war-lordism of earlier days, are the Southeast leaders, who include Marshal Li Chi-shen and General Chang Fa-kwei of western Kwangtung and Kwangsi, General Hsueh Yueh

of Kwangsi and eastern Hunan, and General Yu Han-mou of eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien. In the summer of 1944 these set up a separatist Southeastern Government of Joint Defense on the theory that only they, not the National Government, could provide adequate bulwarks for Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, and Hunan. The Japanese subsequently proved that not even the capacities of these chieftains were up to the press notices. Not only did the foe succeed in linking his projected north-south communications line between Central and South China, but he overran areas of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, and Honan which the Chinese Communist broadcasting station at Yen-an on March 3, 1945, estimated to contain one hundred million Chinese. This link-up never proved of real use to the Japanese, who pulled out again a few weeks later without employing it.

The defense leaders had been able to withdraw with considerable power still in reserve, and presently they joined with the Chinese Democratic League (formerly Federation) in demands for democratic reforms at Chungking. Meanwhile the Communists were scornfully inquiring, in the course of a Yen-an radio broadcast: "With secret political police overrunning the land, corruption rampant, commerce and industry bankrupt, and people seething with complaints in Kuomintang-controlled areas, is this not chaos in the country, or shall we call it instead order in the country?" Linked with the Southeast leaders in support of the Democratic League was a largely unreconstructed war lord of the old regime, General Lung Yun, chairman of the Yünnan Provincial Government. He permitted drastic criticism of Chungking to be voiced at Kunming. Such an attitude was especially conspicuous there because it is the American terminal point for the Burma Road of the Air. It was significant of the constant internal-political bargaining forever in progress that Chungking sought to bind Lung Yun closer by making him deputy commander in chief of all ground forces. The peace nullified many such positions and may throw local leaders back toward autonomy.

World notoriety attached to Japan's brutal gendarmes, hated and feared wherever they were known. Therefore the question is sometimes asked as to whether any such opprobrium applies to the Chinese Army's *hsien ping*. These were formerly supposed to police Chinese communications inside the war zones, but in practice they

frequently extended their functions beyond the ordinary M.P. jobs to make unauthorized detentions comparable to those of the Tai Li group. Shortly before the end of the war there was much publicity regarding a new China habeas-corpus law. But with less noise, it later became known that this was not to give relief to those accused of military offenses, a question losing importance after Japan's surrender. At any rate, it would be decidedly excessive to compare China's gendarmes at all closely with the plain-clothes *ronin* and uniformed Japanese who used to form an all too effective Nipponese Gestapo functioning from Tokyo to Shanghai and beyond, and causing trouble for not only Japanese but even foreigners who came at all in touch with Japanese affairs. During the summer of 1940 I sought to fly from Shanghai to Peiping by Japanese commercial plane and discovered, through a Japanese friend in the Shanghai Consulate General, that the Japanese gendarmes were blocking this because of the Shanghai *Evening Post's* "anti-Japanese" attitude. But it is an interesting commentary on Japanese practices that by taking a bold "what about it?" stand, and getting some quietly amused support from my consulate friend (son, it happened, of a famous Japanese general), I was finally able to get my Japanese permit and fly north on the Japanese plane. Even the Japanese could be moved with the right explosives, I learned well ahead of atomic bombing.

Both Chinese and foreign educators are inwardly perturbed over the organization known as the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, loosely linked with the Chinese Army though supposedly designed to train young men and women in the political teachings of the Kuomintang and Sun Yat-sen. Enough of its militarist-totalitarian inclinations have been revealed to disconcert American missionary and modern-minded Chinese educators. But there has been no conspicuous provocation which was felt to justify taking an open stand against it.

Peacetime conditions will no doubt cause fresh questions to arise regarding the influence of the formerly much-discussed New Life Movement. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang were sponsors of this movement. One of their leading subordinates, "Colonel" (actually General) J. L. Huang, headed the roughly parallel Officers Moral Endeavor Association, of the Army. Huang is a portly,

good-natured, English-speaking man who has led various expeditions of the foreign correspondents and who still prefers the title of colonel. On the Kiangsi trip of 1935 the foreign press had a good chance to size up the New Life Movement and O.M.E.A. together, and there was an initially hostile reaction to certain blue-nosed aspects. It was forbidden, for example, to smoke in the streets, though one might smoke indoors. Neat attire was prescribed, and policemen might stop a private citizen for going about with garments unbuttoned. Among the ninety-five rules adopted soon after the start of the movement in early 1934 were:

"Do not laugh about a death or a funeral. Help your neighbor when his house is on fire."

There were also somewhat Confucian admonitions about taking care of one's parents and loving one's brothers and sisters, while a Ben Franklin influence was apparent in: "Go to bed early and get up early" as well as, "Do not spend too much money on weddings and funerals."

Leaders declared that New Life was imbued with the spirit of military discipline, productive activity, and the fine art of living—certainly a liberal contract even for China, where comprehensive ideas are cherished. I think we all shied off especially from that "military discipline" angle, which included such rules as, "Keep in line while walking" and "Inspect your house every morning and night." We heard of one foreigner at an inland point who was hauled off to the police station because his overcoat was unbuttoned; but he outwitted the authorities by pointing to the ornamental buttons on the sleeves of his coat and inquiring, "What about these, do I have to keep them buttoned too?"

The correspondents' final judgment on the New Life Movement was that, while it sounded puritanical and militaristic, like so many other things in China this movement and O.M.E.A. were for the most part modified by the Chinese sense of balance so that they did more good than harm. Cities where the New Life symbol was frequently in evidence seemed to be decidedly cleaner and more orderly than the average. They appeared to be in keeping with the ideal Generalissimo Chiang had announced at Nanchang, Kiangsi, in February of 1934, when he said that this movement had been started "to give new life to a nation whose people have long been

accustomed to the habits of disorderliness, dullness, weakness, rudeness, and vulgar manners." His summary continued that the movement "aims at the promotion of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, and accuracy. One's daily activities should be guided by the famous virtues: courtesy, justice, integrity and conscientiousness [*li, i, lien and chin*]." Writing on all this in *T'ien Hsia* magazine of November 1936, I commented that such a movement, "sponsored by the highest in the land and reaching to the lowest, seems to me to represent at once a confession of national weakness and a profession of national strength." In the view of those supporting the movement the former point appeared to find its most generalized expression in "the lack of national unity." The latter manifested itself in a new pride of the Chinese individual, whether private citizen or policeman on the corner.

During the war the New Life Movement was little mentioned. But it represented an interesting and significant effort of which more should now be heard again. Like many other Kuomintang reform measures, it was started in former Communist territory and as offset to certain principles which had been basic in the then recently chased-out Chinese Soviet Republic. The Generalissimo, "Colonel" Huang, and others prominent in the movement are still at the top in National Government affairs. Again there is great danger to China because of disunity and general slackening. So it would hardly be surprising to see a peacetime revival both of New Life for civilians and Moral Endeavor for the Army.

Any "is it true?" session tends to drift finally to the question of the Chinese Communists. Kuomintang spokesmen, official and otherwise, have been the best press agents their Red opponents could possibly have. If the question could be allowed to rest, it would presently come into perspective and be seen as only a part of the great fabric of China problems, notably that of the minority groups in general. Since it has been constantly advertised there has been an equally constant growth.

One thing seems agreed by all who have come in contact with the Communists—they do have honest, sincere, intelligent leadership, however narrow in experience on the national or international scale. In Chungking, where he was Communist representative off and on, I had stimulating talks with General Chou En-lai. He

seemed straightforward, moderate, and liberal rather than radical. A point which impressed me at the Red headquarters in the national capital was the fact that even casually encountered subordinates in the Communist group were similarly intelligent and free in their conversations. I have in mind such people as Chen Chia-kang, who went to the San Francisco Conference in the spring of 1945 as English-speaking secretary of the elderly but still alert and intelligent Communist representative Tung Pi-wu. I also recall a young Miss Kung Peng, eager and enthusiastic. Such young Communists never appeared to fear that they would get into trouble at Yenan because of saying the wrong thing.

In general the Kuomintang camp has been more conservative and reluctant to talk freely, but I think this has been overadvertised in some degree. There was never, even in wartime Chungking, any such feeling as we used to have in the lobby of the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, where we discussed Japanese politics in whispers and referred to the Emperor as "Charlie" in hopes that police snoopers would not understand if they overheard. Many people both in and out of the Chinese Government talked quite freely in Chungking. It was largely a question of whether you were well known and trusted. Old-timers among the correspondents got their best material for criticism from among the ranks of those criticized.

A thing which astounds many who gain more than a surface acquaintance with Chinese intellectual leaders is their breadth of mental background. It is not for nothing that the Chinese gained, centuries ago, a world reputation for brains. Often the lowliest coolie will surprise one by his smiling shrewdness, of which the humor is always a balancing as well as seasoning factor. The brilliance of such men as Dr. Hu Shih, former ambassador to Washington, is well known, though even those who think they know him in his overseas life are seldom aware of his home services to the Chinese "literary revolution." This started in 1917 and was notable for rejuvenating the dead Chinese literary language by infusing it with the life of China's spoken usage. There are many other figures such as Dr. Wang Chung-hui, former judge on The Hague Court of International Justice and later secretary general of the National Supreme Defense Council; Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, internationally known diplomat recently at the Court of St. James's; and Quo Tai-chi, also

ex-ambassador to Britain and, like Hu Shih, a most engaging conversationalist and critic.

But even more interesting than these, in a sense, are such less-known men as Carsun Chang, head of the Chinese National Socialist Party which became a leading participant in the Chinese Democratic League. He is brother to Chang Kia-ngau, who for years headed the Bank of China and was later Minister of Railways, then of Communications. Chang Kia-ngau is known as a banker and financier who came to the United States in 1943 to conduct postwar planning arrangements as adviser to the Executive Yuan. With such a financial-minded family connection Carsun Chang might be expected to set up shop in some Chinese equivalent of Wall Street. Instead he is leader of a party committed to a program of socialism, although it has been charged that he heads an "intellectual elite" denying the desirability of a mass following.

Things like that happen in other countries. But what is almost unique to China is the way such men as these two brothers get along. They see no major conflict in their views, apparently—certainly nothing to cause bad feeling or to make Carsun anything of a black sheep. Instead he is admired and helped (even by the Generalissimo) as an idealist whose ideas may have real value for the China of the future. This illustrates both Chinese tolerance and the fluidity of Chinese economic and political ideas when these are divorced from power politics.

China has suffered from well-meaning efforts to praise Chinese supersagacity on a somewhat fantastic plane. For example, one still hears the yarn about the Chinese who watched Americans playing tennis and then inquired whether coolies couldn't be hired to do such work. Plenty of Chinese today realize the value of exercise, enjoy such games as tennis, and take an interest in Chinese Davis Cup players when peaceful conditions permit such matches. Similarly, wasn't it Li Hung Chang who among other wise saws was supposed to have said that since it was known that one horse could run faster than another, why race? No one who had ever seen a Shanghai Race Day or watched the Chinese interest at Peking's Pamaochang would believe that any Chinese could take so cavalier a stand on a colorful sport involving wagers.

Today the quality of the Chinese mind is being better under-

stood, even by people never in China. China has good representation abroad, not merely among the ambassadors, ministers, and consuls who get plenty of publicity, but among her export-brand industrialists and bankers and journalists. Among the former there have been many able Chinese recently visiting the United States—men like Chang Kia-ngau, Li Ming, K. P. Chen, and others whose reports home have steered Chungking economic thought along realistic directions. The official Central News Agency of China is represented by David Lu in Washington and T. C. Tang in New York City, both remarkable men—good mixers, keenly intelligent and personally likable. They attend all important international conferences and are trusted by our own highest officials. By no means incidentally, their skill in news selection is playing an important part in educating their fellow countrymen at home concerning the United States. In my opinion they set a high mark for American correspondents to shoot at in the latter's interpretations of China—though our Chinese guests have the advantage of a considerably easier censorship problem!

"Is it true what they say . . . ?" Curiosity seekers will go on asking questions and spreading rumors about things Chinese, beyond doubt. Yet one would think that even the most fervent gossip would sometimes be abashed by the lack of real foundation for most of the talk. China is no land of mystery or melodrama. How the character of Fu Manchu came to be created, I have no idea. I remember how the then mayor Wu Te-chen roared with laughter in Shanghai at sight of his luncheon guest, the late Warner Oland, who was "Charlie Chan" in the movies. Gazing on Oland's little droopy black mustache, Wu shouted, "Mr. Oland, you look more Chinese than I do!" So it is with many things. We fabricate our own ideas of what China is, touching up a bit here and correcting the outline a bit there, until finally we have something more exciting by far than the original. Our own inventions become so complicated that we lose ourselves in trying to understand what we have created. Yet if we would only study the original we might find the true China simple and easy to understand. Perhaps as our modern world grows smaller, owing to faster and easier communications of all sorts, we can increasingly neglect "what they say" and learn our own facts of China and the whole Far East on a basis of eyewitness reality.

16

CHINA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD OF TOMORROW

TWO MAIN FACTORS will shape the placement of China within our world of tomorrow. First, what kind of world shall we have tomorrow? Second, what kind of China shall we have? A good world and a strong, united China can get along together very nicely because it is historically clear that the Chinese are civilized to the marrow—the kind of neighbors all folk of good will can relish, providing the Chinese house is put and kept in order.

If World War II were finally disclosed only as the prelude to bigger and better international calamities, nothing could save China. However rapidly the Chinese move toward modernization, it will still be necessary that they have a little time to catch their breath and recover their power. If we have achieved no decisive advance in the security of nations, China's place in the howling jungle must obviously be merely that of innocent victim. China has a great military potential but little which presently qualifies her for leadership in a militarized world. If brute force is to be the instrument of survival in an anarchistic world, which seems the logical alternative to progress, since there is no standing still, China should join with the Philippines in becoming a military protectorate of the United States. Unless some such umbrella is found, there can be no shelter.

But we need not as yet think in any such defeatist terms. The San Francisco Conference and many other signs are encouraging. Even the atomic bomb may prove a powerful factor for security, because it seems so clearly to pose the issue, "Peace—or else!" Realism requires that the possibility of international anarchy be faced,

but a weighing of current evidence gives ground for hope that the world has learned something at last through recent hard knocks. Perhaps in our world of tomorrow the security of China can be taken for granted.

Next comes the question of what China can do in a world which for the sake of argument may be presumed secure. First, she has already been given helping hands to enable her to get on her feet after eight punishing years of war attended by a considerable degree of internal political trouble. Anglo-American friendship could be taken for granted, and Soviet Russia surprised many cynics by settling all outstanding issues in her treaty just at the close of Nipponese hostilities. This was followed by moves designed to bring harmony within the Chinese family. But China's internal unity and development are dependent upon the achievement of fundamental and sweeping reforms entailing an unprecedented acceptance by Chinese leaders of democratic procedure. It will take time to prove how this can work out against the tremendous forces of inertia and reaction which already have clogged progress through many years.

It should be accepted as basic that despite China's flatteringly frequent appearance in headlines trumpeting affairs of the great nations, China is not automatically guaranteed any early position as one of the genuinely leading Powers. Even a durable peace won't do it; even every safeguard of outer security won't do it; only internal Chinese reforms can put down the roots from which true greatness can grow.

Unless the Chinese unite permanently, solidly, and in a way which will bring benefit to the people as a whole, they face tragedies beyond anything they have so far experienced. An early, obvious consequence would be unprecedentedly furious and destructive civil war. Later there would be breakup into theoretically autonomous states which from the present look of things would have to link themselves closely with Soviet Russia. This latter might not be entirely to the bad from the standpoint of the people, even though Russian democracy has so far been almost exclusively on the economic side and relatively little along the political lines to which we are accustomed. But it would doom China as a nation. By most of the standards we accept it would represent grave retrogression for the Chinese, who are one people and should be united in one coun-

try. Only thus can they develop their natural genius fully and in time take their historically foreshadowed place in the world. Indeed, Russia through her 1945 treaty of friendship with China endorsed this view in substance.

We cannot certainly predict, and should not try actively to direct, a united China's eventual courses. That is up to the Chinese. They will choose what they deem best, and it is likely to be different in degree from anything anywhere else in the world. Yet the Chinese have such quality of universality, and such ability to assimilate new ideas to their own advantage, that there should logically be something of the best practice of all foreign nations embodied in the China of the future. Like other growing organisms in the sun, they will draw from many sources to build their strength.

Too many people mistake superficial power for basic unity. We go back to the bad old concept of Chinese unification by a strong man—the thing is no different if it is practiced by a strong party. Neither can win all minds, nor can either remain forever strong. Our American Government has been clear-visioned, on the whole, in this matter. Among its recent representatives, former Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss was most emphatic in advising that there be real understanding and the growth of a unity worthy of the name in every sense. Sumner Welles said in October of 1942: "The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof." Again and again this has been underscored, but not too frequently. Others have joined in this attitude, though I believe that it was first and best enunciated by the United States, as the traditional great foreign friend of China.

After visiting his superiors in Washington and returning to Chungking by way of Moscow, where he talked with Premier Stalin, U. S. Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley said on April 28, 1945: "The United States, Great Britain, and Russia are in agreement on Chinese policy and are anxious for China to work out her own destiny in her own way." Four months later Russia gave proof of her sincerity by concluding the treaty of friendship and alliance. Nothing I say of Russia should be taken as reflecting upon Soviet sincerity. I am convinced that Russia, like the other wartime Allies, feels

it will be best for the world to have a free, independent, united China; though I am further convinced that the always realistic Russians would move with any contingency in China as elsewhere to find a workable solution devoid of sentiment.

Neither sentiment nor altruism are to be very heavily counted upon these days in any quarter. After all, well as we Americans think of ourselves, it wasn't our pledge of eventual Philippine independence which finally caused the Congress of the United States to pass the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act on March 24, 1934. In that instance American altruism had knocked its head against a political stone wall for years, until some of our more selfish interests decided it would benefit them to help cut the Philippines adrift; then and not until then was a definite date set for Philippine independence. Let us not expect more from others than the record lets us claim for ourselves. But at the same time let us not be so over-shrewd as to presuppose that people with views and programs in some ways different from our own, such as the Russians, must necessarily be willful and contrary just for meanness. In this matter of China it happens to be the fact, and the astute hard-boiled Russians know it to be the fact, that a united China is best for everyone concerned.

But I think we should all face the further point, that one of our toughest tasks in dealing with postwar China must be to believe in and live up to what we have all been saying—that only China can decide China's destiny. Every high diplomatic function is knee-deep in such fine sentiments. The point is to breathe life into them.

The temptation to meddle and muddle in China is going to be acute.

There will be constant suspicion that other countries are yielding to that temptation, therefore we should do the same.

Even now, we have a probably imperfect realization of how certain social-economic concepts are bound to collide in future, all over the world. Every country will see some evolution in its philosophy, but several of the largest countries already have strong, in many points opposed, lines. We shall feel it is for China's best interest that we guide her into right courses, i.e., toward the way we ourselves think and act.

How much luck we shall have in restraining ourselves is highly

problematical. Credits and other help such as China needs are natural cover for the ideas of the benefactor. At any rate I have no hesitation in saying that we should restrain ourselves. We may help and we have a right to exact adequate protection for our money, goods, and technical services; we may even give friendly advice; but with those things we must stop unless we want to stir up another witch's caldron of boiling hate bound to slop over into fresh catastrophe.

China herself is bound to feel temptation toward loss of self-control in a most literal sense. I think that historic experience gives China an adequate safeguard against the danger of any piecemeal surrender of physical assets. She knows what it has been to have others running her railroads, her mines, even her maritime customs, and she will see to it that nothing even savoring of extraterritorial jurisdiction, political or economic, ever returns while she retains any semblance of being still a united nation. I doubt whether foreign would-be exploiters who would try such tactics are anywhere in evidence today. China can give the foreigner types of mortgage rights, or even administrative powers, which will afford adequate security for whatever is advanced without dangerous implications. She has shown how far she is prepared to go in extreme cases by the new partnership with Russia in the Manchurian railways and the southern ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. But there are other types of involvement, more subtle but for that very reason more dangerous. I have already suggested that if the last war is to be succeeded by supersavagery, China should get under an umbrella of American protection. That is the sort of thing I mean. Only extreme peril can justify such extreme measures on the part of either China or a potential guardian Power. It is time for China to stand on her own feet and to depend on good relations among all the Powers for maintenance of world peace. The days of delicate international balances are near their close, and China can, if she will, be a strong factor in erecting a more solid structure.

China has shown repeated readiness to embrace a new world order. At Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 the Chinese Government advocated that "the Charter [of the general international organization then in process of formation] should provide specifically that adjustment or settlement of international disputes should be achieved with due regard for principles of justice and international law." This po-

sition was cordially endorsed by the three other Powers sponsoring the United Nations International Security Conference which opened at San Francisco in April of 1945.

Dr. T. V. Soong headed the Chinese delegation at that conference. He made an interesting reference to the Chinese attitude in a speech delivered May 4 at Berkeley, where he was accepting an honorary LL.D. from the University of California. Dr. Soong recalled "the emphasis which China has given to the placing of moral values above physical forces in the future world order" and said that "in stressing the moral factor, China has been guided by her profound faith in the cause of freedom and justice. In her long history, China has given abundant evidence of her belief in the ultimate triumph of right over might. One of our great philosophers referred to this policy of moral considerations as 'The Kingly Way.' When the Father of our Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, visited Japan in 1925, he was already in the grip of a fatal illness, but almost with his dying breath he tried to dissuade the Japanese from their chosen policy of aggression, by pointing out to them the alternative benefits of 'The Kingly Way.' But the Japanese had so far committed themselves to their policy of domination and conquest that, while paying lip service to the doctrine of 'The Kingly Way,' they continued on their course of aggression which has led them so surely to disaster."

More than would meet the ordinary occidental eye appears in the foregoing, and it may be of significance in evaluating future Far East trends. In setting forth upon their conquests the Japanese craftily sought to establish a position of moral ascendancy among oriental peoples. They drew on every historic source they could find or invent, in an effort both to convince their own public and to win over the inhabitants of invaded areas. "The Kingly Way" mentioned by Dr. Soong, known in Chinese as *Wang Tao*, was advertised by the Japanese as their own path as leaders in an "Asia for the Asiatics" policy pointed toward world domination.

The Japanese went back to their *Nihon Shoki* (Chronicles of Japan), written in A.D. 720, which in turn quoted an alleged proclamation by the Emperor Jimmu in 660 B.C. This probably faked document said among other things: "At present, affairs are in a crude condition, and the people roost in nests or dwell in caves. If a great man were to establish laws, justice could not fail to flourish.

. . . Japan's capital may be extended to embrace the six cardinal points, and the eight cords may be covered so as to form a roof." This all-embracing "Hakko Ichiu Principle" was dredged up to furnish basis for a declaration that it fitted the twentieth-century world, which was confused but could be brought to order through coming under the tentlike shelter of imperial Japanese rule administered by remote, vague overlords well versed in the meanderings of "The Kingly Way." In all this hocus-pocus the Japanese, as usual, drew from Chinese sources and copied ancient Chinese talk and thought. They were hypocrites stealing ideas originally sincere.

In counter against this, modern-minded Chinese are dipping from the great reservoir of their past to establish a groundwork of fresh moral ascendancy. Their purpose is to build in sincerity a solid structure which Japan's military gangsters sought to jerry-build with lies. Nippon's edifice was foredoomed to collapse. China can at least attempt to weld a centuries-tested morality to the needs of our confusing new world, and her endless patience and deep knowledge are tools of great value.

Speaking before the San Francisco meeting, Dr. Soong won the first applause granted any delegate when he gave assurance that "we are prepared to yield a part of our sovereignty to the new international organization in the interest of collective security." Although he was subjected to some criticism for this at Chungking, none who knows China will deny that he expressed a position in which China has traditional claim to leadership. Whatever the Chinese have been, their attitude as a country has been moderate and flexible toward others when not marred by too much of the former and now outworn isolationism. We must grant that it takes courage for the spokesman of a still weak nation to say what Dr. Soong did—the usual attitude in such case is of prickling belligerency born of an inferiority complex. In China's case such an attitude stems from centuries of experience and sober reflection on the advantages of give-and-take. We need not fear that China will trouble us by delusions of grandeur if she grows to the status of a true world Power and the leading nation of the Far East.

Such influential Chinese newspapers as *Ta Kung Pao*, "the *Manchester Guardian* of China," have shown increasing tendency to stress the need for educating China's people as world citizens. It

has frequently hit out against a spirit of narrow nationalism in China or elsewhere. Likewise it has spoken against economic imperialism, from which many Chinese believe their country has suffered at the hands of foreigners, although it is no longer claimed that China even resembles a "hypo-colony." Commenting on the prospects for an effective world organization, *Ta Kung Pao* declared in April of 1945 that it was clear "the people of the old world are invigorated with a new resolution, so it will not matter materially even though there are imperfections in the organization. Amendments and changes can be made from time to time. But should the world remain unchanged, it could not profit by any organization however perfect. The devil will come back."

Basic objectives were stated by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in an address before a joint session of the Supreme National Defense Council and the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on August 24, 1945, to discuss results of the Japanese capitulation. Among other things the Generalissimo said:

"At this great turning point in history, the National Government should make clear to the people of China and of the whole world the main objectives in its policy of realizing national independence and completing the national revolution. We fervently hope that the bitter lessons of this war will not be quickly forgotten, and that security in China and peace in the world may be permanently established. . . . The aim of our national revolution is twofold. In our relations with other nations we seek national independence and freedom. Within the nation we seek equality for all racial groups. . . . China will not use the occasion of Japanese unconditional surrender as a pretext for disregarding international agreements and infringing upon the rights of our allies [this with special reference to Hong Kong]. . . . In collaboration with our allies, we shall strive to bring about friendly relations between all free and independent nations, insure the continuance of peace, and prevent the re-emergence of power politics. We should see to it particularly that the peoples of the world do not again suffer from inequality, the want of freedom, scarcity and fear. . . . Let our people with one heart and one mind strive toward this goal."

That there will be real effort along these lines is to me beyond question. Indeed, I rather wonder whether the almost ultracivilized

inner nature of the Chinese will not bring certain shocks to the West. There are, moreover, certain practical disadvantages to too much easy tolerance. The characteristic which allows a Chinese individual to tuck away half a dozen assorted religions with no trace of indigestion, and a comfortable chuckle, will cause China as a nation to display a more than ordinary Christian forgiveness of enemies—or at any rate a readiness to work with and make money from them! The Chinese are an old, sophisticated people who know that hate is often a too costly luxury. So it may be taken for granted that just as China traded with Japan after the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, and as wartime Free China later traded with Occupied China, so there is bound to be a rapid restoration of close commercial relationships with the erstwhile foe—Japan primarily, because nearest, and Germany and Italy in such degree as is justified by circumstances. The views of many influential Chinese toward Germany were well expressed by a Chungking quarterly magazine in late 1944 when it presented a tranquil analysis declaring that though Germany had had bad political leaders there was no deep enmity between the two peoples, nor should there be any economic rift between them. Said this organ, the *Ching Shih*:

The good quality and cheap price of Germany's machinery and chemical products have long rendered them popular in China. After the war China will still rely on Germany for much of the machinery and materials she needs for reconstruction and national defense. Similarly when Germany wants to rebuild her strength she will need materials from China. There are no limits to the future development of Sino-German trade.

The Germans, like the Japanese, have always shown superior capacity for analysis of the China market, and they adjust their trade customs to suit the notions of customers. Unless we display similar teachability we shall find ourselves making generous loans, selling locomotives and ships and other big articles for which we shall try to get cash on the line, and the Germans will quietly peddle needles and aspirin and many other small but profitable commodities on long-term credits and do well at it.

Part of China's readiness to go along with the Japanese lies in a deep Chinese self-assurance, which some unfriendly critics have

called conceit. Passing manifestations of the "island monkey's" ability to copy Western factories and guns were regarded with the same indulgent smile (perhaps forced a little at times) as was accorded Nipponese drafts upon the earlier bounties of China and India. With Confucius, every Chinese knew in his heart that eventually "the dwarfs will be swallowed by the dragon." Therefore why get excited and heat oneself with hatred? Even in their moments of greatest exasperation China never subscribed to Paul V. McNutt's recommendation for "extermination of the Japanese—in toto." They knew it couldn't be done. China has consistently recognized that she had a permanent and good-sized neighbor of not less than seventy million inhabitants, and she has been prepared to see to it that they got along. But henceforth China proposes to make a bigger profit.

Actually the great rival of China in the Far East today, however friendly a rival, is Soviet Russia, a country facing toward the Orient at least equally with the Occident. Anxieties that Russia would take an aggressive postwar attitude toward China were stilled by the prompt conclusion of a treaty settling every disputed point as of the start of new peace. There was still the question of Marxian ideology, as repugnant to a banker in Shanghai as to one in London or New York, yet accepted by an appreciable percentage of Chinese today as perhaps embodying at least a kernel of eventual China solutions. Both these questions are bound to lie latent, if they do not rise to impressive stature in any immediate future. It seems to me that the ghost of "Russian imperialism" has been pretty well laid by the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty, universally regarded as mutually sincere. Russia will never interfere in China's internal affairs, by any present indication, as Japan did from 1931 onward with the pretext of trying to help China by force. It is amazing to see occasional American references, even today, to a theory actually "made in Japan" to the effect that the 1931 Manchuria invasion was due to Nipponese anxiety over China's disunity. Clearly the motivation of the Japanese militarists lay partly in election results within their own country, showing a rise in democratic understanding, and partly in a decline of war-lordism in China. This latter development carried a plain hint that before long a strong and unified China might place

herself beyond the possibility of any such domination as had been frankly asked some years before in the Twenty-one Demands. Japan seems now out of military consideration for years to come, and we may hope permanently; the question is whether Russia could replace her evil position, and there is general opinion favorable to Russia on that point.

But it would be foolish indeed to overlook the possibility of an increasing Soviet influence under any conditions, and a probability of direct Soviet involvement at least along China's borders if China fails in the effort to build herself into a powerful, democratically based structure offering no menace to Soviet security. The word "democratic" is used deliberately and with no desire to draw a parallel or contrast as between China and Russia. Whether Russia is or should be democratic falls outside my scope, but I am convinced that the nature of the Chinese is such that only democracy can suit their modern national needs, so if they fail to achieve democracy they fail to achieve union, and thus all fails.

We shall every one of us be in trouble if China rolls herself into an inextricable snarl due to whatever causes. Soviet Russia is closest and has the most at stake. Also she has great power, and resolution to use that power if she deems best. Her influence in a China crisis will be dynamic, while the rest of us are likely to be relatively static. America's attitude toward Chinese internal politics, for instance, has usually been simply to favor the "ins" and hope for the best. Russia can favor the "ins" too, as witness the treaty of friendship with a Kuomintang regime, but finally she will always choose to do the thing that works. If the Kuomintang, helped and trusted, does not make good, Russia will adopt whatever tactics seem to fit the then existing circumstances. The United States, having built up the Kuomintang forces as a wartime necessity, might in time of crisis find no other course than to do some fast stepping sidewise and out, whereas Russia almost certainly would act quite otherwise.

In the event of development of Chinese armed separatism on a decisive scale, Russia would lose no time in choosing sides. The situation would no longer favor support of conservatism; now Russia would go along with the Chinese party ideologically devoted to her own avowed objective, Marxian communism. One touch of real

civil conflict in China could change the Moscow attitude of letting Chinese communism perish in the wilderness unencouraged save by occasional kind words from *Pravda*. Again the link broken in 1927 would be forged, and this time it might prove more durable. There would not only be Soviet help for the Chinese Communists, but Russian involvement in all the potential Polands along Sino-Russian borders. The eventualities are easy to foresee: Creation of buffer states, Soviet-helped and diplomatically linked with the U.S.S.R. Here is a roll call from West to East.

Tibet: An area already virtually independent, but with both Chinese and British influence. Chinese suzerainty has already virtually vanished, following suggestion of autonomous status by Generalissimo Chiang. Moscow could provide the lamas with solid inducement toward Soviet alignment.

Sinkiang: Russia once held this riches-packed territory, then pulled out voluntarily and later confirmed the move by treaty. But she could still return.

Outer Mongolia: Here is territory already autonomous, treaty-linked with the U.S.S.R., and no longer even under a semblance of Chinese claim to suzerainty. It furnishes a pattern for other areas inclining toward sovietism.

Inner Mongolia: This was for years dominated by the Japanese. China has not made herself popular. Whatever happens, there is a prospect of inclination toward the U.S.S.R.

A Communist Northwest: Just what this would finally take in territorially is anybody's guess. Enthusiasts supporting the Chinese Communists believe they might sweep far east and south.

Manchuria: The 1945 treaty confirmed Chinese sovereignty while leaving Russia considerably involved as partner. This is a workable solution if China holds up. But a China embroiled in trouble should expect Soviet occupation, or at least domination, of all Manchuria.

Korea: Russia joined with Britain and America in the Cairo pledge and would not strike openly at Korea's independence. But strong persuasion might be used on even the freest of Koreas to join hands with Russia.

Turning from things material to those of the mind, what are the prospects for growth of Marxian communism as a political-eco-

nomic force in China with Moscow as fountainhead? Within the short life of China's Communist party, dating back only to 1921, there have already been numerous ideological deviations. Moscow has never exercised any sort of real control, though she had great influence up to 1927. It is reasonably accurate to say that communism is little more than a label in China today, since it does not even go so far as the collectivism of Russia. But communism as an aspiration lives on in the hearts of many keen, intelligent, and able men and women. They have never abandoned Marxian ideals. They thank nobody for creating the false impression that they have done so. As with peace the Chinese Communist party re-establishes contact with a growing Chinese industrial society after years as an agrarian reform movement, there is bound to be a great effort to revert to Marxian thought and to establish Marxian practice.

How successful this will be cannot be accurately forecast. But there is likely to be evolution showing both Russian and American influence, yet on a uniquely Chinese pattern. Dr. Sun was probably right in his intuitive perception that China is not fertile ground for the class war, though the wrong kind of future Chinese industrial development might change this completely. Further, while the Chinese are ideally adapted to various forms of co-operative enterprise, they will stand stubbornly against too intimate an encroachment into the field of individual ownership and enterprise. Communal ownership of most forms of consumer goods, aside from perhaps a few basic essentials, won't appeal; and the peasant has a fierce desire to own his land. Chinese railroads and other major utilities have been state-owned for years, China's minerals belong to the nation, and I anticipate a continued tendency to experiment with state ownership of various large enterprises, although the new Chinese economic policy finally excluded the state's intended monopoly of heavy industry. Labels are a plague, but perhaps it may be said that a certain amount of socialism seems reasonable and natural for China, though orthodox communism does not. Capitalism is bound to have gained in prestige by America's wartime and postwar contributions of goods and technique.

The Chinese are bound to explore many of the general paths common to us all. They are industrially backward, and their communications are spotty, also they are innately conservative. But they

may in certain respects forge ahead rapidly because of the very fact that there is so much to be done. Things needed provide a vacuum into which rush the forces of accomplishment. I think we may look for tremendous development, and I hope with this that the Chinese technique of co-operation (not to be confused with the bad business of providing jobs for everyone in the family!) may be fruitfully utilized.

Anything can happen in the way of internal growth. And unless cool heads and firm hands keep control, almost anything might. What worries me is not the risk that Sun Yat-sen's ideas of Chinese development will *not* be equaled, or exceeded, but that they will—in wrong ways. Industrialization run wild in a postwar China could be worse than any Juggernaut. We and the Chinese should want no more industrial nightmares of the former Shanghai type endlessly magnified and extended. China needs industrialization, certainly, but what she needs is a controlled industrial development taking into consideration the people's old customs and present well-being. There must be a parallel modernization of agriculture. Even the impact of Chinese goods on world markets, and China's own capacity to absorb foreign imported products, must have study. China's progress must mean benefit for the people of the whole world. That is not a quixotic statement, it is plain common sense in a Chinese pattern.

A great many problems already press upon China. Wartime brought inflation, bad enough but for quite a period estimated by Dr. J. Lossing Buck to have affected only about ten per cent of the people. He felt that, on the contrary, peacetime deflation might hit at least ninety per cent, explaining:

Deflation causes cessation or great curtailment of production and business; when prices begin to fall people postpone purchases, a reverse of buying in advance in an inflationary period. Costs are incurred for manufacture when the level is higher than finished products are sold, and there is lag in the fall of such costs as taxes, rents, wages, and interest rates; therefore businesses run without profit or at losses, forcing them to close and spreading unemployment. Deflation puts individual against individual, class against class, and even nation against nation. It causes changes in governments within a country. It has been claimed that Germany's attempt at deflation brought Hitler into power.

Obviously China's capacity for dealing with both inflation and deflation may play a great part in her future progress, even in her contacts with the world. Dr. Buck unconsciously gave an amusing example of how inflation in wartime tended to cut China's world contacts by citing a publication called *Economic Facts*, published at Chengtu and not generally available in the United States because of China's officially "pegged" exchange rate "making the cost prohibitive for most subscribers"—in itself an interesting thumbnail lesson in "economic facts"!

Currency stabilization is one of China's greatest basic problems. My attitude toward this complex subject resembles that of the late Will Rogers toward the German submarine of World War I. Will said he'd solved the whole matter. "All you have to do," he explained, "is just boil the ocean. There's your solution—now you work out the details." Somehow the Chinese Government must halt a condition where within a single month a black-market trader may offer 3200 Chinese dollars for a single American dollar, then be willing to give no more than the 20-to-1 rate. Peace, which did that, disclosed a Shanghai whose local currency had soared from a pre-war 3-to-1 to around 100,000-to-1. An American correspondent first into Shanghai spent 10,272,000 local dollars for two days at a hotel. He, or his home auditor, must have been anxious for somebody to start boiling the economic ocean.

There are details to be worked out in scores of other fields. Chinese law and its administration is a case in point, of interest to Americans and many others. Formerly, under extraterritorial jurisdiction, we had our own United States Court for China which tried Americans under American law. Other extraterritorial Powers such as Great Britain, Japan, and the Central Powers before World War I had their comparable treaty privileges, originating less in "imperialism" than in China's former desire to wash her hands of the affairs of such outlanders. Today we all come under Chinese law, but this is in process of evolution. During the autumn of 1944 the Chinese Government invited Judge Milton J. Helmick, last to preside over the former U. S. Court for China, to visit China and make an on-the-scene study. He combines a sympathetic attitude toward China with a scholarly philosophy of the law. He toured under Judicial Yuan invitation and State Department auspices, conducted a

four-months' study, and found the Chinese anxious to get advice on which to base a modern legal and judicial system. After his return to America, Judge Helmick said: "I urged upon my Chinese friends the desirability of looking more and more in the direction of the Anglo-American legal system and philosophy and relying less upon the German-Japanese code system which China now has." He made specific suggestions on commercial laws, courts, and procedure. There are indications that these, coupled with proposals from foreign business and diplomatic experts, will bring useful changes. It is interesting to note that in exchange the Chinese sent to America Dr. D. S. Chen, former Shanghai lawyer and member of the Shanghai Municipal Council, to conduct an extended study of the American legal system and judicial administration.

This may be cited as typical of China's present approach. There is an obvious willingness to learn, a readiness to improve, though often a justified stubbornness against following some foreign pattern unmodified when an already existing Chinese pattern offers advantages. With government help several thousand Chinese youths are studying in America. There has been considerable tendency toward innovation in China's internal affairs despite stubbornness of the Kuomintang in maintaining its own sole grip; for example, during early 1945 the Executive Yuan voted sweeping changes in China's tax structure on recommendation of Dr. T. V. Soong. Government monopolies on salt, tobacco, and matches were abolished, and a number of wartime or other special consumption taxes were cleared away from such essentials as cotton and vegetable oils. The idea was to simplify the taxation system and lighten burdens. Changes of this sort are not conspicuous, but they show a constant effort to adjust, which no doubt played its part in seeing China through eight years of hostilities. They should have significant bearing on China's future.

There is a wholesome substratum upon which the foundations of a new China can rest, providing the building is soundly erected, with proper division of stresses. There are good timbers with which to build. China's relations with her neighbors are seen to be essentially sound. The sun is shining, and China is in the sun.

Things are therefore pretty much up to the occupants of the Chinese house. If they find ways to live together peacefully and con-

structively, the future looks all right unless the alarmists turn out to have something in their occasional muttered forecasts of impending division of the whole world into two parts, Communist and Capitalist, with World War III as a dismal prospect. If they are right, God help China. But for the matter of that—God help us all.

INDEX

- Abbot, Willis John, 148
- Abend, Hallett, news editor of the *Peking Leader*, 115
- Airfields in China, profiteering in their construction, 186, 193-94
- Alcott, Carroll Duard, cable editor of the *China Press*, expelled from Shanghai, 324; censorship aimed at his news broadcasts, 327; 325
- All-China Federation of National Salvation Unions, issues manifesto, 87-88; "Seven Gentlemen" imprisoned, 89; 95
- Alley, Rewi, factory inspector in Shanghai, 12, 230, 243
- Allman, Norwood Francis, of the *Shun Pao*, 318; expelled from Shanghai, 323
- Amerasia* magazine, on Chinese disunity, 97
- America's Far Eastern Policy*, book by T. A. Bisson, quoted, 229-30
- Amery, Col. Leopold Stennett, his defense of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, 310
- Ancestor worship in China, in Catholic controversy, 293-94
- Andrews, Dr. Roy Chapman, 3
- Anfu Club, the Tammany Hall of China, 41
- Annam, its independence proclaimed by Japan, 170
- Arcos raid in London, 52
- Arita, Hachiro, Japanese Foreign Minister, considers negotiations useless, 153
- Army (U.S.) personnel, and their conflicts with Chinese, 189-90
- Arnstein, Daniel, inquiry into conditions on the Burma Road, 239
- Asia for the Asiatics, the policy of Tokyo, 151, 166, 178
- Associated Press, dispatches on the "Stilwell affair" quoted, 331
- Atkinson, Brooks, his explanation of the recall of Gen. Stilwell, 200-2; declares foreign capital could not participate in China's reconstruction, 267-68
- Atomic bomb, a shock to China as well as to Japan, 190; 369
- Baker, John Earle, 26
- Bates, Miner Searle, of the University of Nanking, 290-91; his *Missions in Far Eastern Cultural Relations* quoted, 301; 302
- Bauer, Col. Max, 212
- Bee* (H.M.S.), bombed by Japanese, 180
- Belden, John, newspaperman, 167
- Belgium, its treaty with China ended, 34
- Bernardi, Mario di, 214
- Berrigan, Darrell, correspondent for the *New York Post*, barred from China, 339
- Bevin, Ernest, British Foreign Secretary, receives surrender of Japan, 174
- Bickel, Karl August, president of United Press, reprimands correspondent for withholding dispatch, 117; 119-20
- Birth control, endorsed by the Kuomintang, 10; subject of interest in China, 13; apparatus sold in Japan, 144
- Bisson, Thomas Arthur, his book *America's Far Eastern Policy* quoted, 229-30
- Blue Shirts, a terrorist group, 92
- Bluecher, Vassily Konstantinovich, Soviet representative in Far East, his "removal," 43
- Bogomolov, Dmitri V., succeeds Karakhan as ambassador to China, 124
- Borodin, Michael Markovitch, Soviet adviser to Chinese Nationalist Gov-

- ernment, 12, 33; sent out of country, 55; an interview with him, 65-68; becomes editor of English-language newspaper in Moscow, 123; 42-43, 50, 69-70, 265
- Bose, Subhas Chandra, named head of a "provisional government" of India by Japanese, 167
- Boxer Protocol, 23-24, 26-27, 116
- Boynton, Charles L., his *Handbook of the Christian Movement in China*, 296
- Bretton Woods international conference, 166, 353
- Bristol, Admiral Mark Lambert, press conference on board his flagship, 120
- Browder, Earl, delegate to Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 69; on the matter of putting the Chinese Communist armies under an American officer, 105
- Bruce, George, general manager of the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, 315, 320, 326
- Buchman, Alexander, newspaper photographer in Shanghai, 310
- Buck, Dr. John Lossing, authority on China's land problems, 230-31, 233-36, 238; on peacetime deflation, 382; an example of inflation, 383
- Buck, Pearl S., receives the Order of the Jade from the Chinese Government, 48
- Buddhism, important in China, 283
- Buffer states, helped by Soviet Russia, 380
- Buick, David and Dorothea, of the business staff of the Shanghai *Post*, 313
- Burke, James, quoted on relations between Chinese and Americans, 197-98
- Burma, and the India problem, 166-67, 175; effect of Japanese propaganda, 168; Road closed by Britain, 185
- Burton, Wilbur, American correspondent in Peking, arrested by Chinese police, refused help by American Legation, 114-15, 117-19
- Butts, James, of the Chicago *Daily News*, 306
- Byas, Hugh, his reflection on Japanese revolution, 138
- Byrnes, James Francis, policy toward Thailand, 176
- "C. C. Clique," 92
- C. C. P'ai, "China's Tammany Hall," 92, 361
- Cairo Conference, its declaration on Japan, 157-58; 162, 173
- Calhoun, A. D., 72
- Canton, Nationalist Government set up, 50
- Capitalism in China, principle endorsed by the Nationalist regime, 265-66; resolution of Supreme National Defense Council, 271-73
- Catroux, Gen. Georges, replaced by Decoux as governor general of Indo-China, 169-70
- Censorship, in China, 188-89; Philippines free of it, 303; interferes with sending of story of the massacre of students by Tsao Kun, 306; oddities in cutting of stories, 308; methods of evading the censors, 309; rules not to be relaxed after Japan's surrender, 329; censoring not to be a permanent institution, 338; abolished in Free China, 339
- Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, 86; conditions for uniting with the Communists, 96, 101-2; Chiang Kai-shek's speech quoted, 153
- Central Political Council, 91
- Chang, Carsun, head of the National Socialist Party in China, 90, 367; supports United Front, 91, 265
- Chang, Samuel, a Chinese go-between, 318-19; assassinated, 324-25; 348
- Chang Chun, Gen., governor of Szechuen, 93; as Foreign Minister engages in fruitless negotiations, 153
- Chang Fa-kwei, Gen., 361

- Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, 31; goes over to the Nationalists, 58; exiled and imprisoned, 88-89; 59, 81
- Chang Kia-ngau, 268, 367-68
- Chang Tso-lin, war lord of Manchuria, 23; his help to Japan, 24; campaigns against Feng Yu-hsiang, 30-31; his purge of the Anfu Club, 41; invades Legation Quarter of Peking, 52, 114, 118, 122; killed in railroad explosion, 56; replaces Tuan Chi-jui as provisional president, 114; 32, 37, 115-16, 211, 354
- Chang Tsung-chang, war lord of Shantung, killed, 37, 38
- Chartered Bank branch in Chungking, 274
- Cheap labor of China, its gradual disappearance, 227-28
- Cheeloo University, 299
- Chen, D. S., 384
- Chen, Eugene, Foreign Minister in Nationalist Government, 50-51; refuses to join Nanking Government, 55; starts *People's Tribune*, 69; it ends, 72; becomes Foreign Minister of new Foochow Government, 76-77; captured by Japanese in Hong Kong, dies, 77; 20, 70, 111, 113
- Chen, K. P., arranges first loan for Chiang Kai-shek, 266; at International Business Conference in Rye, N. Y., 270; 268, 368
- Chen Chia-kang, at San Francisco Conference, 366
- Chen Chiung-ming, fires on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's headquarters, 45
- Chen Kung-po, succeeds Wang as president of Nanking puppet government, 162
- Chen Kuo-fu, of the "C. C. Clique," 92, 360-61
- Chen Li-fu, of the "C. C. Clique," 92; formerly Minister of Education, 360
- Chen-O'Malley Agreement, 51
- Cheng Chien, Gen., replaces Ho Ying-chin as War Minister, 205, 221, 361
- Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire Lee, and his "Flying Tigers," 185-86; his complaint of stealing American war material by Chinese, 196-97; reasons for his retirement, 202; his public-relations office, 329
- Chi Hsieh-yuan, 36
- Chiang Kai-shek, strikes at Chinese Communists, 33, 50; on the Kuomintang, 39; helped by "Nanking Affair," 51 ff.; married to Meiling, sister of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, 57; kidnaped by Communists, 59, 81; called dictator and lunatic, 78; his comment on the Communist "Declaration on Unity," 83; New Year message on constitutional government, 86; burned in effigy, 87; his promise of equal legal status for all parties, 95; established the United Front, 101; his "Victory and Democracy" message, 103; announces a People's Congress, 104; as portrayed by Japanese newspapers, 144; at Cairo Conference, 157; his interest in Indian problems, 166; encourages independence for Indo-China, 170; offer of Chinese troops for Burma, 175; asks recall of Gen. Stilwell, 186-88, 199-202; observations on Chungking's need of censorship, 333; his manner of dealing with rumors, 342-43; statement of the basic objectives of the government, 376
- Chiang Kai-shek, Mme., her devotion to the Generalissimo, 344; her American visit, 345
- Chiang Tso-pin, Chinese ambassador to Japan, offers co-operation to Foreign Minister Hirota, 152
- China, under the Manchu Dynasty, 19; the Boxer Protocol, 23-24; inaugurates new policy toward foreign governments, 34; its export-import trade, 79; protests Russia's transfer of Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, 123-24; signs treaty of friendship with Russia, 131; as a market for Philippine products, 164-65; declares war on Japan,

- 182; is blockaded, 185; soldiers' pay increased, 222; industrialization a future prospect, 227 ff; silver-based currency abandoned, 240; her economic history, 255; desire for foreign goods developing, 256; lend-lease goods cut down by blockade, 275
- China Among the Powers*, book by D. N. Rowe, quoted, 231
- China Critic* of Shanghai quoted on Christian missions in China, 289
- China Enters the Machine Age*, book by Kuo-heng Shih, 249-50, 252
- China Handbook, quoted on Protestant Christian Movement, 296; on Publication Law, 328
- China National Aviation Corporation, 185, 353
- China Trade Act, its operation, 273, 275
- China Yearbook, quoted on religion among Chinese people, 282; describes Tu Yueh-sen, 358
- Chinese, their character and history, 1 ff.; attitude toward foreigners, 17-18; their standards of honesty abroad, 164; their "genius for disorganization," 216
- Chinese Association of Labor, 358
- "Chinese Changchun Railway," name conferred on South Manchuria line, 109
- Chinese Democratic League, its objection to one-party rule, 97-98, 104; demands reforms at Chungking, 362
- Chinese Eastern Railway, 109, 112; China sells her rights, 121-22; Russian rights transferred to Japan, 123-24; renamed North Manchuria Railway, 124
- Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, 248-49
- Chinese Institute of Engineers, 238
- Chinese Labor Movement, The*, book by Nym Wales, quoted, 244
- Chinese News Service, reports on reduction of the Army, 218
- Chinese Revolution of 1911, and establishment of the Republic, 19
- Chinese Soviet Government, its abolition, 81, 83, 96
- Chinese Youth Party, 91
- Ch'ing Pang, Chinese secret society, 53
- Ching Shih*, Chungking magazine, on relations with Germany, 377
- Chou En-lai, Gen., censor, 335, 365
- Christian missionaries in China and Japan, 281 ff.
- "Christian Movement in China in Relation to Emerging Problems of Labor and Industry, The," 252
- Christian Rural Service Union of Kiangsi, 292
- Christian Science Monitor*, 30, 307
- Christianity, banned in China by Emperor K'ang Hsi, ban lifted by French treaty, 294; handbooks quoted, 296; its influence gone beyond numbers, 299
- Chu Hsueh-fan, head of Chinese Association of Labor, 358
- Chungking, government established, 60; its News Service on Communist strength, 94; courage under bombing, 184; control of censorship, 329
- Chungking Press Hostel, 328
- Chungking School of Journalism set up, 276
- Churchill, Winston Spencer, at Cairo Conference, 157; on the Indian problem, 166; his declaration of policy, 174; 200
- Cigarettes in China, their price affected by the low tariff, 22, 255; 256-57
- Civil war in Spain, 58
- Civil wars in China, 7, 64
- Clark, Grover, editor of *Peking Leader*, 33, 37-38
- Clement XI, Pope, 294
- Cogdal, Miss Mary Elizabeth, 291-92
- Cohen, Gen. Morris, 352, 354-55
- Collins, Dr. Daniel, 343
- Commercial Press of China, its Chinese dictionary, 6
- Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, 32-33

- Commissions to household help in China, 8
- Committee of Thirty, 290
- Communications, their improvement in China, 13
- Communism in China, its character, 12; in landlord-tenant relations, 17
- Communist Central Executive Committee, issues "Declaration on Unity" over the menace of Japan, 81-82
- Communists, in the Kuomintang, 44, 48-49; uphold Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People, 45; set up soviet form of government in Central China, 55; kidnap Chiang Kai-shek, 59, 81; attempts to crush them proving hard, 75; their "long march" to the Northwest, 77; their strength among the minority political groups, 94; accept conditions for uniting with Kuomintang, 96; break with the organization, 98-99; struggle in Shanghai, 105-6; effect of treaty with Russia, 108; enter Shansi province, 152; strength of their army, 219; character of their leadership, 365
- Confucianism in China, 283
- Confucius, little known to Chinese, 16; principles adapted by Japanese, 161; effect of his principles on Chinese life, 228-29; Catholic attitude, 293-94; 346
- Conscription law, as administered in China, 191; changes in methods, 205
- Coonley, Howard, on the industrialization of China, 228
- Co-operatives in China, 11, 248-49
- Cricket* (H.M.S.), bombed by Japanese, 180
- Currency unification in U.S. cited, 64
- Current History* magazine quoted, 127
- Currie, Lauchlin, suggest *Guide to China's Industry*, 276
- Dailey, Charles, 307
- Dairen, to be free port, 109
- Dawes, Charles Gates, 353
- Declaration of Renunciation, by Russia, giving up Boxer Indemnity payments, 110
- "Declaration on Unity," issued by Chinese Communists, its name-calling, 81
- Decoux, Vice Admiral Jean, governor general of Indo-China, 169; arrested by Japanese, 170
- Dewey, Thomas Edward, cited, 64
- Doihara, Maj. Gen. Kenji, an interview, 150-51
- Dollars, U.S. and Chinese, in exchange transactions, 194, 279
- Domei News Agency of Japan, 264
- Dominican Friars enter China, 293
- Donald, William Henry, 89, 343-44, 349-52
- Doolittle, Gen. James Harold, his flying exploits, 213
- Doriot, Jacques, delegate to Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 69
- Dumbarton Oaks, China seeks racial equality, 166; 373
- Earthquakes in Japan, 20, 27, 140-41, 281
- Economist* (London), on the Far East, 171
- Eighth Route Army (Chinese), 83; its size, 219
- Elder, James, 31
- Elliston, Herbert, of the *Washington Post*, 349
- Emperor of Japan, his status among the people, 137
- Empress Dowager of China. *See* Tzu Hsi
- Espey, John Jenkins, 291-92
- Ethiopia, attacked by Italy, 58
- Eurasia Aviation Corporation, 212
- Evans, Richard Taylor, American lawyer in Tientsin, 118
- Evening Post and Mercury* (Shanghai), attacks Japan's invasion of Manchuria, 58-59, 148; to be published in Chungking, 102; letter from Dr. Hsia, 156-57; taken over by Japanese, 161; location of its print shop in Chungking and meth-

- ods of production, 242; on 1945 Chinese budget, 266; criticism of paper's attitude on Manchurian invasion, 310-13; Chinese-language edition called *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 315; moves to Chungking, 327, 334; paper suspended, 336-37; publication to be resumed, 340; Chiang Kai-shek's story published in American edition and distributed throughout America, 343; 358
- Exchange transactions in China in U.S. and Chinese dollars, 194, 279
- Exclusion law of U.S. resented in Japan, 145
- Extraterritoriality in China, abolished, 18, 33-34, 60, 273; Russia takes action, 112; ended by Britain, 157
- Factory Law of China in Shanghai, 246
- Fahs, Charles Harvey, 297
- Falkenhausen, Gen. Baron Ludwig von, 212
- Farmer-Labor party in China, 91
- Fascism in Japan, 147
- "February Mutiny" in Japan, 152
- Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties, 97-98, 100
- Fei Hsiao-tung, Dr., of National Yunnan University, 230; co-translator of *China Enters the Machine Age*, 249-50, 252-53
- Feng Yu-hsiang, his *coup d'état*, 25-26; in command of Peking, 27-29; in war with Chang Tso-lin, 30-31; 32, 50, 56, 160, 211, 361
- Feudalism in Japan, destroyed by revolution, 138
- Fish monopoly in Shanghai, 262-63
- Fitch, George, of the Y.M.C.A. in Nanking, 290; meets Chiang Kai-shek, 342
- Fleisher, Wilfrid, on Japanese fascism, 147; on her postwar empire, 175
- Foochow, new separatist regime, 76; its collapse, 77
- Forbidden City, in Peking, 28-29, 31, 158, 160
- Ford, M. C., 316
- Foreign Correspondents Association in Chungking, 201
- Forman, Harrison, explores Kuomintang territory, 93
- Four Hundred Million Customers*, by Carl Crow, 255-56
- Fourteenth Air Force, in China, 186, 329
- Fox, Dr. Charles James, his *North China Star* in Tientsin, 308
- France, her interest in Indo-China, 169-70; reopens Chinese door to Catholicism, 294
- Franklin, Judge Cornell S., warns Chinese on American capital, 275
- Free China, industry set up, 60; its area, 158, 173; smuggling, 185; its exports to Japan, 191; sale of tungsten to Japanese, 193; profiteering in airfield construction, 194; difficult for Americans to maintain offices, 273; harbored North American missionaries, 298; its schools, 300; censorship abolished, 339; 102, 107, 192, 195, 203, 220
- French Revolution, 19
- Fukien Christian University, 299
- Galen. *See* Bluecher
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, 167
- Gannett, Lewis, 121
- Gauss, Clarence Edward, American ambassador to China, 188; resigns, 202, 335; his advice on understanding of China, 371
- Gayn, Mark J., 315
- George, Henry, his single tax cited, 48
- Gerlach, Miss Talitha, 252-53
- German military mission in China, 212; ordered to withdraw, 216
- Gibbons, Floyd, 317
- Gilbert and Sullivan war campaigns in China, 7; pattern of Peking Government, 21
- Ginling College, 299
- Goebbels, Dr. Joseph, 144
- Goette, John Andrew, 306, 307
- Gold in exchange transactions in China, 194

- Gordon, Gen. Charles George ("Chinene"), cited, 201
- Gould, Randall Chase, quoted, 21-22, 99-100, 116, 128; at press conference aboard Admiral Bristol's flagship, 120; associated with *Japan Advertiser* and news editor of *Japan Times*, 136; experience in earthquake, 140-41; goes to the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, 148, 307; his book, *Chungking Today*, 183; connection with Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, 305; gets through first complete story of Tsao Kun's massacre of students, 306; takes on job as correspondent of *Christian Science Monitor*, 307; expelled from Shanghai, 323-24; goes to Chungking edition of *Post*, 327; an editorial quoted, 336; statement in final issue of *Post*, 337; decision to resume publication, 340
- Graham, Betty, 220
- Grand Hôtel de Peking, 30
- Gratke, Charles Edward, foreign editor *Christian Science Monitor*, 332
- Greater Asia doctrine, 151-52
- Gripsholm, repatriation ship, 298, 327
- Guam, as an issue, 182
- Guerrilla warfare, its ineffectiveness, 216-19
- Guide to China's Industry*, compiled by U.S. Foreign Economic Administration, 276
- Gunpowder, and the Chinese, 3
- Gunther, John, on Chang Tsung-chang, 37; checking on Kuomintang, 92
- Hague Court of International Justice, 366
- Hahn, Emily, 326
- Halliburton, Richard, 8
- Hamaguchi Cabinet, signs London Naval Treaty (1930), 147
- Han Fu-chu, Gen., governor of Shantung, executed, 221
- Handbook of the Christian Movement in China*, its statistics, 296
- Hangchow University, 299
- Harbin, Soviet consulate raided by Chinese, 122
- Harkson, U.S., radio station, 327
- Hashimoto, Col. Kingoro, ordered attack on all vessels on Yangtze, 180
- Hawks, Frank, aviation pilot, 214
- Hearn, Lafcadio, 137
- Hearst, William Randolph, 304
- Helmick, Judge Milton John, of the U.S. Court for China, 325; last judge to preside, 383-84
- Hinder, Miss Eleanor M., welfare worker in Shanghai, 12-13, 230, 243; her book, *Life and Labour in Shanghai*, quoted, 246-48; 249
- Hioki, Eki, Japanese commissioner on extraterritoriality, 32
- Hirohito. See Prince Regent
- Hirota, Koki, Japanese Foreign Minister, 152
- Hitler, Adolf, his rise to power, 58; his hopes in China, 212; 145
- Ho-Umetzu Agreement, 77
- Ho Ying-ching, Gen., signs Ho-Umetzu Agreement, 77; leading figure in "Whampoa Group," 93; accused as pro-Japanese, 100; retires as War Minister, 204; 361
- Hong Kong, as an issue between China and Britain, 165, 175; taken by Japan, 185
- Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation branch in Chungking, 274
- Hsia, Dr. C. L., letter to Shanghai *Post*, 156-57
- Hsin Chung Hui (Regenerate China Society), 40
- Hsu, Francis L. K., expert on war-time industry, 230; co-translator of *China Enters the Machine Age*, 249-50
- Hsu Shu-hsi, Prof., on Hirota's three principles, 152
- Hsuan Tung, "Boy Emperor" of China, ousted from Forbidden City in Peking and abdicates, 28-29
- Hsueh Yueh, Gen., 361
- Hu Shih, Dr., former Chinese ambassador to Washington, 366-67

- Hu Tsung-nan, 361
 Hua Chung University, 299
 Huang, Col. J. L., head of Officers Moral Endeavor Association, 363
 Hull, Cordell, policy toward Thailand, 176; his two-way economic traffic, 255; 319
 "Hump" of the Himalayas, 185; growth of traffic over it, 206-7
 "Hundred days" reform, 28, 35
 Hung, Chinese secret society, 53
 Hurley, Gen. Patrick Jay, President Roosevelt's personal representative in China, 200; succeeds Gauss as ambassador to China, 202; as a diplomat, 205-6; assured on censorship, 338; talks with Stalin, 371
 Hwa Nan College, 299
Idzumo, Japanese battleship, efforts to sink her, 215
 Illiteracy, China's struggle to free itself from, 13
 India, nationalists seek to incite Chinese against Britain, 166
 Indo-China, France's richest colony, 169-70; treated as enemy-occupied territory, 176
 Industrial Co-operatives in China, 11
 Industrial insurance, taken up by Nationalist Government, 263
 Industrial reconstruction of China, considered by Sixth National Kuomintang Congress, 277
 Industrial Workers of the World, 85
 Industrialization of China, its prospects, 227 ff.
 Inflation in Chungking, 347-48
 Inner Mongolia, Japan assumes control, 125; a puppet state, 159
International Development of China, *The*, book by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 45; its ten-point program, 258-62
 Isaacs, Harold, of *Newsweek* magazine, barred from China, 339
 Ishimoto, Baroness Shizue, her work for birth control, 146; her admiration for Mme. Sun Yat-sen, 146-47
 Italy, her Ethiopian adventure, 58
 Jacquinet, Father, establishes wartime safety zone in Shanghai, 300
 Japan, invasion of Manchuria, 39, 58, 122-24, 137, 199, 307, 310; effect of Sino-Soviet treaty, 109; signs neutrality treaty with Soviet Russia, 128; its administrative misrule, 168; concept of co-prosperity sphere, 171; declares war on China, 182; regimentation of business, 263; its *coup* against missionaries, 286; 105, 107, 130
Japan Advertiser, 143; 304
Japan Times (Tokyo), "Earthquake Extras," 143; its story of attempt on life of Hirohito, 304-5
 Japanese, their characteristics as a people, 136 ff.
 Japanese-German Association in Berlin, 129
 Jehol province, seized by Japan, 59, 149
 Jimmu, Emperor of Japan, his alleged proclamation, 374-75
 Joffe, Adolph A., Far East representative of Soviet Union, 42-43, 64-65, 68; 47, 111, 126
 Johnson, Nelson Trusler, U.S. ambassador to China, his perspective of the nation, 184
 Jouett, Col. John Hamilton, American aviation officer, 213
Journey from the East, by Mark Gayn, 315
 Judo, or jujitsu, as a Japanese national policy, 135, 155, 180
 K'ang Hsi, Emperor of China, 53; ordered the Board of Rites to outlaw Christian religion, 294
 Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich, Soviet minister to China, signs treaty with Dr. Koo, 112; raised to ambassador, 112-13; returns to Moscow, 114; succeeded by Bogomolov, 124; executed as "counterrevolutionist," 33, 43; 52, 68
 Kaung Hsu, young emperor of China, kept guarded till his death, 28
 Kawagoe, Shigeru, appointed Japanese ambassador to China, 153
 Kellogg, Frank Billings, 120

- Kemmerer, Dr. Edwin Walter, 355
 Kemmerer Commission, 352
 Kiangsi province, co-operative movements, 11
 Kidnaping, by Wang Ching-wei's gangsters, 321
 Kinney, Henry W., 141, 351
 Kipling, Rudyard, concept of the "white man's burden," 174-75
 Koo, Dr. V. K. Wellington, Chinese Foreign Minister, signs treaty with Soviet Russia, 112; 366
 Korea, her perilous situation, 110; her natives slaughtered by Japanese in Tokyo and Yokohama during earthquake, 142
 Kung, Dr. H. H., married to sister of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, 57; financial administrator of National Government, 93, 194; direct descendant of Confucius, 346; 347-48, 352
 Kung, Mme., 343, 346
 Kung Peng, Miss, 366
 Kunming, study of its factory conditions in *China Enters the Machine Age*, 249-52
 Kuo Min News Agency, 318
 Kuomintang, as a political force, 4, 32, 35, 39; endorsed birth control, 10; its beginnings, 40; Communists in its membership, 44, 48; party of revolution, 62; fighting Communists, 75; its overthrow of warlordism, 76; its strength compared with Communists, 94-95; struggle in Shanghai, 105-6; effect of treaty with Russia, 108; as portrayed by Japanese newspapers, 143-44; Sixth National Congress considers industrial reconstruction of China, 277
 Kwangtung University, Canton, 45
 Kwong, H. J., 210
 Lacks, George, newspaper photographer in Shanghai, 310
Ladybird (H.M.S.), bombed by Japanese, 180
 Lamaism in China, a form of Buddhism, 284
 Landis, Judge Kenesaw Mountain, 69
 Landlord-tenant relations in China, 17, 231 ff.
 Landownership and industrialization in China, 227 ff.
 Lao-tse, his teachings, 283
 Lattimore, Owen, 2, 177
 Lea, Lt. Gen. Homer, his work for changes in China, 35
Leader (Peking), 33, 38, 70, 115
 League of Nations, fails to check Japan in Manchuria, 58, 76, 88, 179; commits hara-kiri, 110; 358
 Leahy, Admiral William D., his demand for battleships, 181
 Ledo Road opened, named Stilwell Road by Chiang, 207
 Lee Choy, of the Kuo Min News Agency, 318
 Lend-lease goods, cut down by blockade of China, 275
 Leonard, Royal, explains the kidnaping of Chiang, 88-89
 Li Chi-shen, 361
 Li Fu-ying, Gen., court-martialed and shot, 221
 Li Hung Chang, cited, 367
 Li Ming, at the International Business Conference in Rye, N. Y., 268-70; on an "arrest" list, 323; 368
 Li Tao-chao, Chinese Communist, 49
 Li Tsung-jen, Kwangsi general, joins United Front, 96; demands China tackle Japan head on, 153
 Li Yuan-hung, President of China, expelled by Tsao Kun, 21, 28
 Lingnan University, 299
 "Literary revolution" in China, 366
 London Missionary Society, 294
 London Naval Treaty (1930), 147
 Lu, David, representative in Washington of Central News Agency of China, 368
 Lu Chung-lin, Gen., conscription minister, admits starvation among recruits, 224
 Lukouchiao, clash with Japanese, 39, 59
 Lung Yun, Gen., chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government, 362

- Lusey, Albert, opens Press Wireless in Shanghai, 319
- Lynch, Fennimore, 355
- MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, his release of prisoners, 138; 202, 350
- MacMurray, John Van Antwerp, American minister to China, refuses help to Americans under arrest, 115-17, 119
- McNutt, Paul Vories, his recommendation for exterminating the Japanese, 378
- Magna Charta of England, 19
- Malaya, its productive wealth, 168-69
- "Managed currency" inaugurated in China, 240
- Manchu Dynasty, its rot and collapse, 19, 34; the Boxer Protocol, 23; overthrown by Kuomintang, 39; 53, 158, 160
- "Manchukuo," newly created out of Manchuria, 76, 138; takes over Chinese Eastern Railway, 112, 123-24; its treatment by censors in news dispatches, 308
- Manchuria, invasion by Japan, 39, 58, 122-24, 137, 147, 158, 179; Chinese sovereignty restored, 110
- Mann, Thomas, delegate to Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 69
- Mao Tse-tung, 75
- Marshall, Ray Gifford, United Press correspondent in Peking, 111; his call on Soviet ambassador, 113; 116
- Marx, Karl, cited, 11, 47, 71
- Maryknoll Leper Colony in southern Kwangtung, 292
- Matheson, Roderick O., of the *Chicago Tribune*, 142; his eyewitness story of attempt on life of Hirohito, 304, 305
- Matsuoka, Yosuke, signs neutrality treaty with Soviet Russia for Japan in 1941, is denounced by Russia in 1945, 128
- Maw, Dr. Ba, puppet premier of Burma set up by Japanese, 168
- "May 30 incident" at Shanghai, 50
- Mayer, Ferdinand L., refuses help to Americans under arrest by Chinese, 114-17, 119
- Mazaki, Gen. Jinzaburo, 151
- Medical practice by the Chinese, 14-15
- Meiji, and modern industry in Japan, 9-10, 134
- Meng Chiang, Japan's puppet state of Mongolia, 125
- Miles, Rear Admiral Milton E., 356
- Mills, Hal P., of the *Hwa Mei Wan Pao*, 318; expelled from Shanghai, 324; his office bombed, 325
- Miner, Charles S., joins the *Post* in Chungking, 335-36; statement in final issue, 337; to resume publication, 340
- Ming Dynasty, effort to restore it, 35, 53
- Minor Heresies*, by John J. Espey, 291-92
- Missionaries in China and Japan, 203-4; and missions, 281 ff.
- Missions in Far Eastern Cultural Relations*, by Searle Bates, 301
- Mitchell, Milly Bennett, correspondent in Peking, 69; arrested by Chinese police, refused help by American Legation, 114-15, 117-19
- Mohammedanism in China, 284
- Moneylenders in China, 234
- "Mongolian People's Republic," 124-25, 158-59
- Mook, Dr. Hubertus Johannes van, acting governor general of Netherlands Indies, 172
- Moore, Frederick, reveals Japan's Twenty-one Demands on China, 134, 139; is hired by Japan as adviser, 139; his belief in ultimate ruin of Japan, 140; 351
- Moosa, Spencer, American censor in Chungking, in "Stilwell affair," 331
- Morris, John, of the U.P. in Shanghai, 320
- Morrison, Rev. Robert, of the London Missionary Society, 294

- Mountbatten, Admiral Louis, head of Southeast Asia Command, 199; secret visit to Chungking, 331-32
- Munsey, Frank, cited, 359
- Mussolini, Benito, his gift of airplane to Chiang, 214
- Naide, Rt. Rev. Yasutaro, Japanese Bishop of Osaka, 286
- Nakamura, Col., 321
- Nanking, Nationalist Government moved, 55; taken by Japan, 60; fake government takes on Wang Ching-wei as President, 161-62
- "Nanking Affair," establishes Chiang Kai-shek, 51 ff.
- Narcotics forced on people in North China by Japanese, 151, 161
- National Christian Council of China, 295
- National Defense Advisory Council, 90
- National Defense Planning Commission, 276
- National People's Congress to be convoked, 82
- National Revolutionary Army, replaces Red Army, 83
- National Socialist Party in China, its program quoted, 90; supports United Front, 91, 265; at San Francisco Conference, 95; 97
- National Yunnan University, 230
- Nationalist Government, set up at Canton, 50; moves to "Wuhan," 51; its plan of opium suppression, 54; moves to Nanking, 55; established at Chungking, 60; its policy of nationalizing all mineral resources, 232
- Nelson, Donald Marr, his efforts to improve Chinese industries, 199, 220; advice on low interest rate for loans, 237; 206, 228, 278-80
- Nepotism in China, 9-10
- Netherlands Indies, their productive wealth, 169
- Neutrality treaty between Russia and Japan denounced by Russia, 128
- "New Democracy" of Chinese Communists, 94
- "New economic policy" of the National Government, 91, 271-73, 276
- New Fourth Army, 83, 101, 218
- New Life Movement in China, 80, 363-64
- Newspaper correspondents in Chungking, their difficulties under censorship, 188-89
- Nineteenth Route Army, 58, 149, 211
- Nippon Dempo Tsushinsha, merges with Nippon Rengo into Domei News Agency, 264
- Nishihara Loans, 41
- Non-Aggression Pact signed by China and Russia, 127
- North China Daily News*, 320
- North China Star* of Tientsin, 308
- Northern Punitive Expedition, 34, 49-50, 67-68, 114
- Officers Moral Endeavor Association, 363-64
- Olds, Robert Edwin, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, 120
- On a Chinese Screen*, book by W. Somerset Maugham, hurt Christian missions, 281
- Opium, suppression attempted by Nationalist Government, 54; shops established by Japanese in Nanking, 291; import into China legalized, 294
- Opium Suppression Bureau of Shanghai, 359
- Opper, Frederick B., becomes editor of the *Post*, 327; with the Chungking edition, 334-35
- Oriental Affairs* magazine, on fish monopoly in Shanghai, 262
- Osmeña, Sergio, 164
- Outer Mongolia, a problem, 107; signs treaty with Russia, 125; 110
- Pai Chung-hsi, joins United Front, 96
- Pan-American Airways, 185
- Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 69
- Panay* (U.S.S.), sunk by Japanese, potential of war, 179-82

- Parry, Duke, 304
 Pawley, William Douglas, airplane constructor, 214
 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 39 *passim*
 Peffer, Nathaniel, his advice to China on conflict with Japan, 87
 Peking, occupied by Nationalists, name changed to Peiping, 56
Peking Daily News, 308
People's Tribune (Hankow), 69; quits, 72; 114
 Perry, Matthew Calbraith, opened Japan to modern world, 19; his treaty with "Kingdom of Lew Chew," 158
Personal History, book by Vincent Sheean, 30, 71
 Pettus, William Bacon, on language sounds, 6-7
 Philippines, captured by Japanese, 185; Tydings-McDuffie Act, 372; 164-65
 Plans for National Reconstruction, by Dr. Sun, 45, 49
 Po Wong Wui (Protect Emperor Society), 35
 Political parties in China, 91-93
 Powell, John Benjamin, editor of *China Weekly Review*, expelled from Shanghai, 323; struck by a hand grenade, 327
Pravda, Moscow newspaper, 380
 Press Wireless, operates in Shanghai, 319-20; in Chungking, 330
 Price, Francis Wilson, Dr. Sun translator, 255
 Price index of U.S. and Chinese dollars, 194, 279
 Prince Regent (Hirohito), story of attack on him, 304-5
 Printing, and the Chinese, 3
 Prohme, Rayna, correspondent, 30, 69-70, 113-14; dies suddenly, 71
 Prohme, William, correspondent, husband of the preceding, 30, 69, 70; kills himself, 71
 Protestants in China, 282-83, 294
 Pu Yi, Henry, "Boy Emperor" of Manchukuo, 28-29
 Publication Law of China, 188, 328
 Quo Tai-chi, ex-ambassador to Great Britain, 366-67
 Rations of Chinese soldiers, 223
 Red Army, abolished by Communists, 83
 Religions among Chinese and Japanese, 16, 282 ff.
 Remer, Charles Frederick, estimates mission property values, 297
 République Nationaliste Parti de la Jeune Chine, French name of the Young China Party, 90
 Reuter agency barred from press conferences at American Legation in Peking, but later welcomed, 120
 Ricci, Matteo, Italian Jesuit, brought Roman Catholicism to China, 293
 Richet, Prof. Charles, 239
 "Rites Controversy" in China, 293
 Rockefeller Foundation, its contributions in the Far East, 297
 Roman Catholics in China, 281; first mission, 293; statistics, 283, 296; in Japan, 286
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, President of the U.S., his "a little bit to the left," 62; at Cairo Conference, 157; his concern over bombing of American vessels on the Yangtze, 179; explains Gen. Stilwell's recall, 199-200
 Rowe, David Nelson, his book *China Among the Powers* quoted, 231, 235
 Rowland, Harry, aviation pilot, 213
 Rundle, Walter, 187
 Russia (Soviet), signs new treaty with National Government of China, 105, 108, 112, 131; gives up Boxer Indemnity payments, 110-11; break with Nationalist Government, 121; forces joint control of Chinese Eastern Railway, 122; transfers her rights to Japan, 123-24; signs treaty with Outer Mongolia, 125; Non-Aggression Pact with China, 127; denounces neutrality treaty with Japan, 128; rival of China in Far East, 378
 Russo-Japanese War, 24

- St. John's University in Shanghai, 299
- Saito, Rev. Shuji, 287
- Salvation Army, target of Japanese, 286
- Salzmann, Capt. Erich von, German newspaperman, 33
- San Francisco Conference on International Organization, 95, 366, 369, 374
- San Ho Wui (Triad Society), 35
- San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People), founded, 45, 49; adopted by Communists, 83; 363
- Sanders-Bates, J. A. E., ordered to be expelled from Shanghai, 324
- Sato, Shichi, Japanese ambassador to Russia, 128
- Scarab (H.M.S.), bombed by Japanese, 180
- Scrap metal, its continuing sale to Japan, 182-83, 192
- Secret societies in China, 53-54
- Seeckt, Gen. Hans von, 212
- "Shakee Road massacre," 50
- Shanghai, and the secret societies, 54; struggle of Communists and Kuomintang, 105; taken by the Japanese, 215; called itself "Paris of the East," 289
- Shanghai Club, 149, 314
- Shanghai University, 299
- Shanhaikwan, battle of, 26
- Shantung Christian University, 299
- Shao Lin Monastery, 53
- Shark's Fins and Millet*, by Miss Ralf Sues, its references to opium, 360
- Shaw, Glenn, on Japanese hospitality, 136
- Sheba, Togo, 143
- Sheean, Vincent, his *Personal History*, 30, 71; his friendship with Russians in Peking, 120-21; 69-70
- Shen, James, of the Young China Party, 90, 92
- Shepherd, George, of the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union, 292
- Shidehara, Baron Kijuro, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 144
- Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japanese Foreign Vice-Minister, 151-52
- Shih Kuo-heng, his book, *China Enters the Machine Age*, 249-50; 230
- Siam, name resumed by Thailand after war, 177
- "Sian Affair," reunites Kuomintang and Communists to meet Japanese aggression, 55, 59, 80, 88, 95, 126, 343
- Sicawei Observatory, 297
- Sie Cheou-kang, delegate to the Vatican, 300
- Silver, U.S. launches buying program, 240
- Simpson, Bertram Lenox (Putnam Weale), operates bilingual daily, 316
- Singapore, taken by Japanese, 185
- Sinkiang, Chinese sovereignty restored, 110
- Sino-American Co-operative Organization (SACO), 356-57
- Sino-Japanese War, 17
- Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, 105-6, 108, 378; Non-Aggression Pact signed, 127
- Smith, Miss A. Viola, 273
- Smuggling in China, 185, 192
- Snow, Edgar Parks, on the aim of Chinese Communists, 265
- Social Democratic party in China, 91
- Social Interpretation of History*, book by Dr. Maurice William, and its influence on Dr. Sun, 47
- Soong, Meiling, married to Chiang Kai-shek, 57
- Soong, T. V., active in Nanking Government, 57-74; signs treaty of friendship with Stalin, 131; his opinion of Stilwell case, 202; opinion of Gen. Hurley, 205; assures him on censorship, 338; at San Francisco Conference, 374; his changes in tax structure, 384; 347-48, 352
- South Manchuria Railway, 109, 112
- Soviet Legation in Peking raided by police, 52, 114, 118
- Spilvanek, I., chargé in Russian Legation in Peking, 52

- "Squeeze," system of blackmail in China, 67
- Squires, Dudley, 325
- Stalin, Joseph, his leadership of Russia, 108; signs treaty of friendship with T. V. Soong, 131; concurs in Cairo Conference statement, 157; talks with Ambassador Hurley, 371
- Standard of living among Japanese, 145
- Starr, Cornelius Vander, owner of the Shanghai *Evening Post and Mercury*, attacks Japan's invasion of Manchuria, 148, 310-11; expelled from Shanghai, 323; his statement of policy, 324; suspends Chungking edition, 337; decides to resume publication, 340; 263, 315-16, 325, 335-36
- Steel industry of U.S., 17
- Steele, Archibald T., compares censorship, 330; meets Chiang, 342
- Stein, Guenther, on Communists' "New Democracy" in China, 94; his estimates of inhabitants in occupied China, 159; 163
- Stewart, Maxwell Slutz, on Dr. H. H. Kung, 93
- Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., his recall at Chiang's request, 105, 186-88, 199-202, 331, 335; his opinion of the Chinese soldier, 209-10; takes picked Chinese to India for special training, 224; his public-relations office, 329; 23
- Stilwell Road, 207
- Stimson, Henry Lewis, his effort to help China, 58; its failure, 179
- Stowe, Everett M., memorandum on Christian movement in China, 252-53
- Stratemeyer, Gen. George E., 207
- Strong, Anna Louise, 71
- Stuart, Dr. John Leighton, and his Yenching University, 51; prisoner of Japan, 298
- Sultan, Lt. Gen. Daniel Isom, made commander of the China-Burma-India theater, 199
- Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun, his criticism of the Kuomintang, 44, 86; on Communist strength, 94; on spheres of influence for capital in China, 270-71; gratified over U.S. reaction to China's treatment of economic problems, 277-78; 268
- Sun Yat-sen, Dr., and the Chinese Revolution, 19; trouble as President, 20; issues statement of collaboration with Soviet Union, 42-43, 47, 64-65, 68; appointed President for life, 44; his book, *The International Development of China*, 45, 258; his principles stated by Mme. Sun, 72-73; his theory of international development wins victory in China, 254; his death, 32-33, 46, 48; elevated as a saint, 35; his body removed to a mausoleum on Purple Mountain, 57, 345; 46, 60, 62, 85, 111, 151
- Sun Yat-sen, Mme., critical of the Nanking Government, 55; her statement on Dr. Sun's principles, 72-73; her allegiance to the memory of her husband, 344-45; 57-58, 70-71, 74, 89, 146-47, 205
- Sung, Far T., his Chung Mei (Sino-American) News Agency, 114; takes refuge in Soviet Embassy to escape arrest, 115; his letters burned, 117; becomes consul general to Batavia, 118
- Supreme National Defense Council, 91, 192; adopts new economic policy, 271-73
- Sutton, Gen. Francis Arthur, 352, 354
- Ta Kung Pao*, Chinese newspaper, 375-76
- Ta Mei Wan Pao*, Chinese-language edition of the *Post*, 315-19
- Tai Li, Gen., said to be head of the Blue Shirt terrorists, 92-93; fighting Communists in Shanghai, 105; 355-57, 360
- Taiherchwang, Japanese defeated by Chinese, 216
- "Taku incident," 23
- "Tammany Hall" of China, 41, 92
- Tang, T. C., representative in New

- York of Central News Agency of China, 368
- T'ang Leang-li, secretary of Wang Ching-wei, 160, barred from a West Coast of America restaurant, 161
- Tangku Truce, 77
- Taoism in China, 283
- Tariff duties in China, their effect on the price of cigarettes, 22, 255; increased by country's autonomy, 34, 56
- Taub, Alexander, on the *Guide to China's Industry*, 276
- Taylor, Bert Leston, 5
- Taylor, Floyd, adviser to Chinese Ministry of Information, 94; editing Chinese propaganda, 276
- Teh, Prince, head of Inner Mongolia, 159
- Thackrey, Theodore Olin, editor of the *Post*, 148; editorials attacking Manchurian invasion, 311; reports on atrocities, 312; returns to America, 150; 313, 345
- Thailand, in war against U.S. and Britain, 171; treated as enemy-occupied territory, 176; declares null and void her war resolution, and resumes name of Siam, 177
- Third International, 108, 122
- "Thought Control" in China, 92, 360
- Three Principles of the People, founded, 45, 49; endorsed by Communists, 83, 96; 103, 328-29
- T'ien Ju-k'ang, expert on wartime industry, 230
- Tighe, Dixie, newspaper correspondent, 207
- Time* magazine, its estimate of Chinese Communist strength, 94; its apocryphal story of a talk between Roosevelt and Leahy, 181
- Times* (N.Y.), quoted on President Roosevelt's explanation of Gen. Stilwell's recall, 199-200
- Timperley, H. J., Reuter representative in Peking, 120
- Tong, Hollington K., appointed chief censor at Shanghai, 308, 330-33; quits, 334
- "Trading with the enemy," 192
- Trans-Siberian Railway, 112
- Triad Society, 35
- Trotsky, Lev Davidovich, on the Chinese Communists, 54, 233
- Tsai Ting-kai, Gen., and his Nineteenth Route Army, fighting the Japanese, 58, 149, 211; heads new Foochow Government, 76; joins United Front, 77
- Tsao Kun, assumes presidency of China, 21, 25; responsible for civil war, 23; orders machine-gunning of a throng of students, 306; 27-28
- Tseng, H. P., 331
- Tsiang, T. F., seeking treaty in Moscow, 126
- Tso Shun-sheng, of the Chinese Youth Party, 91
- Tu Yueh-sen, fighting the Communists in Shanghai, 105; 357-60
- Tuan Chi-jui, Provisional President, 31-32; superseded by Chang Tso-lin, 114
- T'ung Meng Hui (Brotherhood Society), headed by Dr. Sun, 40
- Tung Pi-wu, Communist, at San Francisco Conference, 366
- Tungsten, sold by China to Japanese, 192-93
- Turner, Eugene, of the Kiangsi Y.M.C.A., 292
- Twenty-one Demands of Japan upon China, 134, 139, 379
- Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act for the Philippines, 372
- Tzu Hsi, Empress Dowager of China, her sympathy with Boxers, 23; keeps her nephew, Emperor Kaung Hsu, guarded until his death, 28; spares life of Wang Ching-wei, 160
- "Uncle Chump from Over the Hump," song written in Chungking by Walter Rundle, 187, 201, 208
- Union Co-operative in Shansi province, 93
- Unions in China as a racket, 245

- United China Relief in U.S., 15
 United Front in China, war against Japan, 77, 81, 89, 95-96, 99, 126, 158, 237
 United States, supports National Government of China after Japan's capitulation, 105-6; remitted Boxer payments, 111; its interest in Far East, 174-76; entry into the war, 184
 United States Court for China, under extraterritoriality, 383
 University of Missouri School of Journalism, 308
 University of Nanking, 299
 Vaughn, Miles Walter, 119, 317
 Vichy, as a German puppet, 169-70
 Vocational Educational Group, 92, 97
 Wales, Nym, his book, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, quoted, 244
 Wallace, Henry A., advice to China, 279
 Wan Li, Emperor of China, 293
 Wang, Dr. C. T., on mission to Japan, 111, 154
 Wang Ching-wei, in the National Government, 81; swings from left to right, 160; made President of fake "National Government," 161; his gangsters engage in kidnaping, 321; his death, 162; 326
 Wang Chung-hui, Dr., co-head of National Defense Council Committee, 268, 366
 Wang Keh-min, of North China, 162
 Wang Shih-chieh, Dr., made chief censor, 333-34; Minister of Information, 338; 339
 Wang Wen-hao, Dr., Minister of Economics, head of War Production Board, 206
 Wang Yu-chuen, his citation of Shantung, 235
 War-lordism, its usurpations, 21-22; drawing to its close, 25, 30, 32, 34; 35-36, 39, 50, 76, 110
 Washington Conference (1921), 34
 Watts, Richard, on American interference in China's civil war, 206
 Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert Coady, succeeds Gen. Stilwell, 173, 199; his attitude as adviser, 204-5; change after his arrival, 221-22, 224; 361
 Wei, James, Chinese censor, 330
 Welles, Sumner, on the attitude of the State Department, 371
 Weng, H. C., on population in China, 239
 West China Union University, 299
 "Whampoa Group," 93
 Whiteing, Percy, 322
 Wilhelmina, Queen, declares for a Netherlands Commonwealth, 172
 William, Dr. Maurice, influence of his book, *Social Interpretation of History*, on Dr. Sun, 47; made life member of Kuomintang, and the Order of Jade bestowed on him by Chinese Government, 48
 Woodhead, H. G. W., his *Oriental Affairs* magazine on fish monopoly of Shanghai, 262; British columnist, 320; 326
 World War II, its line-up, 5; Japan surrenders, 105, 107, 130; her avarice in occupied lands, 168; 58, 369
 Wu, Dr. C. C., 238
 Wu, K. C., 334
 Wu Pei-fu, a leader in Peking Government, 22, 25; price put on his head by Feng Yu-hsiang, 27; loses Hankow, 50; his retirement and death, 29-30; 32, 69
 Wu Te-chen, former mayor of Shanghai, 322, 354-55
 Wu Yi-fang, Dr., president of National Christian Council of China, 295
 "Wuhan," Nationalist Government moved from Canton, 51
 Yang Hu-chen, Gen., Manchurian leader, 88
 Yen, Y. C. James, his mass-education movement, 5, 13, 36, 78, 92, 236-37

- Yen Hsi-shan, his co-operative plan for commodities, 11; 37, 56, 93
Yenching University, kept going during war, 298; 51, 299
Yenching-Yünnan Station for Sociological Research, 249
"Yi," as a Chinese word, 6
Yin Ju-keng, head of puppet regime in Manchuria, 76, 150
Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, 154
Young, Dr. Arthur Nichols, 352-55; and his son Allen, 353
Young China Party, 89, 90, 92, 97
Yu Han-mou, Gen., 362
Yu Pin, Bishop Paul, Vicar Apostolic of Nanking, and member of People's Political Council, 300
Yuan, L. Z., city editor of *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 326
Yuan Shih-kai, displaces Dr. Sun as President of Chinese Republic, 20, 40; his death, 20, 41; 39
Yui, O. K., Finance Minister of China, 267-68; 352
Zaibatsu, the big business of Japan, 139
Zero, Japanese plane, its maneuverability, 130

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



124 393

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY